Taiwan at the Center of China's Pacific Strategy as US Defense Plan Leaves Island Unnamed

A Defense Pledge With Taiwan Missing

The Trump administration's 2026 National Defense Strategy, released on January 23, promises a "strong denial defense along the First Island Chain" without mentioning Taiwan. The omission puts the island's position at the center of a regional security debate: how can Washington defend a maritime barrier stretching from Japan toward Borneo while leaving its central link unnamed?

As of February 6, the contrast with the previous strategy is stark. The Biden administration's 2022 document mentioned Taiwan eight times and described Beijing's "increasingly provocative rhetoric and coercive activity." The 2026 version refers to the island chain more broadly, leaving governments in Tokyo, Manila and Taipei to assess what Washington's wording means for their security.

The First Island Chain runs through the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan and the Philippines toward Borneo. Its islands and narrow sea passages separate China's coastal waters from the open Pacific. Beijing sees the chain as both a defensive perimeter and a barrier to naval movement. Washington and its allies view it as a line along which they can organize their defenses.

Taiwan sits midway along that line. Chinese control of the island would give Beijing more room to send naval forces into the Pacific, increase pressure on important trade routes and create new security risks for nearby countries. Taiwan's position also makes it central to efforts to restrict those movements.

The First Island Chain is central to the operating area of China's Eastern Theater Command, a major military command responsible for the East China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and surrounding areas, including Zhejiang and Fujian provinces. The geography connects China's territorial ambitions, military planning and dependence on maritime commerce.

How the Island Chain Shapes Naval Power

American military planners developed the First Island Chain concept in the 1940s as they considered how to contain Soviet and Chinese maritime ambitions. In the 1950s, John Foster Dulles identified an arc running from the Kuril Islands through Japan, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan and the Philippines as the first strategic barrier.

The islands create chokepoints, narrow passages through which ships must travel between the China Seas and the Pacific. They shape access to the South China Sea, East China Sea and Yellow Sea, waters containing rich fishing grounds, substantial oil and natural gas reserves, and routes carrying more than 60 percent of China's maritime trade.

Chester Cabalza, president of the International Development and Security Cooperation think tank, explains that breaking through this maritime cordon is essential to Chinese military strategy. China's most advanced capabilities for keeping US forces out of particular maritime areas are designed to counter a barrier aligned with Washington.

Retired diplomat Alfredo Toro Hardy described Taiwan's geographic role in his Global Policy Journal article, The Most Dangerous Area in the World.

From a strategic point of view, the island's location within the First Island Chain can act as a barrier into the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and the Yellow Sea.

Toro Hardy also described Taipei as a "bottleneck hampering exit from the said seas into the Pacific Ocean." His explanation places Taiwan at the junction between China's nearby seas and its ambitions farther offshore.

James Holmes, a professor at the US Naval War College, wrote in Proceedings magazine that the chain presents a "formidable barrier to exit from or entry into the China Seas." Defenders positioned around its islands and straits could combine weapons against ships and aircraft, sea mines, diesel submarines and small patrol craft carrying missiles.

Holmes argues that these comparatively inexpensive defenses could create overlapping fields of fire, meaning several weapons could cover the same sea passage. China would then need costly countermeasures whose effectiveness would be uncertain.

Trade and Energy Make the Geography Matter

China's interest in the First Island Chain extends beyond the movement of warships. Data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies show that more than 64 percent of China's maritime trade passed through the South China Sea in 2016. Nearly 42 percent of Japan's maritime trade used the same waterway.

The figures place China's share more than 22 percentage points above Japan's, using the reported thresholds. Both countries depend heavily on these routes, although China's exposure is greater by this measure. The figures describe the South China Sea specifically, one of the major waterways connected to the island chain.

Overseas supplies meet approximately 75 percent of China's oil demand and more than 40 percent of its gas demand. Ships carrying energy and other goods must move through waters where military pressure could disrupt access or raise the cost of keeping routes open.

For Beijing, greater control around the chain would therefore serve an economic purpose alongside a military one. Protecting access to imported fuel and maritime trade is part of the strategic calculation, while the same waterways also carry supplies essential to Japan and other regional economies.

Taiwan's location joins these concerns. A force operating from the island could affect the sea lanes connecting Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, while also changing the conditions under which US, allied and Chinese ships move between those areas.

Taiwan's Position and Beijing's Threat of Force

General Douglas MacArthur described Taiwan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in 1950. The phrase captured the military value of an island positioned to influence sea lanes between Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

Under Beijing's control, Taiwan could obstruct US and allied movements into and out of the China Seas. Under Washington's influence, the island serves as a forward position facing mainland China and a bottleneck limiting Chinese naval power. The Taiwan Strait is the most volatile flashpoint within this wider maritime contest.

