China’s Space Program Faces Rare Double Setback as Two Rockets Fail Within Hours

A Rare Double Setback Strikes China’s Ambitious Space Program

China’s space program faced an exceptionally difficult 24-hour period in mid-January 2026, suffering two separate launch failures that together represent a significant setback for both state and commercial space ambitions. The dual failures occurred less than 12 hours apart, marking a sharp contrast to China’s record-setting success in 2025 and raising questions about the reliability of its expanding launch fleet as it pursues an aggressive 2026 schedule targeting more than 100 launches for the first time in history.

The first incident involved the veteran Long March 3B rocket, a workhorse of China’s space program for decades. The second was the highly anticipated debut of the Ceres-2, a new commercial launch vehicle developed by Beijing-based private company Galactic Energy. Both failures resulted in the complete loss of their payloads, including a classified experimental satellite and approximately six commercial satellites destined for low Earth orbit.

The dual setbacks come at a strategically sensitive moment as China accelerates its efforts to compete with Western space capabilities. The country has recently filed paperwork with the International Telecommunications Union for megaconstellations totaling more than 200,000 satellites, indicating long-term ambitions that require both reliable launch capabilities and substantial improvements in manufacturing and deployment capacity.

The Long March 3B Failure: A Rare Misstep

The Long March 3B lifted off at 11:55 Eastern time (1655 UTC) on January 16 from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in southwest China. Amateur footage indicated the launch had taken place on schedule, in line with airspace closure notices, but silence followed as the mission progressed. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) confirmed the failure approximately 12 hours after liftoff, announcing that the Shijian-32 satellite had been lost due to an anomaly in the rocket’s third stage.

The official Xinhua News Agency reported that “the specific cause is under further analysis and investigation,” offering few additional details about the malfunction. This failure represents the first complete loss of a Long March 3B mission since the Palapa-N1/Nusantara-2 satellite loss for Indonesia in April 2020, which also involved a third stage issue. The incident appears to be the first outright launch failure for the entire Long March family in approximately 300 launches, highlighting the rocket’s previously exceptional reliability record.

The hypergolic-fueled Long March 3B serves as China’s primary launcher for missions to geostationary transfer orbit, carrying communications, meteorological, remote sensing, and technology demonstration satellites. This failure may delay upcoming launches for critical programs such as the TJS experimental series and Tianlian relay satellites, which provide communications support for human spaceflight and other missions.

The Shared Technology Concern

Of particular concern to mission planners is that the newer Long March 7A rocket, which launches from the coastal Wenchang spaceport, inherits its upper stage from the Long March 3 series. This shared design means the Friday failure could impact scheduled launches of both the 3B and 7A rockets until investigators determine whether the issue lies in the common stage design or was specific to this particular vehicle.

China does possess alternative launch options, including the newer Long March 7A which launches from Wenchang, but any widespread grounding of the 3B/7A upper stage family would create scheduling challenges for China’s geostationary satellite deployment plans. The Long March 7A uses a hydrolox upper stage inherited from the 3B, meaning technical findings from this investigation could affect multiple launch vehicles.

The Mysterious Shijian-32 Satellite

CASC provided minimal information about the Shijian-32 satellite and its intended mission, maintaining the program’s characteristic secrecy. The Shijian series comprises a diverse family of satellites typically used to conduct experiments, test new technologies, and verify operational practices on orbit. While official descriptions label Shijian satellites as experimental or multirole, Western defense analysts frequently categorize the series as platforms for testing high-end signals intelligence or space-based surveillance technologies.

The loss of any classified satellite represents a significant financial and intelligence setback, as these payloads often contain sensitive technologies that can take years to develop and replace. This particular mission’s failure comes at a time when China is actively expanding its space surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities as part of its broader military modernization efforts.

Recent Shijian missions have demonstrated increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Two separate satellites, Shijian-21 and Shijian-25, separated in geosynchronous orbit late last year after spending months apparently docked together in order to conduct on-orbit refueling tests. These activities highlight China’s growing expertise in advanced space operations and autonomous rendezvous capabilities.

Ceres-2 Debut Ends in Failure

Less than 12 hours after the Long March 3B failure, Galactic Energy suffered its own setback with the long-delayed debut flight of its Ceres-2 rocket. The Ceres-2 lifted off at 11:08 p.m. Eastern time on January 16 (0408 UTC, January 17) from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center in northwest China. Galactic Energy confirmed the loss of the debut flight, stating that an anomaly had occurred and that the specific cause is under further investigation.

