South Korea's Young Men Leave the Workforce at the Fastest Rate in the Developed World

Young Men's Participation Falls to 82.3 Percent

South Korea's labor force participation rate for men aged 25 to 34 fell to 82.3 percent in 2025, down 7.6 percentage points from 2000. That was the steepest decline among the 38 members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), where the average fell by 2.6 points, from 93.2 percent to 90.6 percent, over the same period.

The Korean decline was nearly three times the OECD average. By 2025, young Korean men's participation rate was 8.3 percentage points below the average across the organization. The gap matters because participation measures whether someone is working or actively looking for work. A person who stops searching leaves the labor force, even if they have no job.

South Korea's broader workforce moved in the opposite direction. Participation across the population rose from 61.2 percent to 64.5 percent during the same quarter century, driven largely by more women entering employment and older workers remaining economically active. Young men's withdrawal therefore sits inside an economy where participation has been growing.

The decline has continued since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Before that crisis, participation among young Korean men was comparable to levels in other developed economies. Since then, it has moved steadily away from the OECD benchmarks that once served as reference points for the country's economic development.

As of April 16, 2026, the concern extends beyond a difficult hiring cycle. Bank of Korea analysis describes a pattern affecting successive generations, while South Korea faces rapid population aging, historically low fertility and rising costs for pensions and care. Fewer young men working today could mean a smaller base of workers supporting the country for decades.

More Young Men Are Classified as Resting

Among economically inactive young men, the largest single segment is now those classified as "resting." They account for 4.8 percent of men aged 25 to 29 and 3.7 percent of men aged 30 to 34. Both shares exceed those of young men preparing for employment examinations or pursuing further education.

The category describes people outside employment who are not actively seeking work. Their situation differs from that of unemployed jobseekers, who remain part of the labor force because they are searching. It also differs from a planned period of study or preparation for an examination that could lead to a job.

The Bank of Korea's concern is that this growing group reflects a weakening connection to working life. A pause in job hunting can become more difficult to end as time passes, particularly when the route into stable employment is already narrow.

A Bank of Korea official described the combination of falling participation and rising inactivity as a cause for concern:

"The rapid decline in participation among young men and the rising share of those not seeking work are concerning," another central bank official said.

The pattern differs from the experience described in the United States, where lower participation among younger people can precede a stronger labor supply later as they complete advanced qualifications. In South Korea, young men who withdraw show little tendency to return. The analysis warns that their connection to employment is unlikely to recover naturally simply because they grow older.

Women's Entry Changes the Employment Picture

Women aged 25 to 34 have moved sharply in the other direction. Their participation rate rose by 25.1 percentage points between 2000 and 2025, reaching 77.5 percent. That increase brought them much closer to men of the same age, narrowing a gap that had persisted for a generation.

The figures show how much the balance changed. Men's participation was 89.9 percent in 2000, while women's was 52.4 percent, a gap of 37.5 percentage points. By 2025, the gap was 4.8 points, with men at 82.3 percent and women at 77.5 percent.

University graduates show a similar shift. In 2000, the number of economically active women holding university degrees was only about half the corresponding number of men. By 2025, the ratio had approached equality.

Women's employment in clerical occupations reached 114 percent of men's employment, meaning women outnumbered men in those roles. In professional occupations, the figure reached 98 percent, placing women close to parity with men.

A Bank of Korea official linked those changes to stronger competition for desirable jobs:

"The number of young women in professional and clerical roles has reached levels comparable to men," a Bank of Korea official said, noting that competition for quality jobs has intensified dramatically.

For men born between 1991 and 1995 who held degrees from universities offering courses lasting four years, or higher qualifications, the probability of labor force participation fell by 15.7 percentage points compared with the reference generations used in the analysis. Among women with corresponding qualifications, it rose by 10.1 points over the same comparison.

Manufacturing Decline Meets the Graduate Race

Manufacturing once provided a major route into employment for young Korean men. Its decline has coincided with an expansion of services, where women have gained ground through their educational credentials and skills. Men seeking the kinds of jobs that previously absorbed large numbers of young workers now face a different employment market.

