UN Report Maps Southeast Asia's Criminal Economy, From Billion Dollar Scams to Trafficking

Shared networks turn separate crimes into a connected economy

Scams caused estimated losses of $88.3 billion to $114.1 billion across East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand in 2025, while people from at least 80 countries and territories have been identified in scam compounds across Southeast Asia. A United Nations report released on July 21, 2026, connects those figures to a wider criminal economy linking online fraud, human trafficking, drug sales, illegal gambling, data theft and money laundering.

The report, An Interconnected Criminal Ecosystem: Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment for Southeast Asia 2026, describes networks that increasingly share recruitment channels, financial systems, digital tools and transport arrangements. Groups that once concentrated on one territory or illegal trade now operate across several markets, buying or supplying services to other criminal organizations.

A scam business may obtain stolen personal information from one group, use another to process online payments, turn to a third for cryptocurrency transfers and rely on a fourth to recruit or traffic workers. Those same systems can support drug trafficking, illegal gambling and migrant smuggling. Each operation can draw on a wider network without controlling every part of it.

Delphine Schantz, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime regional representative for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, described the change at the report launch.

What we are seeing is a shift in which groups that stayed within their own geographic domain and criminal specialty are now operating across multiple illicit markets at once, relying on the same service streams.

Schantz compared the arrangement to corporate franchising. Specialized units handle activities such as laundering money, trafficking people, smuggling migrants and collecting data, while remaining connected to a shared network. That division of work makes the criminal economy more flexible and harder to dismantle.

Scam losses grow alongside new digital methods

The UNODC estimate for scam losses in 2025 is sharply higher than the $18 billion to $37 billion estimated for 2023. Even the lower figure for 2025, $88.3 billion, exceeds the annual economic output of several countries in the region. The increase reflects both expanding criminal operations and improved efforts to measure the damage.

Many victims still do not report fraud, the agency warned. Shame, uncertainty about what happened and a lack of confidence in authorities can keep losses out of official records.

Investment fraud, romance scams, payment redirection and impersonation attacks are among the methods used. Criminals increasingly combine stolen data, convincing fake websites, encrypted communications and cryptocurrency payment channels to reach victims and move their money quickly across national borders.

Artificial intelligence gives these operations additional tools. Generative AI can create convincing messages in several languages. Deepfake video and voice technology can imitate company executives, relatives or public officials, making a fraudulent request appear to come from someone the victim recognizes.

The report also warns that criminal groups may adopt agentic AI, systems able to carry out a sequence of tasks with limited human direction. Such systems could identify targets, conduct social engineering and assist with cryptocurrency theft. Social engineering means manipulating people into sharing information or taking an action that helps the criminal.

Malvertising is another route to victims. This technique places malicious software inside legitimate advertising networks, allowing attacks to reach large numbers of users without criminals contacting each person individually. UNODC said incidents linked to malvertising rose 42 percent year on year in 2025.

The report's main dates and comparisons show how the assessment spans several years:

• 2019: The earlier UNODC assessment provided the comparison for the current methamphetamine market estimate.
• 2023: Estimated scam losses were $18 billion to $37 billion.
• 2025: Estimated scam losses reached $88.3 billion to $114.1 billion, and malvertising incidents rose 42 percent year on year.
• July 21, 2026: UNODC released its assessment of transnational organized crime threats in Southeast Asia.

Trafficked workers face coercion as operations spread

People from at least 80 countries and territories have been identified in Southeast Asian scam compounds. Many were recruited through advertisements promising work in customer service, technology or online sales, then transported through transit points in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.

Inside some compounds, victims have been confined, threatened or subjected to violence while being forced to deceive people online. Recruitment is widening beyond Asia, with advertisements seeking speakers of German, Polish, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, French, Swedish, Norwegian and English.

Authorities have disrupted some large facilities, particularly in border areas of Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia. UNODC says these actions have often displaced operations instead of ending them. Criminal groups have moved into smaller buildings and private homes, or relocated to other countries, including Timor Leste, Pacific island states and parts of Africa.

UNODC analysts call this jurisdiction shopping. Criminal groups seek places where regulation is weak, corruption is common or enforcement agencies have limited resources. A large compound can disappear after a raid while its recruiters, payment systems, software and management teams keep working elsewhere.

Inshik Sim, a UNODC lead analyst, said existing enforcement systems were struggling to match the networks they face.

