Beijing Showcases the AJX002
During a military parade on September 3, 2025, marking the 80th anniversary of the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War, China unveiled a weapon designed to reshape naval warfare in the Pacific. The AJX002, an extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV), rolled through Beijing as a centerpiece of the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s growing autonomous arsenal. Measuring approximately 18 to 20 meters in length and powered by a stealthy pump-jet propulsion system, the torpedo-shaped drone represents a significant leap in underwater combat technology.
The AJX002 is specifically engineered for offensive minelaying missions. With an estimated range of up to 1,000 nautical miles (approximately 1,800 kilometers) and the capacity to carry roughly 20 naval mines per deployment, this autonomous system can operate far from Chinese shores without risking human crews. Alongside the AJX002, observers noted a second, larger XLUUV design, the HSU100, concealed under tarpaulin during rehearsals, suggesting a diverse family of underwater drones is under development. The public display of these assets signals Beijing’s intent to project power silently beneath the waves, targeting critical maritime chokepoints with a persistence and stealth that traditional submarines cannot match.
Offensive Minelaying and the First Island Chain
For decades, the First Island Chain, a geographic arc stretching from Japan through Taiwan and down to the Philippines, served as a strategic barrier constraining Chinese naval expansion. Now, Chinese military planners intend to transform this barrier into a blockade weapon against the United States and its allies. According to analysis published in the Chinese military magazine Shipborne Weapons, the PLAN could deploy the AJX002 to conduct offensive minelaying operations, planting munitions not in Chinese territorial waters for defense, but in international sea lanes to deny access to adversaries.
The strategy focuses on key maritime corridors surrounding Japan’s Ryukyu Islands and strategic chokepoints in the Philippines. By seeding these waters with autonomous mines, China aims to sever the logistical arteries that would sustain U.S. and Japanese forces in a regional conflict. This approach appears inspired by recent activities in the Strait of Hormuz, where the threat of maritime blockades demonstrated how vulnerable global shipping remains to asymmetric tactics. Rather than attempting to seal Taiwan’s immediate vicinity, the doctrine prioritizes isolating the island by cutting off external supply routes, effectively trapping potential interveners outside the battlespace while compressing Taiwan’s operational space.
War Gaming the Blockade
The strategic implications of this minelaying capability have not gone unnoticed in Washington defense circles. A July 2025 report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) war-gamed a potential Taiwan blockade scenario, revealing devastating consequences for allied logistics. The analysis found that Chinese submarines and mines, working in concert, could destroy up to 40 percent of inbound ships attempting to reach Taiwan, even assuming maximum Taiwanese resistance.
China’s submarines and mines destroyed 40% of inbound ships to Taiwan, even with maximum Taiwanese resistance. Any blockade creates escalatory pressures that are difficult to contain.
This capability functions as a force multiplier within China’s broader anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) strategy. By layering minefields with missile overflights, live-fire exercises, and Coast Guard interdiction, Beijing could create a gray-zone environment where commercial shipping halts due to mere suspicion of mines, regardless of actual clearance. Bonny Lin and colleagues at CSIS describe this as a joint blockade campaign, involving surface action groups, Coast Guard vessels, and covert minelaying to interdict noncompliant ships under a law-enforcement framing. The mines extend the reach of this screen, turning compliance enforcement into a physically enforced barrier that risks escalating into open conflict.
Targeting the Underwater Eyes
Beyond blockading Taiwan, the AJX002 and its sister XLUUVs serve a broader mission: dismantling the American undersea surveillance advantage that currently exposes Chinese submarine movements. The U.S. military operates the Fish Hook Undersea Defense Line, a network of fixed seabed sensors stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines and beyond, designed to track Chinese submarines as they transit into the Pacific. In internal military writings, Chinese naval officers acknowledge that this integrated, three-dimensional surveillance system poses a critical threat to PLAN operations.
Retired U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, now a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, notes the strategic value of these large drones.
These are pretty damn big. You could put a lot of fuel in them. You may or may not see it enter the water in a maritime base, and you don’t really know where it’s at. Ten hours later, it could be almost anywhere.
Chinese strategists view the cables and arrays of the Fish Hook network as an Achilles Heel. XLUUVs capable of severing cables, planting explosives, or spoofing sensors could blind American anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Neutralizing this surveillance grid would not only help achieve a Taiwan blockade but also secure China’s sea-based nuclear deterrent. Currently, China’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are constrained to a bastion strategy in the South China Sea, vulnerable to American attack submarines. By punching holes in U.S. seabed surveillance, Beijing hopes to enable its nuclear forces to break out into the open Pacific, complicating American strategic calculations.
Risks and Countermeasures
While the minelaying drone strategy offers Beijing significant tactical advantages, it remains a double-edged sword. Mining international waters in peacetime or crisis constitutes an act of war under international law, risking massive escalation and global sanctions. Furthermore, China remains the world’s largest trading nation by volume, with approximately 90 percent of its commerce traveling by sea. A blockade of the First Island Chain would inevitably disrupt China’s own economic lifelines, potentially backfiring with catastrophic consequences for Beijing’s long-term stability.
The effectiveness of the strategy also exposes a critical vulnerability in American naval planning. The U.S. Navy’s plan to replace aging Avenger-class mine countermeasures vessels with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) has foundered on technical failures and delays. Government Accountability Office reports from 2022 and 2025 confirm that the LCS has not demonstrated the operational capabilities needed to perform its mine-clearing mission, citing equipment failures and immature technologies. Should the U.S. lack reliable mine countermeasure capabilities in a contested environment, the ability to sustain access to Taiwan through mined waters becomes questionable, potentially deciding the conflict not through fleet engagements but through logistical strangulation.
Key Points
- China unveiled the AJX002 extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicle (XLUUV) in September 2025, a torpedo-shaped drone capable of carrying 20 mines and traveling 1,800 kilometers autonomously.
- The drone is designed for offensive minelaying targeting the First Island Chain, specifically chokepoints near Japan’s Ryukyu Islands and the Philippines, to block U.S. and allied access to Taiwan.
- War games suggest Chinese submarines and mines could destroy 40 percent of shipping attempting to reach Taiwan, functioning as a critical component of an anti-access strategy.
- The AJX002 also serves to counter U.S. undersea surveillance networks like the Fish Hook Defense Line, potentially blinding American anti-submarine warfare capabilities.
- The strategy carries significant risks for Beijing, including potential disruption to its own maritime trade, global sanctions, and the possibility of rapid escalation into wider conflict.
- The U.S. Navy faces gaps in mine countermeasure capabilities, with the Littoral Combat Ship program failing to deliver promised operational readiness for clearing sophisticated minefields.
