Kinmen and Matsu: Taiwan’s Frontline Islands Face Pressure and Integration Pitches

Islands at the edge of Taiwan sovereignty

Taiwan is closely watching whether Beijing will reference the Kinmen islands in a new five year economic plan now under discussion. The possibility comes at a sensitive moment for Kinmen and the Matsu archipelago, two Taiwan governed island groups that sit just off the coast of China’s Fujian province. They are far closer to Chinese cities like Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Fuzhou than to Taiwan’s main island, yet they remain under Taipei’s administration and have long been a barometer for the state of cross strait relations.

These islands carry layers of history and symbolism. During the Cold War, they endured years of shelling from the mainland. Today they host a significant Taiwan military presence as well as growing tourism. Ferry links to the mainland began in 2001 in an effort to normalize daily life, and local economies developed dense ties with nearby Chinese cities. Even so, tension has risen again in recent years, fueled by maritime patrols, drones, disputed air routes, and new infrastructure proposals that sidestep Taipei.

The latest debate in Beijing comes alongside a steady increase in Chinese coast guard activity near Kinmen and Matsu, Chinese adjustments to civilian aviation near their airfields, plans for a bridge from Xiamen to Kinmen that Taipei has not approved, and the looming opening of a new international airport in Xiamen a short distance from Kinmen. Together, these moves knit security frictions with economic and administrative ambitions, putting the small islands at the center of a much larger contest.

Why Kinmen and Matsu matter

When the Republic of China government retreated to Taiwan in 1949 at the end of the Chinese civil war, it retained several offshore islands. Over time, most were captured or evacuated. Kinmen and Matsu were the exceptions. Their beaches sit within sight of the Fujian coast, and at Kinmen’s closest point the gap is only a few kilometers. The islands were pounded by artillery until 1979, and martial law on Kinmen and Matsu lasted until 1992. They became symbols of Taiwan’s endurance and reminders of how narrow the physical and political distance can be across the strait.

Local residents never lost the habit of looking both ways. On a stormy day along Kinmen’s west coast, a resident named Robin Young pointed toward the skyline of Xiamen, clearly visible across the water, then down the beach lined with old tank traps and pillboxes. After explaining that Kinmen is often the first to feel shifts in cross strait winds, he summed up a common fear shared by many on the island.

Kinmen resident Robin Young said: “If the Chinese attack Taiwan, the first assault will come here.”

Today the islands are both fortified and open to visitors. They host Taiwan troops and coast guard units, yet they rely heavily on commerce and family links with the Chinese coast across the water. Many residents speak the same dialects and maintain business ties with Xiamen, Quanzhou, and Fuzhou, reflecting how closely social and economic life intertwines with the mainland even as political control remains with Taipei.

A dangerous new normal at sea

Chinese coast guard patrols near Kinmen and Matsu have grown in scale and complexity since early 2024. Ship tracking transmissions show that Chinese government vessels entered the restricted and prohibited waters around the islands much more often in 2024 than in prior years, with activity peaking in the spring. By 2024, Taiwan’s coast guard was dealing with an average of roughly a dozen reported incursions per week, and there were instances when 10 or more Chinese government ships operated near Kinmen at the same time. In the autumn, coast guard vessels also pushed into restricted waters around Matsu during larger Chinese military drills that simulated a blockade of Taiwan. The pattern points to a sustained effort to normalize Chinese law enforcement presence near the islands and strain Taiwan’s maritime patrol capacity.

This posture departs from a long running, if fragile, tacit understanding that both sides would avoid frequent probes against the closest offshore zones. The erosion of that unwritten rule increases the odds of incidents at sea, where even routine pursuits or inspections can spiral into a serious diplomatic crisis.

A deadly chase near Kinmen

Tensions spiked on February 14, 2024, when a Chinese speedboat capsized after fleeing a Taiwan coast guard inspection inside Kinmen’s prohibited waters. Two Chinese nationals died. Beijing quickly vowed to increase patrols in nearby waters. In the days that followed, Chinese coast guard ships moved more assertively around Kinmen and, in one case, boarded a Taiwanese tourist vessel for checks before it continued its trip under Taiwan coast guard escort.

Taiwan’s Ocean Affairs Council minister Kuan Bi ling urged restraint, warning that aggressive actions shake public confidence and frighten travelers. She said the boarding of the tourist boat did nothing to calm nerves or improve cross strait ties.

Ocean Affairs Council minister Kuan Bi ling said: “The incident hurt the feelings of the people and created panic, not benefiting either side of the Taiwan Strait.”

Premier Chen Chien jen reinforced that message, calling for calm and practical cooperation to keep seas around Kinmen safe for residents and fishermen as patrols increase on both sides.

