Pakistan Rejects Use of Indus Waters as Pressure as Treaty Dispute Deepens

Zardari brings the water dispute to Doha

President Asif Ali Zardari has warned that India's suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty will not stand, taking Pakistan's objections to the Second World Summit for Social Development in Doha. His intervention brings renewed attention to a dispute over six rivers whose waters support food production, electricity generation and daily life for Pakistan's population of roughly 240 million.

As of November 7, 2025, India says the agreement will remain in abeyance until Pakistan curbs cross border militancy. Pakistan says the treaty contains no provision allowing one country to suspend it and warns that any attempt to reduce its share of river flows would be treated as an act of war. A tribunal convened under the treaty has said proceedings and obligations continue despite India's position. India rejects that tribunal's authority.

Zardari framed access to water as a universal human right, linking the dispute to climate vulnerability and efforts to reduce poverty. He said Pakistan would defend its treaty rights and opposed using shared rivers to put pressure on another country.

President Asif Ali Zardari's message to the Doha summit was:

President Asif Ali Zardari said the weaponization of water against Pakistan will not succeed, and that water must remain a universal human right rather than a tool to coerce nations.

Pakistan's dependence on the Indus Basin gives the confrontation consequences far beyond diplomacy. Government estimates say the basin irrigates most of the country's arid farmland, while hydropower from the river system supplies a major slice of its electricity. Disruption could spread through farms, urban water supplies and industry. The dispute also places another source of tension between two neighbors armed with nuclear weapons, at a time when Himalayan glaciers and erratic monsoon rains are already changing water availability.

How the treaty divides six rivers

The Indus Waters Treaty was signed in 1960 after years of negotiations facilitated by the World Bank. Instead of requiring the countries to share every river equally at all times, it allocated entire rivers between them. India received the eastern rivers, the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej. Pakistan received the western rivers, the Indus main stem, Jhelum and Chenab.

India retains permission to make certain uses of the western rivers, including uses that do not consume the water, such as hydropower that relies on river flow rather than large reservoirs. Those projects must follow strict design rules limiting storage and preventing material changes to flows reaching Pakistan. Pakistan, in turn, cannot interfere with India's use of the eastern rivers.

The agreement established the Permanent Indus Commission, a standing body through which the two countries exchange data, meet and address concerns. It also created technical rules for hydropower projects and a process for moving unresolved disagreements beyond the commission. This framework survived wars and repeated political crises.

World Bank President Ajay Banga has described the limits on changing the agreement. The bank has a designated role as a facilitator under the treaty.

Ajay Banga said the treaty does not contain any provision that permits suspension by one side, and any change requires agreement by both countries.

That requirement for agreement by both countries sits at the center of Pakistan's legal position. India, meanwhile, argues that present conditions require the pact to be reassessed. The dispute therefore concerns both the rules governing particular power projects and the continued operation of the agreement itself.

Why India put the agreement in abeyance

India announced that the treaty would be held in abeyance after the April 2025 attack on tourists near Pahalgam in Kashmir. New Delhi blamed groups based in Pakistan and said the agreement would remain on hold until Pakistan stopped supporting what India calls cross border terrorism.

India also argues that the treaty favors Pakistan and no longer reflects present realities. Its stated reasons for seeking changes include population growth, rising water stress and climate pressures. New Delhi has sought modifications while proceeding with hydropower development on the western rivers, arguing that its project designs comply with treaty rules.

India's Ministry of External Affairs has rejected the arbitration body hearing Pakistan's objections to those projects. In a formal statement, the ministry challenged the legitimacy of the court's constitution and dismissed its awards.

India's Ministry of External Affairs stated that the Court of Arbitration has no legal standing and that its awards are void, adding that India has never recognized this arbitral body.

Home Minister Amit Shah has taken a hard public position on restoring the treaty and on Pakistan's access to water.

Home Minister Amit Shah said the Indus Waters Treaty will never be restored and that Pakistan would be denied water it has been getting unjustifiably.

India's security conditions and its demand to revise the agreement have brought water management directly into the political confrontation. Pakistan's response centers on the treaty's existing allocation of rivers and its objection to unilateral suspension.

