Taipei Warns China's Ethnic Unity Law Could Target Taiwanese Independence Supporters

A New Chinese Law Raises Alarm in Taiwan

China's National People's Congress approved the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress on March 12, 2026, by 2,756 votes in favor, three against and three abstentions. In Taipei, officials warned that the legislation's 62 articles could give Beijing another legal instrument to pursue Taiwanese independence supporters, including people outside mainland China.

The law's stated purpose is to build a shared national consciousness among China's 55 officially recognized ethnic minority groups. Its provisions also reach into education, parenting, religion and marriage, while Article 61 provides for legal liability for organizations and individuals outside the People's Republic of China.

Shen Yu-chung, deputy minister at Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, said language about protecting national sovereignty creates uncertainty over what conduct Beijing could punish. He warned that the legislation could "spill over into becoming a legal basis for handling cross-Strait issues," extending a law about ethnic relations into Beijing's dealings with Taiwan.

Shen described a gap between the law's broad demands and its punitive provisions.

"How exactly one is supposed to promote unification or promote unity is left vague and hollow, but the punishments are concrete," Shen explained.

Taipei's concern is that the law could criminalize support for Taiwan's distinct identity and democratic governance. Previous Chinese legislation primarily targeted explicit advocacy for Taiwanese independence. Officials now fear that failing to actively promote unification could also bring legal consequences, widening the range of speech and behavior that Beijing treats as a threat.

A senior Taiwanese official, speaking on condition of anonymity, described that possible shift.

In the past, you'd be punished for supporting Taiwan independence. Now, you also have to actively support unification, or you'll get into trouble as well.

How Article 61 Extends Beyond China's Borders

Article 61 is central to Taiwan's warning. It states that "organizations and individuals outside the territory of the People's Republic of China" who "undermine ethnic unity and progress or incite ethnic separatism" will be pursued for "legal liability." Its language gives the legislation a reach beyond the territory where Chinese authorities ordinarily enforce domestic law.

Taiwanese officials describe this as "long-arm jurisdiction." In simple terms, Beijing is asserting authority to hold people responsible under Chinese law for conduct outside China. The concern extends to the millions of Taiwanese citizens who travel internationally or maintain business relationships with mainland China.

The clause mirrors the extraterritorial provisions of the 2020 Hong Kong National Security Law. Under that law, authorities have issued bounties for 34 overseas activists accused of subversion. The comparison helps explain why Taipei views Article 61 as a practical threat to people abroad, as well as a statement of Beijing's political position.

The new legislation provides a framework for pursuing advocacy for Tibetan, Uyghur or Taiwanese self-determination anywhere in the world. Self-determination means a people's ability to decide their own political future. Diaspora communities and foreign citizens could therefore face claims that their statements or activities violate Chinese legal standards.

Human rights organizations have documented campaigns in which Chinese security services harass students studying overseas and threaten family members who remain in China to press for ideological compliance. In July 2025, authorities arrested a Chinese student for "inciting separatism" after the student spoke out for Tibetan rights while studying abroad.

The ethnic unity law gives prosecutors explicit statutory authority to pursue cases involving foreign residents. The concern is especially acute for people whose public activities take place overseas but whose families, travel or business interests keep them connected to China.

Mandarin Becomes the Central Language of Education

The law requires Mandarin Chinese to serve as the primary language of instruction from preschool through the end of compulsory education. Minority languages, including Tibetan, Uyghur and Mongolian, are pushed into a secondary position in the education system.

Article 15 requires children to "basically master" Mandarin by age 15. Official documents must also display Mandarin more prominently than minority languages whenever both appear. The requirements reach beyond what students study, establishing a hierarchy between languages in both classrooms and public administration.

For a child whose family speaks a minority language at home, the policy places Mandarin at the center of formal learning. The issue is therefore about the language through which children learn other subjects, as well as the time available to study their own language.

The law extends nationwide restrictions already introduced in minority regions. Its education provisions make the central government's preference for Mandarin a legal requirement, reducing the space for regions to determine how their languages are used in schools.

Parents, Religious Institutions and Marriage Face New Rules

Parents and guardians must "educate and guide minors to love the Chinese Communist Party" and help them "establish the concept that all ethnic groups of the Chinese nation are one family." The law also says they "shall not teach minors concepts detrimental to ethnic unity and progress."

Those provisions bring political requirements into family life. Parents face restrictions on teaching ideas associated with a distinct cultural identity when authorities consider those ideas harmful to ethnic unity. The law makes the transmission of identity between generations subject to the state's political expectations.

Religious groups, schools and venues must conform to "the direction of the Sinicization of religion in China." Sinicization, in this setting, means bringing religious practice into line with the government's vision of Chinese culture and national identity. The policy has already resulted in the demolition of mosques in Xinjiang and the installation of surveillance equipment in Tibetan monasteries.

Marriage choices also come within the law's reach. The legislation bans interference with those choices on grounds of ethnicity or religion. Alongside its other provisions, this rule promotes intermarriage as a means of assimilation, the process through which distinct communities are drawn into a common cultural identity.

What Happens to Promises of Minority Autonomy?

China's constitution and the 1984 Law on Regional National Autonomy guaranteed ethnic minorities the right to use and develop their own languages, together with limited self-government. The ethnic unity law marks a shift toward prioritizing assimilation over those earlier promises of diversity and regional autonomy.

Scholars describe the change as a move from China's "first-generation ethnic policy" to a "second-generation" framework. The earlier approach promised room for distinct communities to maintain their languages and some control over regional affairs. The newer approach places a shared national identity above those differences.