Chinese President Xi Jinping set out Beijing's position at the Communist Party's 20th party congress. He said the Taiwan question belonged to the Chinese people and paired a stated preference for peaceful reunification with a refusal to abandon force.

Taiwan is China's Taiwan. Resolving the Taiwan question is a matter for the Chinese, a matter that must be resolved by the Chinese," Xi said. "We will continue to strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity and the utmost effort, but we will never promise to renounce the use of force, and we reserve the option of taking all measures necessary.

Xi's position leaves military action among Beijing's options. That keeps Taiwan's security tied to decisions in Washington and to the preparations of neighboring countries.

Cabalza warns that a war over Taiwan would involve the world's most powerful military and economic actors. Such a conflict would reshape warfare and the strategic order across the Indo-Pacific, unsettle alliances and force countries with economic or security ties to Taiwan to decide whether and how to participate.

Why Japan and the Philippines Face Direct Risks

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi said in 2025 that a Chinese naval blockade or the use of military force against Taiwan could "by all means become a survival-threatening situation" for Japan. The wording carries legal significance: under Japanese law, such a situation could allow military deployment overseas beyond the restrictions of the country's pacifist constitution adopted after World War II.

Japan would face less room for maritime maneuver if China dominated the First Island Chain. Its routes to the Pacific would become more constrained and exposed, while the People's Liberation Army Navy could operate more freely in the western Pacific.

Chinese forces could then place greater pressure on Japan's eastern flank, an area historically regarded as secure. Japan's sea lines of communication, the routes carrying goods and energy supplies, would become more vulnerable. Its military would face a heavier burden, alongside weaker confidence in US deterrence.

The Philippines occupies the southern part of the chain. Northern Luzon sits beside important passages connecting the South China Sea and the Pacific, making its location relevant to both military movements and the protection of shipping.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has acknowledged that a full war between the United States and China over Taiwan would draw his country into the consequences. He said "there is no way that the Philippines can simply stay out of it."

The Philippines would face pressure from its proximity to contested chokepoints, the passage of military forces through nearby seas and potentially large refugee flows from conflict areas. Its choices would also be complicated by the need to balance security cooperation with Washington against economic dependence on China.

Washington Leaves Room for Negotiation

The 2026 National Defense Strategy combines a pledge to defend the First Island Chain with silence on Taiwan. The approach leaves the administration diplomatic room to maneuver while increasing uncertainty for countries whose security depends on how that pledge would work in practice.

Denial defense means trying to prevent an opponent from achieving a military objective. Along the island chain, it involves making it difficult and costly for Chinese forces to move through defended passages or operate freely around them.

Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of defense for policy and an architect of the strategy, has pressed allies to define their roles in a possible Taiwan contingency. At the same time, he has publicly said Washington "does not seek to dominate China, nor do we seek to strangle or humiliate it."

Dennis Wilder, a former National Security Council director for China, linked the document's revision to President Donald Trump's desire for a successful Beijing visit. Wilder said "the Pentagon had sent it over ages before and they rewrote it because Trump wants a beautiful visit to Beijing." No date for that visit was given.

The strategy also seeks "strategic stability" through expanded communications between the US military and China's People's Liberation Army. Such contacts are intended to help officials manage dangerous incidents before they grow into a larger confrontation.

The February 2023 surveillance balloon incident showed how difficult those communications can be. After a US F-22 fighter jet shot down the Chinese balloon, then Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin tried to reach his Chinese counterpart through a crisis line.

The People's Liberation Army refused the call, saying Washington had failed to create "the proper atmosphere" for dialogue. Kurt Campbell, a former White House Indo-Pacific coordinator, has described hotlines with Beijing as tending to "ring endlessly in empty rooms." The usefulness of these arrangements therefore depends on both governments being willing to communicate during a crisis.

China's Ambitions Reach Beyond Taiwan

Admiral Liu Huaqing, regarded as the father of the modern Chinese Navy, outlined a strategy in three phases during the 1980s. His vision extended from nearby maritime control to a navy capable of operating worldwide.

• In the 1940s, American planners developed the island chain concept to contain Soviet and Chinese maritime ambitions.
• In the 1950s, John Foster Dulles identified the first strategic barrier running through the Kurils, Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan and the Philippines.
• During the 1980s, Liu envisaged control of the First Island Chain by 2000, control of the Second Island Chain by 2020 and a global navy by 2050.
• In 2018, US Pacific Command became Indo-Pacific Command, recognizing a wider geographic scope.
• On January 23, 2026, Washington released its new defense strategy, pledging denial defense along the First Island Chain without naming Taiwan.

