Pakistan Rejects Weaponisation of Indus Waters Treaty

Water as leverage faces pushback in South Asia

President Asif Ali Zardari used a global forum in Doha to warn that India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty after an April attack in Kashmir will not stand, calling water a universal human right and warning against turning rivers into a tool of pressure. New Delhi says the pact will remain in abeyance until Pakistan curbs cross border militancy. Islamabad counters that the treaty contains no clause for unilateral suspension and says any attempt to reduce its share of flows would be treated as an act of war. A Hague based tribunal convened under the treaty has said proceedings and obligations continue despite India’s position, while India rejects the tribunal’s authority.

The stakes are high. Pakistan’s population of roughly 240 million relies on the Indus Basin for food, jobs, and power. Government estimates say the basin irrigates most of the country’s arid farmland. Hydropower drawn from the system supplies a major slice of electricity. Any disruption would radiate through agriculture, urban water supplies, and industry. The dispute adds to long running friction between two nuclear armed neighbors and lands at a time when climate stress is already squeezing rivers fed by Himalayan glaciers and erratic monsoon rains.

Speaking at the Second World Summit for Social Development in Doha, Zardari framed the issue in moral terms and warned that Pakistan would defend its treaty rights. He linked water pressures to climate vulnerability and poverty reduction.

President Asif Ali Zardari said the weaponization of water against Pakistan will not succeed, and that water must remain a universal human right rather than a tool to coerce nations.

What the Indus Waters Treaty says

Signed in 1960 after years of negotiation facilitated by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty divided control of six rivers of the Indus system between India and Pakistan. The agreement is unusual because it allocates entire rivers rather than requiring equal sharing at all times, and it built a framework that survived wars and frequent crises. The treaty also set up a standing commission, technical rules for hydropower design, and a ladder of dispute resolution that can escalate to international arbitration.

How the rivers are divided

Under the pact, India received the three eastern rivers, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. Pakistan received the three western rivers, the Indus main stem, Jhelum, and Chenab. India may use western rivers for non consumptive purposes such as run of river hydropower so long as projects meet strict design rules that limit storage and do not materially alter flows into Pakistan. Pakistan, in turn, cannot interfere with India’s use of the eastern rivers.

How disputes are resolved

The treaty created the Permanent Indus Commission, where the two sides exchange data and meet to address concerns. Technical disagreements can go to a neutral expert. Legal disagreements can advance to a Court of Arbitration convened under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. That court is currently handling Pakistan’s objections to the Kishenganga and Ratle hydropower projects on the Jhelum and Chenab. Case information and awards on competence and interpretation are published by the tribunal’s registry at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The case page is available here.

World Bank President Ajay Banga, whose institution is a designated facilitator in the treaty, has described the treaty’s status in direct terms.

Ajay Banga said the treaty does not contain any provision that permits suspension by one side, and any change requires agreement by both countries.

India’s position and domestic drivers

India argues that the treaty is tilted in Pakistan’s favor and does not reflect present day realities. New Delhi cites population growth, rising water stress, and climate pressures as reasons to reassess obligations. It has sought modifications to the pact and has pressed ahead with hydropower development on the western rivers while arguing that project designs comply with treaty rules. After the April attack on tourists near Pahalgam, the government said the treaty would be held in abeyance until Pakistan stops supporting what India calls cross border terrorism.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs has also rejected the authority of the arbitration body hearing Pakistan’s objections to hydropower projects, calling the forum inconsistent with the treaty. In a formal statement, the ministry dismissed the arbitral awards and questioned the legitimacy of the court’s constitution.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated that the Court of Arbitration has no legal standing and that its awards are void, adding that India has never recognized this arbitral body.

India’s home minister has taken a hard public line. He has vowed that India will not restore the treaty under current conditions and characterized Pakistan’s access to water as unjustified.

Home Minister Amit Shah said the Indus Waters Treaty will never be restored and that Pakistan would be denied water it has been getting unjustifiably.

Legal battle in The Hague

Pakistan initiated arbitration in 2016 over Indian hydropower plans on the western rivers and has continued to pursue the case. The Court of Arbitration has issued procedural and jurisdictional findings, including a 2025 award confirming that it can proceed. India has chosen not to participate, arguing that the forum is not valid under the treaty and that a neutral expert route should be used instead. The tribunal has continued its work, including site visits and hearings, with published materials indicating a focus on whether project elements meet the treaty’s strict design limits.

The Court of Arbitration is administered by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which acts as registry and provides logistical support. The tribunal’s composition includes international jurists and technical experts. While India rejects the process, the treaty text outlines that the court’s function is to interpret provisions when the parties disagree on legal questions, and to ensure that hydropower development on the western rivers does not restrict Pakistan’s use of those waters.

Pakistan has raised the stakes in diplomatic arenas as well. Addressing the United Nations Security Council in a session on climate and security, Pakistan’s permanent representative criticized what he called the deliberate weaponization of shared rivers and appealed for a return to treaty compliance.

Ambassador Asim Iftikhar said there is no treaty clause that allows one country to suspend obligations on its own, and warned that undermining the Indus framework endangers millions who depend on predictable river flows for food and energy.

