China’s Influence Dominates Myanmar’s Election and Military Power

The Geopolitical Power Play Shaping Myanmar’s Future

Myanmar’s military regime has managed to regain momentum in its battle against a determined patchwork of opposition groups, retaking some territory and pushing ahead with a widely condemned election that begins on Sunday. This turnaround represents a significant shift in a five-year conflict that first erupted after the 2021 coup, when the military ousted the democratically elected government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. Analysts point to China and its shifting support as one of the most important factors changing the dynamics on the ground.

“This is really all China playing a role in tilting things in favor of the military regime,” says Jason Tower, senior expert at the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime who is focused on Myanmar. Beijing has used border closures to pressure powerful ethnic armed groups in the north of the country to agree to ceasefires and even hand back territory to the military, while simultaneously stepping up diplomatic support and continuing weapon transfers.

China’s approach to Myanmar represents a complex geopolitical calculation where economic interests, security concerns, and regional influence intersect in ways that have profound implications for Southeast Asia. While China publicly espouses a policy of non-interference, its actions in Myanmar demonstrate how it quietly but decisively shapes outcomes in strategically important neighboring states.

China’s Strategic Calculations Behind Election Support

China’s backing for Myanmar’s widely condemned election may seem paradoxical for a one-party state that doesn’t hold competitive democratic votes at home. However, this support stems from Beijing’s assessment that a managed political process offers the best path to stability that protects its core interests. China views Myanmar as a crucial link to the Indian Ocean, with ambitious infrastructure projects including highways and a deep seaport that have been jeopardized by ongoing conflict.

Earlier this year, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi expressed hope that the vote would achieve “domestic peace with a cessation of hostilities among parties and national governance based on the will of the people,” along with national reconciliation and “social harmony.” China will send election observers alongside countries including Russia and Vietnam, providing a veneer of international legitimacy to a process that monitors and UN experts have condemned as a sham.

The election lacks true opposition participation, with the military’s proxy party, the Union Solidarity and Development party, dominating the proceedings. The National League for Democracy, which won the last free election in 2020, has been forcibly dissolved, and many genuine opposition parties have been prohibited from participating or have boycotted the process entirely.

“China supports the election because it would like to see a return to more predictable rule in Myanmar under the 2008 constitution, rather than the current emergency rule,” explains Richard Horsey, senior adviser on Myanmar at the International Crisis Group. Beijing appears to believe that a structured election represents the most viable path out of the current impasse, especially given its assessment that gradual reform rather than complete revolution offers the best chance for stability.

Economic Interests Driving Beijing’s Calculus

China’s primary interest in Myanmar remains economic. As the biggest investor in the country, Beijing has committed funds worth billions of dollars for infrastructure projects including the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), which would provide a direct trade route from southwestern China to the Indian Ocean. This corridor would allow China to avoid the potentially vulnerable Strait of Malacca for energy shipments and provide strategic alternatives for its trade routes.

Key Chinese investments include the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port in Rakhine State and oil and gas pipelines connecting Kyaukphyu to Kunming in Yunnan province. These projects have been severely disrupted by post-coup fighting, with the Arakan Army seizing control of several major cities in Rakhine State, putting Chinese investments at risk. Without Chinese intervention, Beijing’s substantial economic interests in the region could be jeopardized.

The post-COVID years have seen the deceleration of the Chinese economy, which impacts both neighboring countries and China’s ambitious infrastructure projects, especially through the Belt and Road Initiative. With international affairs becoming less of a priority for Beijing as it focuses on domestic economic challenges, Myanmar remains mainly the concern of the Yunnan provincial government rather than China’s central leadership—as long as United States involvement remains minimal.

Military Aid and Technology Transfers Changing Battlefield Dynamics

China has significantly increased its military support to Myanmar’s junta, providing advanced weaponry that has helped shift the balance of power on the battlefield. Perhaps most significantly, China has supplied newer drone technologies that have enabled the military to target opposition forces with greater precision while minimizing risks to its own troops.

“The newer drone technologies that’s related to China, the pressure on ethnic armed organisations, reducing the amount of resistance that the junta was facing in the northern part of the country, that’s on China,” explains Jason Tower. China has also facilitated the military’s inclusion in platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, boosting its international standing.

According to analysis by the Stimson Center, China has delivered six fighter jets and other military equipment since August 2024. The Myanmar Air Force has taken delivery of FTC-2000G trainer jets, which are lighter and cheaper to operate than more advanced aircraft but perfectly adequate against mainly civilian targets or military opponents lacking surface-to-air missiles. The air force has also received increased quantities of Chinese-made drones, including both reconnaissance models and armed variants capable of carrying payloads.

