Europe Expands Taiwan Defence Ties as Drones and Supply Chains Open Doors

European firms take a more public role in Taipei

Roughly 490 exhibitors and 1,500 booths filled Taiwan's largest defence exhibition, where a first appearance by Airbus, a German trade office stand and a meeting between a senior Czech lawmaker and Taiwan's defence minister made Europe's growing interest more visible. Participation at the Taipei Aerospace and Defence Technology Exhibition rose sharply from 2023, giving Taiwan a broader audience as it seeks security partners under sustained military pressure from China.

As of September 24, 2025, the movement remains selective. European companies and officials are exploring drones, secure communications, emergency services and industrial cooperation, while governments weigh their relationships with Beijing. China claims Taiwan as its territory, making even modest public contacts politically sensitive.

Taiwan has outlined a path to increase defence spending toward 5 percent of gross domestic product by 2030. GDP measures the size of an economy, so that target ties military spending to a larger share of the country's economic output. The plan could translate into tens of billions of dollars in procurement this decade, attracting suppliers to a market still dominated by American companies.

The German Trade Office Taipei hosted a stand, Airbus made its exhibition debut with a prominent drone display, and Pavel Fischer, chairman of the Czech Senate's Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security Committee, met Defence Minister Wellington Koo on the show floor. For several European participants, these were public steps toward engagement after decades of caution.

Europe's emerging role is largely complementary to that of the United States. Taiwan wants more suppliers and stronger domestic production. European partners see opportunities in technologies that serve civilian and military needs, particularly where cooperation can also reduce reliance on Chinese components.

A Czech meeting captures the changing tone

Fischer greeted Koo at the Czech pavilion, where he spoke about closer contacts despite political pressure from Beijing. His message reflected the Czech Republic's increasingly vocal support for engagement with Taipei and the growing practical focus of those discussions.

Fischer, who chairs the Czech Senate committee responsible for foreign affairs, defence and security, described Taiwan's partnerships and the pressure surrounding them:

Today in Taiwan we have many partners to work with. We know the complexity of Taiwan in the international arena, because of the active measures by the Communist Party of China.

A Taiwanese executive at a manufacturer of drones for military use that works with European partners linked the changing atmosphere to Russia's war in Ukraine. The executive described a reduction in the hesitation that had previously surrounded cooperation:

There is much less caution now. The world has changed because of Ukraine.

Russia's full-scale invasion prompted European governments to accelerate defence spending, reconsider critical suppliers and seek more reliable technology partners. Taiwan's position as a democracy under pressure, alongside its strength in technology, gained greater attention in that reassessment.

Ukraine puts supply chains into sharper focus

The Baltic states and parts of Central and Eastern Europe have pushed for firmer policies toward China and closer ties with Taipei. Western European governments have also become more open to practical contacts, including cooperation on emergency services, secure communications and industrial standards for technologies with civilian and military uses.

European companies have been reassessing their dependence on drones, optics and other components made in China. A supply chain is the network of businesses supplying the parts and services needed to build a product. Dependence on suppliers that might become unavailable during a crisis can interrupt production precisely when equipment is needed most.

Taiwan's effort to develop unmanned systems and secure communications without Chinese components fits European concerns about reliability and exposure to sanctions during a crisis. Political limits remain, but cooperation framed around civilian missions or public safety can also strengthen Taiwan's ability to withstand pressure.

Decades of caution still shape European decisions

Europe's restraint has a long history. When the Netherlands sold Taiwan two submarines in the 1980s, China retaliated swiftly and severely. Dutch authorities later pledged to block further arms sales. France sold six frigates in 1991 and 60 Mirage fighter jets in 1992, then pulled back from major deals.

European governments subsequently avoided large weapons sales to Taiwan, while much of the cooperation that continued remained out of public view. British expertise has nevertheless helped Taiwan's indigenous submarine programme, which combines local production with foreign technical support to strengthen its ability to deter threats at sea.

The sequence shows how current contacts fit into a much longer relationship:

• 1980s: The Netherlands sold Taiwan two submarines, prompting Chinese retaliation and a later Dutch pledge to block further arms sales.
• 1991: France sold Taiwan six frigates.
• 1992: France sold Taiwan 60 Mirage fighter jets before retreating from major deals.
• 2023: The earlier Taipei exhibition provides the comparison for the sharp increase to roughly 490 exhibitors and 1,500 booths.
• First half of 2025: Taiwan's drone exports to Europe rose sharply, with Poland accounting for a large share of orders.
• 2030: Taiwan aims to bring defence spending toward 5 percent of GDP.

