EU Glass Fibre Duties Target Chinese Production in Egypt, Bahrain and Thailand

Tariffs Target a Trade Route Through Three Countries

The European Commission imposed anti-dumping duties of 11% to 25.4% in March 2025 on glass fibre products made by Chinese companies operating in Egypt, Bahrain and Thailand. The measures targeted production routes that European manufacturers said allowed Chinese businesses to avoid existing EU tariffs by manufacturing abroad through investments linked to the Belt and Road Initiative.

Imports from the three countries had captured 24% of the EU glass fibre market by 2024. Egypt alone accounted for 18%, meaning it supplied three quarters of the combined share held by those countries. That expansion came despite existing anti-subsidy duties of 13.1% on Egyptian glass fibre reinforcements, imposed in 2020.

The dispute concerns a lightweight material used to strengthen other materials. Glass fibre appears in wind turbine blades, solar panel components, electric vehicle batteries and aerospace applications. European producers directly employ more than 4,500 people across eight EU countries, while industry advocates say the wider supply chain supports hundreds of thousands of indirect jobs.

Brussels faces two connected pressures: protecting European factories from unfair competition and maintaining supplies for manufacturers that depend on glass fibre. Renewable energy businesses, vehicle makers and construction companies all use the material, so changes in its price or availability can travel through several industries.

Industry leaders welcomed the finding of unfair practices but questioned whether the tariffs were high enough. Their concern was that subsidies could help Chinese producers absorb the extra charges, allowing imports to keep gaining ground while European factories faced the possibility of closure.

How Production Shifted Beyond China

The Commission first imposed anti-dumping duties on direct glass fibre imports from China in 2010. Chinese producers subsequently established factories in other countries, allowing goods to enter Europe as Egyptian, Bahraini or Thai products rather than Chinese imports.

China's Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, provided a broader framework for that overseas expansion. Beijing invested approximately $1 trillion across more than 150 countries, supporting infrastructure, raw material extraction and the relocation of state owned enterprises abroad.

For glass fibre manufacturers, special economic zones offered places to build factories under agreements between China and host governments. European producers argued that these facilities extended Chinese industrial capacity beyond China's borders while avoiding the tariffs applied to goods shipped directly from China.

China Jushi was among the companies identified with the establishment of factories in Egypt and Bahrain. Facilities operating under agreements between local governments and Beijing often received substantial support from both Egyptian and Chinese authorities.

Egypt became a particular focus because its glass fibre production capacity reached 400,000 tonnes a year despite having virtually no domestic market for the material. European manufacturers described the facilities as export platforms, with Europe an important destination for their output.

Chinese domestic production capacity was already equal to twice European demand. Manufacturers in Europe warned that further expansion abroad could add to the pressure created by that excess capacity, leaving European plants competing against a growing volume of exports supported by public funding.

What the Subsidy Rulings Changed

The European Court of Justice confirmed in a November 2024 ruling that Chinese subsidies could legally be attributed to Egyptian production under EU trade law. The decision upheld the 13.1% anti-subsidy measures imposed in 2020 on Egyptian glass fibre reinforcements.

The judges recognized the relationship between Chinese industrial policy and companies operating in Egyptian economic zones created through Belt and Road agreements. Financial support originating in China could benefit production in Egypt, even though the finished goods crossed the EU border as Egyptian products.

That finding gave Brussels a legal basis for addressing public support that crosses national borders. A subsidy is financial help from a government. In this dispute, the central issue was whether assistance from China could be taken into account when assessing the conditions under which Egyptian factories produced their goods.

A 2023 General Court ruling concerning biodiesel exports also addressed this question. The court found that subsidies granted by Chinese authorities could be attributed to Egyptian producers even when materials originated in third countries. It annulled Commission regulations that had failed to recognize that connection, finding that the Commission had erred in concluding there was no link between Chinese subsidies and Egyptian producers.

The cross-border framework covered benefits connected with activities such as buying used cooking oil or establishing factories in Egypt using Belt and Road financing. Recognizing where the financial benefit ultimately reached helped authorities examine support that a trade investigation focused on a single country might miss.

The rulings provided legal groundwork for the glass fibre action and for examining the treatment of production outside China. Anti-subsidy investigations address government assistance, while anti-dumping investigations examine export pricing. Both became part of the wider dispute over the competitive conditions facing European manufacturers.

Two Sets of Duties Cover Different Products

The duties of 11% to 25.4% on production in Egypt, Bahrain and Thailand complemented separate measures imposed earlier in March 2025 on glass fibre yarns imported directly from China. Those yarn duties ranged from 26.3% to 56.1%.

