Air Power, Drones, and Pressure from Beijing: How Myanmar’s Junta Is Regaining Ground

Battle for Myanmar’s trade corridor shifts back toward the junta

Myanmar’s military has clawed back ground along the trade artery that links northern Shan State to China, reversing some of the shock losses it suffered late last year. The army retook Kyaukme, a strategic town on Asian Highway 14, within three weeks of insurgents seizing it, and later pushed into Hsipaw to restore control over the road to the Chinese border. The method was blunt and devastating: daily air strikes, artillery barrages, and drone guided attacks that flattened neighborhoods and sent residents fleeing. These gains have been powered by a retooled war effort, one that leans on air power, newly mobilized conscripts, and a surge of support and leverage from China.

Beijing has not hidden its priority. Stability on its frontier, protection of energy pipelines that run from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan, and continuity for high value infrastructure projects all matter. Chinese officials have tightened border controls on dual use goods, pressured ethnic armies to halt offensives and curb weapons flows, and supplied the junta with drones, spare parts, training, and political cover for an election the generals want to stage this year. The result is a conflict that has tilted back toward the military in key corridors, even as vast areas remain contested or in the hands of resistance groups.

Kyaukme and Hsipaw show a new playbook

When Taang fighters first took Kyaukme, it looked like a psychological breakthrough for insurgents who had surged across northern Shan State under the banner of Operation 1027, a coordinated offensive by the trio known as the Brotherhood Alliance. The army’s response showed how the war had changed. Drone spotters and commercial quadcopters, now in military hands by the thousands, fed coordinates to pilots. Jets and attack aircraft pounded central streets and suspected hideouts, while motorized paragliders appeared over lightly defended zones to drop improvised bombs. Within weeks, the town fell back under junta control, and the same pattern repeated in Hsipaw.

These towns matter for more than symbolism. Control of the road to the Chinese border restores customs revenues to the state and gives the army the ability to move supplies along a vital trade route. It also sends a message to anxious officials across the frontier. The junta may be losing ground in some regions, but it aims to secure where trade, pipelines, and planned voting overlap.

Why Chinese backing matters

China views Myanmar through a security and economic lens. The oil and gas pipelines that stretch nearly 800 kilometers to Yunnan reduce reliance on seaborne routes. Border trade supports entire provincial economies. Disorder that spills across the frontier threatens both. That is why Beijing has stepped up aid and influence. Policy analysts say Chinese support now includes funds for a national census and an election, technology and training for the state, tighter export controls on dual use goods, and an effort to coax or coerce key ethnic actors along the border into ceasefires.

Cross border leverage and quiet coercion

Ethnic armies that fought the military to a standstill in late 2023 found their room to maneuver shrinking in early 2025. Border gates closed, power and internet flickered off in adjacent towns, and sources with knowledge of frontier dynamics described detentions and warnings when rebel leaders crossed into China. In northern Shan State, resistance forces withdrew from hard won positions, including a major city, without a fight, after weeks of pressure. The aim from Beijing’s perspective is straightforward: stop the conflict from endangering trade and infrastructure, and prevent the collapse of the Myanmar state.

Ni Ni Kyaw, a spokeswoman for a prodemocracy force that battled for the city before the withdrawal, described what she saw as direct intervention aligned with Chinese interests.

“China claims not to interfere in Myanmar’s internal affairs, but in Lashio, they clearly stepped in and managed the situation directly,” she said. “China’s approach to Myanmar’s affairs is driven purely by self interest.”

At the same time, long standing channels for arms and logistics have shifted. The powerful United Wa State Army, a pivotal source of weapons for many insurgents, has faced pressure to curb supplies to other groups. Some factions have paused offensives or pulled back from towns they previously held.

Arms, drones, and the supply chain

A decisive factor in the junta’s resurgence is the scale and diversity of equipment flowing to its forces. Chinese made drones now fill arsenal gaps, from off the shelf quadcopters used to scout and drop munitions to larger systems that can strike with greater range. The air force, short of serviceable Russian Yak 130 trainers and slow to field heavy Sukhoi fighters, has leaned on Chinese aircraft that are compatible with Myanmar’s maintenance base. A second batch of FTC 2000G fighter jets arrived in 2024, and pilots began using them in combat roles, according to former officers and images from military ceremonies. These jets carry bombs, rockets, and missiles, and have become a backbone for strike missions when weather and logistics allow.

China’s role extends beyond finished aircraft. An independent advisory group of former United Nations officials has published details on how Chinese state industry has helped Myanmar’s defense factories set up bomb production lines. Investigators cited Chinese engineers, training for factory staff in China, and ongoing remote assistance as parts of the buildout. The same report described the military’s reliance on foreign micro electronics and inputs for aerial munitions, and argued that without external supplies the bombing campaign would slow.