Training, maintenance and support, and technologies serving both civilian and defence needs now offer ways to expand cooperation without immediately returning to the politically charged sales of combat aircraft or major warships.

Central and Eastern Europe become an entry point

The Czech Republic is part of a wider regional movement. Lawmakers from Lithuania, Slovakia and other countries have visited Taiwan, while business chambers have established channels to explore cooperation. Companies in Poland, the Czech Republic and the Baltic states see opportunities in drones, software and sensors.

Ukraine's battlefield experience has made inexpensive systems that can be produced in large numbers particularly relevant. Such equipment can help a country facing a stronger adversary by making surveillance and other capabilities more widely available and making losses easier to replace.

At a major defence exhibition in Kielce, Poland, Taiwanese companies and European partners signed memoranda of understanding on unmanned aerial vehicle technology. These agreements set out an intention to cooperate. The proposed combination brings together Taiwanese components and electronics, Polish manufacturing capabilities and, in some cases, Ukrainian experience in research and development during wartime.

Europe contributes demand, practical testing knowledge and access to purchasing channels. Taiwan contributes its electronics industry, component suppliers and effort to build a supply chain without Chinese parts. Drone exports from Taiwan to Europe rose sharply in the first half of 2025, with Poland taking a large share of orders, although the amounts remain small beside traditional defence contracts.

Central and Eastern Europe offers three practical advantages for Taiwanese businesses. Many governments are seeking new suppliers as they replace equipment used in Ukraine and fill urgent gaps. Regional industries are accustomed to combining NATO standards with older equipment from different systems. Companies there also tend to have fewer entrenched commercial ties to China, reducing their exposure to export restrictions or consumer boycotts.

Legal requirements, national one China policies and possible retaliation still affect decisions. Even so, the region offers Taiwanese companies a route to increase production, develop components jointly and align certification requirements with European buyers.

Drones connect civilian missions and defence needs

Taiwan is investing across a range of unmanned platforms, including aerial drones for reconnaissance and strikes and sea drones inspired partly by Ukraine's operations against the Russian Navy. Reconnaissance means gathering information about an area or an opposing force. Taipei wants to expand production while excluding Chinese components.

Airbus's first appearance at the Taipei exhibition illustrated how European companies can approach this market through several kinds of activity. Alongside its commercial aircraft business, the company highlighted public safety, law enforcement and secure communications. A Flexrotor drone capable of taking off and landing vertically attracted attention and carried a sticker reading I heart Taiwan.

An Airbus representative described the company's work beyond passenger aircraft, including capabilities relevant to emergency response and reliable communications:

These include helicopter applications for supporting search and rescue missions, emergency services and law enforcement, as well as secure communications services.

These products show why technologies with civilian and military uses have become a practical bridge. Helicopters can support rescue and policing, while secure communications help services continue operating under pressure. For Taiwan, stronger emergency response and communications can also improve readiness during a security crisis.

Europe's effort to rebuild its own defence industry adds another reason to explore cooperation. The EU initiative commonly described as Readiness 2030 or ReArm Europe seeks to increase production capacity, speed up purchasing and reduce dependence on single suppliers.

If European programmes provide legal and financial routes for cooperation with Taiwan on vetted technologies serving civilian and military purposes, shared purchasing and financing could help Taiwanese manufacturers expand. European buyers would gain another possible source of equipment beyond platforms made in China. Eligibility for such cooperation remains a condition of that possibility.

One China policies leave room for practical contacts

European governments accept that there is only one Chinese government, but each maintains its own version of a one China policy. Those national policies determine how individual countries engage with Taipei in practice, rather than Beijing's one China principle.

Some European states keep contacts discreet and avoid visits by senior officials. Others allow travel at ministerial level or formal agreements covering science, education and technology, while maintaining that these activities leave their recognition policies unchanged.

A German cabinet minister's visit to Taiwan for a science and education cooperation event illustrated that approach. Beijing protested, but there were no major penalties. Many European governments favour practical trade and technology contacts that fit within existing policies while avoiding overt military agreements.

Taiwan's foreign minister has recently visited Prague, Rome and Vienna, and European delegations have become more visible at events in Taipei. These contacts indicate greater comfort with discussions touching on security, including awareness of activity at sea, crisis response and protection against cyber threats.