The direct import rates included a duty of 26.3% for specific sampled producers such as Henan Guangyuan New Material Co., Ltd. Rates reached 56.1% for other Chinese origins. The lower range applied to the production covered in the three other countries reflected different calculation methods for established overseas facilities and direct exports.

Glass fibre yarns are used to make woven fabrics that reinforce cementitious materials, thermoplastic resins and elastomers. These are materials based on cement, plastics that can be reshaped with heat, and flexible materials respectively. Reinforcing them with glass fibre helps make components suitable for demanding industrial uses.

European industry advocates wanted closer alignment between the duties on direct imports and those on production abroad. They argued that a lower tariff on overseas factories left a financial incentive for Chinese businesses to supply Europe through those locations.

The Commission had also investigated aluminium foil from Thailand and glass fibre products from Türkiye. Those cases formed part of a wider effort to challenge routes used to avoid trade defenses across different sectors.

Brussels increasingly examined whether overseas production represented independent industrial development or an extension of Chinese manufacturing capacity established to evade existing measures. The glass fibre dispute brought that question together with concerns about government financing, export pricing and growing production capacity.

How the Investigation Reached Definitive Duties

The investigation process involved a complaint from European producers, provisional measures and a final decision. The yarn investigation began under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036, the EU legislation governing protection against dumped imports.

The key dates show how the legal and trade actions developed:

• 2010: The Commission imposed anti-dumping duties on direct glass fibre imports from China.
• 2013: China launched the Belt and Road Initiative.
• 2020: The EU imposed anti-subsidy duties of 13.1% on Egyptian glass fibre reinforcements.
• 2023: The General Court ruling concerning biodiesel addressed the attribution of Chinese subsidies to Egyptian producers.
• 3 January 2024: Glass Fibre Europe filed a complaint representing domestic producers.
• 16 February 2024: The Commission initiated the investigation under Article 5 of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036.
• 15 October 2024: Provisional duties were imposed.
• November 2024: The European Court of Justice upheld the treatment of Chinese subsidies benefiting Egyptian glass fibre production.
• 18 March 2025: The provisional yarn duties became definitive.
• March 2025: Duties of 11% to 25.4% were announced for glass fibre production in Egypt, Bahrain and Thailand, alongside the separate measures on direct Chinese yarn imports.

Definitive measures typically operate for five years, putting the measures on a timetable extending to 2030 unless reviewed. That period gives producers a defined interval of protection, while leaving the effectiveness of the rates central to the industry's concerns.

Investigators faced a pricing challenge in Egypt because the country had virtually no local glass fibre consumption. A conventional comparison between export prices and prices charged to domestic customers was therefore difficult.

Under World Trade Organization rules, investigators calculated a domestic value using full production costs plus a reasonable profit margin. In simple terms, they worked out a benchmark price from the cost of making the goods and an allowance for profit, rather than relying on a substantial Egyptian customer market.

Manufacturers Welcome Action but Challenge the Rates

Ludovic Piraux, president of Glass Fibre Europe, said the investigation had confirmed unfair practices. He also argued that the response did not fully address the strategies behind investments in other countries.

The investigation confirms the existence of unfair practice, which is an important signal. But the measures adopted remain insufficient to fully address the predatory strategies pursued through these investments in third countries.

Piraux's concern reflected an industry that had spent about 15 years confronting increases in Chinese imports. European manufacturers argued that subsidies and sales below production costs made it difficult to compete, even after duties were imposed.

Cedric Janssens, secretary general of Glass Fibre Europe, had previously described the Egyptian economic zones as closely tied to Chinese production policy. In that statement, he referred to measures taken against companies in China in 2014:

This investigation is crucial. They have set up these companies in an economic zone that amounts to an extension of the Chinese territory abroad, enabling them to circumvent the anti-dumping measures taken in 2014 against companies established in China.

Egypt's 18% EU market share was central to the industry's argument. Producers pointed to its growth despite the existing 13.1% anti-subsidy duty as evidence that the earlier level of protection had failed to restore competitive balance.

The new maximum of 25.4% for the three countries became the next test. Industry advocates argued that state support could offset the charge, allowing exporters to continue pricing aggressively while European businesses struggled to maintain production.

Workers Face the Risk of Factory Closures

Judith Kirton-Darling, general secretary of industriAll Europe, warned that continued pressure from Chinese dumping could lead to the loss of European factories. Her concern extended beyond individual businesses to the ability of the industry to keep operating in Europe.

In the longer term, the situation could worsen if the EU does not take a stronger stance on Chinese dumping. It is more than likely that we will face plant closures in Europe which will fundamentally undermine our industry.

More than 4,500 direct workers across eight EU countries stood at the center of those concerns. Industry advocates also pointed to hundreds of thousands of indirect positions across the value chain, including businesses that supply producers or use their materials.