South Korea's emphasis on higher education has also come at the expense of vocational training. More university qualifications have not necessarily supplied the practical skills employers need. A graduate can have more formal education than a vacancy requires while still lacking the specific skills needed for a different occupation.

The 2022 OECD working paper highlighted the combination of declining manufacturing employment and a rapid increase in university credentials. Together, those changes have left many male graduates overqualified for available jobs but short of practical preparation for emerging technology and service occupations.

The problem is especially difficult for graduates whose qualifications were built around routes into employment that have since narrowed. Years spent collecting academic credentials may leave them poorly positioned for jobs requiring technical experience. At the same time, artificial intelligence is reducing demand for some of the general tasks that previously gave graduates their first opportunity to work.

AI Removes Some of the First Steps Into Work

Over the past four years, youth job losses have been concentrated in occupations with high exposure to artificial intelligence. Repetitive clerical and administrative work has been especially affected. These jobs historically gave young people initial experience, a regular income and a first step toward a more stable career.

AI exposure means that a job contains tasks that the technology can perform or replace. In the occupations described here, those tasks include routine work involving information rather than physical production. When employers need fewer people to carry out that work, the number of openings for inexperienced applicants can shrink.

Young men face this change alongside the growth in highly educated women entering professional and clerical employment. AI affects workers of both sexes, while men also face the contraction of employment channels that previously recruited large numbers of male graduates.

Clerical work had often been a fallback for graduates unable to secure professional positions. Its contraction leaves fewer alternatives just as the pool of qualified applicants has expanded. The combined pressure is a narrower entry point: fewer routine jobs to start in, more competition for remaining positions and a greater need for skills suited to changing occupations.

The Bank of Korea's recommendations connect this technological shift to training. Young people need preparation that responds to industrial restructuring and the tasks employers require as AI spreads, rather than relying mainly on another academic qualification.

A Generational Pattern That May Persist

The Bank of Korea describes the decline as a cohort effect, meaning a pattern associated with groups born around the same time. In this case, successive generations of young men are entering the labor market later or abandoning entry, with weaker participation continuing as they age.

The persistence since the 1997 Asian financial crisis is central to that assessment. Participation has continued to decline through a long period, rather than falling only during a short downturn and then recovering. The gap with other developed economies has widened along the way.

The "resting" category adds to concerns about lasting withdrawal. Men in that group are outside the active search for work, unlike people moving between jobs or studying toward a defined qualification. Early withdrawal is associated with lasting exclusion from regular employment tracks, which can leave men without economic independence or the means to form a family.

The main dates and periods trace how the pressures have accumulated:

• 1997: The Asian financial crisis marked the beginning of the continuing divergence in young men's participation from other developed economies.
• 2000 to 2025: Participation among men aged 25 to 34 fell by 7.6 percentage points, while participation among women of the same age rose by 25.1 points.
• 2021: South Korea's population began declining.
• 2022: An OECD working paper examined the mismatch involving manufacturing decline, university credentials and the skills needed for employment.
• 2024: The OECD Economic Survey addressed population decline, employment divisions and the need to extend working lives.
• 2025: Young men's participation reached 82.3 percent, against an OECD average of 90.6 percent.

The concern is that better economic conditions alone may leave many of these men outside work. Reconnecting them with employment requires routes into jobs that they can realistically obtain and retain.

Population Decline Makes Every Worker Matter

South Korea's fertility rate stands at 0.7, the world's lowest and well below the replacement level of 2.1. The fertility rate expresses the average number of children a woman would have under prevailing birth patterns. Replacement level is the approximate rate needed for one generation to replace itself.

The population began falling in 2021. Projections indicate that it will halve over the next six decades, with older people accounting for approximately 58 percent of the population by 2080. Young men's withdrawal therefore comes as fewer children are being born to replace workers who retire.

