The Collapse That Exposed a Deeper Problem
When British prosecutors dropped charges against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry last month, the decision sparked immediate political controversy. The two men, accused of spying for China under the Official Secrets Act, walked free not because they were proven innocent, but because the Crown Prosecution Service determined it could not prove Beijing posed a threat to UK national security. This legal technicality revealed a fundamental question that has haunted successive British governments: what kind of threat does China really pose, and how should the UK respond?
Lord Hermer, the attorney general, subsequently blamed outdated legislation for the case’s collapse. Yet the incident highlighted something more troubling than legal inadequacies. It exposed the vast gulf between traditional conceptions of espionage, involving diplomats and secret handovers of documents, and the complex reality of modern Chinese state threats that encompass cyber warfare, academic infiltration, bulk data theft, and political influence operations.
The case against Cash and Berry, one of whom advised MPs on China policy, had been hailed as a major breakthrough in counter-espionage when announced in 2024. Their acquittal came after the Crown Prosecution Service reviewed classified evidence and concluded that proving Chinese state activity represented a threat to the UK would be impossible under current statutory frameworks. This outcome left opposition politicians accusing Prime Minister Keir Starmer of prioritizing diplomatic relations with Beijing over national security, a charge the government denies.
What the collapse truly illuminated was the inadequacy of existing laws designed for a different era of spycraft. When the Official Secrets Act was conceived, espionage meant dead drops and microfilm. Today, it involves artificial intelligence, bulk data harvesting, and influence operations that blur the line between legitimate international relations and subversion. The challenge facing British authorities is not simply catching spies, but defining where legitimate international relations end and threats to national security begin.
Beyond the Cold War Model
Sir Ken McCallum, the head of MI5, has explicitly warned against viewing Chinese intelligence through an outdated lens.
Try not to think too much just in terms of classic card-carrying spies based out of the embassy in the John le Carré mould.
While China certainly maintains traditional intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover, this represents merely the visible tip of a much larger apparatus.
The Chinese intelligence services maintain an estimated workforce of half a million personnel when accounting for domestic and international security operations. This vast scale allows Beijing to pursue intelligence objectives with a breadth that dwarfs most other nations. However, what truly distinguishes China’s approach is the integration of espionage with economic strategy, political influence, and transnational repression.
According to a deputy national security adviser’s witness statement in the collapsed Cash and Berry case,
The Chinese Intelligence Services are interested in acquiring information from a number of sources, including policymakers, government staff and democratic institutions and are able to act opportunistically to gather all information they can.
Yet this description barely captures the sophistication of contemporary operations.
The Headhunter Networks
One of the most pervasive modern tactics involves the use of professional networking platforms to cultivate sources. In November 2025, MI5 issued a rare visual guide to Members of Parliament warning about specific methodologies employed by the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS). The alert identified fake LinkedIn profiles operated by individuals posing as recruitment headhunters, specifically naming personas such as Amanda Qiu and Shirly Shen.
These operatives target parliamentary staff, economists, think tank employees, and geopolitical consultants, offering substantial financial incentives for seemingly low-level information initially. The strategy involves approaching targets to operate as freelance consultants tasked with producing geopolitical reports, before gradually escalating demands to include confidential and insider insights. Security Minister Dan Jarvis told the House of Commons that these activities represent a covert and calculated effort to interfere in UK sovereign interests.
The academic sector faces similar pressures. MI5 has documented a steady stream of attempts to lure UK academic experts through professional networking sites, aiming to acquire technology with both military and civilian applications. Andrew Badger, a former US intelligence official and co-author of The Great Heist: China’s Epic Campaign to Steal America’s Secrets, warns that
when core intellectual property and process knowledge leak, entire industries can be upended.
Cyber Campaigns and the Data Appetite
While human intelligence operations continue, cyber espionage represents China’s most formidable capability. In August 2025, the UK finally confirmed its involvement in Salt Typhoon, a highly sophisticated campaign compromising telecommunications companies worldwide. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), an arm of GCHQ, warned that
the data stolen through this activity can ultimately provide the Chinese intelligence services the capability to identify and track targets’ communications and movements worldwide.
Salt Typhoon represents just one component of a broader ecosystem of Chinese state backed cyber activity. The McCrary Institute at Auburn University has identified multiple Typhoon groups including Volt Typhoon, which infiltrates critical infrastructure to pre-position for potential disruption rather than mere espionage, and Flax Typhoon, which targets Internet of Things devices for data collection. These groups exploit zero-day vulnerabilities and living-off-the-land techniques that make detection extremely difficult.
Beyond targeted espionage, Western security officials express alarm at Beijing’s pursuit of bulk data, large-scale datasets containing financial, personal, and health information. Ciaran Martin, former head of the NCSC, notes that
China has been trying to collect population level data on British people. That may be useful to train artificial intelligence or to better understand the country or even influence opinion.