The scale and complexity of this expanding organized crime economy are outpacing existing responses, which were not structured to address such sophisticated criminal activity.

A person recruited in Africa may be held in a Southeast Asian compound, ordered to target victims in Europe and paid through accounts connected to another jurisdiction. With victims, managers and financial channels separated by thousands of miles, national investigations become slower and criminal leaders gain more opportunities to hide.

Drug profits and sea routes sustain the wider network

The Golden Triangle, where Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet, remains a major production center for methamphetamine and other drugs. Traditional trafficking markets continue to supply substantial revenue even as digital scams expand.

The regional methamphetamine market is estimated to be worth as much as $74.8 billion at retail level, about 20 percent higher than the estimate in UNODC's 2019 assessment. Retail value refers to the value of drugs when sold to their final buyers.

The ketamine market is valued at $2.7 billion to $7.2 billion, while the heroin market is estimated at $24.1 billion to $27.7 billion. Together, the annual retail value of the methamphetamine, ketamine and heroin markets is estimated at $75 billion to $109.7 billion.

Trafficking routes reach beyond Asia. The report identifies evidence of drugs produced in Southeast Asia reaching Africa, Europe and South Asia, extending the region's criminal trade into distant markets.

The Sulu and Celebes seas, linking Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, are another important part of the network. Heavy legitimate shipping traffic gives criminal groups opportunities to conceal illegal cargo among ordinary commercial shipments.

These waters are used to move drugs, firearms, wildlife and equipment that supports scam operations. The same routes can carry people and other illicit goods, connecting physical trafficking with the infrastructure needed for digital crime.

Satellite communications equipment, including systems using satellites in low earth orbit, can help criminal facilities operate in remote areas or places under close surveillance. Communications equipment therefore joins drugs and other contraband as cargo that can support the wider criminal economy.

Illegal gambling supplies revenue and moves criminal money

Illegal betting generates estimated global turnover of $340 billion to $1.7 trillion a year, with much of the supporting infrastructure based in Southeast Asia. Turnover is the amount wagered, rather than the amount operators keep as profit.

Gambling platforms can process deposits, disguise movements of criminal funds and direct users toward other illegal services. Their payment systems may connect to underground banking networks, fraudulent accounts and cryptocurrency exchanges. Those connections make gambling a financial channel for scams, trafficking and money laundering as well as a criminal market in its own right.

Young people face particular risks. Illegal operators use social media advertising, influencers, referral networks and features borrowed from mobile games to attract users with small bets and promises of quick wealth. Rewards, rankings and social competition can make gambling resemble entertainment and encourage repeated play.

Debt can push some users toward illegal lending, theft, fraud or work as money mules, people used to receive or move criminal funds. Groups may exploit people who are financially vulnerable or already involved in the justice system, using debts and limited employment options to recruit them into wider operations.

Schantz warned that the boundary between online gaming and gambling was becoming less distinct.

While online gaming initially refers to interactive digital play without mandatory monetary stakes, the two sectors have converged through design features that deliberately exploit this ambiguity, making the crime more dangerous.

Fragmented national rules allow operators to move platforms and payment systems across borders. Blocking one brand or website often has little effect when hundreds of services that appear separate use the same underlying technology.

Corruption and hidden finances keep operations running

UNODC identifies corruption as a primary enabler of organized crime. It allows groups to obtain protection, operate compounds, move goods and gain access to formal financial systems. Technology is one part of the network, while protection and financial access help keep it functioning.

Criminal profits circulate through shell companies, casinos, informal money transfer networks, bank accounts controlled by intermediaries and digital assets. Shell companies can obscure who controls a business or its money, while money laundering disguises the criminal origin of funds.

Cryptocurrency allows money to move quickly, but investigators often lack the specialist skills needed to trace transactions, freeze funds and recover assets. Networks benefit when money crosses jurisdictions faster than authorities can exchange information and act.

Financial institutions also face growing exposure. Fraud losses have risen much faster than the capacity of the Asia Pacific cyber insurance market. Victims, banks, technology companies, telecommunications providers and insurers face competing questions about who should prevent fraud and who should reimburse people who lose money.

Australia has introduced duties to combat scams for banks, telecommunications providers and digital platforms, with proposed rules covering reimbursement and shared liability. Singapore has updated guidance against money laundering for insurers and strengthened reporting requirements.

