Shan Leader Accuses World of Ignoring Myanmar Airstrikes as China Reshapes the Conflict

Yawd Serk Calls for Action as Civilian Deaths Mount

More than 1,000 civilian locations struck in 15 months. At least 1,728 civilians killed since late 2024. Those figures frame the warning delivered by General Yawd Serk, chairman of the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS), as Myanmar's military prepares to turn a tightly restricted election into a new government while continuing its air campaign.

Speaking at his isolated mountaintop headquarters at Loi Tai Leng, between forested hills on the Thai border, the leader of one of Myanmar's most influential ethnic armies accused world leaders of ignoring the suffering. His first media meeting in years came days after the military strengthened its political position through elections conducted in limited parts of a country engulfed by conflict.

Yawd Serk appealed directly for international attention:

The civilians are suffering and I want the international community not to ignore it,

The Myanmar Peace Monitor documented strikes on more than 1,000 civilian locations over 15 months. The National Unity Government's Human Rights Ministry recorded at least 1,728 civilian deaths since late 2024. Those figures describe different measures of the air campaign: places attacked and people killed.

Myanmar's conflict widened after the February 2021 coup removed the elected government of Nobel peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. Villages, schools, religious buildings and camps for displaced people have since become targets of military aircraft.

Yawd Serk also described his loss of confidence in outside support:

Nowadays, we can't even think who we can rely on,

His RCSS controls strategic territory between China and Thailand. Its position places it within a struggle involving ethnic armies, the military government and neighboring powers whose decisions affect both battlefield advances and civilian survival.

An Election Behind the Continuing War

The military backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) claimed victory in January, winning 739 of the 1,025 contested seats. Voting took place in stages during late 2025 and early 2026, in the limited areas where the authorities could organize it.

The USDP's tally amounts to about 72 percent of the contested seats. The United Nations and international rights groups denounced the polls as a theatrical exercise intended to preserve military power behind a civilian facade. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing was expected to become president.

The junta has also created a Union Consultative Council to oversee military and civilian administrations. Its powers were described as "exceptionally broad," suggesting that Min Aung Hlaing intends to retain control regardless of the electoral outcome.

The political process is unfolding alongside a war in which pro-democracy forces and ethnic armed organizations have taken territory across large parts of Myanmar. The military, also known as the Tatmadaw, increasingly uses fighter jets, helicopter gunships and transport aircraft modified for attacks to project force where its ground troops have suffered setbacks.

The junta says it targets terrorists. The civilian locations hit, including places where people worship or seek shelter, are central to the accusations against it.

Churches and Shelters Under Attack

On February 8, military jets bombed a Baptist church in Chinpiang village, Matupi Township, while people gathered for Sunday services. At least three civilians, including a child, were killed and others were injured.

Strikes that same day damaged a Buddhist Dhamma Hall in Mindat town and destroyed residential areas in Kanpetlet. The attacks reached communities using religious buildings as gathering places, as well as people in their homes.

On October 8, 2025, an airstrike hit a monastery sheltering displaced civilians in Makyikone village, Natogyi Township. It killed Daw Kyin, aged 45, and injured at least ten others, including children. Villagers had taken refuge there while fleeing military columns advancing through central Myanmar.

The National Unity Government recorded 372 airstrikes between March 28 and May 9, 2025, during a declared earthquake truce. Those attacks took place across 13 of Myanmar's 15 states and regions, killing 334 people and injuring 552.

The Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO) identified Iranian aviation fuel shipments as directly enabling attacks on religious communities and called for international sanctions on aviation fuel supply chains. Fuel arriving from abroad allows the military to keep aircraft operating despite losses on the ground.

Military analysts have described attacks on former bases captured by resistance forces, including Strategic Operations Command 15 in Buthidaung Township and other installations in Arakan State, as evidence of strategic desperation rather than coherent military planning.

An Arakan military observer used a local expression to describe destroying positions that the military could no longer hold:

If you can't have the meat, you scatter sand on it.

Why China Holds Such Influence

Yawd Serk singled out China as the outside power actively shaping Myanmar's conflict. He declined to elaborate after saying:

There is one country which intervenes in Myanmar, it is China and only China,

China's foreign ministry responded that Beijing has "long played a constructive role in the domestic peace and reconciliation process" and supports efforts by the parties to strengthen dialogue.

China has substantial economic interests in Shan State and neighboring regions. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, part of the Belt and Road Initiative, connects Yunnan Province with Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean through pipelines, roads and hydropower projects. These include the Upper Yeywa and Shweli-3 plants.

The Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone and deep-sea port in Rakhine State give China direct access to the Indian Ocean, reducing its reliance on the Strait of Malacca. Protecting those investments gives Beijing a strong interest in controlling disruption along trade and infrastructure routes.

Beijing has shifted from initially supporting certain ethnic armed organizations to pressuring them to stop offensives that threatened the junta's survival. Its ability to restrict supplies and border access has translated economic influence into changes on the battlefield.

Resistance Gains Reversed Under Chinese Pressure

During Operation 1027 in late 2023 and 2024, the Brotherhood Alliance seized most of northern Shan State, including its capital, Lashio. The alliance consists of the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA).

