November deadline uncertain despite faster negotiations
Philippine President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. says he cannot be certain that ASEAN and China will complete a South China Sea Code of Conduct before the regional bloc hands its chairmanship to Singapore in November. His caution comes despite more frequent negotiations and a Philippine push to finish the agreement in 2026.
Contents
- November deadline uncertain despite faster negotiations
- Four issues still divide the negotiating table
- Even ordinary words remain contested
- Monthly talks put the 2026 target to the test
- A code to manage incidents, not settle ownership
- Maritime rights remain a separate legal issue
- Hormuz disruption adds urgency to the maritime agenda
- Manila's diplomatic approach faces a security challenge
- What Singapore would inherit if talks continue
- Key Points
Speaking in an interview in Singapore, Marcos acknowledged substantial progress but stopped short of promising a completed text by the handover. He said efforts would continue to resolve the remaining issues. The proposed code is intended to establish rules for managing confrontations in disputed waters, where dangerous encounters have continued without a binding agreement governing conduct.
The distinction between November and the end of the year matters. Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro has expressed qualified confidence about completion by December 2026, while the Philippines hopes to demonstrate progress when ASEAN leaders meet in Manila in November. Those are related goals, but they are not the same deadline.
Marcos also sounded more optimistic at the 24th Forbes Global CEO Conference in Singapore, saying ASEAN and China were making good progress toward concluding negotiations this year. Taken together, his remarks describe a government still committed to an agreement, but unwilling to guarantee that the hardest provisions will be settled before its chairmanship ends.
The unresolved questions reach beyond wording. Negotiators have yet to settle whether the code will be legally binding, which waters it will cover, how it will relate to the existing 2002 declaration, and its terms of reference. Faster meetings have created more opportunities to negotiate, without yet producing agreement on those central choices.
Four issues still divide the negotiating table
Lazaro has identified four outstanding issues: the legal status of the code, its geographic scope, its relationship with the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, and its terms of reference. Each affects what the eventual agreement would require and how it would work.
The Philippines wants a legally binding code that explicitly references the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). A binding agreement would create legal obligations for its parties. That does not automatically guarantee compliance, however, and the details of monitoring and responding to violations would still matter.
Geographic scope determines where the agreed rules would apply. The relationship with the 2002 declaration determines how a new code would sit alongside the political commitments ASEAN and China already made. Terms of reference define the framework within which the arrangement operates.
Lazaro declined to disclose Philippine negotiating limits or the compromises Manila might accept, citing the sensitivity of the discussions. No final wording or agreed enforcement arrangements have been announced. Describing the negotiations as progress toward a binding code therefore requires a qualification: binding status remains one of the questions being negotiated.
Even ordinary words remain contested
The difficulty is visible in disputes over basic language. At a forum in Washington earlier in June, Lazaro said negotiators had still not resolved the definition of self-restraint after nearly a decade of talks. That phrase matters because governments must agree on what behavior a commitment actually prohibits or requires.
Marcos, speaking as Philippine president and the current ASEAN chair at the Singapore business conference, described how disagreements over language can slow negotiations:
The discussions have been going on for a while, and sometimes it's a bit frustrating that just the definitions of ordinary words are becoming bones of contention. But we are determined to come to an agreement and to hopefully de-escalate the situation,
A shared phrase is not enough if parties interpret it differently when ships meet at sea. Agreement on definitions is consequently part of the substance of the code, rather than a final editing exercise.
Monthly talks put the 2026 target to the test
Lazaro said ASEAN and Chinese negotiators now meet every month, a frequency she described as a departure from previous practice. She also said the desire to conclude the code exists on both sides, not just among ASEAN governments.
The accelerated schedule follows Manila's preparations for its chairmanship. The Philippine push for a 2026 agreement included proposals for more frequent negotiating rounds and tighter timelines. Monthly meetings show that the process has intensified, although they do not establish how close the parties are to resolving the remaining provisions.
The main milestones show both the length of the effort and the limited time left under Philippine leadership:
- 2002: ASEAN and China adopted the nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.
- 2023: Both sides agreed to guidelines intended to accelerate code negotiations.
- Early 2025: Officials reported a third reading of the draft text.
- January 2026: The Philippines assumed the ASEAN chairmanship and made completion of the code a priority.
- June 22, 2026: Lazaro described monthly negotiations and maintained the goal of concluding the code within the year.
- November 2026: ASEAN leaders are due to meet in Manila, and the chairmanship is scheduled to pass to Singapore.
- December 2026: Lazaro's stated target for completing the agreement reaches its deadline.
Asked in her June interview about confidence in finishing by December, Lazaro, the Philippine foreign secretary, gave a qualified answer:
I am an optimist; at the same time, a pragmatist.
Marcos's November caution does not formally abandon that December target. It does make clear that the political goal and the negotiating outcome remain separate.
A code to manage incidents, not settle ownership
The proposed agreement is meant to reduce dangerous encounters and misunderstandings. It would not, by itself, decide sovereignty over islands or draw maritime boundaries. Those disputes involve separate legal and diplomatic processes.
Marcos has acknowledged that distinction. At the Singapore conference, he said the immediate task may be to manage the problem rather than resolve it, so that mistakes and misinterpretations do not turn confrontations into something worse.