These measures can reduce losses, but criminal networks move data, workers and payment channels across several countries. Investigators need timely financial intelligence, shared databases and evidence that courts in different jurisdictions can use.

Why closing compounds leaves parts of the business intact

Large raids can rescue trafficking victims, seize equipment and disrupt a criminal site. The UN report warns that disruption alone leaves the business systems supporting an operation in place.

Managers may retain stolen data, digital platforms, cryptocurrency wallets and recruiters after a compound closes. Workers can be moved to another site while technical teams continue operating from a different country. Smaller facilities are harder to locate and can be more difficult to connect to a wider criminal organization.

Authorities may seize buildings while failing to identify the people controlling the money, software, recruitment and data supply chains. The visible site is only one part of an operation whose essential services may be spread across borders.

Schantz said shutting down individual sites was insufficient.

A counter organized crime strategy focused on disruption alone does not work. We have to address all the drivers, including prevention and following the money.

Following the money means investigating financial flows alongside the underlying offence. Investigators can trace cryptocurrency, identify beneficial owners of companies, examine casino payments, freeze assets and pursue confiscation orders. A beneficial owner is the person who ultimately owns or controls a company, even when other names appear in its paperwork.

Removing profits can make it harder for criminal networks to recruit workers, bribe officials and rebuild after enforcement action. Financial investigations therefore target resources that may survive the loss of a building or website.

UNODC calls for shared investigations and victim protection

UNODC urges governments to update and harmonize laws so criminal groups cannot exploit major differences between national systems. It also calls for earlier intelligence sharing and investigations focused on networks rather than isolated offenders.

The report recommends practical changes across enforcement, finance, technology and victim support:

• Expand investigations guided by intelligence to identify networks before they grow.
• Strengthen financial investigations and the recovery of criminal proceeds.
• Improve cooperation between police, customs, financial intelligence units and technology regulators.
• Address corruption and locations that provide safe conditions for criminal operations.
• Build stronger responses to artificial intelligence, deepfakes, encrypted services and cryptocurrency crime.
• Provide trafficking victims with rescue, legal support, health care and safe return options.
• Improve safeguards for children and young people exposed to illegal gambling, exploitation and online abuse.

People forced to conduct scams should be treated as victims when evidence shows coercion, rather than automatically prosecuted as willing participants. Trafficked workers may have been threatened, confined or deprived of their identity documents. The agency supports a response centered on the people harmed as well as the crimes committed.

The ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons already provides a legal basis for regional cooperation. Authorities still need compatible procedures, shared standards for evidence and resources for sustained investigations. The networks' ability to relocate quickly will test that cooperation.

The report gives recommendations rather than a dated schedule for carrying them out. Its focus is on changing how agencies investigate, cooperate and protect victims across borders.

The costs reach households, businesses and public services

Scam losses reduce household savings, weaken trust in digital payments and impose costs on businesses and financial institutions. Trafficking harms migrants and workers, while corruption can weaken public services and discourage legitimate investment.

Drug profits provide cash for further criminal expansion. Illegal gambling and underground finance create channels connecting online fraud with physical crime. Children can encounter gambling, exploitation and criminal recruitment through the same social platforms and mobile services they use for ordinary communication and entertainment.

UNODC presents organized crime as a security and development threat extending beyond police and courts. Shared services allow money, information, workers and goods to move between different criminal markets, so damage in one area can support expansion in another.

The assessment explains why drug seizures and police raids capture only part of Southeast Asia's criminal economy. Its strength comes from shared services, adaptable technology, access to global markets and the ability to exploit gaps between governments and private companies.

Key Points

• UNODC released its Southeast Asia organized crime threat assessment on July 21, 2026.
• Estimated scam losses reached $88.3 billion to $114.1 billion across East Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand in 2025, compared with $18 billion to $37 billion in 2023.
• People from at least 80 countries and territories have been identified in Southeast Asian scam compounds.
• Criminal groups share services supporting fraud, trafficking, gambling, data theft, drug sales and money laundering.
• The regional methamphetamine market may be worth as much as $74.8 billion at retail level.
• Global illegal betting turnover is estimated at $340 billion to $1.7 trillion annually.
• UNODC calls for stronger financial investigations, shared intelligence, compatible laws, action against corruption and protection for victims.