Singapore's Fertility Rate Falls to 0.87 as Government Seeks a Societywide Reset

27,500 Births and a Warning About Singapore's Future

Singapore's total fertility rate fell to 0.87 in 2025, the lowest level in its recorded history. Preliminary figures put resident births at approximately 27,500, down 11 per cent from the previous year and the smallest number of newborns since records began.

Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong warned Parliament in February 2026 that the decline was an "existential challenge" for the city-state. His warning concerns the country's ability to sustain its society and economy as fewer children are born and more citizens grow older.

The total fertility rate describes how many children a woman would have over her lifetime if the birth rates recorded at different ages in a particular year continued. Singapore's figure is far below the replacement threshold of 2.1 children per woman needed to maintain a stable population.

The government's response now extends beyond payments to parents. Minister in the Prime Minister's Office Indranee Rajah will chair a new workgroup examining marriage and parenthood support, with a proposed "societywide reset" covering attitudes, workplaces and community support.

Singapore already offers baby bonuses, tax rebates, childcare subsidies and housing priorities for families. The continuing decline has put a larger issue at the centre of the debate: whether people can fit parenthood into daily lives shaped by demanding jobs, living costs and changing personal priorities.

As of March 17, 2026, the workgroup's approach points toward a broader review of those pressures. An expanded Marriage and Parenthood Survey scheduled for 2026 will track changing attitudes and help inform recommendations.

Fewer Children, More Older Citizens

Current trajectories suggest that every 100 residents would have just 44 children and 19 grandchildren. The figures illustrate how a small generation of parents produces an even smaller generation of children when fertility remains low.

Singapore's citizen population could begin shrinking by the early 2040s without intervention. At the same time, one in five citizens is now aged 65 or older, compared with one in eight a decade ago.

Population ageing changes the balance between people working and people needing support. The outlook described in the demographic warning includes a potential situation in which each working adult supports 2.4 seniors, placing pressure on healthcare systems and pension frameworks.

A dependency ratio is a way of expressing that balance. In practical terms, fewer working adults must help support a larger older population, while the smaller number of children limits the size of the future workforce.

Singapore therefore faces two connected challenges. It needs to make raising children more manageable for people who want families, while preparing public services and the economy for an older population. Births today affect the workforce many years later, so the pressures cannot be addressed through a single year's increase in newborns.

Why Some Singaporeans Stop at One Child

Mr Chen, a business consultant aged 31, welcomed his first child in December 2024. He finds fatherhood "deeply rewarding," but he and his wife, a nurse, have decided that one child is enough.

Their weekly dinner parties with friends have stopped as infant care takes up their time. His account shows how a decision about another child can depend on the demands of ordinary days, as well as the cost of raising a family.

Mr Chen also described a workplace calculation that makes parenthood feel at odds with professional advancement:

Employers do not benefit from giving their employees more time with their families," he observed. "They would profit more from someone who can dedicate more time to the job, not someone rushing off to fetch their child from school.

Ms Haslinda Hassan, a single nurse aged 37, has chosen to remain childless, citing the high cost of living and a desire for personal autonomy. She described her priorities in personal terms:

Maybe I'm a bit selfish; I just want time to myself," she acknowledged. "I don't need kids to feel complete.

Such choices have gained wider acceptance among millennials and Gen Z. Career development, travel and individual fulfilment compete with traditional expectations about marriage and children. For some people, support that makes parenting cheaper still leaves unresolved the question of whether they want to become parents.

How Singapore Reversed Its Family Planning Message

Singapore's current effort to encourage births follows an earlier campaign aimed at reducing them. In the 1970s, the government promoted "Stop at Two," using public messaging, family planning programmes and disincentives for larger families in housing allocation.

The total fertility rate fell from 4.66 in 1965 to below replacement level by 1975. The campaign helped produce one of the world's fastest demographic transitions, moving Singapore from large families to much smaller ones.

By the middle of the 1980s, policymakers recognised that the success of limiting births had become a problem. The message changed to "Have Three or More, if You Can Afford It," followed by four decades of policies encouraging parenthood.

