China and Taiwan Clash Over World War II History as 80th Anniversary Sparks New Tensions

Why this anniversary matters

Eight decades after Japan announced its surrender in the Pacific War, memory of World War II remains a live fault line in East Asia. Beijing will stage large commemorations on September 3 to mark the end of what it calls the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression. The events, which include a military parade and ceremonies, carry a dual message. They honor wartime sacrifice, and they reinforce the Chinese Communist Party’s story of the conflict and of China’s place in the postwar order. Taiwan sits at the center of that story. The island was a Japanese colony from 1895 until 1945, and in the Chinese government’s narrative, Taiwan’s return to China at the end of the war is a core outcome that must be respected today.

That framing is contested in Taipei. Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has criticized Beijing for giving the party a starring role in a war that, Taipei argues, was fought and won by the Republic of China government led by the Kuomintang. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council has warned public officials not to travel to the mainland for the September 3 parade and related events, and has advised citizens against participation. The dispute is not a mere academic quarrel. It goes to the heart of questions about sovereignty, Taiwan’s identity, and security across the Taiwan Strait.

The clash over wartime memory is also a clash over language. Beijing uses terms like victory in the War of Resistance and Taiwan’s recovery to emphasize unity and continuity of Chinese territory. Independence leaning politicians in Taipei increasingly speak of the end of Japanese rule, which avoids implying that the island returned to a government seated in Beijing. With the 80th anniversary as a backdrop, both sides have sharpened their rhetoric, invited allies to their ceremonies, and used museums, exhibitions, and media to press their case.

Beijing’s message and invitations

Beijing says its commemoration is inclusive and national in scope. Zhu Fenglian, spokeswoman for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, faulted the DPP for downplaying what she called the Communist Party’s crucial role in resisting Japan. She said representatives from all walks of life, including people from Taiwan, would be invited to the 80th anniversary events in the capital. Her argument is that the victory over Japan and Taiwan’s return after colonial rule are part of a shared story. In her view, those from Taiwan should not be absent when that story is told.

The Chinese government casts the commemoration as both remembrance and affirmation of the postwar settlement. Chinese officials cite the wartime Cairo Declaration of 1943 and the Potsdam Proclamation of 1945, which referenced Cairo, to argue that Taiwan’s return to China was already agreed by the Allied leaders during the war and carried forward at Japan’s surrender. A defense ministry spokesperson, Jiang Bin, used the run up to the anniversary to link the history of 1945 with present day policy. The ministry’s remarks were carried in Chinese state media and framed reunification as a historical certainty.

Before delivering that message, Jiang’s role and position were spelled out at a press conference in Beijing. He then presented the government’s stance in stark terms.

Jiang Bin, spokesperson for China’s Ministry of National Defense: “The return of Taiwan to China is an integral part of the victory outcomes of World War II and the postwar international order… the trend toward China’s reunification is unstoppable.”

Beijing has extended invitations to former Kuomintang figures and veterans from Taiwan, a gesture that both recognizes the ROC army’s place in the war and underscores the mainland’s claim to speak for the entire Chinese nation. In 2015, when China held a similar parade for the 70th anniversary, Taipei’s participation was limited. This year, the political temperature is higher and the public attention is greater, including in Taiwan, where major outlets have carried live coverage of military parades in the past. Chinese media and academic commentary also stress that World War II marked the end of semi-colonial arrangements in China and the start of a new international role, points that help connect pride in wartime sacrifice to present day ambitions.

Taipei’s response and restrictions

Taiwan’s government has pushed back on both the historical narrative and the optics of a large military march in Beijing. The Mainland Affairs Council has banned public officials from traveling to the mainland to attend the parade and warned that cooperation with the organizers could bring legal penalties. Officials argue that China is using World War II history to pressure Taiwan and to claim credit for a victory won by a different government. DPP leaders also object to the showcase of weapons at a time when Chinese aircraft and ships operate around Taiwan on a near daily basis.

The party’s position was laid out by its China affairs department in a message that condemned the tone of the events in Beijing. The department’s identity and role were stated before the charge, which focused on the parade and its imagery.

DPP China affairs department: “The second world war should have taught humanity the lessons of opposing aggression and pursuing peace, yet Beijing chose instead to showcase the troops and weapons it now uses to intimidate its neighbors… militarism taken to the extreme.”

Taiwan’s defense minister, Wellington Koo, addressed the question of who led the war effort against Japan. Speaking at the legislature, he noted that the ROC, not the People’s Republic of China, received Japan’s surrender and fought the bulk of the war on the Chinese front. His remarks placed the wartime record firmly in the ROC column.

