Singapore’s Fertility Crisis: Can a Radical Reset Reverse the Decline?

A Record Low and an Existential Warning

Singapore’s total fertility rate has plummeted to 0.87 in 2025, marking the lowest level in the nation’s recorded history and falling well below the replacement threshold of 2.1 children per woman needed to maintain a stable population. Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong delivered a stark warning to Parliament in February 2026, describing the trend as an “existential challenge” that threatens the very fabric of the city-state’s society and economy. Preliminary figures reveal approximately 27,500 resident births occurred in 2025, representing an 11 per cent decline from the previous year and the smallest number of newborns since records began.

The mathematics of this decline paint a sobering picture for future generations. Based on current trajectories, for every 100 residents today, they will have just 44 children and merely 19 grandchildren. Without intervention, Singapore’s citizen population could begin shrinking by the early 2040s. The rapid ageing of the population compounds the urgency, with one in five citizens now aged 65 or older, up from one in eight just a decade ago. This demographic shift threatens to create an unsustainable dependency ratio where each working adult supports 2.4 seniors, straining healthcare systems and pension frameworks.

The Personal Calculus Behind the Numbers

Behind these statistics lie individual decisions shaped by economic pressures and cultural shifts. Mr Chen, a 31-year-old business consultant who welcomed his first child in December 2024, embodies the dilemma facing many young Singaporean couples. Despite finding fatherhood “deeply rewarding,” he and his wife, a nurse, have determined that one child is enough. Their weekly dinner parties with friends have ceased, replaced by the relentless demands of infant care.

His reasoning reflects broader anxieties about workplace culture in Singapore. “Employers do not benefit from giving their employees more time with their families,” he observed. “They would profit more from someone who can dedicate more time to the job, not someone rushing off to fetch their child from school.” This perception that parenthood and professional advancement are incompatible drives many to limit family size or forgo children entirely.

Ms Haslinda Hassan, a 37-year-old single nurse, represents another facet of the trend. Citing the high cost of living and a desire for personal autonomy, she has chosen to remain childless. “Maybe I’m a bit selfish; I just want time to myself,” she acknowledged. “I don’t need kids to feel complete.” Such attitudes, once socially stigmatized, now find wider acceptance among millennials and Gen Z, who prioritize career development, travel, and individual fulfillment over traditional family structures.

From Stop at Two to Have Three or More

The current crisis carries a particular historical irony. In the 1970s, Singapore’s government aggressively promoted the “Stop at Two” campaign, successfully reducing the total fertility rate from 4.66 in 1965 to below replacement levels by 1975. Public messaging, disincentives for larger families in housing allocation, and family planning programs engineered one of the world’s fastest demographic transitions.

By the mid-1980s, policymakers recognized their success had become a liability. Slogans shifted to “Have Three or More, if You Can Afford It,” initiating four decades of pronatalist policies including baby bonuses, tax rebates, childcare subsidies, and housing priorities for families. Despite these efforts, the fertility rate has continued its downward trajectory, deteriorating from 1.41 in 2001 to the current 0.87. This persistence suggests that policy interventions may struggle against deeper structural forces.

Julius Mok, a PhD candidate studying Singapore policy at the University of Melbourne, assessed the situation with striking candor.

What the government has discovered and is now panicking about, quite rightly, is these [policies] are not working.

This frustration captures the reality facing policymakers who have watched successive incentive packages fail to reverse long-term trends. The sustained decline indicates that financial incentives alone cannot overcome the legacy of anti-natal attitudes or address the fundamental restructuring of life priorities among educated populations.

A Global Phenomenon with Local Nuances

Singapore’s predicament mirrors a broader pattern affecting virtually all advanced economies. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reports that its average fertility rate has halved from 3.3 children per woman in 1960 to just 1.5 in 2022. Neighboring South Korea hit a world-record low of 0.72 in 2023, while Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and major Chinese cities face similarly dire figures.

However, South Korea’s recent experience offers a glimmer of hope. After eight consecutive years of decline, the Korean fertility rate has edged upward to 0.8 in 2025, following massive government investment exceeding 360 trillion won (approximately US$250 billion) since 2006. Seoul’s “Birth Support Project” provides welfare housing for newlyweds, expanded daycare capacity, and cash grants of 2 million won per birth. Parental leave entitlements now extend up to three years for couples, sending what National University of Singapore Professor Jean Yeung described as “a loud and clear message that they are serious about changing gender norms.”

The Korean rebound illustrates that sustained, coordinated effort across multiple sectors can slow decline, even if reversing it entirely remains elusive. For Singapore, which has already implemented many similar measures, the challenge lies in identifying which specific combinations of policy and cultural change might shift local behavior.

Workplace Culture and the Gender Divide

Academic research increasingly points to workplace dynamics as a key barrier to family formation. A recent study by Assistant Professor Senhu Wang from the National University of Singapore Department of Sociology found that flexible work arrangements could substantially increase fertility intentions among unmarried Singaporeans aged 25 to 39. The research revealed that reduced working hours, in particular, increased men’s likelihood of planning children, while all forms of flexibility boosted women’s intentions.