Communities dependent on glass fibre manufacturing faced the possibility that industrial restructuring would translate into closed production lines and fewer jobs. The tariff debate therefore concerned both the price of imported material and the continued operation of European factories.

Threatened broad tariff increases in the United States added another concern. European manufacturers feared that Chinese goods facing greater barriers in the American market could be redirected toward Europe through trade routes that remained open.

The effectiveness of the EU measures had not been settled by the tariff announcement. Industry leaders continued to question whether the rates would deter the pricing practices they described and prevent the closures feared by unions.

Why Energy and Transport Manufacturers Are Affected

Wind turbine manufacturers need large quantities of glass fibre for blades. Solar panel producers use the material in mounting systems and protective components, while electric vehicle batteries and aerospace products are among its other applications.

Glass fibre also appears in cars, trucks, trains and aircraft, as well as building insulation, fire protection systems, acoustic insulation and filtration systems. Its use across these sectors means that a trade measure aimed at producers can also affect a much wider group of customers.

European renewable energy businesses depend on access to affordable material. Duties can protect domestic production while also increasing the cost of imports used by manufacturers already dealing with supply chain inflation.

Brussels therefore had to consider two parts of the same production chain. European glass fibre factories sought protection from unfairly priced imports, while businesses making turbines, vehicles and other products needed dependable supplies at manageable prices.

The green transition made that balance especially pressing. Europe wanted domestic producers capable of supplying renewable energy projects, yet the manufacturers building those projects also faced pressure to control costs.

The dispute connected trade defense with economic security: preserving the ability to make a material used in essential industries while maintaining supplies for the companies that turn it into finished products.

German Price Forecasts Added to Supply Concerns

Market forecasts for Germany in March 2025 anticipated substantial glass fibre price volatility as the tariff changes tightened Asian supply. Imported prices were expected to rise, while the usual increase in automotive demand during spring was expected to add to consumption.

Rising prices for industrial silica sand, a production input, were another potential source of higher costs for domestic manufacturers. Producers could therefore face changes in both the prices charged by overseas competitors and the cost of their own raw materials.

European traders were also seeking inventory ahead of possible disruptions linked to American tariffs. Those purchases could bring demand forward, creating temporary spikes as businesses bought material earlier than usual to protect their stocks.

The forecasts described several pressures acting together: tighter import supply, seasonal demand, higher input costs and precautionary buying. For customers using composite materials, those pressures created uncertainty about purchasing costs and delivery conditions.

Higher duties were intended to improve competitive conditions for European producers. The price outlook showed why manufacturers farther along the supply chain were also watching the measures closely.

A Wider Test for EU Trade Defense

Chinese investment across Eurasia, Latin America and Africa gave the dispute a reach beyond glass fibre. European authorities were increasingly examining whether production in other countries created an independent industry or provided an alternative route for Chinese capacity facing trade restrictions.

The approach used in glass fibre offered a model for examining steel, aluminium, ceramics and other sectors in which Chinese companies had established production abroad after EU duties. The earlier cases involving aluminium foil from Thailand and glass fibre products from Türkiye showed that scrutiny already covered more than one product or location.

The Commission's strategy brought trade defense closer to economic security policy. Its treatment of Chinese subsidies benefiting Egyptian production allowed it to examine financial support across borders rather than stopping at the country named as the origin of the goods.

European manufacturers argued that enforcement also depended on the size of the duties. Egypt's expanding market share under the previous tariff remained their clearest example of why a legal finding alone might leave substantial competitive pressure in place.

The period extending toward 2030 gave European industry time to consolidate. Continued Chinese capacity expansion, both at home and abroad, remained central to concerns that temporary tariffs might delay industrial displacement rather than prevent it.

Europe's immediate task was to keep domestic glass fibre production available for its renewable energy and industrial needs while limiting unfair competition. The dispute joined factory employment, public subsidies, manufacturing costs and the security of essential material supplies in a single test of EU trade policy.

The Bottom Line

• The Commission announced duties of 11% to 25.4% in March 2025 on glass fibre from Chinese companies operating in Egypt, Bahrain and Thailand.
• The three countries held 24% of the EU market by 2024, including 18% supplied by Egypt.
• A November 2024 European Court of Justice ruling upheld the attribution of Chinese subsidies to Egyptian production and existing duties of 13.1%.
• Separate definitive duties of 26.3% to 56.1% applied to glass fibre yarns imported directly from China.
• Manufacturers and unions questioned whether the measures would protect more than 4,500 direct jobs across eight EU countries.
• Glass fibre is used in renewable energy, transport, construction and aerospace, connecting the tariffs to manufacturing costs and supply security.
• The measures typically run for five years, extending toward 2030 unless reviewed.