Liu's timetable proved unrealistic, but the ambitions behind it remain. The Second Island Chain runs from Japan through the Marianas and Micronesia to Guam, a US territory containing America's strategic naval base in the western Pacific.

Chinese dominance of that chain would extend Beijing's reach into the middle Pacific and provide a position for military and economic activity farther from its coast. China's success in persuading the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to Beijing also points to efforts to establish footholds beyond the first barrier.

Some analysts describe fourth and fifth island chains extending into the Indian Ocean. China's first overseas military base, at Doraleh in Djibouti, and facilities capable of civilian and military use at Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka reflect a wider reach.

Those locations support China's ability to protect routes extending toward Africa and challenge India. The change to the name Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 acknowledged that the strategic geography now stretches beyond the Pacific alone.

Political Divisions Add Pressure on Allies

Beijing also watches the domestic politics of countries aligned with Washington. Political division can absorb government attention, complicate defense spending and weaken agreement on how to respond to Chinese pressure.

The political strains described across the region include South Korea's crisis following President Yoon Suk-yeol's declaration of martial law and subsequent impeachment proceedings. In Japan, the October 2024 election losses left Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru leading a minority government.

Taiwan's President Lai Ching-te has faced declining approval ratings amid legislative gridlock. In the Philippines, bitter conflict between the Marcos and Duterte families has added another source of division.

Analysis in The Diplomat connects these internal disputes to limits on the ability of US allies to strengthen their defenses. China combines increasingly coercive activity by its Coast Guard and Maritime Militia with economic pressure and disinformation campaigns aimed at weakening opposition.

These gray zone tactics involve pressure that stays below the level of open warfare. The approach echoes Sun Tzu's idea of "winning without fighting," exploiting an opponent's weaknesses without beginning a direct military confrontation.

The 2026 US strategy calls on allies and partners to "take on a greater share of the burden" of collective defense. That demand places further pressure on governments dealing with internal instability. Japan faces the challenge of increasing defense expenditure amid political constraints, while the Philippines must manage its security relationship with the United States and its economic dependence on China.

Such competing demands can create opportunities for Beijing to advance territorial claims without triggering direct US military intervention. The political strength of the alliance network matters alongside the range and number of its weapons.

Missile Deployments Build a Defensive Network

The United States and its allies have begun strengthening defenses along the First Island Chain despite uncertainty over Washington's Taiwan policy. The deployments are intended to place weapons near the passages Chinese forces would need to use.

The United States has deployed Typhon missile systems to Japan's Yamaguchi Prefecture and the Philippines' Zambales province. NMESIS systems designed to strike ships have been installed in Okinawa, Miyako Island, Ishigaki Island and Batan Island in the Philippines.

Japan plans to deploy Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectiles for "island defense" in Kyushu and Hokkaido. The Philippines intends to station BrahMos missiles designed to attack ships in western Luzon and Palawan.

Together, these systems could create overlapping fields of fire across important maritime approaches. A Chinese attempt to move through the chain would face threats from several locations, increasing the potential cost of a breakout.

The effectiveness of that deterrent depends on political commitment and agreement among allies. Taiwan could become alarmed if it interprets omission from the US strategy as abandonment. Allied confidence could weaken if governments believe their security is becoming a bargaining chip.

Beijing's reading matters too. If Chinese leaders see Washington's pursuit of stability as a willingness to avoid confrontation at almost any cost, they could use the lack of explicit language on Taiwan to apply further pressure. The central issue is whether the military defenses along the chain are supported by a political commitment that the countries involved understand and trust.

The Bottom Line

• The US defense strategy released on January 23, 2026, pledges denial defense along the First Island Chain but leaves Taiwan unnamed. The 2022 strategy mentioned Taiwan eight times.
• Taiwan sits at the center of a maritime barrier running through Japan and the Philippines toward Borneo. Control of the island would change access between the China Seas and the Pacific.
• More than 64 percent of China's maritime trade and nearly 42 percent of Japan's passed through the South China Sea in 2016. Imported supplies meet approximately 75 percent of China's oil demand and more than 40 percent of its gas demand.
• Xi Jinping has retained the option of force against Taiwan. Japan and the Philippines face risks to shipping, military access and regional security from a conflict.
• China's ambitions extend toward the Second Island Chain and the Indian Ocean, including its base in Djibouti and facilities in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
• Domestic political divisions complicate allied defense preparations, while Chinese Coast Guard, Maritime Militia, economic and information campaigns apply pressure below the level of open war.
• Typhon, NMESIS and planned Japanese and Philippine missile deployments aim to make Chinese military movement more costly. Their deterrent value depends on sustained political commitment and alliance cohesion.