Korean Youth See Children as Joyful but Fear Financial Burden

A Tale of Two Perceptions

Young South Koreans present a paradoxical view on parenthood that reveals the deepening demographic crisis facing the nation. According to a comprehensive international survey by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs, Korean adults aged 20 to 49 express stronger belief than their peers in Germany, Japan, France, and Sweden that children bring great joy and life satisfaction. Yet they simultaneously report the most intense concerns about the economic burden of raising a family.

This contrast paints a picture of a generation caught between cultural values that celebrate family life and economic realities that make it increasingly difficult to afford one. The study surveyed 2,500 adults in each of the five countries, providing robust comparative data that highlights Korea’s unique position in the global fertility landscape.

When asked whether having children would increase joy and life satisfaction, Korean respondents agreed most strongly at 74.3%, surpassing France at 67.9%, Sweden at 64.9%, Germany at 62.7%, and Japan at 57.5%. This finding suggests that contrary to some narratives, Korean youth are not rejecting parenthood out of changing values or lifestyle preferences. Rather, they face structural barriers that prevent them from acting on their family aspirations.

The economic concerns among Korean respondents were similarly striking. Fully 92.7% agreed that parenthood increases economic burdens, far exceeding the levels found in Germany at 77.6%, France at 75.5%, Japan at 73.2%, and Sweden at 65.2%. This statistic represents one of the clearest demonstrations of how financial anxiety shapes reproductive decisions in modern Korea.

The Marriage-to-Childbirth Gap

One of the most revealing patterns in the survey data emerges when comparing marriage intentions with childbirth intentions. Among unmarried respondents, Korea recorded the highest intention to marry at 52.9%, followed by Sweden at 50.2%, Germany at 46.5%, France at 38.2%, and Japan at 32%. This indicates that Korean youth are not abandoning the institution of marriage itself.

However, when all respondents were asked about their intention to have children, the ranking shifted dramatically. Sweden topped the list at 43.2%, followed by France at 38.8%, Germany at 38.6%, Korea at 31.2%, and Japan at 20.3%. The significant drop between marriage and childbirth intentions specifically in Korea suggests that many who plan to marry hesitate to have children due to perceived costs and challenges.

Even among those who expressed an intention to have children, Korea recorded the lowest average planned number of offspring at 1.74. Germany and Sweden tied for the highest at 2.35, followed by France at 2.11 and Japan at 1.96. This number falls well below the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman needed to maintain population stability without immigration.

Researchers from the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs directly connected these findings to Korea’s demographic challenges. The research team noted in their report that “the findings suggest a link between economic burdens and Korea’s low total fertility rate,” adding that there could be room for improvement if negative perceptions of childbirth are eased and tangible institutional support is strengthened.

This marriage-childbirth gap reflects a specific pattern in Korean society where couples marry but delay or forgo having children due to financial constraints. The data shows that cultural preferences for family formation remain strong, but economic pressures reshape how those preferences translate into actual family size.

The Demographic Emergency

South Korea faces what may be the world’s most severe demographic challenge. The nation has held the lowest fertility rate globally for several years, with the total fertility rate plunging to 0.72 in 2023. This figure represents a catastrophic decline from the replacement level of 2.1, which Korea last achieved in the early 1980s.

The implications of this trend extend far beyond simple population statistics. A recent projection by the Korean Peninsula Population Institute for Future warns that South Korea’s population could plummet to just 15% of its current level by 2125 if current trends continue. Under the worst-case scenario, the population would shrink from 51.68 million today to 7.53 million in a century, falling below the current population of Seoul alone.

Even the most optimistic projections show substantial decline, with population expected to shrink to at least 15.73 million. The median projection puts the 2125 population at 11.15 million, representing a collapse of nearly 80% from current levels. The pace of decline accelerates over time, with a 30% reduction projected by 2075 followed by more than 50% reduction in the subsequent 50 years.

This demographic collapse transforms Korea’s population structure from a once-broad pyramid to an inverted shape where elderly dependents vastly outnumber working-age citizens. By 2100, the worst forecasts suggest there will be 140 seniors for every 100 working-age people, compared to the current ratio of 30 seniors per 100 working-age individuals.

The economic consequences are profound. The International Monetary Fund estimates that every 1% decline in Korea’s population reduces real consumption by 1.6%, creating a downward spiral of economic activity and tax revenues just as spending needs for elderly care explode upward.

Housing Costs and Employment Stability

Research into the economic determinants of fertility in Korea has identified specific factors driving the financial burden perception. A study by Nam and Hwang published in 2023 used survey experiments to analyze how various economic factors influence marriage and childbirth decisions among Korean adults.

Their findings revealed that housing costs significantly reduce both marriage and childbirth intentions, while education and medical expenses showed less direct impact. This aligns with broader concerns in Korean society about skyrocketing property prices in major cities, particularly Seoul, where home ownership has become increasingly difficult for young adults without substantial family wealth.