Resistance forces advanced to within 22 kilometers of Mandalay. Families of military personnel fled the garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin as the prospect of resistance forces capturing Myanmar's second largest city grew.

Beijing then closed border gates, cutting food and medicine supplies to ethnic armies and preventing weapons procurement. The United Wa State Army (UWSA), Myanmar's most powerful ethnic armed group, faced asset seizures and border closures until it agreed to stop providing military assistance to the MNDAA and TNLA.

By August 2025, UWSA Vice Chair Shao Guoan reportedly told allied groups that Chinese pressure had created:

the worst survival crisis in our 40-year history.

The MNDAA handed Lashio back to the regime in April 2025 after peace talks in Kunming controlled by China, although it retained rural territory. The TNLA subsequently relinquished Mogoke and Mongmit during negotiations in October 2025.

Those concessions allowed regime forces to advance into territory held by resistance groups in northern Mandalay and cut supply lines to People's Defense Force (PDF) groups. China's intervention reversed major resistance gains while helping stabilize the junta.

Beijing's Political Engagement

China's involvement also reached Myanmar's party politics. In July 2024, the Chinese Communist Party invited leaders of four parties to Beijing: the USDP, the People's Party, the Arakan Front Party (AFP), and the Shan and Ethnic Democratic Party (SEDP).

The National League for Democracy, which the junta dissolved, and the National Unity Government in exile, which represents the ousted democratic administration, were absent. All four invited parties were registered with the junta's State Administration Council (SAC) and maintained varying degrees of cooperation with the military.

The SEDP represents Shan interests and engages pragmatically with the regime to pursue regional goals. The AFP has shown willingness to work with the SAC to negotiate greater autonomy in Rakhine State.

Beijing's selective engagement reflects a preference for stability under military rule or governance influenced by the military, rather than a democratic transition that could introduce uncertainty. Supporting these parties serves its interest in secure border regions, trade and resource extraction, while limiting the emergence of governing structures that might challenge its economic priorities.

The International Crisis Group has described a "fractured landscape" in which efforts to stabilize the junta enough to protect Chinese infrastructure risk deepening grievances. The battlefield settlements and party outreach show how China's economic priorities shape both military and political outcomes.

Why the RCSS Still Maintains Its Ceasefire

Yawd Serk's position differs from that of many ethnic armed leaders fighting the junta. The RCSS continues to maintain the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), signed in October 2015, while condemning military attacks and favoring a political solution over renewed fighting.

His history helps explain that calculation. Yawd Serk emerged as a commander in the Mong Tai Army (MTA) under General Khun Sa, the prominent narcotics entrepreneur who declared Shan independence in 1993 before surrendering in 1996.

When Khun Sa handed over thousands of troops and weapons, Yawd Serk refused to surrender. He reformed his forces as the Shan State Army-South and established the RCSS as its political wing in 2000.

Yawd Serk and Min Aung Hlaing have a relationship marked by decades of mutual hostility alongside periodic diplomatic engagement. Meetings have featured handshakes and broad smiles despite what observers describe as a "visceral antipathy" between the two men.

The RCSS initially condemned the 2021 coup, then adopted an ambivalent position, continuing peace talks while other signatories abandoned the NCA. Six of the agreement's ten signatories have resumed armed resistance, including the Karen National Union, the Chin National Front and the All Burma Students' Democratic Front.

The RCSS leader says he will judge the new government by its actions rather than its words. That approach also reflects military vulnerability: rivals backed by China have pushed his forces out of northern Shan territories, while the UWSA's southern divisions threaten Loi Tai Leng and RCSS positions along the border.

A Call for Federalism and Different Leadership

On February 7, Yawd Serk addressed a military parade marking Shan National Day. About 7,000 people attended, including representatives of rival groups. His speech linked Myanmar's turmoil to the conduct of its leadership.

The RCSS chairman attributed the crisis to:

leadership driven by excessive ego, pride, and greed - placing the will of one individual above the desires of the public.

Yawd Serk praised Aung San Suu Kyi's ousted administration, called for trust among Myanmar's armed factions and proposed a Federal Army to ensure national security. Such an army is a key demand of forces opposing the military.

He also stressed the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which established the Union of Myanmar as a federal system with distinct administrative arrangements for ethnic states. Federalism means sharing authority between a national government and regional governments, rather than concentrating every decision at the center.

Yawd Serk argued that national leaders had lost touch with the "Middle Way," or moderation, needed for unity. His appeal combined criticism of personal rule with a demand for political arrangements that accommodate ethnic states.

Min Aung Hlaing responded with a statement urging ethnic groups and groups he called "terrorist" to abandon armed struggle and join peace talks. Yawd Serk dismissed the message as an old refrain that "no one has accepted," while continuing to favor negotiations over renewed war.

A Ceasefire Framework and Divided Alliances

The NCA's tenth anniversary exposed how far it had fallen short of ending decades of ethnic conflict. The agreement became a means of managing hostilities while the military retained ultimate authority. Its collapse accelerated after the 2021 coup destroyed its political foundations.