The company extended its “sincerest apologies to all parties involved in the mission,” acknowledging the impact on customers and stakeholders. Approximately six satellites were thought to be aboard the flight, including the ultra-flat disk satellite Lilac-3 from the Harbin Institute of Technology and Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

The Ceres-2 launcher was expected to be a significant upgrade over Galactic Energy’s earlier Ceres-1 rocket, with the capability to deliver 1,600 kilograms to a 500-kilometer-altitude low Earth orbit (LEO), substantially above the 400 kg to LEO capacity of the smaller Ceres-1. The launch followed just one day after the smaller Ceres-1 had made a successful return to flight from a converged barge off the coast of Shandong province, recovering from a November failure.

A Strategic Blow to Commercial Ambitions

Industry observers note that while the Long March 3B is a veteran workhorse of the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, the Ceres-2 failure represents a more strategic blow to China’s burgeoning private aerospace ecosystem. Galactic Energy had positioned the Ceres-2 as a larger, more capable successor to its Ceres-1 series, aiming to capture a larger share of the Asia-Pacific commercial launch demand and compete with international smallsat launch providers.

The 100-tonne, four-stage launch vehicle featured three solid-propellant core stages and a liquid-fueled upper stage, representing a significant technological leap for the company. Its loss, alongside six commercial satellites, underscores the inherent risks in the rapid scaling of private launch capacity within the region.

The financial implications of the Ceres-2 failure are substantial. Similar launch vehicles in this class typically involve development costs exceeding several hundred million yuan (approximately US$42 million), and the loss of six satellites adds further pressure to the commercial insurance and venture capital markets supporting Chinese space startups.

Galactic Energy’s Setback Amidst Expansion Plans

The Ceres-2 loss comes as a significant blow to Galactic Energy’s ambitious growth strategy. The company is simultaneously preparing for the debut flight of its first liquid propellant launcher with the Pallas-1 rocket, designed to deliver approximately 8,000 kg to LEO, positioning it to compete for larger commercial satellite deployment contracts. Additionally, the company has filed initial paperwork toward an initial public offering (IPO), indicating its intention to access public capital markets to fund further expansion.

Galactic Energy had recently touted its ability to launch from both land and sea to increase mission flexibility for regional clients. The company’s successful sea-based launch of its Ceres-1S rocket from the waters off Shandong province just one day before the Ceres-2 failure demonstrated this capability, delivering four Tianqi constellation satellites into orbit. This juxtaposition of success and failure highlights the volatile nature of the current Asia-Pacific space race, where high-frequency launch schedules are increasingly the norm.

Regional competitors, including India’s ISRO and emerging private players in Japan and Australia, are watching closely as China moves to rectify these technical hurdles to maintain its dominant position in the regional launch manifest. India also suffered a failure earlier in the week, with an anomaly resulting in the loss of the PSLV-C62 rocket and 16 satellites, demonstrating the challenges facing launch providers across the region.

From Record Success to Unexpected Setback

The dual failures stand in stark contrast to China’s exceptional performance in 2025, when the country achieved 92 orbital launch attempts with only two failures. That record year included successful debuts of new launchers and demonstrated China’s ability to manage an increasingly complex and ambitious space program. The country had now suffered two losses within 12 hours in January 2026, raising questions about whether quality control and oversight have kept pace with the rapidly expanding launch schedule.

According to comprehensive analysis of China’s 2025 space activities, the year marked a fundamental transformation in the nation’s approach to space access. More than 300 spacecraft were sent into orbit across the year, supported by a mix of government, military and commercial missions. Private companies played a larger role than ever before, with 16 commercial launches attempted, most of them successful, reflecting a maturing ecosystem that no longer sits entirely in the shadow of state contractors.

The Challenge of Scaling Operations

China’s launch cadence in 2025 was described as “nothing short of industrial,” with rockets lifting off from Wenchang, Jiuquan, Taiyuan and Xichang often with only days between missions. This kind of operational rhythm demands not just rockets, but sophisticated logistics, trained personnel and rapid turnaround on the ground. The January 2026 failures suggest that maintaining this intense pace while preserving reliability may prove challenging, even for China’s increasingly experienced space workforce.