Can India actually cut water to Pakistan

Technical constraints matter as much as political threats. India possesses no large reservoirs on the western rivers that could stop or divert most flows into Pakistan under a quick timeline. The treaty’s rules have limited new storage for decades, and new megaprojects would take many years to build. India can use run of river plants that pass most water downstream after power generation. It can also manipulate short term flows within operating rules, for instance through sediment flushing or by timing maintenance or diversions. Those tools can disrupt Pakistan at the margins, especially in winter, yet they can also affect Indian farmers and power users upstream. The most immediate lever is data sharing and coordination, which India has suspended.

Run of river limits and engineering realities

Run of river hydropower relies on natural flow rather than large storage. Operators divert water through tunnels to spin turbines and then return water to the river. Storage, if any, is small and mostly used to regulate daily power peaks. That makes major long duration cuts to downstream flows difficult without building new infrastructure that sits outside treaty limits. Engineering teams would also face significant permitting, financing, and geotechnical hurdles in the Himalayan foothills before any new storage could come online.

Data and timing of flows

The treaty envisions regular exchange of hydrological data and consultations, which help both countries prepare for floods, allocate scarce water in dry months, and manage reservoirs. Without shared data, Pakistan’s planners must guess about upstream conditions. That can increase flood risk, delay sowing seasons, and reduce power dispatch reliability. Pakistan’s limited storage capacity magnifies the risk. Analysts estimate that the country relies on the Indus system for the overwhelming share of its renewable water and that reservoir siltation has eroded the cushion needed to ride out dry spells.

Climate change and public health risks

Warming in the high Himalaya is changing the rhythm of the Indus. Glaciers are retreating, snow is melting earlier, and monsoon rainfall is growing more erratic. Both India and Pakistan face rapid growth in water demand as cities expand and farms intensify. Groundwater reserves that once buffered dry years are falling. Climate stress amplifies the cost of uncertainty in transboundary rivers. Any breakdown in coordination hits hardest during extremes, when an extra day of warning can save crops or protect a city’s water intake.

Food, energy, and disease

Pakistan’s farm economy depends on predictable irrigation from the Indus and its canals. Interrupted flows or poorly timed releases can slash yields, worsen salinity in the lower basin, and push food prices higher. Hydropower shortfalls raise electricity costs and increase reliance on expensive fuels. Public health risks are severe. Only a minority of drinking water is considered safe, and waterborne illnesses already account for a large share of disease. Lower and more polluted flows would increase exposure to pathogens, harm children’s growth, and strain hospitals. Cities that depend on the Indus for dilution of wastewater would face harsher quality swings in dry months.

The Kashmir factor and the risk of escalation

The treaty crisis cannot be separated from the conflict in and around Jammu and Kashmir. After the April attack that killed tourists near Pahalgam, India blamed Pakistan based groups and took retaliatory steps, including announcing that the treaty was in abeyance. Cross border strikes followed, before a United States brokered ceasefire helped halt a rapid slide. The rhetoric has stayed heated, with political leaders on both sides promising to defend national interests and warning against interference with river flows.

Pakistan’s elected leadership has pledged to resist any attempt to curb flows from the western rivers. The prime minister has spelled out a categorical red line.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said Pakistan will not allow India to take even one drop of water that belongs to Pakistan.

Domestic politics in both countries can magnify risks. National pride, water scarcity, and disputes tied to Kashmir can push decision makers toward hard lines. Water still tends to be managed by engineers and civil servants through routine cooperation, yet the current freeze in formal talks has weakened those stabilizers.

What could lower the temperature

Practical steps exist even amid strained ties. The two sides could restart regular meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission and quietly restore data sharing on river flows and dam operations. Technical contacts can happen without fanfare and can save lives during flood season. A limited operational understanding on sediment flushing, reservoir drawdown rates, and outage scheduling would reduce surprises downstream. The designated roles for neutral experts and the World Bank provide tools to solve specific technical disagreements without sweeping political bargains.

Longer range stability will require investments and reforms at home. Pakistan can expand off stream storage, upgrade canal telemetry, reduce conveyance losses, and improve water quality control. India can prioritize project designs that leave river flows predictable downstream and share real time data that helps Pakistan manage droughts and floods. Joint glacier and snowpack monitoring with open data would benefit both sides. None of these steps settles larger disputes. They can, however, reduce the chance that a dry winter or an ill timed reservoir drawdown tips a crisis.

The Bottom Line

• India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty after an April 2025 attack in Kashmir, while Pakistan says unilateral suspension is illegal and any cut in flows would be an act of war.
• A Hague based tribunal convened under the treaty says it has jurisdiction and the treaty remains in force. India rejects the tribunal’s authority.
• President Asif Ali Zardari says water weaponization will not succeed and calls water a universal human right.
• India argues the treaty is outdated and unfair, seeks modification, and has rejected arbitral awards on hydropower disputes.
• Technical limits constrain India’s ability to halt flows now. Run of river hydropower and minimal storage on the western rivers restrict major diversions.
• Pakistan’s dependence on the Indus is extreme, with limited storage, large irrigation needs, and significant hydropower reliance.
• Climate change is making flows more volatile. Reduced cooperation increases risks to agriculture, electricity, and public health.
• Quiet restoration of data sharing, revived commission meetings, and technical understandings could reduce danger while larger disputes remain unresolved.