• 1965: Singapore's total fertility rate stood at 4.66.
• 1970s: The government promoted the Stop at Two campaign; fertility fell below replacement level by 1975.
• Middle of the 1980s: Policy shifted toward encouraging larger families.
• 2001: The total fertility rate was 1.41.
• 2025: Fertility reached 0.87, with approximately 27,500 resident births.
• February 2026: Gan warned Parliament about the demographic challenge.
• 2026: An expanded Marriage and Parenthood Survey is scheduled to track attitudes.

Julius Mok, a PhD candidate studying Singapore policy at the University of Melbourne, gave a blunt assessment of the continuing decline despite successive incentives:

What the government has discovered and is now panicking about, quite rightly, is these [policies] are not working.

The fall from 1.41 in 2001 to 0.87 in 2025 shows the difficulty facing those policies. Financial incentives alone have struggled against the legacy of attitudes discouraging births and the restructuring of life priorities among educated populations.

South Korea's Small Rebound Offers a Comparison

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development reports that average fertility across its members fell from 3.3 children per woman in 1960 to 1.5 in 2022, roughly halving over that period. Singapore's difficulties sit within a wider pattern affecting virtually all advanced economies.

South Korea reached a world record low of 0.72 in 2023. Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and major Chinese cities also face very low fertility. South Korea's rate subsequently edged up to 0.8 in 2025 after eight consecutive years of decline.

The Korean increase followed government investment exceeding 360 trillion won, approximately US$250 billion, since 2006. Seoul's Birth Support Project includes welfare housing for newlyweds, expanded daycare capacity and grants of 2 million won per birth.

Parental leave entitlements in South Korea now extend to as much as three years for couples. National University of Singapore Professor Jean Yeung described the message conveyed by that provision:

a loud and clear message that they are serious about changing gender norms.

South Korea's experience offers a modest example of fertility rising after a prolonged decline. Its response combines housing, childcare, money and time away from work, addressing several pressures on families together.

Singapore has already introduced many similar measures. The practical question for its review is which combinations of policy and cultural change might influence local decisions. South Korea's increase also leaves its fertility rate far below replacement level, showing the distance between a small rebound and a stable population sustained by births.

Flexible Work and the Unequal Burden of Care

Assistant Professor Senhu Wang of the National University of Singapore Department of Sociology studied flexible work arrangements and fertility intentions among unmarried Singaporeans aged 25 to 39. The research found that flexibility could substantially increase their intentions to have children.

Reduced working hours particularly increased men's likelihood of planning children, while all forms of flexibility increased women's intentions. The findings connect decisions about parenthood to the amount of time people expect to have available, rather than income alone.

Women continue to carry a disproportionate share of childcare and the career costs associated with it. Men also face workplace cultures that discourage taking parental leave. These pressures can leave a family with formal access to support but difficulty using it in everyday working life.

South Korea illustrates the gap between parental leave provisions and participation. Despite generous leave of one year available to both parents, only 3.4 per cent of eligible fathers took the benefit in 2020. The corresponding figure in Japan was 12.7 per cent.

Korean men spend 49 minutes a day on unpaid labour, roughly one third of the OECD average, while women spend three and a half hours. The unequal division of tasks helps explain why changing gender norms matters alongside expanding benefits.

Singapore's recently implemented Tripartite Guidelines on Flexible Work Arrangement Requests aim to address workplace barriers. Professional occupations face particularly high costs associated with fertility because demanding work cultures combine with intensive expectations about parenting.

The research points toward changes in productivity expectations and performance measures, as well as formal policies. A workplace that judges commitment by long hours can make it difficult for employees to use the flexibility intended to help them raise children.

What France, Hungary and Israel Show

France maintains a fertility rate near 1.8, among the highest in the European Union. Its support includes universal childcare, generous parental leave and monthly family allowances starting with the second child.

France treats those benefits as civic infrastructure across income levels rather than simply assistance for poorer households. The approach makes support for parenthood a regular part of public provision.

Hungary has taken a more aggressive financial approach, including mortgage forgiveness and a lifetime exemption from income tax for women with four or more children. After policies introduced in the 2010s, its fertility rate rose from 1.25 to 1.6 by 2021.