James Leibold, a professor at Australia's La Trobe University who has studied China's ethnic policies for decades, described the legislation as ending the substance of the original autonomy promise.

a death nail in the party's original promise of meaningful autonomy.

The new framework effectively supersedes the earlier protections by making assimilation the governing priority. It also puts into law policies already carried out through administrative orders in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Measures previously imposed by officials now become part of a national legal framework.

For minority communities, the change connects several areas of daily life. Decisions about classroom language, religious practice and what parents teach their children are all brought under the same demand for ethnic unity.

Tibet and Inner Mongolia Show the Changes Already Under Way

Approximately one million Tibetan children attend state boarding schools that separate them from their families and communities. These institutions operate primarily in Mandarin and restrict the use of Tibetan even during daily activities.

Tibet's traditional examination arrangements once allowed ethnic minority students to take university entrance examinations in their native languages. That system has largely disappeared. Tibetan students now face competition in Mandarin or severely limited educational opportunities.

Inner Mongolia experienced a related change in 2020, when authorities replaced textbooks in Mongolian with Chinese versions. Mass protests followed, and authorities responded with immediate crackdowns.

Students in Inner Mongolia now study Mongolian for just one hour a day, treating their native language as a foreign language in their own homeland. The ethnic unity law extends the direction of these restrictions across China, removing educational autonomy from minority regions.

Tibet and Inner Mongolia illustrate why the legislation reaches further than a declaration about national belonging. A change in the main language of schooling affects children's daily lives, their access to higher education and their contact with the language spoken by their families.

Warnings About Control of Thought and Expression

Maya Wang, associate Asia director at Human Rights Watch, described the legislation as an attempt to control speech and ideas across borders. Her statement referred to the draft law.

The draft law on ethnic unity is a blatant effort by the Chinese government to control people's thoughts and expression about China both inside and outside the country.

Wang said the legislation enables tighter ideological controls and targets ethnic and religious minorities by erasing language rights previously guaranteed under Chinese law. Her assessment connects the rules governing life inside China with the overseas reach of Article 61.

The provisions operate at several levels: schools must prioritize Mandarin, parents must teach loyalty to the Communist Party, religious institutions must follow Sinicization, and people abroad can face accusations of undermining unity. Together, they broaden the settings in which political and cultural expression can attract official punishment.

Taiwan's warning sits within that wider concern. Officials in Taipei fear that Beijing could apply the language of ethnic unity to people who defend a separate Taiwanese identity, bringing a dispute over political status into the same legal framework used to govern ethnic minorities.

Why Taipei Sees a Wider Political Strategy

Taiwan has 24 million residents. By framing them as another ethnic group within the Chinese nation, Beijing's approach seeks to weaken the legitimacy of Taiwan's distinct political identity and democratic institutions. Taipei sees the legislation as part of a broader strategy of political pressure.

That narrative also supports disinformation campaigns, including "Yimeilun," or the U.S. skepticism narrative. The campaign questions American reliability as an ally and seeks to drive a wedge between Taipei and Washington.

Economic concerns center on whether the law could support new forms of coercion against Taiwan. Restrictions on trade across the Taiwan Strait or on regional supply chains could be presented as measures to protect ethnic unity. More systematic targeting of Taiwanese exports and investment flows could create persistent volatility for companies with substantial exposure to the Taiwan market.

Military concerns focus on the treatment of ethnic unity as a national security priority with reach beyond China's borders. That framing could leave Beijing less tolerant of ambiguity over Taiwan's status and lower the threshold for military posturing in the Taiwan Strait. The law's passage has also been interpreted as a victory for hardliners in Beijing that could reduce internal constraints on aggressive military tactics.

No specific new trade restriction or military measure was identified in connection with the law's passage. These concerns describe possible uses of the framework, while the immediate development is the creation of additional legal authority.

Taiwan's Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung recently rejected claims by Chinese diplomats that Beijing upholds the principles of the United Nations Charter. He said China's recent military provocations showed a gap between its statements and its conduct.

once again expose a hegemonic mindset that does not match its words with its actions.

Lin stated that Taiwan's sovereignty has never belonged to the People's Republic of China, regardless of how Beijing presents ethnic unity.

The Events Leading to the March 12 Vote

The legislation follows years of changes affecting minority education and China's approach to political activity abroad. The key dates show how earlier protections and later restrictions lead into the new national framework.

• 1984: The Law on Regional National Autonomy guaranteed ethnic minorities language rights and limited self-government.
• 2020: Authorities replaced textbooks in Mongolian with Chinese versions in Inner Mongolia, prompting mass protests and crackdowns. The Hong Kong National Security Law also introduced extraterritorial provisions.
• July 2025: Authorities arrested a Chinese student for "inciting separatism" after the student advocated for Tibetan rights while studying overseas.
• March 12, 2026: The National People's Congress approved the Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress, with 2,756 votes in favor, three against and three abstentions.

The vote turns policies associated with assimilation into a broader legal framework. Taiwan's response focuses on how Beijing could use that framework against Taiwanese citizens, while minority communities face direct requirements affecting language, education, religion and family life.

What to Know

• China approved the 62 article Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress on March 12, 2026.
• Taiwanese officials warn that it could target independence supporters and people who fail to actively support unification.
• Article 61 provides for legal liability for individuals and organizations outside China accused of undermining ethnic unity or inciting separatism.
• Mandarin must be the primary language of instruction from preschool through compulsory education, and children must "basically master" it by age 15.
• Parents must teach loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, while religious institutions must follow the government's Sinicization policy.
• The law extends policies already applied in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, prioritizing assimilation over earlier autonomy and language protections.
• Taipei's concerns extend to political pressure, possible economic coercion and military tensions across the Taiwan Strait.