Six signatories have formally exited, citing the junta's "total disregard" for NCA principles and its continued use of force against civilians. Four maintain peaceable terms with the regime: the RCSS, the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, the Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council, and the Arakan Liberation Party. Among those four, only the RCSS has substantial military capacity.

Shan groups have agreed in principle on a framework for a future federal state, yet remain divided. The Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army-North (SSPP/SSA-North), which never signed the NCA, has a tense relationship with the RCSS despite their shared advocacy for Shan interests.

The RCSS expanded into northern Shan territories after 2015, often with tacit military approval. That expansion created lasting resentment among Ta'ang and other communities that are not Shan, bringing routine clashes and tensions between communities.

Yawd Serk's unity appeal at the February 7 gathering, attended by longstanding rivals, acknowledged that the coup had changed the balance of power in ways that threatened all Shan factions.

The Karen National Union (KNU), one of the strongest groups fighting the junta, sent a letter rather than attending the ceremony. KNU spokesperson Saw Taw Nee described the moment as "critical for us to build unity" and welcomed the Shan initiative:

We are proud that our Shan brothers are trying to pave the way.

Ethnic armed organizations recognize that divided resistance serves the junta's strategy of dividing its opponents. Competing territorial claims and shifting alliances over decades still obstruct cooperation. The UWSA's expansion across eastern Shan State and its movement south toward RCSS positions add pressure on Yawd Serk, including the possibility of circumstances resembling those faced by Khun Sa in 1996.

Accountability Efforts Reach Timor-Leste

The International Criminal Court (ICC) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) maintain proceedings concerning crimes against the Rohingya. Those cases concern events before the 2021 coup, while the current air war has intensified the demand for accountability.

ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing in November 2024. As of February 11, 2026, more than a year later, no decision had been issued. Procedural delays and limited enforcement capacity remain obstacles to international justice.

Timor-Leste, which joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) four months earlier, appointed a prosecutor in February 2026 to examine the Myanmar military's responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. It became the first ASEAN state to take such action against a fellow member.

The complaint was brought by CHRO under universal jurisdiction. That principle allows domestic courts to hear allegations of certain international crimes regardless of where they occurred. Similar efforts have been attempted in Argentina, Turkey and Germany.

These cases face difficulties involving arrests, diplomatic immunity, and gathering evidence and witnesses from overseas. Opening a legal process also requires practical steps to bring suspects and evidence before a court.

Western powers have mainly applied diplomatic pressure and sanctions. ASEAN has been constrained by its principles of non-interference, while neighboring countries prioritize stability along their borders over democratic outcomes. Domestic forces consequently carry much of the burden of resistance. For families moving between villages and civilians sheltering in monasteries, international condemnation has brought little protection from aircraft.

How the Crisis Reached This Point

Myanmar's present conflict brings together older ceasefire disputes, the military takeover, resistance advances and diplomatic pressure. The main dates show how those developments accumulated:

• October 2015: The RCSS signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement.
• February 2021: The military ousted Aung San Suu Kyi's elected government.
• Late 2023 and 2024: Operation 1027 brought major Brotherhood Alliance gains in northern Shan State.
• July 2024: The Chinese Communist Party invited four Myanmar parties to Beijing.
• November 2024: ICC prosecutor Karim Khan requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing.
• March 28 to May 9, 2025: The National Unity Government recorded 372 airstrikes during the earthquake truce.
• April 2025: The MNDAA returned Lashio to the regime after talks in Kunming.
• October 8, 2025: An airstrike hit the monastery in Makyikone village.
• October 2025: The TNLA relinquished Mogoke and Mongmit during negotiations.
• Late 2025 and early 2026: The military conducted elections in stages; the USDP claimed victory in January.
• February 2026: Timor-Leste appointed a prosecutor to examine allegations against Myanmar's military.
• February 7, 2026: Yawd Serk called for unity and a Federal Army at Shan National Day celebrations.
• February 8, 2026: Airstrikes hit the church in Chinpiang, a Dhamma Hall in Mindat and residential areas in Kanpetlet.

By February 11, Yawd Serk's appeal captured several pressures at once: continuing civilian deaths, the military's effort to consolidate political control, China's ability to reverse resistance gains, and ethnic leaders struggling to unite while protecting their own territories.

The Essentials

• The Myanmar Peace Monitor recorded attacks on more than 1,000 civilian locations in 15 months; the National Unity Government's Human Rights Ministry recorded at least 1,728 civilian deaths since late 2024.
• Yawd Serk urged international action while maintaining the RCSS ceasefire and calling for political dialogue, ethnic unity and a Federal Army.
• The military backed USDP claimed 739 of 1,025 contested seats after restricted elections held in stages.
• Chinese pressure helped bring the return of Lashio, Mogoke and Mongmit to the regime and disrupted resistance supply routes.
• CHRO identified Iranian aviation fuel shipments as enabling attacks and called for sanctions on fuel supply chains.
• Timor-Leste opened a prosecutorial examination of allegations against Myanmar's military, while the ICC arrest warrant request remained undecided.