The number of Hungarian women having four or more children doubled within a decade. Those changes offer an example of family size and fertility increasing alongside substantial financial support.

Israel maintains fertility of approximately 3.0. It combines state funded IVF treatments with a cultural orientation supporting family formation across religious and secular communities. IVF, or in vitro fertilisation, is a form of assisted reproduction.

France, Hungary and Israel illustrate different combinations of financial, practical and cultural support. Singapore already includes elements of these approaches through subsidised childcare and assisted reproduction support.

Singapore's review must also account for its own constraints: extreme population density, intense educational competition and competitive workplace cultures. Benefits that help with one part of raising a child may leave other pressures intact.

Immigration and the Citizen Core

Singapore plans to welcome 25,000 to 30,000 new citizens annually over the next five years, alongside 40,000 permanent residents. Immigration is part of its response to birth numbers too low to sustain population levels.

Gan said citizen population growth would slow to approximately 0.5 per cent annually even with these inflows. The government has committed to maintaining ethnic balance and ensuring that infrastructure keeps pace with population changes.

Tan Poh Lin, a senior research fellow at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, warned about the consequences of losing a substantial citizen core. She described the risk of Singapore becoming:

just another attractive destination for international migration

Her concern centres on maintaining a rooted nation while integrating newcomers. Singapore's demographic response therefore involves national identity and social cohesion alongside the size of its workforce.

Immigration provides demographic insurance against persistently low fertility and supports the economy. The underlying decline in local births still requires a response of its own. The government's dual approach is to maximise support for parenthood while managing the population changes that immigration brings.

What the Societywide Reset Could Examine

Indranee's workgroup will examine marriage and parenthood support holistically. Its three areas of focus are shifting societal mindsets toward family formation, aligning workplace culture with family needs and involving the wider community in supporting parents.

The initiative acknowledges that successive financial incentives have been insufficient to reverse the decline. It opens the discussion to how housing, transport and workplace practices affect a family's ability to manage daily responsibilities.

Researchers have suggested examining "sacred cows" that may discourage family formation. Singapore's policy of reducing reliance on cars, while environmentally sound, can create logistical difficulties for families caring for young children and elderly parents at the same time.

Housing policies also warrant attention. Priority schemes for married couples may still leave the space needs of larger families inadequately addressed.

Other possibilities include the government sharing the cost of temporary replacements during parental leave, reducing the chance that colleagues resent taking on additional work. Legal protections allowing employees to disconnect from work outside working hours could also reduce pressure on family time.

These measures are suggestions for consideration, with the workgroup's recommendations and their effect on fertility still undecided. The expanded Marriage and Parenthood Survey in 2026 is intended to provide a clearer picture of changing attitudes.

Associate Professor Tan Ern Ser of the Institute of Policy Studies said policies offering "more time, more money" were necessary but insufficient. He suggested also drawing attention to the personal rewards of raising children:

joy of being able to give love and receive love from one's own flesh and blood.

Singapore's challenge is to connect those rewards with conditions that make parenthood manageable. The proposed reset brings the debate back to the choices described by Mr Chen and Ms Haslinda: how much time, money and personal freedom people are willing and able to devote to raising children.

Key Points

• Singapore's fertility rate reached a record low of 0.87 in 2025, with approximately 27,500 resident births, down 11 per cent.
• The citizen population could begin shrinking by the early 2040s without intervention; one in five citizens is already aged 65 or older.
• Indranee Rajah will lead a workgroup examining attitudes, workplace culture and community support for marriage and parenthood.
• Research among unmarried Singaporeans aged 25 to 39 links flexible work arrangements with stronger intentions to have children.
• South Korea's fertility rate rose from 0.72 in 2023 to 0.8 in 2025 after extensive investment in family support.
• France, Hungary and Israel offer different examples of combining financial support, services and cultural acceptance of parenthood.
• Singapore plans to welcome 25,000 to 30,000 new citizens annually over the next five years, alongside 40,000 permanent residents.
• An expanded Marriage and Parenthood Survey is scheduled for 2026 to help inform recommendations.