Civil war continues to rage across much of Myanmar, with the military still unable to control vast areas of territory, but China’s support has at least allowed it to regain some ground. The regime has managed to retake strategically important towns like Kyaukme and Hsipaw on the main trade route from the Chinese border to the rest of Myanmar, areas that had been captured by ethnic armed groups in 2023.

Drone Warfare Revolutionizing the Conflict

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has dramatically changed the nature of combat in Myanmar. Initially, opposition forces used cost-effective commercial drones retrofitted for military use to devastating effect, dropping 25,000 munitions by drone during Operation 1027 and swamping remote military outposts. The junta has responded by importing, producing, and deploying a range of smaller quadcopters and hexacopters that can drop munitions, as well as Russian and Chinese-made kamikaze drones.

Local People’s Defense Force commanders describe the military’s use of drones as “day and night.” By late 2024, opposition forces acknowledged that “the military junta has extensively used drones in almost all their battles.” The regime benefits from the fact that opposition forces have almost no countermeasures or jamming devices available, allowing the military to employ some of its most accurate weaponry to target resistance forces.

China has also implemented new export control regulations for dual-use items, specifically blocking the export of drone components to opposition groups. These restrictions have already begun to significantly affect the resistance’s ability to sustain its drone programs, with leaders in Southern Shan and Karenni states reporting rising costs for procuring UAV components.

Opposition contacts note that Thailand has also begun cracking down on drone and parts purchases by Myanmar’s opposition forces. Despite these challenges, resistance groups are working to overcome the junta’s countermeasures, but Beijing’s restrictions reflect its clear intent to weaken opposition forces that have leveraged UAVs to great effect on the battlefield.

Border Pressure and Diplomatic Maneuvers

China has applied intense pressure on ethnic armed organizations along its border to halt their offensives and, in some cases, return territory to junta control. This pressure has taken various forms, including cutting off electricity and internet service along the border, as well as shutting down all border trade, which has devastated local economies.

In a significant development, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) finalized a ceasefire with the junta in Kunming on January 20, 2025, pledging to return the town of Lashio to junta control by mid-2025. The agreement came months after reports of China allegedly detaining the MNDAA commander Peng Deren to compel peace talks. The handover of Lashio, the capital of northern Shan State and its most important economic hub, represents Beijing’s most striking intervention to date.

China also encouraged the United Wa State Army (UWSA) to move west out of its enclave along the Chinese border to stop the MNDAA’s and TNLA’s southward advance into Central Shan State. Beijing simultaneously demanded that the Wa stop selling ammunition and arms to opposition forces. These maneuvers demonstrate how China uses its leverage over border-dependent armed groups to achieve its strategic objectives.

China has also pressured the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which controls some 13 of 18 townships in Kachin State, to stop its offensive. Following the January 2025 ceasefire between MNDAA and SAC, China reopened three main border gates while maintaining a blockade on three others controlled by the TNLA and MNDAA.

The Scam Center Factor

China’s shifting approach to Myanmar has been significantly influenced by its frustration with organized crime and scam compounds operating in border areas. These centers, established by Chinese-led crime networks, have trafficked Chinese citizens into Myanmar to work in online fraud operations. By 2023, the number of scammers working in Myanmar was estimated at 120,000 people, with total annual revenue estimated at $15.3 billion—roughly equivalent to a quarter of Myanmar’s GDP.

The junta’s unwillingness to commence large-scale anti-scam operations provided a golden opportunity for the resistance, as China gave its tacit approval for Operation 1027 in late 2023. The Three Brotherhood Alliance explicitly stated that eliminating cyber scam centers was one of the major reasons for commencing the offensive. The success of Operation 1027 forced scam centers to relocate to other places in Myanmar and in the region, particularly to the Shwe Kokko area on the Thai-Myanmar border.

Since the coup, scam centers have expanded as the military looked the other way, needing to keep militias on its side. The thriving business of scam operations became one of the primary revenue generators for various armed groups. The Chinese government has maintained pressure on both the junta and the Thai government to fully eradicate these scam centers, which led to the termination of internet and phone communications to Shwe Kokko from Thailand’s side in May 2024.

Only recently has the junta actively undertaken the task of combatting scam center operations, after bombing parts of the infamous KK Park compound over recent months. The military has reassured China that economic projects will go ahead and has vowed to crack down on scam compounds, but it remains unclear whether the military will be able to keep these promises.