Yanghee Lee, a former UN special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar and a co founder of the advisory council, framed the ethical stakes in stark terms.

“China must end military support to the Myanmar junta,” she said. “The memory of bombings will linger for Myanmar’s people.”

Beijing rejects accusations that it fuels abuses and says it is cautious in defense exports. Yet its broader posture, from support for a managed vote to tightened border controls that hinder insurgent access to dual use parts, has helped the military shift the tempo.

Air power returns the initiative to the junta

Across the country, air power has become the tool of choice for a military that is stretched on the ground. Where soldiers struggle to patrol beyond garrison towns, jets, helicopters, and drones can reach deep into hostile territory. Strikes have hit schools, clinics, and residential areas. Monitoring groups counted hundreds of raids late in 2023 alone, and local tallies suggest at least a thousand civilians have been killed this year by air attacks. Millions have been displaced since the coup, with the United Nations estimating that the total exceeds three million. Conflict trackers count many tens of thousands of deaths.

Chinese jets and a shrinking maintenance lifeline

Myanmar’s Russian platforms have faced serviceability problems. Spare parts are costly and fuel consumption is high. By contrast, Chinese aircraft fit more easily into local logistics. A former sergeant who defected after the 2021 coup said the Chinese jets have already flown combat sorties from key air bases, filling the gap left by grounded trainers and delayed heavy fighters.

“Many Russian made Yak 130s are out of service, so the Chinese jets are critical,” said Zay Ya, a former Myanmar Air Force sergeant. “The Chinese planes can be used immediately, while the heavier Sukhoi needs time and resources the air force does not have.”

The FTC 2000G has also figured in the war’s risks for pilots and civilians. Resistance forces claimed to down one of the jets in early 2024 during an attack in northern Shan State. In separate strikes, the aircraft was identified in bombings that hit residential buildings near the Chinese border. Those incidents fed calls by rights groups for a halt to all arms transfers into Myanmar.

Drones reshape the battlefield

Since 2021, both sides have turned to drones. For insurgents with limited artillery, modified commercial quadcopters became cheap precision tools. Drone teams dropped small bombs on outposts and ammunition dumps, filmed convoys, and disrupted supply lines. That tactical edge is shrinking. The military has mirrored these methods, built its own drone units, and procured advanced jammers. Resistance groups now report that jamming cuts their range and reliability, while the military’s drones help correct fire for artillery and guide aircraft to targets. The result is a drone arms race layered onto air strikes, one that advantages the side with deeper supply chains and broader access to electronics.

Conscription, ground forces, and control of trade routes

Air strikes alone do not hold ground. The junta has replenished ranks with a sweeping conscription drive that forced tens of thousands of young men into service since late 2023. New units, even if unevenly trained, give commanders the manpower to re enter towns cleared by air power and to man checkpoints along highways and river crossings. The army has prioritized trade corridors to China and Thailand, as well as district centers where it aims to stage voting. That focus helps explain why the military retook Kyaukme and Hsipaw quickly, while resistance lines elsewhere in Rakhine and Chin States still hold.

Operation 1027 had exposed the army’s brittle presence in the north, as coordinated assaults by three ethnic armies overran around 180 outposts and shook confidence in Naypyitaw. The counter campaign has again shifted perceptions. The military is not in full control of the country, but it has restored a measure of mobility and leverage along the routes that matter most to its survival.

The humanitarian cost and the law of war

Myanmar’s war has exacted a crushing toll on civilians. Air strikes have hit schools, hospitals, and marketplaces. In one of the deadliest incidents of 2023, a bombing of a village gathering killed scores. Local rights groups document repeated attacks on places of worship, including churches in Karenni State. Education has moved into secrecy in many resistance held areas, with classes in riverbeds under tarps or in makeshift shelters. Aid groups say landmines and booby traps left by retreating units have made many homes unlivable.

Independent researchers have traced the supply chains that feed the bombing campaign, from aircraft and munitions to jet fuel. They argue that without external supplies and technical assistance, the intensity of air operations would drop. Their reports also contend that the pattern of strikes amounts to a strategy of terror, intended to crush civilian morale and depopulate areas that support the resistance. That assessment aligns with testimony from communities that describe repeated raids without military targets nearby.

Morgan Michaels, a research fellow who studies the conflict, warned that the destruction will shape politics and society for decades.

“The military has destroyed more than one hundred thousand homes in the dry zone alone, leaving deep grievances that will last generations,” he said.

Human rights advocates have urged Beijing to stop all transfers that enable air strikes, including parts and technical help for munitions production. They also argue that China has used its veto power at the United Nations Security Council to block a binding international arms embargo. Chinese officials reject those claims and say they seek de escalation and dialogue. The reality on the ground is a widening humanitarian crisis and a growing scarcity of food, medicine, and shelter in conflict belts.

