US Panel Pushes Taiwan Funding for Philippine EDCA Upgrades

Why a US panel wants Taiwan to help fund Philippine bases

A United States congressional commission has urged lawmakers to let Taiwan pay for upgrades at Philippine military sites used by US forces. The aim is straightforward: make these locations more capable as staging grounds in a crisis, especially if China launches an attack on Taiwan. The recommendation focuses on bases covered by the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, or EDCA, which allows the US military rotational access to Philippine facilities for training, prepositioning equipment, and building certain infrastructure. The commission’s 2025 report says Taiwan’s support would be routed through the US government’s Foreign Military Sales system, so the island’s funds would be treated as payment for nonweapon services administered by the United States rather than as direct aid to the Philippines.

The proposal prioritizes EDCA sites in Luzon and Palawan, where geography matters most. Northern Luzon faces Taiwan across the Luzon Strait. Palawan faces the South China Sea, where Chinese vessels regularly challenge Philippine ships. The commission also suggested similar arrangements on Japan’s southwestern islands and in Pacific Island countries that recognize Taiwan. The logic is that investments in third countries can still advance Taiwan’s security if they strengthen the ability of the United States and partners to respond quickly during a crisis.

What EDCA sites are and why their locations matter

EDCA was signed in 2014 and initially covered five sites. In 2023, Manila added four more, bringing the total to nine. The agreement does not permit permanent foreign bases, but it gives US forces access to agreed sites for joint activities and to build facilities that remain Philippine property. The sites most relevant to a Taiwan contingency are in northern Luzon: Basa Air Base in Pampanga, Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija, Naval Base Camilo Osias and Lal-lo Airport in Cagayan, and Camp Melchor Dela Cruz in Isabela. In Palawan, Balabac Island and Antonio Bautista Air Base look toward contested waters in the South China Sea. The other EDCA locations are Mactan-Benito Ebuen Air Base in Cebu and Lumbia Air Base in Cagayan de Oro.

Location is the core of the strategy. The Luzon Strait links the South China Sea to the Philippine Sea, cutting across the First Island Chain that hems in China’s navy and air force. Northern Luzon sits astride this choke point. It offers runways and ports that can support surveillance aircraft, refueling, and logistics hubs that shorten response times to events around Taiwan. Palawan’s Balabac Island, near the southern entrance to the South China Sea, can help host maritime patrol aircraft and support coast guard and navy missions. In recent years, US and Philippine projects at EDCA sites have included runway repairs, fuel storage, and warehouses for humanitarian response supplies, all of which are also useful in a conflict.

How the funding would work under Foreign Military Sales

The commission’s plan relies on the Foreign Military Sales program, a long-standing channel through which partner governments pay the US to arrange equipment sales or services, with contracts managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. In this case, Taiwan would open an FMS case for nonweapon support services. A US contractor would execute the work, the Philippines would receive the infrastructure, and Taiwan would be the payer, since it benefits from faster and stronger US regional capabilities. The model is designed to avoid the optics of Taipei directly funding Philippine bases while still achieving the strategic effect.

Commission Vice Chair Randall Schriver has argued that using FMS could both raise Taiwan’s defense investment and strengthen the US ability to assist Taiwan in a crisis. He has also said the arrangement offers political cover for Taipei, which is sensitive about being seen to finance facilities on foreign soil, and for Manila, which emphasizes that EDCA sites remain Philippine-owned and are not intended to host a permanent US presence.

Schriver said: “China is going to stomp heavily on any kind of collective action on Taiwan.”

Washington is already putting money into the EDCA build-out. The US government allocated tens of millions of dollars for infrastructure in recent years, and the 2025 defense budget includes about 128 million dollars for 36 projects across the nine sites, ranging from airfield upgrades and fuel depots to logistics and humanitarian assistance facilities. The commission’s proposal would let Taiwan supplement that work where it most strengthens deterrence.

Why this is sensitive in Manila

The Philippines is a US treaty ally, and the government under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has expanded cooperation after a period of drift in the alliance. Still, tying EDCA upgrades directly to a Taiwan contingency is politically sensitive. Critics warn that increasing US access in northern Luzon could draw the country into a conflict over Taiwan. Some lawmakers have questioned why many EDCA sites face north rather than west toward China’s South China Sea outposts. Philippine officials have consistently said EDCA facilities will not be used for offensive operations related to Taiwan and stress that the sites support disaster response and broader deterrence.

What Philippine officials have said so far

Philippine defense officials say they were not previously briefed on the commission’s recommendation, and the government is still studying the idea. The Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of National Defense would decide how to proceed if Washington advances the proposal. That cautious tone reflects Manila’s balancing act: it wants stronger defenses and closer cooperation with allies, yet it seeks to avoid steps that could spark immediate retaliation from Beijing.

How Beijing is likely to respond

China claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has not ruled out using force to take the island. Beijing also regularly pushes back against measures that tighten US and partner cooperation around Taiwan or in the South China Sea. It criticized the expansion of EDCA in 2023, framing it as a move that could destabilize the region. Any public role for Taiwan in financing upgrades that strengthen US access to Philippine sites would almost certainly trigger sharp diplomatic protests and could be followed by economic pressure or more assertive moves by Chinese maritime forces in contested waters.

Schriver has warned regional partners to expect blowback from Beijing as coordination tightens. He argued that the question will be how much pressure these governments are prepared to accept.

As Schriver put it: “China is going to stomp heavily on any kind of collective action on Taiwan.”