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor at Risk

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), established in 2018 as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, represents Beijing’s most ambitious infrastructure project in Myanmar. The corridor aims to connect southwestern China to the Indian Ocean through a network of highways, railways, pipelines, and ports, reducing China’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca for energy shipments.

The CMEC has been severely disrupted by post-coup fighting, threatening billions of dollars in Chinese investments. China has several key investments in Kyaukphyu, a major city in Rakhine State, including a large deep-water port and an oil pipeline running from Kyaukphyu to Kunming. During the civil war, the Arakan Army seized control of several major cities in Rakhine State, jeopardizing Beijing’s interests there without Chinese intervention.

Furthermore, if the Myanmar military continues to lose territorial control, and with both the military and ethnic armed groups needing funds to sustain the war, all sides may tacitly allow transnational criminal syndicates to set up more scam compounds to profit from them. Telecom fraud has metastasized into what Richard Horsey describes as “a stubborn cancer of international crime” that threatens regional security.

The disruption of economic projects has frustrated Beijing, which initially declined to back the military regime that seized power in February 2021, viewing the coup as damaging its strategic interests and imperiling its large investments. China was also unhappy with commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing, whom it viewed as incompetent, harboring anti-China sentiments and insufficiently cooperative in addressing Beijing’s main concerns—particularly regarding scam centers.

A Balancing Act Between Competing Interests

China’s approach to Myanmar demonstrates a delicate balancing act between competing interests and actors. While China is the primary backer of the junta in military, economic, and diplomatic terms, it also maintains relationships with ethnic armed groups fighting against the military. This dual engagement allows Beijing to exert influence across the political spectrum and protect its interests regardless of who holds territory.

China’s state-centric diplomatic preference means it maintains high-level interactions with the junta despite the regime’s lack of effective territorial control in many areas. The junta still controls crucial state infrastructure including international airports, seaports, and economically important areas like the commercial capital Yangon, which hosts most foreign embassies.

Conversely, the resistance holds areas that were economically insignificant before the coup, though it does control previously prosperous China-Myanmar border trade routes. However, these routes have been minimally active since Operation 1027, with attempts to fully reopen them failing despite China’s eagerness to resume trade.

China has conducted backdoor diplomacy through various groups with its special envoys, but this is not tantamount to overt support. Beijing separately invited former Myanmar President U Thein Sein, deputy leader of the State Administration Council Soe Win, and political parties participating in the next election, while appearing cautious about Min Aung Hlaing’s increasing ties with Moscow.

Regional and International Implications

China’s intervention in Myanmar has significant regional implications, affecting how other countries approach the crisis. The warming ties between China and Myanmar have made ASEAN’s marginalization even pronounced—or rather, highlighted ASEAN’s helplessness regarding the Myanmar crisis.

ASEAN proposed its Five-Point Consensus on Myanmar in April 2021, but more than four years later, the consensus remains stuck on paper. ASEAN’s efforts to resolve the Myanmar issue have stalled, exposing its lack of real leverage over the military junta. China’s support for the election may not only cloak Myanmar’s non-inclusive political process in a veneer of legitimacy but also further weaken ASEAN’s standing and its ability to address internal problems.

“ASEAN cannot react with umbrage if China is making more ‘progress’ than the regional body, their regional efforts have been fruitless,” says David Mathieson, an independent analyst who closely follows Myanmar affairs. China’s confidence in intervening in the Myanmar issue stems mainly from its economic relationships with most ASEAN countries—an important source of political leverage.

Moreover, because ASEAN states generally pursue a strategy of balancing between China and the United States, Beijing believes it can take more exploratory political actions on Myanmar without jeopardizing its relations with ASEAN members. While ASEAN hopes to advance the peace process, it lacks effective channels to communicate directly with the military. China, in contrast, not only has long-standing familiarity and frequent interaction with the junta but also maintains contact with some anti-junta forces and wields substantial influence over ethnic armed groups.

The Geopolitical Competition Factor

The shifting dynamics in Myanmar must be understood within the broader context of geopolitical competition in Southeast Asia. The United States, which played a pivotal role in Myanmar’s 2015 general election by supporting voter education programs and civil society, has downgraded diplomatic ties with the nation following the coup. Washington’s reduced presence has created space for China to expand its influence without significant pushback.

Five years ago, the United States assisted with programs aimed at strengthening global democracy and countering China’s influence in the region. Following the coup, those efforts have been dramatically scaled back, leaving China as the primary external actor with meaningful influence over Myanmar’s trajectory.