Elections, legitimacy, and control

The junta plans to hold an election this year, with support from Chinese aid for a census and technical work. The leading party from the last national vote is banned, and the military retains sweeping powers under the constitution it wrote more than a decade ago. Large portions of the map are unsafe for polling. Analysts expect voting to be staged in zones where the army has reasserted control, especially along trade corridors and in provincial capitals. The goal is to claim a mandate and present a path out of crisis to foreign partners.

That narrative faces a stubborn reality. Opposition groups, including the People’s Defense Force and allied ethnic armies, still hold or contest wide areas across the country. The state struggles to deliver services in many places and has lost the trust of much of the population. Even with Chinese backing, the election is unlikely to resolve the core dispute over military dominance, especially as fighting continues to displace civilians and damage infrastructure.

Beijing’s balancing act and regional risk

China sits at the center of the conflict’s external dynamics. It is Myanmar’s main trade partner and investor, a supplier of aircraft and electronics, and a gatekeeper for cross border flows. It has even allowed private security providers to operate near strategic projects, freeing up Myanmar units for combat elsewhere. Yet its leverage has limits. The more the war targets civilians, the more it fuels resistance. Rebel groups adapt to technology, shift tactics, and find new supply paths. That cycle undermines Beijing’s goal of a predictable frontier.

Pressure on ethnic armies near the border

Across northern Shan State, ethnic armies operate in a mosaic of territories that overlap with China’s economic footprint. Chinese officials have leaned on these groups to stop fighting near border towns and around infrastructure. Reports from commanders and local leaders describe a mix of incentives and coercion, from promised trade openings to abrupt shutdowns of electricity and internet connections that paralyze affected towns. The withdrawal from Lashio stands out as a case where pressure delivered a swift result.

One resistance spokeswoman captured the frustration felt by fighters who had just taken heavy losses to capture the city.

“China’s approach to Myanmar’s affairs is driven purely by self interest,” said Ni Ni Kyaw. “They clearly stepped in and managed the situation directly.”

The pullback may reduce immediate risk to nearby pipelines and trade routes, yet it also leaves insurgents convinced that they face a two front contest, against the junta and against the constraints imposed from across the border.

What could meaningfully change on the ground

Every major shift in the war has been rooted in changes to supply, technology, or foreign leverage. The insurgent surge in late 2023 blended local momentum with drone tactics that punished exposed outposts. The junta’s rebound in 2024 and 2025 rides on air power, a flood of drones, and a conscription drive that replenishes units. Breaking that cycle would require either a negotiated freeze that sticks across multiple fronts or a disruption of the weapons and fuel that power air strikes.

Rights groups and aid organizations call for a halt to all arms transfers to the military, targeted sanctions on entities that enable munitions production, and measures to stop jet fuel reaching air bases. Some voices go further, arguing that the resistance needs material help, including anti aircraft systems, to deter attacks on civilians. Others warn that more weapons could widen the conflict and increase civilian harm. The only consensus across these camps is that air strikes are the single greatest driver of displacement and death.

Defense scholars caution that Chinese assistance, while helpful to the junta, does not fix fundamental weaknesses in manpower and logistics. Air frames still require maintenance cycles, pilots remain a finite resource, and ground forces need morale and cohesion to hold territory once planes fly home.

Dr. Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a Southeast Asia defense expert, offered a sobering assessment of what Chinese jets and support can achieve for Myanmar’s military.

“The delivery may give the junta a tactical advantage,” he said, “but it will not shift the balance, as the junta faces a shortage of manpower.”

For civilians in the path of the war, the stakes are immediate. Bomb shelters are rising near schools and clinics. Families move at night to avoid aircraft. Community groups catalog blast fragments and craters to document strikes for future accountability. Those daily choices, far from front page politics, will determine whether communities can endure long enough to see a pause in the air war.

The Bottom Line

• The army retook Kyaukme and Hsipaw with sustained air strikes, drones, and new conscripts, restoring control along a trade route to China.
• China has tightened border controls, pressured ethnic armies, and supplied technology and funding, including support for a planned election.
• Chinese made FTC 2000G jets bolster the air force as Russian platforms falter, while drones now guide more precise and lethal strikes.
• Independent researchers say Chinese state industry has aided Myanmar’s bomb production, and advocates urge an end to all enabling transfers.
• Air power drives most civilian casualties, with hundreds of strikes recorded in late 2023 and at least a thousand civilians believed killed this year.
• Forced conscription has added tens of thousands of soldiers, helping the military hold towns reclaimed after bombing campaigns.
• Wide areas remain outside junta control, and more than three million civilians are displaced according to UN estimates.
• Analysts argue Chinese backing strengthens the junta tactically but does not resolve manpower shortages or secure lasting control.
• A negotiated freeze or a halt to weapons and fuel for air operations would be needed to change the trajectory of the conflict.