Employment stability also emerged as a crucial factor. The study found that regular employees, public sector workers, and government officials showed higher intentions to marry, indicating that job security lowers the threshold for forming families. In Korea’s competitive labor market, where temporary and irregular employment has become increasingly common, this factor excludes many young people from feeling ready for family life.

Perhaps most revealing, the study found that employed women had significantly lower desired numbers of children, highlighting the particular challenges Korean women face balancing career and family. This reflects the structural inequality in Korean workplaces where women often face career penalties for motherhood.

The burden of housing costs significantly reduces one’s intention to marry and have children, while the effects of education and medical expenses were not confirmed. For employed individuals, regular employees, public sector workers, and government officials, there was a higher intention to marry, indicating that employment stability reduces the threshold for marriage.

These findings suggest that Korea’s fertility crisis is not merely about cultural changes but about specific economic structures that make family formation financially precarious. The high cost of housing, combined with labor market insecurity, creates a formidable barrier to parenthood.

The Limitations of Financial Incentives

South Korean governments have implemented numerous policies attempting to address the fertility crisis, primarily through direct financial incentives. Programs such as the baby bonus provide monetary transfers to parents upon the birth of a child. However, research suggests these approaches have fundamental limitations.

A study published in the Demography journal analyzing Korea’s baby bonus program found that over 74% of the program’s expenditures go to infra-marginal births, meaning children who would have been born even without the financial incentive. The researchers estimated that the program’s benefit level would need to be approximately 15 times larger to meaningfully impact Korea’s demographic trajectory.

This inefficiency stems from the nature of such incentives. Most people who have children would have done so regardless of the relatively small government payments, meaning the money primarily serves as a transfer to existing parents rather than an incentive for new parents. Those on the margin who might be influenced by financial incentives represent a small fraction of the population.

We show that using the same assumptions and the same binary-choice models used in this literature, and we can estimate the entire unconditional distribution of the reservation price of fertility, which is the minimal compensation an agent must receive to induce her to have a child. Our estimates show that the program’s benefit level and budget would have to be orders of magnitude (about 15 times) larger for the program to bring South Korea back to desired levels of fertility.

A new study from Brunel University London further examined how taxation policies may have inadvertently contributed to the fertility decline. The research highlighted that while tax policies aim to encourage childbirth, their design and implementation often fail to address the complex socio-economic factors influencing family decisions.

The conclusion from this body of research is clear: standard financial incentives cannot overcome the structural barriers to family formation in contemporary Korea. Addressing the fertility crisis requires deeper changes to how Korean society organizes work, housing, and family life.

Global Context and UN Perspective

Korea’s struggle with fertility reflects a broader global trend, though it represents an extreme case. The United Nations Population Fund’s 2025 State of the World Population report found that financial constraints, not infertility or rejection of parenthood, drive declining birth rates worldwide.

The report, which surveyed 14 countries representing one-third of the world’s population, found that roughly 40% of respondents cited economic barriers as the main reason for having fewer children than they would like. In South Korea specifically, three in five respondents reported financial limitations as an obstacle to having children, compared to just 19% in Sweden.

The UN report challenges narratives that blame falling fertility rates on changing values or rejection of family life. Instead, it frames the issue as a crisis of reproductive agency, where people lack the ability to create the families they want due to economic constraints, lack of quality healthcare, and gender inequality.

The survey findings indicated that the world is not facing a crisis of falling birth rates but a crisis of reproductive agency. Roughly 40 percent of respondents cited economic barriers such as the costs of raising children, job insecurity and expensive housing as the main reason for having fewer children than they would like.

Natalia Kanem, executive director at UNFPA, emphasized that “fertility rates are falling in large part because many feel unable to create the families they want.” This perspective reframes policy responses away from coercive measures toward expanding genuine choices for prospective parents.

The comparison with Sweden proves particularly instructive. While Sweden has one of the world’s most generous parental leave systems, with both men and women entitled to 480 days of paid leave per child, its fertility rate remains below replacement level. This demonstrates that even extensive welfare systems cannot fully overcome economic and social barriers to parenthood in developed economies.

Gender Equality and Work-Life Balance

The International Monetary Fund has identified gender inequality as a central factor in the fertility challenges facing both Korea and Japan. Women in these countries face particularly difficult trade-offs between career and family, which significantly affects fertility decisions.

IMF research shows that women in Japan and Korea perform approximately five times more unpaid housework and caregiving than men, more than double the OECD average for gender gaps in unpaid work. This unequal distribution of domestic labor makes motherhood particularly costly in terms of career advancement and personal time.

