Satellite images reveal China’s sweeping missile factory buildup and its strategic aims

A surge in missile factories and bases since 2020

China has spent five years racing to expand the network of factories, research centers and test grounds that feed its missile arsenal. A review of satellite images compared with maps and government notices points to construction at scale. More than 60 percent of 136 known or suspected missile related and Rocket Force sites show expansion between early 2020 and late 2025. The added floor space exceeds 21 million square feet, a footprint the size of a major industrial district.

The buildout strengthens Beijing’s ability to threaten or deter forces in the Western Pacific. It is designed to complicate any United States or allied intervention around Taiwan and to raise the cost of operations near China’s coastline.

Within that network, 99 sites tied to missile manufacturing show growth at 65 locations. Thirty seven bases of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, the branch that handles nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles, expanded at 22 locations. A recent United States Defense Department estimate said the Rocket Force increased its missile inventory by about 50 percent from 2020 through 2024.

The surge reflects a policy set by Xi Jinping in 2012 to modernize the armed forces into a world class military. Money followed that directive. Defense spending has risen at a steady pace and the missile enterprise sits at the center of that push.

William Alberque, a former NATO arms control director now at the Pacific Forum, frames the expansion as part of a wider competition.

We are in the initial phases of a new arms race.

What the images show on the ground

Imagery shows new factory towers, long assembly halls, deep berms and bunkers associated with the handling of energetic materials. In several places, missile sections, support vehicles and launch related hardware sit in the open on tarmacs. Thick blast walls and earthen mounds surround many buildings, a sign of safety rules for explosives.

The facilities are not confined to remote deserts. Some sit inside major cities. Others are tucked into valleys with limited road access and natural cover. Rural land has been cleared and villages relocated to make room for sprawling industrial plants, test stands and rail served depots.

Many of the locations connect to China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation, the two state owned giants that deliver rockets and missiles across the People’s Liberation Army. Ownership records, supplier announcements and tender notices help link otherwise ordinary looking factories to sensitive weapons work.

How analysts identify hidden facilities

Analysts look for a consistent set of signatures. These include double perimeter fencing, frequent security checkpoints, mock objects for tracking tests, covered test bays, blast berms, short range rail spurs and unusual heat plumes. When several of these features cluster near known defense campuses, the likelihood of missile related activity rises.

Why missiles sit at the core of Beijing’s strategy

Missiles offer Beijing speed, reach and scale. A dense inventory of ballistic and cruise weapons can hold airfields, ports and logistics hubs at risk across the first island chain. The plan is to create an anti access area denial belt, often called A2AD, that pushes carrier groups and bombers farther from Taiwan and the East China Sea.

Recent wars have reinforced that lesson. Russia used cheap drones and massed rockets to force defenders to expend expensive interceptors, then followed with heavier salvos. Chinese military journals have argued for a similar mix of volume and precision, using waves of low cost systems to blind radars and exhaust air defenses, opening corridors for higher end ballistic strikes.

Decker Eveleth, a researcher with CNA who tracks missile deployments, describes the opening moves in a Taiwan scenario. He argues that the first targets would be the places that enable outside help.

China plans to target Taiwan’s ports, helipads, and supply bases to block the US or its allies from sending any aid.

For the United States and partners, that approach means defending long supply lines while protecting forward bases from repeated attacks. It also turns industrial output into a central variable. A country that can build more missiles, faster and at lower cost, holds an advantage in any extended contest.

China’s nuclear growth, still smaller than US and Russia

Specialists estimate that China holds roughly 600 nuclear warheads as of 2025, far fewer than the arsenals of the United States and Russia but growing faster than any other nuclear state. Since 2023, the stockpile has risen by about 100 warheads per year. The Pentagon has projected that the total could top 1,000 by 2030, although the final figure will depend on how many silos are filled, how many warheads are assigned to each missile and how much fissile material is produced.

China says it follows a no first use policy and typically stores warheads separate from launchers. Training now stresses faster launch readiness, better early warning and greater survivability across road mobile, rail mobile and silo forces.