Taiwan premier Chen Chien jen said: “We seek to lower tensions and keep the waters safe through a rational and cooperative approach.”

Lines on the water and how they are being tested

Taiwan law defines prohibited and restricted waters around its territory that vessels from the mainland may not enter without permission. The boundaries around Taiwan’s main island mirror international norms at 12 and 24 nautical miles. Around Kinmen and Matsu, however, Taipei set much tighter zones in the early 1990s, only about 2.2 and 3.2 nautical miles from the low water line. For decades, both sides largely respected these smaller buffers even without a formal agreement. Beijing does not recognize them and now frequently contests them.

China’s pressure often uses gray zone tactics, activity that falls below open conflict but creates continual stress. Around Matsu, large dredging fleets have repeatedly appeared near the islands, forcing Taiwan to surge patrols. Off Kinmen, incursions by coast guard cutters and fishing boats are more frequent. Drone flights and the cutting of undersea communication cables have added new layers of risk. Each of these steps chips away at Taiwan’s ability to keep the narrow island zones predictable and safe.

Legal and information campaigns run alongside these patrols. By treating the waters as subject to Chinese law enforcement, Beijing presents a narrative that challenges Taiwan’s jurisdiction. Over time, persistent presence and repeated inspections can build a sense of fait accompli. That is the essence of gray zone pressure. It creates new habits at sea and, if left uncontested, gradually shifts expectations about who is in charge.

Airspace and infrastructure create new risks

Air traffic is another point of friction. China recently opened new civilian flight routes close to Kinmen and Matsu without consulting Taipei. Taiwan aviation and security officials warn that these routes compress reaction time for air traffic controllers and for rescue or security responses around the islands. The new paths sit near busy corridors for planes that land at airports on Kinmen and Matsu, raising concerns about safety and coordination if an emergency occurs.

Those worries will grow once Xiamen’s new international airport opens just across the water from Kinmen. The facility sits only a few kilometers from Kinmen’s shore. Taipei fears miscommunication or aggressive maneuvers in crowded airspace and sees the proximity as both an aviation and a security challenge. Airport operations and coastal radar coverage will sit almost side by side, giving China more capacity to surveil or pressure Kinmen from the air while claiming it is managing civilian flights.

On the ground, Beijing has also advanced plans for a bridge from Xiamen to Kinmen. China has not consulted Taipei on the project, and Taiwan’s government has not approved any link. No construction has started on the Kinmen side. A bridge could transform travel and trade, yet it would also deepen administrative and security entanglement with the mainland. For Taiwan officials, that makes it more than an economic question.

Politics and daily life on the islands

For many islanders, daily life is shaped by proximity to Fujian as much as by politics in Taipei. Residents share language, clan ties, and business interests with people on the Chinese coast. Kinmen even receives water from the mainland through a pipeline, a reminder of the practical links that have grown since ferry routes opened more than two decades ago. Many locals favor stable trade and tourism and prefer to keep political tensions out of their livelihoods.

Some islanders carry memories of the shelling years and are wary of any return to crisis. One Kinmen native, Ne Xie Wang, described how the mood has worsened and recalled childhood rushes to bomb shelters.

Kinmen resident Ne Xie Wang said: “The relationship has really soured quickly in recent years.”

Others focus on the economic stakes. A fisherman and former tour guide, Kuan Lin Yu, said that while politics seems to drive both sides further apart, he still values the spending and interaction that come with travel and business.

Kinmen resident Kuan Lin Yu said: “I would much rather that the Chinese spend their money here than on their artillery ammunition.”

Local politics on Kinmen and Matsu often reflect these cross strait realities. Many leaders advocate stronger economic links and more travel. Younger residents tend to identify more with Taiwan’s civic life. That mix creates a continuing debate over whether integration with Fujian brings peace of mind or new vulnerabilities. Beijing’s proposal to fold nearby areas into a Fujian integration zone and its bridge plan appeal to some islanders. Taipei cautions that such steps, without security guarantees and political reciprocity, expose the islands to pressure that can be hard to reverse.

Taipei, Washington, and signals of resolve

President Lai Ching te underscored the islands’ importance in August 2024 when he marked the 66th anniversary of the second Taiwan Strait crisis on Kinmen. Speaking in Taipei beforehand, he framed the challenge directly.

Taiwan president Lai Ching te said: “Located in the first island chain, Taiwan faces the immediate threat of China. But Taiwan will not be intimidated.”