The 2002 declaration was not legally binding. In the 24 years since its adoption, ASEAN and China have not completed binding conduct rules, while Philippine vessels have faced shadowing, ramming and water cannon use during confrontations with Chinese ships. Those incidents explain why Manila wants more than another statement of shared intentions.
Earlier examination of the competing rules at sea described practical measures a credible code could contain, including communication protocols, crisis hotlines and procedures for investigating incidents. These remain possible tools, not confirmed provisions of a final agreement.
The test is therefore twofold: whether negotiators can agree on a text, and whether that text gives governments and personnel at sea usable rules. A completion date alone would not answer the second question.
Maritime rights remain a separate legal issue
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam have claims that overlap with China's in the South China Sea. The Philippines uses the name West Philippine Sea for waters on its western side, including areas within its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
UNCLOS provides the legal framework for maritime zones. An exclusive economic zone can extend up to 200 nautical miles from a state's coastal baselines and gives it sovereign rights over resources, including fisheries and offshore energy. Those resource rights are different from sovereignty over the entire sea area, and other states retain navigation rights under international law.
The 2016 arbitral award in the case brought by the Philippines rejected the legal basis for China's sweeping historic rights claim where it exceeded the maritime rights allowed by UNCLOS. It also addressed Philippine sovereign rights in parts of its exclusive economic zone. China rejects the ruling.
That legal dispute will not disappear merely because a conduct code is signed. Manila's insistence on an explicit UNCLOS reference reflects its position that rules for encounters must sit within existing international law, rather than replace the legal framework for maritime rights.
Hormuz disruption adds urgency to the maritime agenda
Lazaro has connected the code negotiations to the vulnerability exposed by the Strait of Hormuz crisis. Conflict involving Iran erupted in February, followed by repeated shipping disruptions and oil prices above US$100 a barrel for an extended period. Southeast Asian economies felt the effects despite being far from the conflict.
In her June 22 interview, Lazaro, speaking as foreign secretary, linked that experience to the value of a South China Sea agreement:
I think the whole world will appreciate it if we can come up with this Code of Conduct. This is ASEAN's gift to the world.
The two waterways present different disputes and conditions. Lazaro's comparison concerned the shared economic exposure to maritime disruption, not a claim that the South China Sea faces an identical crisis. Marcos likewise tied the code to freedom of navigation and the needs of global commerce.
At the ASEAN Summit in Cebu in May, leaders called for ratification of the ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement, a regional fuel stockpile and faster work on the ASEAN Power Grid. These initiatives address the region's exposure to energy shocks alongside the diplomatic effort to keep sea routes safe.
Implementation remains unfinished. Marcos acknowledged unresolved questions about storing and sharing fuel reserves and determining priority during shortages. By June, Lazaro said there were still no timelines or ratification updates across ASEAN's 11 members, although the petroleum agreement had reached the Philippine Senate's agenda. The energy response illustrates the same distinction visible in the code talks: agreement on a goal does not settle the operating details.
Manila's diplomatic approach faces a security challenge
The negotiations also sit alongside different public approaches within the Philippine government. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in May, Defence Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. criticized Beijing's conduct in disputed waters and warned that negotiations could give China strategic advantages rather than resolve disputes.
Lazaro did not deny the difference in approach. She grounded her commitment to diplomacy in the president's authority over foreign policy. Explaining her position as foreign secretary, she said:
My position that diplomacy and dialogue are very important is emanating from the architect of foreign policy. The architect of foreign policy is the president of the Republic of the Philippines,
These positions identify the practical challenge for Manila. It is pursuing rules with Beijing while responding to Chinese actions at sea and weighing whether negotiations are producing useful restraints. Marcos's continued support for the process does not amount to a claim that an agreement is close or that it will resolve the underlying dispute.
What Singapore would inherit if talks continue
Singapore is preparing to chair ASEAN in 2027. Its announced 2027 chairmanship priorities focus on stronger regional economic integration and wider global partnerships, including cooperation in energy and technology. An unfinished South China Sea code would add a continuing maritime negotiation to that agenda.
The November handover is a leadership milestone, not an automatic end to ASEAN and China talks. If the text is not ready, Singapore would inherit the process rather than a completed agreement. No replacement deadline beyond the Philippine target of December 2026 has been announced.
The next concrete test is the November leaders' meeting in Manila. The Philippines hopes to show progress there, but Marcos has not promised completion. The questions to watch are whether the parties settle binding status, geographic coverage, the relationship with the 2002 declaration and the operating framework.
For now, monthly meetings and expressions of optimism demonstrate continued political effort. They do not establish that the final compromises have been made. The president's caution leaves open both completion within 2026 and continuation under Singapore's chairmanship.
Key Points
- Marcos cannot guarantee completion of the South China Sea Code of Conduct before the November ASEAN handover.
- The Philippines still seeks an agreement in 2026, with Lazaro expressing qualified optimism about December.
- ASEAN and Chinese negotiators now meet monthly.
- Binding status, geographic scope, the connection to the 2002 declaration and terms of reference remain unresolved.
- The code would manage incidents and misunderstandings, not settle sovereignty or maritime boundaries.
- ASEAN leaders meet in Manila in November, and Singapore takes the chairmanship for 2027.