The legal dispute over Kishenganga and Ratle

Pakistan initiated arbitration in 2016 over Indian hydropower plans on the western rivers. The Court of Arbitration is handling objections concerning the Kishenganga and Ratle projects on the Jhelum and Chenab. The proceedings examine whether project elements satisfy the treaty's strict limits on design.

The treaty provides different routes for different disagreements. Technical questions can go to a neutral expert. Legal disagreements can advance to a Court of Arbitration convened under the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. India argues that the neutral expert route should be used and has chosen not to participate in the arbitration.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration administers the proceedings, acting as registry and providing logistical support. The tribunal includes international jurists and technical experts. Its published materials describe site visits and hearings, as well as procedural and jurisdictional findings. Case information and awards on competence and interpretation appear on the tribunal's case page.

A 2025 award confirmed that the tribunal could proceed. The court has said that proceedings and treaty obligations continue despite India's decision to put the agreement in abeyance. Under the treaty's framework, the court interprets provisions when the parties disagree on legal questions and addresses whether hydropower development on the western rivers restricts Pakistan's use of their waters.

Pakistan has also raised the issue at the United Nations Security Council. During a session on climate and security, its permanent representative, Ambassador Asim Iftikhar, criticized what he called the deliberate weaponization of shared rivers and called for a return to treaty compliance.

Ambassador Asim Iftikhar said there is no treaty clause that allows one country to suspend obligations on its own, and warned that undermining the Indus framework endangers millions who depend on predictable river flows for food and energy.

How the confrontation developed

The present crisis brings together a longstanding disagreement over hydropower design and a more recent confrontation over Kashmir. The sequence matters because the arbitration began years before India announced that the treaty was in abeyance.

• 1960: India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty after years of negotiations facilitated by the World Bank.
• 2016: Pakistan initiated arbitration over Indian hydropower plans on the western rivers.
• April 2025: An attack killed tourists near Pahalgam. India blamed groups based in Pakistan and announced that the treaty would be held in abeyance.
• After the April attack: Cross border strikes followed, before a ceasefire brokered by the United States helped halt a rapid slide toward further conflict.
• 2025: The Court of Arbitration issued an award confirming that it could continue its proceedings.
• By November 7, 2025: Zardari had used the Doha summit to reject the use of water as pressure and reaffirm Pakistan's treaty rights.

Pakistan's elected leadership has promised to resist attempts to curb flows from the western rivers. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has expressed that position in categorical terms.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif said Pakistan will not allow India to take even one drop of water that belongs to Pakistan.

National pride, water scarcity and the Kashmir dispute can push leaders in both countries toward hard positions. Engineers and civil servants have traditionally maintained routine cooperation over water, but the current freeze in formal talks has weakened those stabilizing contacts.

Can India quickly stop the water?

India's ability to carry out a major, sustained reduction in flows is constrained by its existing infrastructure. It has no large reservoirs on the western rivers capable of quickly stopping or diverting most of the water flowing into Pakistan. Treaty rules have limited new storage for decades, and major new projects would take many years to build.

Hydropower plants that rely on river flow generally divert water through tunnels, use it to turn electricity generating turbines and then return it to the river. Their storage, where present, is small and mainly helps operators manage daily peaks in electricity demand. Most water continues downstream after generation.

Large reductions lasting a long time would therefore require new infrastructure outside the treaty's limits. Construction in the Himalayan foothills would also involve permitting, financing and difficult ground conditions, all of which would have to be addressed before substantial new storage could operate.

India can influence the timing of flows over shorter periods. Sediment flushing, maintenance schedules and diversions can alter when water reaches downstream users. Such operations can disrupt Pakistan at the margins, particularly during winter, while also affecting farmers and electricity users upstream in India.

Large diversions and brief changes in flow present different practical risks. A farm can need water at a particular point in its growing season, and a power station needs dependable water to generate electricity. A change in timing can therefore matter even when most of the river's water eventually continues downstream.

Why losing river data matters immediately

India's suspension of data sharing and coordination is the most immediate tool of pressure. The treaty provides for regular exchanges of hydrological data, meaning information about river levels, flows and related conditions, alongside consultations between the countries.

Pakistan uses information about upstream conditions to prepare for floods, divide scarce water during dry months and manage reservoirs. Without those exchanges, planners must make decisions with less knowledge of what is happening farther up the rivers. That can increase flood risk, delay sowing and make electricity generation less dependable.