Furthermore, labor market structures in Korea disproportionately disadvantage working mothers. The phenomenon of labor market duality means many women hold temporary positions with low wages and limited advancement opportunities. Women who leave the workforce during child-rearing years often can only return to inferior non-regular positions, creating a powerful disincentive for having children.

Women in Japan and Korea face especially tough challenges juggling career and family. Many young women witness their peers encountering promotion delays after marriage and childbirth, dealing with problems splitting housework responsibilities, and having difficulty finding adequate childcare. The financial burden associated with raising children is an additional factor affecting couples’ decisions on whether to expand their families.

The IMF suggests that reducing these gender gaps could actually boost both fertility and economic growth. Policies that reduce Korea’s gap between men and women in hours worked to the OECD average by 2035 could boost per capita GDP by 18% while also supporting higher fertility rates by making family formation more compatible with women’s career aspirations.

Cultural change in workplaces represents another crucial piece of the puzzle. Long working hours, inflexible schedules, and limited telework options in Korea make balancing career and childcare exceptionally difficult. Expanding flexible working arrangements could enable both men and women to participate more fully in family life while maintaining their professional contributions.

Fiscal Implications and Policy Options

The demographic collapse creates serious fiscal challenges for the Korean government. The IMF projects that spending on pensions, health care, and long-term care will rise by 30 to 35% of GDP by 2050 due to population aging. Without offsetting measures, government debt could reach 90 to 130% of GDP by 2050, up from below 50% currently.

These projections underscore the urgency of addressing the fertility crisis not just as a social issue but as an economic imperative. However, standard solutions like increasing immigration face political and practical limitations, while financial incentives for childbirth have proven inefficient.

The IMF recommends a multi-pronged approach that includes structural reforms to maintain potential growth through artificial intelligence adoption, greater labor force participation, and more efficient resource allocation. These measures would create more fiscal space to support an aging population even if fertility rates remain low.

Fiscal reforms themselves could help create room in the budget for necessary aging-related spending. Raising additional revenue through tax reform, reducing inefficient spending, and improving government efficiency could all contribute to fiscal sustainability while freeing resources for family support policies.

Perhaps most importantly, the IMF emphasizes the need for a clear and credible long-term fiscal framework that accounts for aging-related spending pressures. Such a framework would make fiscal policy more predictable and transparent while allowing appropriate responses to demographic challenges.

The Korean Peninsula Population Institute for Future proposes additional specific policy directions, including expanding support to reduce the burden of childbirth and child-rearing, establishing a practical work-life balance culture, raising the retirement age, promoting continuous employment, and reforming immigration policy. Above all, they stress the need to restructure the economy around productivity rather than demographic growth.

What Traditional Values Reveal

The survey findings on traditional values provide an interesting counterpoint to purely economic explanations for low fertility. The study by Nam and Hwang found that acceptance of patriarchal values, such as the necessity of having a son, was associated with higher marriage intentions, higher childbirth intentions, and greater desired numbers of children.

At the same time, feeling obligated to provide financial support for children was associated with lower marriage and childbirth intentions. This suggests that expectations about parental financial responsibility, rather than actual costs alone, influence fertility decisions.

The influence of values proved stronger for women than for men in the study, indicating that women’s attitudes toward traditional gender roles and family obligations particularly shape fertility outcomes. This aligns with evidence that Korean women’s increasing education and career aspirations clash with traditional expectations about motherhood.

These findings suggest that cultural change accompanies economic change in shaping fertility decisions. As Korean society becomes more egalitarian in some respects while maintaining traditional expectations about parenthood in others, tensions emerge that make family formation more difficult.

Successful policy responses must address both the economic structures and cultural expectations that create these tensions. Simply providing financial incentives without addressing deeper social patterns is unlikely to meaningfully change fertility trajectories.

The Bottom Line

The survey by the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs reveals a fundamental truth about Korea’s fertility crisis: young Koreans want children but cannot afford them according to current economic and social structures. The disconnect between high aspirations for family life and practical constraints on achieving those aspirations represents a failure of policy and social organization rather than a rejection of family values.

• Korean respondents had the highest belief that children bring joy (74.3%) among five surveyed countries but also the highest concern about economic burden (92.7%)
• Korea ranked highest in marriage intention among unmarried respondents (52.9%) but fourth in intention to have children (31.2%), with the lowest average planned family size at 1.74 children
• South Korea’s fertility rate of 0.72 is the world’s lowest, with projections suggesting population could decline by 85% over the next century
• Housing costs and employment stability are key economic factors affecting fertility decisions, with financial incentives like the baby bonus proving largely ineffective
• Gender inequality in domestic work and career penalties for mothers represent significant barriers to family formation
• The UN reports that financial constraints, not changing values, drive global fertility decline, framing it as a crisis of reproductive agency
• IMF research suggests reducing gender gaps could boost both fertility and economic growth while fiscal reforms address aging population costs