Since 2019, China’s launch numbers have risen every single year. In 2025, that trend reached a new peak, and there is little sign it has topped out. The country is expected to launch more than 100 times this year for the first time, with CASC alone aiming to accelerate from 73 state launches in 2025 to more than 100 in 2026. Commercial launches will further swell China’s overall launch activities, including launches of new potentially reusable launchers such as Zhuque-3 from Landspace, Tianlong-3 from Space Pioneer, iSpace’s Hyperbola-3, Nebula-1 from Deep Blue Aerospace, Pallas-1 from Galactic Energy and Orienspace’s Gravity-2.

Strategic Context: The Space Race and Megaconstellations

These failures occur at a particularly sensitive moment in China’s space program, as the country aggressively expands its orbital presence to rival the US-led Starlink constellation and other global satellite networks. China recently applied to the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) for filings covering nearly 200,000 satellites across two constellations called CTC-1 and CTC-2. These constellations, backed by the Chinese government, would each contain 96,714 satellites spread over an extraordinary 3,660 orbits.

For comparison, there are approximately 14,300 active satellites in orbit today, about 9,400 of which are SpaceX Starlink satellites operating in a handful of orbits. SpaceX has filed to launch up to 42,000 satellites with the ITU. Victoria Samson at the Secure World Foundation notes that China’s massive filing might represent a “land grab” of sorts to secure orbital spectrum rights, though experts note that achieving these deployment goals seems almost impossible given current launch capabilities.

To deploy 200,000 satellites in seven years, China would need to launch more than 500 satellites a week, requiring hundreds, if not thousands, of launches a year. This dramatically exceeds even the most ambitious projections for China’s launch capacity growth. However, the filing does highlight China’s strategic intentions in the megaconstellation field, particularly for space internet companies aiming to capture markets of tens or hundreds of millions of users and control the global flow of information.

Current Competitive Landscape

China faces intense competition in both the commercial and strategic space domains. Earlier in January 2026, before the dual failures, China had successfully launched the Yaogan-50 (01) satellite into an unusual highly retrograde orbit using a Long March 6A rocket. This mission was followed by a Long March 8A launch carrying nine satellites for the Guowang low Earth orbit megaconstellation, which is expected to eventually comprise nearly 13,000 satellites.

The Guowang project represents China’s direct response to Starlink, both commercially and strategically. The satellites are estimated to have relatively high mass, suggesting payloads for applications beyond communications, such as navigation, remote sensing, and space situational awareness for more strategic uses. There are now 145 operational Guowang satellites in orbit, with its operator planning to have 400 satellites in orbit by 2027.

International Tensions and Space Security

The competition in space extends beyond commercial considerations. Earlier in January, Chinese representatives warned the United Nations Security Council that the rapid, unregulated expansion of commercial satellite constellations, specifically SpaceX’s Starlink, poses “pronounced safety and security” risks to global orbital stability. The statement cited historical incidents from 2021 in which the Tiangong space station was forced to perform “preventive collision avoidance control” to avoid Starlink satellites.

China’s warning highlighted concerns about a lack of effective international regulation as a primary driver of collision risks. The representative specifically noted that “for spacecraft operated by developing countries that lack orbit-control capability… this undoubtedly constitutes a major risk.” The diplomatic friction occurs as China accelerates its own rival megaconstellations, with state-backed projects like Qianfan (G60) and Guowang ramping up deployment.

The Bottom Line

• China experienced two separate launch failures within 12 hours in January 2026: a Long March 3B carrying the Shijian-32 satellite and the debut flight of Galactic Energy’s Ceres-2 commercial rocket
• The Long March 3B failure, caused by a third stage anomaly, represents the first complete loss of this rocket type since April 2020 and the first outright Long March family failure in approximately 300 launches
• The Shijian-32 satellite was a classified experimental payload believed to be part of China’s technology demonstration and possibly signals intelligence program
• The Ceres-2 failure resulted in the loss of approximately six commercial satellites and represents a setback for China’s private aerospace sector
• The failures follow China’s record-setting 2025 with 92 orbital launch attempts and only two failures, including successful debuts of new launchers
• China aims to conduct more than 100 launches in 2026 for the first time, despite these setbacks
• Both failures are under investigation, with potential implications for related launch vehicles due to shared technology components
• These setbacks occur as China pursues ambitious megaconstellation plans, having filed for nearly 200,000 satellites with the ITU
• The losses highlight the challenges of maintaining reliability while scaling up launch operations at an industrial pace