Wellington Koo, Taiwan’s minister of national defense: “The war of resistance was led and won by the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China, this is without a doubt.”

Earlier this year, Taiwan criticized both Russia and China for statements about World War II, saying Chinese communist forces made, in the words of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, “no substantial contribution to fighting Japan” and used the war to expand their own strength. President Lai Ching te has been even more direct in defining Taiwan’s present status. In a speech that China denounced as provocative, he argued that Taiwan’s sovereignty is decided by its people and that the island is not part of the People’s Republic of China.

His office and title were set out before his statement, which drew intense reaction from Beijing.

Lai Ching te, president of Taiwan: “Taiwan is of course a country and China has no legal or historical right to claim it.”

Who fought Japan and who accepted the surrender

The record of the war in China is complex. In 1937, after years of internal conflict, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party formed a second united front to resist Japan. The nationalist National Revolutionary Army fought large conventional battles and suffered heavy losses. Communist forces grew behind Japanese lines and relied on guerrilla tactics. That dual track resistance broke down once the war ended, and the civil war resumed.

On September 9, 1945, a week after Allied terms were signed, Japan formally surrendered to the ROC army in Nanjing. In Taiwan, where Japan had governed for half a century, a separate surrender ceremony took place on October 25. ROC officials took charge of the island’s administration. The process that followed was fraught. Many Taiwanese expected better governance than they received from incoming ROC authorities, and some resented the heavy hand of the new rulers. Those tensions exploded in the 1947 February 28 Incident and shaped politics for generations. The communists ultimately won the civil war on the mainland in 1949, and the ROC government relocated to Taipei the same year.

The legacy of those events drives the narratives seen today. For many in Taiwan, the ROC’s acceptance of Japan’s surrender in China and Taiwan is proof that Beijing’s current government cannot claim to have led the war effort. For Beijing, the war belongs to the Chinese nation as a whole, regardless of which party governed at the time, and the united effort of Chinese people on both sides of the strait delivered the outcome that saw Taiwan return to China after occupation.

What the documents say

Beijing and Taipei point to different legal texts to support their positions. Both cite wartime declarations. They disagree on how those declarations relate to postwar treaties and on which governments had standing to receive the fruits of victory. A separate debate concerns how the United Nations and major powers treated China after 1945 and what that means for Taiwan’s status today.

Cairo and Potsdam

The Cairo Declaration of 1943, a communiqué issued by the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China, said that territories seized by Japan from China, including Formosa and the Pescadores, would be restored to the Republic of China. The Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945 called for Japan’s surrender and stated that the terms of the Cairo Declaration would be carried out. Japan accepted the Potsdam terms in August 1945. Beijing argues that these texts established the return of Taiwan as part of the postwar settlement and that China’s sovereignty over the island is grounded in the Allied agreements and the surrender documents. Taiwan’s government also cites Cairo and Potsdam but stresses that they reference the Republic of China, which administered Taiwan after the war and continues to exercise effective control there.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty and Treaty of Taipei

Japan and 48 Allied countries signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951. Japan renounced sovereignty over Taiwan and the Pescadores but the treaty did not name a recipient. The treaty did not involve the ROC or the PRC, which left space for competing legal arguments that survive to this day. In 1952, Japan and the ROC concluded the Treaty of Peace, often called the Treaty of Taipei, which recognized Japan’s renunciation of Taiwan and regulated practical matters between the two governments. Beijing maintains that it is the successor state to the Republic of China that fought in the war and that Allied wartime texts, reinforced by surrender documents, provide the basis for its claim. Washington’s legal language often references the San Francisco treaty context. Analysts note that these divergent readings mirror larger disagreements about the postwar order and the sources of legitimacy in Asia. In 1971, the United Nations seat for China shifted from the ROC to the PRC, a change that confirmed Beijing’s representation of China at the UN but did not settle the separate question of Taiwan’s status in the eyes of all states.

These legal arguments sit alongside political claims. Taiwan’s official timeline notes that the PRC has never exercised sovereignty over the island and that the ROC has governed Taiwan since 1945 and has evolved into a separate democratic system. Beijing rejects that distinction and continues to insist that both sides belong to one China. Each side can find texts to cite, which is one reason the historical debate remains intense.

History, textbooks, and identity in Taiwan

Inside Taiwan, the way history is taught has changed over time. During the decades of martial law, curriculum and textbooks reflected a China centered narrative and downplayed Taiwan’s distinct past. With democratization in the late 1980s and 1990s, new materials highlighted the island’s own experience under different rulers and the diversity of its people. That evolution has been contentious. In 2015, student protests met an education ministry effort to shift language back toward a China centered frame. The protests helped reverse the changes and revealed deep public engagement in how history is presented to the next generation.