The findings highlight persistent gender inequalities in domestic labor distribution. Women continue bearing disproportionate childcare responsibilities and career opportunity costs, while men face workplace cultures that discourage parental leave. In South Korea, despite generous one-year parental leave available to both parents, only 3.4 per cent of eligible fathers took the benefit in 2020, compared to 12.7 per cent in Japan. Korean men spend just 49 minutes daily on unpaid labor, roughly one-third of the OECD average, while women devote three and a half hours.

Singapore’s new Tripartite Guidelines on Flexible Work Arrangement Requests, implemented recently, aim to address these barriers. Cultural norms may prove harder to shift than policy frameworks, however. The research indicates that professional occupations, with their intensive parenting expectations and overwork cultures, face particularly high fertility costs. Addressing these structural issues requires not just legislative changes but fundamental reorganization of productivity expectations and performance metrics.

Lessons from Countries That Defied the Trend

While most developed nations struggle with declining birth rates, several have achieved stability or improvement through comprehensive social engineering. France maintains a fertility rate near 1.8, among the European Union’s highest, through universal childcare support, generous parental leave, and monthly allowances for families starting with the second child. These benefits are designed not as poverty alleviation but as civic infrastructure normalizing parenthood across all income levels.

Hungary has pursued a more aggressive financial approach, offering mortgage forgiveness and lifetime income tax exemption for women with four or more children. Since implementing these policies in the 2010s, Hungary’s fertility rate rose from 1.25 to 1.6 by 2021, with the number of women having four or more children doubling within a decade. Israel presents another anomaly, maintaining a fertility rate of approximately 3.0 through state-funded IVF treatments and a cultural orientation that supports family formation across religious and secular communities.

These examples suggest that policy can influence fertility when it addresses the full spectrum of barriers: financial, logistical, and cultural. Singapore’s current approach already incorporates elements from these success stories, including subsidized childcare and assisted reproduction support. The question remains whether additional enhancements can overcome the city-state’s unique constraints, including extreme population density, high educational competition, and competitive workplace cultures.

Immigration and the Citizen Core

Recognizing that domestic fertility alone cannot sustain population levels, Singapore plans to welcome 25,000 to 30,000 new citizens annually over the next five years, alongside 40,000 permanent residents. Deputy Prime Minister Gan emphasized that even with these inflows, citizen population growth will slow to approximately 0.5 per cent annually. The government has committed to maintaining ethnic balance and ensuring infrastructure keeps pace with population changes.

This reliance on immigration creates tension between demographic necessity and national identity. Tan Poh Lin, a senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, warned that without a substantial citizen core, Singapore risks becoming “just another attractive destination for international migration” rather than a rooted nation. The challenge involves integrating newcomers while preserving the distinctive social cohesion that has characterized Singapore’s development.

Immigration serves not merely as economic augmentation but as demographic insurance against the low-fertility trap. As a strategy, it cannot fully resolve the underlying issue of declining local births. The government’s dual approach aims to maximize fertility support while managing the inevitable population composition changes that immigration brings.

The Radical Reset and Unanswered Questions

In response to the crisis, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Indranee Rajah will chair a new workgroup tasked with examining marriage and parenthood support holistically. The initiative promises a “societywide reset” focusing on three dimensions: shifting societal mindsets toward family formation, aligning workplace cultures with family needs, and engaging the entire community in supporting parents. This represents an acknowledgment that previous piecemeal financial incentives have proven insufficient.

Researchers have suggested examining several “sacred cows” that may inadvertently discourage family formation. Singapore’s car-lite policy, while environmentally sound, creates logistical difficulties for families caring for both young children and elderly parents simultaneously. Housing policies, despite priority schemes for married couples, may not adequately address space needs for larger families. The workgroup may also consider co-funding backfill arrangements for parental leave, ensuring colleagues do not resent absences, and legislating right-to-disconnect protections to reduce after-hours work pressures.

The expanded Marriage and Parenthood Survey, scheduled for 2026, will track evolving attitudes to inform these recommendations. Whether these measures can reverse decades of declining fertility remains uncertain. Associate Professor Tan Ern Ser of the Institute of Policy Studies noted that while “more time, more money” policies are necessary, they are not sufficient. He suggested emphasizing the intrinsic rewards of parenthood, the “joy of being able to give love and receive love from one’s own flesh and blood.”

Key Points

• Singapore’s total fertility rate hit a historic low of 0.87 in 2025, with only 27,500 resident births recorded
• Without intervention, the citizen population will begin shrinking by the early 2040s, with each working adult potentially supporting 2.4 seniors
• South Korea’s fertility rate recovered slightly from 0.72 to 0.8 after massive investment, offering potential lessons for Singapore
• A new government workgroup will pursue a “societywide reset” addressing workplace culture, societal attitudes, and community support
• Research indicates flexible work arrangements could substantially increase fertility intentions, particularly among professional workers
• Singapore plans to welcome 25,000 to 30,000 new citizens annually to offset low birth rates while maintaining ethnic balance
• International examples from France, Hungary, and Israel suggest comprehensive policy approaches can stabilize fertility rates