Recent political developments in the United States have further diminished Washington’s engagement. The Trump administration has expressed little interest in Myanmar other than in the context of tariffs, sending a letter addressed to Min Aung Hlaing as regime leader—the first public recognition of the regime by Washington. Min Aung Hlaing seized on this opportunity, writing a long response calling for an end to U.S. sanctions and offering to send a high-level tariff negotiation team to Washington.

The decimation of USAID and gutting of democracy promotion activities have been well received in Naypyitaw, giving the regime the sense that the United States is no longer pushing back against it or impeding relations between Naypyitaw and countries in its neighborhood. Meanwhile, the National Unity Government and other democratic forces have been left reeling, not only at cuts to financial support but also at the loss of an ideological anchor point that had reassured them that their struggle had supremely powerful backing.

The Human Cost of Political Maneuvering

While geopolitical strategies and economic calculations drive China’s policies in Myanmar, the human cost of this conflict remains staggering. More than four years after the coup, Myanmar continues to lose territory to its foes, particularly some of the country’s larger ethnic armed groups. Despite some limited counteroffensives, regime forces remain overstretched and under pressure on several fronts.

Humanitarian conditions are deteriorating across the country, compounded by natural disasters and economic collapse. According to reports, the military has burned down 110,000 to 120,000 houses across the dry zone alone. The violence has been immense, and there are few people in Myanmar who have not been touched by it.

The military has responded to battlefield setbacks by starting a forced conscription drive. Thousands of young Burmese men have chosen to flee, going into hiding or exile overseas, or joining the resistance. But more than 60,000 have joined the army, replenishing its exhausted ranks. While inexperienced, these new recruits have made a difference, according to insurgent sources.

Stories like that of Mu Mu (pseudonym), a young man in his early 20s, illustrate the desperation faced by ordinary citizens. When the military stormed into his village to seize able-bodied men, Mu Mu hid in a hole beneath a wooden house, his legs trembling uncontrollably. After his family shaved his head and prepared monastic robes, he successfully bribed his way past checkpoint officers to escape to Yangon. About 35 people from his village were not so fortunate and were taken away by the military.

The Road Ahead for Myanmar

Despite China’s backing and the military’s recent territorial gains, fundamental challenges to Myanmar’s future remain unresolved. The planned elections will not resolve the political crisis or reduce the intensity of the armed conflict. Instead, they are likely to harden political divisions and could trigger new waves of violence as the regime tries to ensure secure conditions for voting while resistance forces fight back.

The devastation and human suffering inflicted by the military on the people of Myanmar have left a legacy of grievances against the generals that may last generations. “The violence has been immense, and there are few people who have not been touched by it,” notes Morgan Michaels, research fellow for southeast Asian security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “That’s why it is difficult to foresee a political process right now. Being forced into ceasefire because you literally cannot hold your front lines is one thing, but political bargaining for peace still seems very distant.”

It remains possible that China may pivot away from the military again if it is seen as squandering opportunities to form ceasefires with opponents, or if, in two years’ time, there is still no progress on infrastructure projects. For now, Beijing appears to have concluded that supporting the junta’s election plans represents the best path to achieving its core interests of stability, security for its border, and protection of its economic investments.

Anti-China sentiment has risen in Myanmar, including a perception that China is stoking conflict to increase its own leverage over the country. However, Yun Sun, senior fellow and director of the China programme at the Stimson Center, disputes this characterization. “China doesn’t need a war to exert influence over any of the political players in the country,” she said. “I think what the Chinese will say is that they see the situation as a dynamism, that a balance of power will eventually lead to some stability.”

Key Points

• China has provided decisive support to Myanmar’s military regime, including weapons, drones, and diplomatic backing for widely condemned elections.
• Beijing’s primary interests in Myanmar include protecting the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and combating scam centers that victimize Chinese citizens.
• China has pressured ethnic armed groups along its border to cease fighting and return territory, using border closures and trade restrictions as leverage.
• The junta has regained territory in strategic areas with Chinese support, though it still lacks control over vast swathes of the country.
• China’s intervention has marginalized ASEAN and highlighted the regional bloc’s inability to resolve the Myanmar crisis.
• The conflict has caused immense human suffering, with over 100,000 homes destroyed and widespread forced conscription.
• China maintains relationships with both the junta and opposition groups, reflecting a pragmatic approach to protecting its interests.
• The planned elections lack genuine opposition participation and have been condemned as a sham by international observers.
• Beijing may adjust its support depending on the junta’s ability to deliver on economic projects and security commitments.
• The United States has significantly reduced its engagement with Myanmar, creating space for China to expand its influence.