Pakistan's limited storage capacity makes those uncertainties harder to absorb. Estimates described by analysts put the Indus system's contribution at the overwhelming share of the country's renewable water. Reservoir siltation, the accumulation of sediment that takes up space previously available for water, has also reduced the cushion available during dry spells.

A reservoir with less usable space has less capacity to carry water from a wetter period into a dry one. Pakistan's dependence on the Indus, combined with that shrinking buffer, makes predictable flows and timely information especially valuable.

Flood warnings are another practical concern. During extreme weather, an extra day of notice can help protect crops or a city's water intake. Restoring data exchanges would give officials more time to make operational decisions even while the wider political dispute continues.

Climate pressures reach farms, power and health

Warming in the high Himalaya is changing the Indus system's seasonal rhythm. Glaciers are retreating, snow is melting earlier and monsoon rainfall is becoming more erratic. Both India and Pakistan also face growing demand as cities expand and farming intensifies.

Groundwater reserves that once helped households and farms through dry years are falling. Climate pressures make uncertainty over shared rivers more costly, particularly during droughts and floods, when coordination can help countries respond to rapidly changing conditions.

Pakistan's farms depend on irrigation from the Indus and its canal network. Interrupted flows or releases arriving at the wrong time can reduce crop yields, worsen salinity in the lower basin and raise food prices. Salinity means a buildup of salt, which makes it harder for crops to grow.

Hydropower shortages can also increase electricity costs and force greater reliance on expensive fuels. The effects can spread beyond power stations to households and businesses that need affordable, dependable electricity.

Public health adds another concern. Only a minority of drinking water is considered safe, and illnesses spread through water already account for a large share of disease. Lower flows carrying more pollution could expose more people to pathogens, harm children's growth and place further pressure on hospitals.

Cities that rely on Indus water to dilute wastewater could face sharper changes in water quality during dry months. Agriculture, electricity and health are therefore connected through the same river system: changes in its timing, quantity or quality can affect all three.

Practical steps to reduce the danger

India and Pakistan could restore regular meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission and resume exchanges on river flows and dam operations. Technical contacts can take place quietly and can save lives during flood season, even when political relations remain strained.

A limited operational understanding could cover sediment flushing, how quickly reservoir levels are lowered and when plants are taken out of service. Agreement on those activities would reduce unexpected changes downstream. The treaty's roles for neutral experts and the World Bank also provide ways to address specific technical disagreements without requiring a broad political settlement.

Pakistan could strengthen its own capacity by expanding storage away from the main river channels, upgrading canal telemetry, reducing water lost during conveyance and improving water quality controls. Telemetry is the use of instruments to measure conditions and send readings to managers, helping them track water moving through canals.

India could prioritize power project designs that keep downstream flows predictable and share data as conditions change, helping Pakistan manage droughts and floods. Joint monitoring of glaciers and snowpack, with openly available data, would benefit both countries as the climate changes.

These measures would leave the larger disputes for negotiation while reducing immediate operational risks. More reliable information, clearer schedules and better storage could make a dry winter or a poorly timed reservoir drawdown less likely to intensify a crisis.

No date was given for restoring treaty cooperation or for the next hearing. As of November 7, the main positions remained opposed: Pakistan demanded respect for the existing agreement, India tied its operation to security conditions, and the tribunal continued its work despite India's rejection of its authority.

The Bottom Line

• Zardari rejected the use of water as pressure at the Doha summit and said Pakistan would defend its treaty rights.
• India put the treaty in abeyance after the April 2025 attack near Pahalgam and tied its restoration to action against cross border militancy.
• Pakistan says unilateral suspension is outside the treaty and warns that reducing its allocated flows would be an act of war.
• The 1960 agreement allocated the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India, and the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan, with limited permitted Indian uses of the western rivers.
• The Court of Arbitration says proceedings and obligations continue. India rejects its authority and favors the neutral expert route.
• Existing storage limits constrain India's ability to stop most flows quickly, while changes in timing and the loss of data sharing create more immediate risks.
• Pakistan's population of roughly 240 million depends heavily on the Indus Basin for farming, electricity and water supplies.
• Climate pressures, reduced reservoir capacity and unsafe drinking water increase the costs of disrupted cooperation.
• Commission meetings, river data exchanges and technical agreements could reduce danger while the wider dispute continues.