Office titles, wording in joint statements and diplomatic protocol remain sensitive because Beijing seeks to restrict Taiwan's international engagement. European governments balance support for stability in the Taiwan Strait, concern about coercion and closer practical ties with their position that they do not recognise Taiwan as a state. That balance influences how much defence cooperation they are prepared to discuss publicly.

American suppliers remain at the centre

US companies continue to anchor Taiwan's overseas procurement. The F-16 remains the mainstay of its air force, and American participation at the exhibition was substantial. Taiwan also displayed joint work with North American partners on missiles, rockets designed to counter drones and underwater surveillance drones.

Taipei expects most international defence orders to continue going to American suppliers. The established US Foreign Military Sales system, a channel for government arrangements to supply military equipment, and the depth of American logistics support help sustain that relationship.

European companies have openings in more specialised areas: training, maintenance and support, maritime awareness, secure communications, airspace management, radar upgrades, electronic warfare support and helicopters for rescue and law enforcement. Maritime awareness means knowing what is happening at sea; electronic warfare involves using or disrupting electronic signals.

These activities generally carry a lower political cost than selling combat aircraft or large warships, and many have straightforward civilian applications. Joint production with partners in Central and Eastern Europe could also support Taiwan's effort to establish reliable supplies for unmanned systems without Chinese components.

Europe is unlikely to replace Washington as Taiwan's principal defence partner. Its contribution could fill urgent gaps, make essential services more resilient and reduce dependence on any single supplier. Stronger capabilities would also make coercion against Taiwan more costly while serving European interests in reliable equipment and industrial capacity.

Turning industrial agreements into usable equipment

Joint production of drones and components in Central and Eastern Europe is one possible next step. Taiwanese electronics and software could be combined with European assembly and testing. Certification systems could check component origins and verify claims that equipment is free of Chinese parts, giving buyers a clearer basis for purchasing decisions.

Taiwan's Asia UAV AI Innovation Application R&D Center in Chiayi offers a potential setting for joint trials and training. Demonstrations under realistic conditions could help companies move from memoranda of understanding to purchase orders by showing whether equipment performs as required.

Cooperation at sea could cover underwater surveillance, equipment for dealing with mines, unmanned surface vessels for coastal defence and reconnaissance, and information sharing to improve awareness of maritime activity. Helicopters used by police and rescue services, paired with secure communications, could provide immediate public safety benefits while improving readiness.

Possible steps over the next year include pilot purchases with Poland and other willing partners, bringing Taiwanese testing facilities into European trials of drones and sensors, and creating financing channels for projects with civilian and military applications. Such arrangements would need clear requirements on final users and transparency.

Agreements between companies could also establish shared standards for protection against cyberattacks and tracing the origins of components. Both matter to buyers seeking equipment without Chinese parts. These are possible avenues for deeper cooperation; firm dates for the proposed purchases, trials or financing arrangements have not been given.

Retaliation and export rules keep expansion uneven

China's scrutiny remains a central constraint. European governments and businesses must consider possible trade retaliation, informal boycotts and diplomatic freezes. Companies with substantial business in China face particular exposure, helping explain the preference for gradual steps rather than large public contracts.

Export licensing adds another layer. EU member states apply national laws within a shared framework for arms exports, including criteria covering regional stability, human rights and the final use of equipment. Technologies that also have civilian applications can still require approvals, and political sensitivities vary between capitals.

Taiwan therefore faces a European market moving at different speeds. More officials are visiting, more companies are appearing publicly and industrial agreements are creating practical channels for drones, communications and maritime awareness. Turning that interest into dependable production and deliveries will require companies and governments to work through licensing, standards, financing and political risk.

The Taipei exhibition captured a change from near silence toward selective engagement. American suppliers remain central to Taiwan's defence, while European participation is growing around capabilities that meet public safety needs, strengthen supply chains and help the island withstand pressure.

Key Points

• The Taipei defence exhibition featured roughly 490 exhibitors and 1,500 booths, a sharp increase from 2023.
• The German Trade Office Taipei hosted a stand, Airbus made its debut and Czech senator Pavel Fischer met Defence Minister Wellington Koo.
• Taiwan aims to lift defence spending toward 5 percent of GDP by 2030.
• Central and Eastern Europe is leading practical engagement, including drone agreements in Poland and growing Taiwanese exports.
• Drones, secure communications, rescue services and maritime awareness offer openings for European cooperation.
• US suppliers remain Taiwan's main external defence partners.
• Export approvals, national one China policies and possible Chinese retaliation continue to limit the pace and scope of cooperation.