The old age dependency ratio is projected to rise from 28 percent today to 155 percent, the steepest increase among OECD countries. This measure compares the number of older people with the number of adults of working age. Expressed simply, those figures mean a shift from about 28 older people for every 100 adults of working age to about 155.

Spending on health, long term care and pensions is projected to more than double to 17.4 percent of gross domestic product by 2060. Gross domestic product, or GDP, measures the value of goods and services produced in the economy. A larger share devoted to those costs places greater demands on the workers and businesses financing them.

Some municipalities have already seen kindergartens converted into nursing homes and wedding halls into funeral parlors. Those changes reflect the same demographic movement behind the employment problem: fewer children and prospective parents, alongside a growing population needing care.

Stable Jobs Remain Difficult to Enter

South Korea's division between regular and nonregular employment makes the entry problem harder. Regular jobs provide greater stability, benefits and wages tied to seniority. Nonregular jobs offer less security and fewer opportunities to advance into those protected positions.

Young workers can become stuck in insecure employment with little prospect of moving into regular status. For someone deciding whether an available job offers a viable future, that gap matters alongside the immediate wage. Taking a job may still leave the route toward a stable career narrow.

Older workers with higher education are also remaining in their positions longer than previous generations. They accounted for 104 percent of employment rate increases among older cohorts between 2004 and 2025. A contribution above 100 percent means their gains exceeded the total increase because other groups offset part of it.

The continued employment of older workers helps explain the rise in participation across the population. Within an employment structure with limited movement, however, it can also restrict promotion paths and openings for younger applicants. South Korea needs longer working lives while also giving new entrants access to stable jobs.

The OECD Economic Survey 2024 identifies the division between employment categories as an issue for youth employment and for sustaining the economy as the population ages. Its recommendations include reducing the importance of seniority in setting wages and increasing the legal retirement age. Those changes aim to support longer careers while improving opportunities for new entrants.

Training and Employment Reform Are the Proposed Response

The Bank of Korea recommends shifting away from an excessive focus on academic credentials toward technical education and vocational training. The aim is to connect preparation for work with industrial change and the skills needed as artificial intelligence becomes more common.

The central bank also advocates easing rigid protections surrounding regular employment to expand hiring opportunities. Alongside that change, it calls for stronger routes allowing nonregular workers to move into stable jobs with benefits. The proposals address both the difficulty of entering employment and the difficulty of progressing once someone has entered.

The training recommendation is expressed in the following terms:

With the rapid spread of AI, strengthening skills training will be essential to support young people's entry into the labor market.

The OECD's broader recommendations include tackling the division between regular and nonregular work, reforming immigration policies to expand the supply of workers across skill levels, and addressing the high opportunity costs that discourage family formation. Opportunity costs are what someone gives up by making a choice, such as earnings or career progress when deciding to have children.

No implementation timetable is given for these proposals. Their shared aim is to widen access to employment while preparing South Korea for a smaller population and a larger elderly population. Without stronger routes back into work, young men's skills can weaken during inactivity and their connections to social institutions can grow more distant, leaving fewer workers to support rising public costs.

The Bottom Line

• Participation among South Korean men aged 25 to 34 fell to 82.3 percent in 2025, down 7.6 percentage points since 2000, the steepest decline in the OECD.
• The OECD average fell by 2.6 points to 90.6 percent, while South Korea's participation across the population rose from 61.2 percent to 64.5 percent.
• Women's participation at ages 25 to 34 rose by 25.1 points to 77.5 percent, bringing the gap with men down to 4.8 points.
• Men classified as resting account for 4.8 percent of those aged 25 to 29 and 3.7 percent of those aged 30 to 34.
• Manufacturing decline, competition for professional and clerical jobs, AI exposure and barriers to stable employment are narrowing routes into work.
• South Korea's fertility rate is 0.7, and projections put older people at about 58 percent of the population by 2080.
• Proposed responses include vocational training, changes to employment protections and seniority pay, routes into regular jobs, longer working lives and immigration reform.