Japan to Deploy First Homegrown Long Range Missiles on March 31 as Counterstrike Plans Take Shape

Two Bases Prepare for a New Military Role

Japan plans to deploy its first domestically developed long range missiles on March 31, 2026, putting two new weapons systems into service as Tokyo turns its counterstrike policy into military equipment. The Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) will introduce the Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile (HVGP) at Camp Fuji in Shizuoka Prefecture and the upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missile at Camp Kengun in Kumamoto Prefecture.

The simultaneous deployments will mark a major step in Japan's military transformation, roughly three years after the government adopted counterstrike capabilities in December 2022. Those capabilities are intended to let Japan strike an adversary's missile launch sites and other military targets following an armed attack. Officials describe the weapons as defensive, while their ability to reach beyond Japanese territory has drawn criticism from China and concern among residents near the bases.

The two deployments have different immediate purposes. Camp Kengun will receive an upgraded Type-12 with a range of approximately 1,000 kilometers. Camp Fuji will receive the initial HVGP version for a specialized training detachment, where personnel will develop tactics and training methods for a weapon unlike those the ground force has previously operated.

As of March 14, the deployments remain scheduled for later this month. Missile equipment arrived at Camp Kengun in the early hours of March 9, prompting protests and complaints about the lack of advance notification. A briefing and equipment display for local governments and community representatives is scheduled there for March 17.

The national security decision and the local dispute are now unfolding together: Japan is extending its military reach while communities seek clearer explanations about the weapons being placed near them.

What Changed in Japan's Defense Policy?

Japan maintained an exclusively defense oriented posture for decades after its defeat in 1945. For seven decades, it constrained its military largely to defensive operations in its immediate vicinity and avoided capabilities for projecting force abroad. Article 9 of the constitution, which renounces war as a means of settling international disputes, and public support for pacifism after World War II shaped that restraint.

The policy that governed military planning after the Self-Defense Forces were established in 1954 limited their role largely to repelling attacks on Japanese territory. Japan avoided weapons intended to strike foreign bases or territory, including preemptive attacks against an approaching threat, and relied primarily on missile defense and deterrence through its alliance with the United States.

In December 2022, Tokyo revised its three central security documents and formally introduced counterstrike capabilities. The policy addresses attacks on Japan and threats judged imminent, while officials say the weapons would be used only following an armed attack. The National Security Strategy describes their defensive purpose as disrupting and defeating invading forces over long distances.

Counterstrike means attacking the military facilities responsible for an assault, rather than relying entirely on intercepting missiles after launch. A missile defense interceptor tries to destroy an incoming weapon; a counterstrike weapon can target the launch site or command facilities supporting further attacks. Japan's acquisition of that second option represents one of its largest defense policy changes in decades.

Why Tokyo Sees Greater Urgency

China's expanding military and North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile programs underpin Tokyo's decision. North Korean ballistic missiles can reach all of Japan, and repeated launches have sent projectiles into nearby waters or over Japanese territory. Those tests demonstrate delivery capabilities that could be used against Japanese cities with nuclear payloads.

China operates multiple aircraft carriers, has additional carriers under construction and maintains the world's largest navy by ship count. Its growing military activity around the East China Sea, Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands and the western Pacific has increased Japanese concern about nearby conflict.

Yonaguni, Japan's westernmost island, lies just 69 miles from the Taiwan Strait. That proximity places Japanese territory and forces close to a potential flashpoint. Tokyo's response is to acquire weapons that can threaten important military targets from greater distances, with the aim of making an attack more costly for an adversary.

The Ministry of Defense brought forward the upgraded Type-12 deployment by approximately one year, citing the urgent need to strengthen deterrence. Domestic missiles and planned foreign purchases are intended to work together, giving Japan several ways to respond across different distances and operating environments.

How the HVGP Works

The HVGP introduces Japan to hypersonic weapons technology. Hypersonic weapons travel at least five times the speed of sound, while a hypersonic glide vehicle can maneuver during flight. A conventional ballistic missile follows a more predictable arc; a glide vehicle separates from its booster and travels along the edge of the atmosphere, making its path harder for missile defenses to predict and intercept.

The Block I version destined for Camp Fuji uses a rocket booster powered by solid fuel and a glide vehicle capable of reaching speeds up to Mach 5. Its initial range is approximately 500 to 900 kilometers, enough to cover the contested Ryukyu Islands chain, including areas near Taiwan.

An eight wheeled tactical truck carries two missiles in containers. Road mobility allows launchers to move between positions, helping them survive during combat. The system has also undergone domestic tests covering transportation by air and sea and operation in cold weather.