Identity feeds these debates. Taiwan’s society includes people whose families arrived from Fujian and Guangdong centuries ago, later arrivals who came with the ROC government after 1949, a vibrant indigenous population with deep Pacific roots, and a large Hakka community. Civil society has worked to address wounds from the past, including the February 28 Incident and the period of White Terror that followed. Memorials, museums, and a transitional justice process have brought more of that history into the open. For many citizens today, the experience of pluralism and democracy sits at the center of identity. That affects the language used about World War II and about relations with China. Terms like retrocession still appear in some museums and events, but end of Japanese rule is more common in everyday conversation and carries fewer political assumptions.

Commentary that urges a broader view of Taiwan’s past argues that the island’s history has included colonizers from Europe and Japan, as well as control by Chinese governments. By this view, Taiwan should be treated as an agent in its own right rather than as a passive object inside a larger Chinese frame. Advocates of this approach point out that the Chinese Communist Party has never governed Taiwan, that the Qing did not rule the entire island, and that Taiwan’s people have resisted domination from outside across centuries. That perspective does not deny cultural links with the Chinese mainland, but it rejects the idea that culture alone can decide present sovereignty.

Public reaction and the optics of parades

Coverage of Chinese military parades has drawn large audiences in Taiwan. Reports from Taipei describe a split view among viewers. Some admire advances in Chinese equipment on display. Others see the show as part of a pressure campaign against Taiwan and a claim over wartime credit that does not match the archives. This year, the DPP criticized the display as a platform for political messaging rather than a sober commemoration. The comparison is made sharper by frequent drills by the People’s Liberation Army around the island.

China’s stage management of memory aligns with a wider practice seen in other states. Scholars observe that both China and Russia use large parades not only to honor the dead but to emphasize their role in defeating fascism and to support present foreign policy goals. In that light, China’s emphasis on wartime documents and on unity of the Chinese nation becomes part of a narrative that seeks to fix how the world sees sovereignty disputes that remain unresolved. In Taiwan, a different cultural conversation is also underway. A popular streaming drama about a possible future conflict struck a chord this year, reflecting public anxiety and interest in practical defense rather than ceremonial messages.

Cross strait security and what comes next

The dispute over history overlaps with rising military activity in and around the Taiwan Strait. China has staged several rounds of exercises this year, including war games in April. Taiwan’s defense ministry reports daily flights by Chinese aircraft that approach the island’s air defense identification zone and frequent naval activity. Beijing frames these operations as internal matters. At a briefing in Beijing, China’s Taiwan Affairs Office was pressed on whether such actions prepare the ground for an invasion. The spokesperson rejected the premise of the question, which captured the government’s stance on Taiwan’s status in a few words.

Her institution and role were stated first to make clear the position from which she spoke, then the precise words were presented.

Zhu Fenglian, spokesperson for China’s Taiwan Affairs Office: “Taiwan is a part of China; there is no invasion to speak of.”

In Taipei, Taiwan’s leaders answer that only the island’s citizens can decide their future and that the Republic of China is a democratic government with its own army, currency, and laws. While most countries do not recognize Taiwan as a separate state, many maintain ties under different names and warn that any use of force across the strait would destabilize the region. Commemorations of World War II will not settle these differences. They do, however, show how the past is being used to shape opinion today. Beijing aims to keep attention on a story of national unity and legal continuity from 1945 to the present. Taipei stresses the ROC’s wartime role, the reality of self rule since 1949, and the choices of Taiwan’s people. The two stories are not compatible, which is why anniversaries often sharpen the debate rather than reconcile it.

Key Points

• Beijing’s September 3 events mark the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan and promote a narrative that Taiwan’s return in 1945 confirms Chinese sovereignty today.
• Taipei has restricted officials from attending the events and argues that the Republic of China, not the People’s Republic of China, led and won the war against Japan.
• Chinese officials cite the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation, while Taipei stresses the ROC’s postwar administration of Taiwan and says the PRC has never governed the island.
• Japan surrendered to the ROC army in Nanjing on September 9, 1945, and Japanese forces in Taiwan surrendered to ROC representatives on October 25, 1945.
• Disagreements extend to postwar treaties, including the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1952 Treaty of Taipei, which left room for divergent readings on Taiwan’s status.
• History education and identity politics inside Taiwan shape public language about the war and about relations with China.
• Military parades and state messaging are part of a wider effort by China to link wartime memory to current policy goals, including pressure on Taiwan.
• Cross strait tensions remain high, with frequent PLA flights and naval activity around Taiwan and a sharp rhetorical exchange between Beijing and Taipei.