North Korea Removes Reunification Goal From Constitution and Expands Kim Jong-un's Authority

A New Legal Divide Between the Two Koreas

North Korea has removed all references to reunification with South Korea from its constitution, abandoning a goal that had shaped the country's identity since its founding in 1948. The revision, adopted at a March session of the Supreme People's Assembly in Pyongyang and revealed publicly in early May, also introduces the country's first constitutional definition of its territory and gives Kim Jong-un explicit command over its nuclear forces.

The changes delete commitments to pursue "independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity" and to "struggle to achieve national reunification." The latter commitment had appeared in every version of the constitution since the country's establishment. References in the preamble to reunification achievements attributed to founder Kim Il-sung and former leader Kim Jong-il have also disappeared.

Kim Jong-un's government is therefore changing more than its language about Seoul. It is removing a founding principle that helped justify North Korea's claim to be the sole legitimate government of the entire Korean Peninsula. The revised constitution treats North Korea as a separate state bordering the Republic of Korea, South Korea's official name, rather than as part of one nation awaiting reunification.

South Korea's Unification Ministry presented the changes at a briefing in early May. The revision took more than two years to complete after Kim first ordered it, reflecting the scale of the break with a principle that had guided North Korean statecraft for generations.

The final document also contains an unexpected omission: it does not call South Korea a "primary foe," despite Kim's earlier demand for that description. That choice leaves a less openly hostile legal text alongside his continuing confrontational speeches and military activity.

What Disappeared From the Constitution?

North Korea's previous reunification language carried a political promise: the peninsula's division would eventually end, even though the two governments operated under radically different political and economic systems. For decades, both Seoul and Pyongyang maintained reunification as an ultimate objective through periods of tension, talks and intermittent conflict.

Kim's constitutional overhaul removes one of the remaining legal expressions of that shared national identity. Deleting references to the achievements of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il also marks a generational departure from the ideology associated with his predecessors. The change reaches into the constitution's account of the country's past, as well as its stated goals for the future.

Analysts across the region describe the revision as the legal expression of Kim's doctrine that the Koreas are "two hostile states." In simple terms, the constitution now presents them as distinct countries, rather than members of one divided nation temporarily separated by political circumstances.

North and South Korea remain technically at war because the conflict of 1950-53 ended with an armistice, an agreement to stop fighting, rather than a peace treaty. That unresolved status has allowed both governments to maintain large standing armies along one of the world's most heavily militarized frontiers.

Reunification has also shaped matters beyond military policy, including family reunions, diplomatic approaches and propaganda on both sides of the demilitarized zone. Removing the goal means Pyongyang no longer even formally endorses the idea of a shared Korean homeland. It appears to be declaring the division permanent and calling for relations between separate sovereign states, each claiming authority within its own territory.

A Territorial Clause With No Exact Southern Border

Article 2 introduces the first territorial clause in North Korea's constitution. It defines the country as land "bordering the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation to the north and the Republic of Korea to the south," together with adjacent territorial waters and airspace.

The article says North Korea "will never tolerate any infringement" of its territory. It does not, however, specify the precise border with South Korea or address the disputed maritime boundary in the Yellow Sea. The exact southern boundary therefore remains unstated in the constitutional text.

The Northern Limit Line is especially sensitive. Drawn by the United Nations Command at the end of the Korean War, it functions as a de facto sea border, meaning a boundary used in practice. Pyongyang has never accepted it and argues that the line should lie farther south. The waters around it have been the scene of several deadly clashes over the past quarter century.

Lee Jung-chul, a professor at Seoul National University who analyzed the revised text at the Unification Ministry briefing, suggested that leaving the border undefined may be a deliberate attempt to avoid immediately creating another source of friction.

His interpretation points to a practical advantage for Pyongyang: it can assert sovereignty without committing itself in its highest law to a precise boundary. A fixed constitutional line could complicate future negotiations or military positioning. The wording instead combines a firm warning against intrusion with room to maneuver over where the southern boundary should be.

Kim's Position and Nuclear Command Become Explicit

Kim Jong-un's formal status has also changed. As chairman of the State Affairs Commission, he is now designated North Korea's "head of state." Earlier constitutional wording described the chairman as the country's supreme leader who represents the state.