Successful test firings took place in California during 2024 with support from American facilities. At Camp Fuji, the initial emphasis will be experimentation, operational tactics and training methods rather than immediate combat readiness. The distinction matters because delivery of a new weapon and preparation of crews to use it are separate stages.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries is the prime contractor for both the HVGP and the upgraded Type-12, placing the company at the center of Japan's domestic missile industry. Both systems extend the reach of an industry historically concentrated on shorter range defensive weapons under Japan's postwar restrictions.

What the Upgraded Type-12 Adds

The upgraded Type-12 is a fundamental redesign of Japan's existing coastal defense missile. Its range increases from roughly 200 kilometers to approximately 1,000 kilometers, about five times the original distance. Features that reduce radar visibility are intended to help it avoid detection, while precision guidance supports attacks on selected targets.

The original Type-12 was designed exclusively to attack ships. The improved version can also strike targets on land, including missile launch facilities and command centers. That expanded mission makes it a central part of Japan's emerging counterstrike capability.

Camp Kengun is in Kumamoto Prefecture on Kyushu, Japan's southern main island. From that deployment location, the upgraded missile can reach large portions of North Korea and significant sections of China's eastern coastline. Its greater reach allows ground forces to attack launch sites from beyond the range of many opposing weapons.

Further deployment is planned at Camp Fuji for training in fiscal year 2027. Variants launched from ships are intended for the destroyer JS Teruzuki at Yokosuka Naval Base, while variants launched from aircraft are planned for F-2 fighters at Hyakuri Air Base. Those versions would let Japan use the missile family from land, sea and air.

Island Defense and the Risk of Escalation

The HVGP is presented as a weapon for defending islands, yet its range and flight characteristics also give it a potential role against enemy bases. That combination creates a difficult strategic task: Japan wants to discourage an attack without making a crisis harder to control.

Takuya Matsuda, an assistant professor at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo, described the tension between the HVGP's stated island defense mission and its ability to strike bases:

At the same time, though the HVGP is advertised to be designed for island defense, as de facto ballistic missiles, they harbor the ability to attack enemy bases, which could be considered as escalatory. It is important to consider how the HVGP could be integrated in Japan's overall strategy in bolstering deterrence and managing crisis stability.

The government's 2022 strategy seeks to manage that tension by keeping counterstrike within a defensive framework. Weapons capable of reaching mainland China or North Korea nevertheless give Japan military options that go beyond its previous reliance on interceptors and American deterrence.

The practical challenge is deciding how those options fit into a crisis. A weapon intended to discourage an attack must also be supported by targeting information, trained personnel and decisions about when force can be used. Japan's procurement program addresses the weapons themselves, while training and intelligence projects address other parts of that task.

Where Deployments Go Next

The March 31 introductions are the opening stage of a broader deployment program extending through fiscal year 2027. The Defense Ministry plans HVGP deployments at Camp Kamifurano in Hokkaido and Camp Ebino in Miyazaki Prefecture by fiscal year 2026, expanding coverage of Japan's northern and southern approaches.

Those locations would bring parts of Russia's Far East and the Korean Peninsula within range. They also avoid Okinawa, which hosts the majority of American military forces in Japan and has particular local sensitivities about additional military deployments.

The principal dates show how policy, testing and deployment have developed:

• December 2022: Japan revised three security documents and adopted counterstrike capabilities.
• 2024: The HVGP underwent successful test firings in California.
• March 2025: Washington approved a proposed $200 million support package for the HVGP program.
• October 2025: IHI partnered with Finland's ICEYE on a radar satellite constellation.
• March 9, 2026: Missile equipment arrived at Camp Kengun in the early hours.
• March 17, 2026: Camp Kengun is scheduled to host a briefing and equipment display.
• March 31, 2026: The HVGP and upgraded Type-12 are scheduled for introduction at Camp Fuji and Camp Kengun.
• Fiscal years 2026 and 2027: Further HVGP deployments and Type-12 training deployments are planned.

Kumamoto Residents Demand Answers

Residents and civic groups protested outside Camp Kengun after the March 9 arrival. Demonstrators carried banners reading "Stop long-range missile deployment" and warned that the weapons could make the surrounding area a target during conflict.

The equipment transport took place after midnight without prior public notification. That handling increased local anger and brought criticism from both prefectural and city leaders, turning questions about military deployment into a dispute about transparency and public trust.

Kumamoto Governor Takashi Kimura expressed his frustration to reporters over the absence of notification:

The prefecture has never been notified. It is extremely disappointing that we learned this from media reports.

Kumamoto Mayor Onishi Kazufumi also said the Defense Ministry's handling had undermined public trust and increased residents' anxiety. The March 17 briefing and equipment display is intended for local governments and community representatives. As of March 14, no similar explanatory meeting is planned for the HVGP deployment at Camp Fuji.

Tokyo's national security case therefore faces a local political test. Residents living near the launchers want information about decisions that could affect their safety, while the government is pressing ahead with an accelerated deployment schedule.