Large new missile fields at Yumen in Gansu and near Hami in Xinjiang, first spotted in 2021, suggest that hundreds of silos are being built for solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles. Open source groups have assessed that the fields may hold more than 300 silos when complete. Technical analysis of those sites has been published by the Federation of American Scientists, which provides detailed satellite comparisons for both fields. Readers can see that work here: FAS briefing on China’s second silo field.

Key systems to watch

Several programs reveal how the production surge could change the balance in a crisis.

DF 26 and the Guam killer label

Factories around Beijing and in other provinces have grown their floor space while producing the DF 26, a road mobile medium range ballistic missile capable of conventional or nuclear payloads. The missile can reach the United States territory of Guam and is advertised inside China as an anti ship and land attack system. Flight profiles suggest maneuvering during terminal approach, which complicates interception by systems that expect a stable path.

The DF 26D variant and hypersonic glide vehicles

A new variant called DF 26D has been showcased with a hypersonic glide vehicle. A glide vehicle is boosted to high altitude, then detaches and flies at very high speed inside the atmosphere along a shifting path. That unpredictable flight can make tracking and interception harder than a traditional ballistic arc.

New silo fields and solid fuel ICBMs

The grid layout of the Yumen and Hami fields mirrors older training areas, with equal spacing between launch positions and extensive support roads. Solid fuel missiles can stay in launch tubes for long periods and fire on short notice. If China places even a fraction of those silos on alert, the number of survivable firing positions rises sharply and complicates any attempt to disarm the force in a single strike.

Industry, budget and the production gap

Beijing raised its announced defense budget by 7.2 percent in early 2025 to about 245 billion dollars, the fourth straight year at that pace. Independent analysts believe actual spending is higher once off budget items are counted. The priority on missiles is visible in the scale of concrete poured at factories and the tempo of equipment trials at test ranges.

By contrast, the United States has faced tight stocks of some advanced interceptors after large deployments to partners. A portion of the THAAD inventory, which defends against high altitude ballistic threats, has already been consumed by operational demands. Washington has contracted industry to produce more, including a multibillion dollar award to expand lines, yet each interceptor costs many millions and takes months to build.

Internal risks and recent anticorruption purges

The Rocket Force has endured a sweeping anticorruption campaign that removed several senior officers and procurement chiefs. Investigations have touched units responsible for testing and acceptance of new missiles. Those cases raise concerns about quality control, storage practices and the integrity of performance reporting. Political campaigns can expose wrongdoing and deter graft, yet they can also disrupt schedules, clog decision chains and slow deliveries. The scale of construction suggests that the industrial plan continues, but there are likely to be local delays as managers rotate and contracts are reviewed.

Regional ripple effects for India and the Indo Pacific

India watches these trends with growing concern because Chinese units already deploy short and medium range systems on the Tibetan Plateau and in Xinjiang. Added factory capacity could translate into more frequent rotations and new variants with better accuracy. New Delhi is modernizing its own forces, from Agni and Pralay missiles to Akash NG air defense, while deepening cooperation with partners.

Across the broader region, Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian states are investing in dispersed bases, longer range sensors and resilient supply lines. For Taiwan, the priority is to survive the opening salvos and keep ports and airfields open long enough for help to arrive.

The Bottom Line

• More than 60 percent of 136 missile related and Rocket Force sites in China expanded between 2020 and 2025.
• About 21 million square feet of new floor space has been added across factories, test centers and support depots.
• At least 65 of 99 missile manufacturing sites grew, and 22 of 37 Rocket Force bases expanded.
• The United States Defense Department estimates the Rocket Force increased its missile inventory by about 50 percent since 2020.
• Missiles anchor China’s plan to keep outside forces at distance from Taiwan through an anti access area denial belt.
• Analysts highlight DF 26 production and a DF 26D variant with a hypersonic glide vehicle as systems to watch.
• China’s nuclear stockpile is about 600 warheads in 2025, growing quickly but still far smaller than US and Russian totals.
• Large silo fields at Yumen and Hami point to an expanding force of solid fuel intercontinental missiles.
• Beijing’s defense budget rose 7.2 percent to roughly 245 billion dollars in 2025, while the United States faces pressure to replenish advanced interceptors.
• An anticorruption campaign has shaken the Rocket Force, creating potential delays even as construction continues.
• India and other Indo Pacific states are adapting with new defenses and more resilient logistics to blunt mass missile strikes.