The revised order of state institutions places the commission chairman above the Supreme People's Assembly for the first time. The assembly has also lost its power to recall the president of the State Affairs Commission. Together, those changes further concentrate authority in Kim's hands and remove even the nominal legislative oversight that previously existed.

North Korea's constitution now explicitly assigns command of its nuclear forces to the State Affairs Commission chairman. That gives Kim direct constitutional authority over the country's expanding arsenal. A related defense clause calls North Korea a "responsible nuclear weapons state" and commits it to further nuclear weapons development to safeguard national survival, deter war and protect regional stability.

The revised document therefore connects the separation from South Korea with a stronger formal position for the leader and a continuing commitment to nuclear weapons. Pyongyang describes those weapons as a means of preventing war and protecting the country, while Kim has publicly promised to keep expanding the nuclear forces.

The removal of the assembly's recall power matters within that structure. The institution that previously held a formal power to remove the commission's president no longer has that authority, while the chairman's place above the assembly and command of nuclear forces are written directly into the constitution.

How the Break With Reunification Developed

Kim Jong-un began signaling the policy change in late 2023, when he described South Korea as the North's "main enemy" rather than a wayward brother state. The constitutional overhaul is the culmination of that shift, supported by speeches and actions that have steadily dismantled symbols and infrastructure associated with a common Korean future.

In January 2024, Kim called for constitutional amendments to identify South Korea as the "primary foe and invariable principal enemy" and to state that North Korean territory was entirely separate from the South. His later statements reinforced the exclusion of South Koreans from the category of compatriots.

The main developments unfolded across several dates:

• Late 2023: Kim began describing South Korea as the North's "main enemy."
• January 2024: He demanded constitutional changes defining South Korea as the "primary foe and invariable principal enemy" and separating the two countries' territories.
• February: Kim said North Korea had absolutely no business dealing with South Korea and would permanently exclude it from the category of compatriots.
• The following March: At a major party congress, he called Seoul the "most hostile state" in a policy address that set the tone for the revision.
• March 2026: The Supreme People's Assembly adopted the constitutional overhaul in Pyongyang.
• Early May 2026: The changes were revealed publicly during a South Korean Unification Ministry briefing.

North Korea also destroyed roads and railways connecting the two countries during the administration of South Korea's former conservative president Yoon Suk Yeol. It erected what appeared to be physical barriers near the heavily fortified border. Seoul's military reported in March that similar construction activity had resumed.

Kim ordered the demolition of a major reunification monument in Pyongyang as well. The monument had stood for decades as a visible reminder of the stated goal of national unity. Its destruction physically removed a symbol of the policy now erased from the constitution.

Writing the separation into the country's fundamental law makes a future reversal more difficult. A later North Korean leadership seeking to revive reunification would have to confront a constitutional doctrine that rejects the premise behind generations of earlier policy, potentially creating a serious crisis of political legitimacy.

Why the Missing Enemy Label Matters

North Korea's final constitutional text stops short of identifying South Korea as a "primary foe." Some experts had expected that phrase to become a permanent legal category, matching Kim's speeches and placing another barrier in the way of future diplomacy.

The omission leaves room for interpretation. Pyongyang has removed reunification and asserted a separate territory, but it has chosen less inflammatory wording than Kim previously demanded. That difference suggests a calculated ambiguity as the government strengthens its domestic political message while retaining some diplomatic flexibility and avoiding uncontrolled escalation.

Yang Moo-jin, a professor at the University of North Korean Studies, interpreted the deletion of reunification language as a direct message about territorial separation and mutual restraint:

By deleting references related to unification, North Korea appears to have codified the message that it will no longer seek to claim South Korean territory," he said. "In turn, Pyongyang expects the South not to infringe on the North's territory. Leave us alone.

Lee Jung-chul offered a more optimistic interpretation. He viewed the territorial clause and the absence of explicitly hostile language toward Seoul as a possible foundation for peaceful coexistence between two Korean states. In his reading, Pyongyang may be trying to present itself as a normal state that respects borders and seeks stability.

Leaving both the precise southern boundary and the enemy label out of the constitution gives North Korea flexibility while embedding the doctrine of two states. Policymakers in Seoul, Washington and Tokyo must assess that wording alongside Pyongyang's military behavior as they consider whether it points toward managed stability or a tactical pause in a continuing campaign of hostility.

Seoul Continues to Seek Dialogue

South Korea's presidential office said the government would carry out a comprehensive review of the changes before giving a full response. It also said Seoul would consistently pursue its policy of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.