Analysts say China opposes multilateral steps that involve Taiwan, even when they are routed through US processes and framed as generic infrastructure or support. That reaction has already shown up elsewhere, from responses to closer ties between Taiwan and Pacific allies to sharper rhetoric over joint military drills in the region.

Palau, the second island chain, and a wider maritime network

The commission’s report highlights the value of connecting the Philippines with like-minded partners in the wider Western Pacific, including Palau. Palau sits to the east of the Philippines and occupies a strategic spot in the so-called second island chain used by the US and allies to monitor Chinese naval movements into the broader Pacific. Palau is also one of the few Pacific Island nations that recognize Taiwan. Its leaders and security officials have called for closer coordination with Manila on maritime security.

Philippine officials have pointed to signs of Chinese activity around Palau, including the naming of seamounts claimed by Palau. Both Palau and the Philippines are exploring expanded shiprider agreements, which allow law enforcement officers from one country to ride along on another country’s patrol vessels to extend their reach against illegal fishing, trafficking, and other maritime violations. For Manila, better ties with Palau create depth in a region where contested waters are adjacent and where Chinese naval and militia vessels are active.

Why Palau matters to Philippine security

In any crisis, logistics routes and maritime domain awareness networks are key. Palau’s airfields and waters could help support surveillance and patrol missions that also matter to the Philippines. Connectivity across the first and second island chains, extending from Japan through the Philippines and into Micronesia, gives the US and its partners multiple options to monitor crossings, resupply forces, and move humanitarian aid if conflict or a natural disaster disrupts sea lines. A deeper Philippines-Palau partnership fits that map well.

Quad Plus and the coast guard front line

The commission urged creating a Quad Plus dialogue to bring the Philippines more directly into conversations with the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The focus would be on so-called gray zone activity, what the report labels ICAD, meaning illegal, coercive, aggressive, and deceptive actions. The Philippine Coast Guard sits on the front line of these confrontations. Chinese coast guard and maritime militia vessels have used water cannons, lasers, and dangerous maneuvers to block Philippine resupply missions at outposts like Second Thomas Shoal.

The report recommends prioritizing Manila for foreign military financing and maintaining capacity-building programs that fund training and equipment, especially for the coast guard. It also calls for broader support in cybersecurity, energy security, and digital infrastructure, and it welcomes the Luzon Economic Corridor initiative to build supply chains and transport links across northern Philippines. On the industrial side, the commission says the United States and partners such as Japan and South Korea should work with Philippine shipyards to expand maintenance, repair, and overhaul capabilities for both defense and commercial fleets.

What upgrades could look like at EDCA sites

On the ground, the upgrades envisioned are practical: runway rehabilitation and lengthening, aprons for transport aircraft, fuel storage and pipelines, communications and command centers, plus warehouses for humanitarian relief and military supplies. Some of this is already underway. Projects in Palawan have included humanitarian logistics buildings, fuel tanks, and a command facility. Runway work has progressed at Basa Air Base and on Balabac. These kinds of improvements increase the number of places where aircraft can land, refuel, and be serviced. They offer redundancy if one site is damaged or closed, and they speed up response times for both military operations and disaster relief.

Maritime domain awareness is another priority. Radar sites, better communications, and integration with patrol aircraft such as P-8 maritime patrol planes or Philippine reconnaissance assets can help spot and track vessels in busy waters. The EDCA program also invests in housing, power, and water systems that allow forces to surge during exercises or crises without straining local communities. All of this supports larger joint drills that have grown in scope, signaling that allies are practicing together for contingencies while building habits of cooperation needed for day-to-day operations.

If a Taiwan crisis erupts, what role would the Philippines play

Manila’s leaders say EDCA sites are not launchpads for attacks on Taiwan. Instead, they frame the locations as logistics hubs, training areas, and staging points for surveillance, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. In a crisis, those functions would still matter. Bases in northern Luzon could help monitor the Luzon Strait, where Chinese and Taiwanese forces would maneuver. They could host aircraft that relay communications, refuel, or conduct reconnaissance. Palawan sites could support coast guard and navy patrols that protect Philippine resupply missions and ensure sea routes remain open.

The Philippines and the United States are allies under a 1951 mutual defense treaty. The two governments have clarified in recent years that an armed attack on Philippine vessels or aircraft, including coast guard ships, would invoke the treaty. Philippine planners already assume a Taiwan conflict could spill into adjacent waters, and they are preparing for that possibility. Upgrading EDCA sites is part of that broader effort to make sure that, if a crisis comes, Philippine forces can operate with partners safely and effectively while defending their own territory and citizens.

Key Points

• A US congressional commission recommended using US Foreign Military Sales so Taiwan can fund nonweapon upgrades at Philippine EDCA sites.
• The goal is to improve logistics, surveillance, and resilience at bases close to Taiwan and the South China Sea to strengthen deterrence.
• EDCA provides US rotational access to nine Philippine locations, expanded from five to nine in 2023.
• Priority sites include northern Luzon bases near the Luzon Strait and Palawan sites facing contested waters in the South China Sea.
• Washington already budgeted about 128 million dollars for 36 EDCA projects in 2025, and earlier provided hundreds of millions for upgrades.
• Manila remains cautious. Officials say the proposal is under study and stress EDCA sites will not be used for offensive operations tied to Taiwan.
• Beijing is expected to object. The commission warns regional partners should anticipate strong Chinese pushback.
• The report urges a Quad Plus dialogue, more support for the Philippine Coast Guard, and deeper industrial cooperation, including ship repair in the Philippines.
• Palau and the Philippines are exploring closer maritime security ties, adding depth to a wider regional network that supports deterrence and crisis response.