Longer Ranges and American Missiles

The Defense Ministry has approved $2.07 billion for serial production of HVGP Block 1 and allocated another $5.03 billion to develop advanced versions. The planned Block 2A, expected by 2027, would extend range to approximately 2,000 kilometers. Block 2B, planned for 2030, could reach 3,000 kilometers.

Those distances would allow attacks on targets deep inside China or North Korea from Japanese territory without moving launchers farther forward. The advanced versions could cover much of the Asian continent, widening the military role of a program initially presented around island defense.

Japan also plans to deploy 400 American Tomahawk cruise missiles aboard modified Aegis destroyers, comprising 200 Block IV and 200 Block V weapons. Deployment is planned to begin in March 2026, with deliveries expected to start by the end of the month. The destroyer JS Chokai recently arrived in San Diego for integration training.

Tokyo is acquiring Joint Strike Missiles for launch from F-35 and F-15 fighters. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries also has contracts to develop a new precision missile launched from the surface against surface targets, with performance similar to the Tomahawk.

Kawasaki Heavy Industries is developing a New Surface-to-Ship Missile with a projected range of 2,500 kilometers. That project includes artificial intelligence intended to identify structural weak points on enemy vessels. Together, the domestic programs and foreign purchases are intended to create several overlapping strike options through 2030.

The Intelligence Needed to Find Targets

Japan's longer reaching weapons require intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, often shortened to ISR. These activities locate targets, follow their movements and provide the information needed to direct a weapon. Mobile launchers are particularly demanding targets because they can change position before a missile arrives.

The Self-Defense Forces operate only nine indigenous ISR satellites, too few to track mobile targets across the distances the new weapons can cover. Expanding missile range therefore increases the demand for information as well as the ability to strike.

In October 2025, Japanese corporation IHI partnered with Finnish company ICEYE to deploy a constellation of satellites using synthetic aperture radar. That technology uses radar to detect targets in all weather, helping sustain observation when clouds limit other forms of imaging.

The planned network initially includes four satellites, with options for up to 20 additional spacecraft. Full operational capability is expected by fiscal year 2029. Until Japan's own capabilities mature, it will likely depend on American targeting information, creating a reliance that could complicate decisions during a crisis.

China Objects as Washington Provides Support

China's military newspaper PLA Daily has accused Japan of breaching its pacifist constitution and weakening regional security. Its commentary argued that greater ability to strike distant targets breaks constitutional restrictions against the Self-Defense Forces possessing offensive weapons.

The Chinese military also argued that choosing Kyushu and Hokkaido rather than Okinawa appeared intended to reduce international criticism while still achieving strategic coverage of the first island chain. Japan describes the same buildup as a response to growing regional threats and a means of preventing attacks.

Washington has backed the program with practical assistance. A Foreign Military Sale approved in March 2025 covered $200 million in test preparation, transportation support and related equipment for the HVGP. American permission to conduct test firings in California also demonstrates closer cooperation in defense technology.

That support fits the American strategy of strengthening allied military capabilities to deter Chinese expansion. It accompanies Washington's commitment to use the full range of American military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, in Japan's defense.

The Philippines, which faces its own territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea, is monitoring Japan's buildup as a potential balancing factor against Beijing's military growth. South Korea cooperates with Japan and the United States through their trilateral security relationship, while historical sensitivities about Japanese military power require careful diplomacy.

Russia has expressed concern about missile ranges that could cover military facilities in Vladivostok and Sakhalin. The territorial history surrounding the Southern Kuril Islands, taken by Soviet forces at the end of World War II, adds another sensitivity to relations with Japan.

Japan's immediate task is to introduce the weapons, train their crews and address local concerns. Its longer task is to combine greater striking power with reliable intelligence and crisis management, while maintaining its stated defensive purpose and avoiding the conflict the buildup is intended to deter.

Key Points

• Japan plans to introduce the HVGP at Camp Fuji and the upgraded Type-12 at Camp Kengun on March 31, 2026.
• The initial HVGP has a range of approximately 500 to 900 kilometers; the upgraded Type-12 reaches approximately 1,000 kilometers.
• Camp Fuji will initially focus on HVGP training, experimentation and development of tactics.
• The deployments put equipment behind the counterstrike policy adopted in December 2022.
• Kumamoto residents have protested, and local leaders criticized the lack of advance notification before equipment arrived on March 9.
• A Camp Kengun briefing is scheduled for March 17; no similar Camp Fuji meeting is currently planned.
• Future HVGP versions are planned to reach approximately 2,000 kilometers by 2027 and potentially 3,000 kilometers by 2030.
• Japan also plans 400 Tomahawk missiles and an expanded radar satellite network, with the latter expected to reach full operational capability in fiscal year 2029.
• China has condemned the buildup, while the United States has supported testing and approved a $200 million HVGP support package.