President Lee Jae-myung, who took office on a platform of engagement with the North, has repeatedly called for unconditional dialogue. He has said the two countries are destined "to make the flowers of peace bloom." In April, he promised proactive efforts to restore mutual trust, hoping Pyongyang would respond in kind.

Lee's administration has resisted demands for a confrontational approach. Its argument is that isolation and pressure have historically failed to change North Korean behavior in a meaningful way. Unification Ministry officials intend to study the constitution carefully to assess whether the omission of hostile language represents a meaningful shift or a superficial adjustment intended to confuse international observers.

Pyongyang has so far met those overtures with silence and has rebuffed repeated invitations to talks. Its military activity continues to show a combative posture, leaving a gap between Seoul's effort to rebuild trust and North Korea's response.

South Korea's approach therefore remains focused on coexistence even as North Korea formally abandons reunification. Seoul is examining the revised wording for possible openings, while the relationship remains increasingly frozen in mutual suspicion.

Missile Tests Continue, With One Sporting Opening

North Korea conducted four missile tests in April, its highest monthly total in more than two years, even as the constitutional text was being finalized. Kim's promise to continue expanding nuclear forces reinforces the military direction expressed in the revised defense clause.

A North Korean women's football team is due to travel to South Korea for a rare match later in May. The visit is the only modest sign of connection described alongside the constitutional changes and rejected diplomatic approaches.

Sporting exchanges have historically done little to change the broader political direction between the two governments. The planned match provides a limited point of contact, while formal dialogue remains stalled and military activity continues.

The contrast is central to Seoul's assessment. A constitution without an explicit enemy label offers more restrained wording, but April's missile tests and the refusal of talks show that the legal change is taking place amid continued confrontation.

Russia Ties Give Pyongyang More Support

North Korea's constitutional shift comes as its international partnerships are changing its strategic position. Pyongyang has moved much closer to Moscow since Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Russia and North Korea signed a defense treaty in 2024 calling for mutual military support if either country is attacked. That same year, North Korea sent thousands of troops to Russia's western Kursk region to help repel Ukrainian offensives. The deployment marked Pyongyang's first commitment of ground forces to an overseas conflict in decades.

Seoul and Washington are concerned that Russia may provide advanced military technology or nuclear expertise in return for North Korean support. Senior Russian officials have made a series of prominent visits to North Korea, while Pyongyang has supplied artillery shells and other military materiel for Russia's war effort.

The partnership adds another source of military technology and political backing for Kim's government. It also places the constitutional concentration of nuclear authority alongside a closer relationship with a country receiving direct military assistance from Pyongyang.

Economic Recovery Could Support Military Ambitions

China remains North Korea's main economic lifeline and diplomatic patron. Closer ties with Russia give Pyongyang an additional partner rather than replacing Beijing's central role.

South Korea's Unification Ministry said in April that North Korea's economy was showing signs of recovery, apparently supported by deeper trade and diplomatic relations with both Russia and China. Even a modest stabilization could give Kim more room to pursue military modernization without immediate pressure at home.

Analysts worry that a more economically stable North Korea, supported by two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, will feel more confident about ignoring international sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

The constitutional changes strengthen that direction by formally making Kim head of state and assigning him nuclear command. Alongside the deletion of reunification, they institutionalize a system in which weapons development and military spending take precedence over reconciliation or engagement with Seoul.

The Bottom Line

• North Korea adopted constitutional changes in March 2026 removing all references to reunification, ending a commitment rooted in its founding in 1948.
• Article 2 defines territory bordering China, Russia and South Korea, including adjacent waters and airspace, without specifying the southern boundary or disputed maritime lines.
• Kim Jong-un is formally designated head of state and given explicit command of nuclear forces. The Supreme People's Assembly loses its power to recall the State Affairs Commission president.
• The constitution omits the "primary foe" label Kim previously demanded for South Korea, leaving room for different interpretations of Pyongyang's intentions.
• Seoul continues to seek unconditional dialogue and peaceful coexistence while reviewing the revised text.
• North Korea conducted four missile tests in April. A women's football team is expected to visit South Korea for a rare match later in May.
• Military ties with Russia, including a 2024 defense treaty and troop deployments to Kursk, accompany closer economic and diplomatic relations with Russia and China.