The 1958 crisis brought weeks of bombardment and sea and air battles around Kinmen and Matsu. Taiwan held the line with help from new US equipment at the time, including Sidewinder missiles for air defense. The shelling finally stopped in 1979, but the islands’ symbolic weight endures. They are reminders of past resolve and measure sticks of current deterrence.

Today, Taiwan is investing in coast guard capacity, maritime domain awareness, and rapid response on and around the islands. The United States continues to provide training and arms to upgrade Taiwan’s defense, while avoiding moves that could trigger a major confrontation. Kinmen and Matsu sit in a gray area of strategy for all sides. Their proximity to the mainland and ambiguous place in external security commitments complicate planning. That ambiguity influences Beijing’s calculus, Taipei’s resource allocation, and the pace of testing actions at sea and in the air.

Could Beijing fold Kinmen into economic plans

Beijing’s discussion of a new five year economic plan has revived questions about whether it will formally reference Kinmen. From Taipei’s perspective, any such language would seek to pull the island more directly into mainland administrative and economic frameworks, furthering a pattern set by the Fujian integration zone proposal and the unilateral bridge project. Officials fear that economic measures, introduced as pragmatic conveniences, will be paired with law enforcement presence and legal narratives that weaken Taiwan’s jurisdiction over time.

Kinmen and Matsu already trade with the mainland and host residents who commute or do business across the water. Many islanders will welcome any policy that boosts tourism and makes travel easier. The security concern from Taipei is about authority and control. Economic integration without political agreement can turn into leverage. If paired with stepped up patrols and stronger information operations, it may gradually box in Taiwan’s options on the islands, even if no shots are fired.

Risks of miscalculation

Frequent, close quarters encounters at sea and in the air raise the chance of accidents or rapid escalation. Taiwan’s prohibited and restricted waters around Kinmen and Matsu are narrow. High speed chases, contested inspections, drone flights over sensitive points, and crowded flight corridors near the islands all compress time for decision making. As the tacit rules of the past fray, a routine pursuit can become an international incident.

Analysts warn that a short of war coercion campaign that blends coast guard pressure, economic inducements, tight control of air and sea space, and information operations could undermine Taiwan’s effective control without direct military invasion. Some see limited moves, like a quarantine of Kinmen’s ports or the normalization of aggressive inspections, as potential steps in that direction. Others argue that seizing the islands outright would be a costly gamble that undercuts Beijing’s narrative of peaceful unification and could backfire politically.

A Taipei based scholar, Chen Fang Yu of Soochow University, described the islands’ symbolic pull and the temptation they might present to leaders in Beijing looking for a visible gain without a full scale war.

Political scientist Chen Fang Yu said: “Seizing the largely demilitarized outlying islands could deliver a symbolic win without an all out assault, akin to what Russia did with Crimea in 2014.”

What to watch

Several developments will signal whether pressure is pausing or intensifying around Kinmen and Matsu. The mix spans maritime patrols, law and policy moves, and local politics on the islands themselves.

• Frequency and depth of Chinese coast guard entries into restricted and prohibited waters, especially synchronized operations with fishing fleets.
• Any further boarding of civilian ships or detentions of fishermen, as well as drone activity near sensitive sites.
• Implementation steps for new civil aviation routes and the opening of Xiamen’s new airport, including coordination measures with Taiwan.
• Visible progress on the Xiamen to Kinmen bridge from the mainland side and any response from local governments on Kinmen.
• Signals from Beijing’s new five year plan regarding Fujian and cross strait economic integration, and whether Kinmen is mentioned explicitly or implicitly.
• The scale of Taiwan’s coast guard and military exercises around the islands and any new rules of engagement for inspection and pursuit.
• Local sentiment on Kinmen and Matsu, including support or resistance to deeper integration projects and travel policies.

Key Points

• Beijing is weighing a new five year plan and may reference Kinmen, aligning with broader economic integration efforts centered on Fujian.
• Chinese coast guard incursions into waters around Kinmen and Matsu rose markedly in 2024, creating a tense, routine presence near the islands.
• The February 2024 capsizing that killed two Chinese nationals during a Taiwan coast guard chase sparked tougher Chinese patrols and a tourist boat boarding.
• Taipei says new Chinese air routes near Kinmen and Matsu compress response time and add risk to local civilian flights.
• Xiamen’s new international airport and an unapproved bridge plan to Kinmen heighten Taiwan’s security and sovereignty concerns.
• Residents maintain strong economic and cultural ties with nearby Chinese cities, even as memories of past shelling feed anxiety about renewed crisis.
• President Lai visited Kinmen in 2024, declaring that Taiwan will not be intimidated, while Taipei builds up coast guard and defense readiness.
• The narrow legal zones around the islands, combined with frequent gray zone tactics, raise the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.