The 2024 breach of the UK Electoral Commission, attributed to Chinese state affiliated group APT31, demonstrated this appetite for scale. The attack targeted parliamentarians prominent in calling out the malign activity of China, according to official assessments. Anne Keast-Butler, Director of GCHQ, has stated that
we now devote more resource to China than any other single mission,
acknowledging that
China poses a genuine and increasing cyber risk to the UK.
Transnational Repression and Diaspora Surveillance
A significant portion of Chinese intelligence resources focuses not on British state secrets but on controlling the Chinese diaspora and suppressing dissent. MI5 has warned that Hong Kong police have issued bounties against more than a dozen pro-democracy activists sheltering in the UK, with increased reports of harassment and surveillance against Tibetan campaigners and other minority groups.
This transnational repression serves the Communist Party’s primary goal of maintaining domestic stability. However, some analysts suggest that much of this activity is decentralized and surprisingly amateurish. According to foreign correspondent reports, provincial police departments often dispatch small teams abroad with limited experience, recruiting diaspora members as intelligence entrepreneurs who trade information for favors back home. While this challenges the image of a centrally controlled spy network, it does not reduce the threat to vulnerable individuals.
The Economic Security Dilemma
Perhaps the most complex challenge involves distinguishing between legitimate economic engagement and strategic dependency. The debate over Huawei’s role in UK 5G infrastructure exemplified this tension. Chinese equipment was often cheaper and technologically superior, but dependency created risks of coercion. If Beijing can cut off access to technology upon which daily life depends, it gains leverage over British foreign policy.
This dilemma extends to critical minerals, electric vehicle supply chains, and nuclear energy infrastructure. The UK government must navigate between securing economic growth, which China as the world’s second-largest economy can provide, and protecting national security. The National Security and Investment Act 2021 and the Procurement Act 2023 provide new powers to block foreign acquisitions and exclude suppliers on security grounds, but their application remains politically sensitive.
The proposed Chinese embassy at the former Royal Mint site in London has become a focal point for these concerns. Critics fear the location could facilitate tapping of underground data cables, though some security officials downplay this risk given China’s demonstrated capability for remote cyber access. The decision on whether to approve the embassy remains pending, representing a litmus test for the current government’s approach.
Legal Frameworks and Defensive Measures
The UK has attempted to strengthen its legal arsenal against these varied threats. The National Security Act 2023 created new espionage offenses and established the Foreign Interference Registration Scheme (FIRS), which requires individuals acting at the direction of foreign powers to register political influence activities. While Russia and Iran have been placed on the scheme’s enhanced tier, China remains on the standard tier, a decision that has drawn criticism from MPs including former Conservative leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith.
Defensive measures extend beyond legislation. When Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited China in early 2026, his team employed burner phones, fresh SIM cards, and temporary email addresses to prevent spyware installation. These precautions, standard for at least a decade according to security officials, reflect the reality that sensitive conversations in Beijing must be confined to the secure compartment within the British embassy. Former Prime Minister Theresa May was once advised to dress under her duvet to avoid concealed cameras during a 2018 visit.
The Balancing Act
The fundamental challenge facing British policymakers is reconciling security concerns with diplomatic and economic necessities. The UK cannot simply decouple from China, given its importance in trade, investment, and research collaboration in areas from climate technology to artificial intelligence. Yet engagement opens vectors for the very influence operations that threaten democratic institutions.
This tension has been exacerbated by shifting transatlantic dynamics. As the US adopts increasingly aggressive postures toward Beijing, Washington pressures London to align its policies. The UK finds itself caught between competing demands: maintaining access to Chinese markets and technology while satisfying allies and protecting domestic security.
Sir Ken McCallum has characterized China as representing a
whole-of-system challenge that needs a profound whole-of-system response.
Yet without clear public documentation of red lines, such as the unreleased China audit promised by the government, British institutions remain vulnerable. The head of MI5 has noted a 35% increase in investigations into state threat activities in the past year, suggesting the problem is escalating faster than defensive capabilities.
Key Points
- The case against Christopher Cash and Christopher Berry collapsed because prosecutors could not prove China posed a national security threat under current legal definitions, exposing gaps in UK espionage legislation.
- Chinese intelligence employs whole-of-system tactics including fake LinkedIn headhunters targeting MPs and academics, bulk data collection, and cyber campaigns like Salt Typhoon compromising telecommunications.
- MI5 has issued specific warnings about Chinese Ministry of State Security operatives using professional networking sites to recruit parliamentary staff and researchers with offers of freelance consulting work.
- Transnational repression targets UK-based Hong Kong activists and Tibetan campaigners through bounty programs and harassment, while cyber operations target critical infrastructure for potential future disruption.
- The UK government faces a strategic dilemma in balancing economic engagement with China against security risks, navigating pressure from both Beijing and Washington while attempting to protect universities, parliament, and critical infrastructure.
