Japan Urged to Strengthen Alliances as China Rift Nears One Year

Taiwan dispute puts Japan's alliances and legal limits in focus

Japan is approaching the first anniversary of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's November 7, 2025, remarks on a Taiwan conflict with political dialogue with China still strained, businesses facing economic pressure and no confirmed meeting between the countries' leaders. The next possible opening is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shenzhen on November 18 and 19, 2026.

The dispute centres on whether a Chinese attack or naval blockade against Taiwan could threaten Japan's survival and allow its Self-Defense Forces to act alongside the United States. Beijing demands that Takaichi retract her remarks. Katsuya Yamamoto, a senior research fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, argues that Japan should instead strengthen relationships with Washington and other countries sharing its values.

A government decision adopted more than a decade before the dispute helps explain the legal stakes. The National Security Council and Cabinet's July 2014 security decision, reproduced by Japan's Ministry of Defense, set out limited circumstances in which an attack on a closely related country could justify Japanese force. It also called for parliamentary approval, in principle before deployment.

Japan now faces two connected tasks: explaining those limits abroad and showing its own public how defence decisions are made. Meanwhile, continued commercial contacts and a cemetery cleanup involving about 150 people in Nagasaki show that relations between businesses and ordinary citizens remain active even while the diplomatic dispute persists.

What Takaichi said and why China objected

Takaichi told a House of Representatives committee on November 7 last year that a Taiwan emergency involving warships or other armed force could amount to a "survival-threatening situation" for Japan. That phrase has a specific place in Japanese security law: it describes a grave threat to Japan arising from an attack on a closely related country.

Previous Japanese leaders generally kept their possible response to a Taiwan conflict ambiguous. Takaichi made the connection more explicit, then repeated her position days later while rejecting Beijing's criticism that she was interfering in China's internal affairs.

China claims Taiwan, a self-governing democracy, as its territory and says it may use force to bring the island under its control. Beijing treats Taiwan as a core national interest and has portrayed Takaichi's comments as a threat of Japanese intervention. Its criticism also invokes Japan's wartime militarism, describing the current defence buildup as a revival of that past.

Japan's proximity gives the dispute a concrete security dimension. Parts of Okinawa Prefecture lie roughly 100 kilometres from Taiwan. Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also linked the two countries' security in 2021, describing a Taiwan crisis as a Japanese emergency. Takaichi's remarks brought that connection directly into parliamentary discussion of the conditions for using force.

Three conditions govern Japan's use of force

The July 1, 2014, decision explains the government's interpretation of Article 9 of Japan's Constitution, which restricts the use of force. It says Japan may take the minimum measures necessary to defend its survival and protect its people, including in limited circumstances when another country is attacked.

Collective self-defence means coming to the defence of another country even when one's own territory has not been attacked. Japan's interpretation ties that action to protecting Japan itself. The decision sets out three central conditions:

• An armed attack on Japan, or on a country closely related to it, must threaten Japan's survival and create a clear danger to the fundamental rights of its people.
• No other suitable means must be available to remove the danger and protect Japan.
• Any force used must be limited to the minimum necessary.

The 2015 security legislation, which took effect in 2016, put the revised framework into law. The legislative package included a new International Peace Support Law and amendments to 10 existing laws, including the Self-Defense Forces Act.

A decision during a Taiwan emergency would therefore involve assessing the actual attack, its danger to Japan and the available alternatives. The government's framework also places responsibility on the Cabinet and calls for democratic control through the Diet, Japan's parliament.

Support missions have different rules from combat

Japan's security framework provides several possible responses to a crisis, depending on its severity. Supplying or transporting goods for foreign forces, protecting equipment and using force to defend Japan involve different legal permissions.

The 2014 decision proposed closer coordination among police, the Japan Coast Guard and the Self-Defense Forces for incidents below the threshold of an armed attack. It called for better information sharing, training and faster procedures when police cannot respond promptly, including around remote islands.

Protection of American military equipment was framed narrowly. The decision proposed allowing highly limited weapons use when US units were working with Japanese forces on activities contributing to Japan's defence, including joint training, and when Washington requested or consented to that protection.

For logistical assistance, the decision specified that Japanese personnel should operate away from places where fighting was actually occurring and suspend or stop assistance if combat reached their location. International peace cooperation and rescue activities were also subject to conditions, including consent from the authorities controlling the area. These categories matter because a government's choice of mission determines what personnel may do and which safeguards apply.

Why Yamamoto favours stronger partnerships

Yamamoto argues that Takaichi's statement described an existing legal possibility rather than a newly created power. He says Beijing has distorted it into a suggestion that Japan would initiate force in a Taiwan emergency.

The Sasakawa Peace Foundation researcher explained his reading of the prime minister's remarks:

From the content itself of Ms. Takaichi's remarks, there is absolutely nothing new being said,

Yamamoto opposes a retraction because he considers the remarks accurate and sees no assurance that withdrawing them would improve relations. He also argues that China's broader approach to Japan predates Takaichi's statement, making a quick diplomatic repair unlikely.

His proposed response is to increase Japan's influence through cooperation with the United States and other countries sharing similar values. Explaining why he sees partnerships as necessary, Yamamoto said:

If Japan wants to make its voice heard by China, or to get China to properly pay attention and engage in a proper deal, unfortunately, Japan alone cannot achieve this,

Stephen R. Nagy, a professor at International Christian University and senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, similarly argues that Japan should retain its right to speak candidly about Taiwan. He describes Japan's approach to China through three elements: continued engagement, economic resilience and deterrence. In plain terms, that means keeping communication open, reducing exposure to economic disruption and maintaining enough defensive strength to discourage attack.

Trade contacts continue while leaders remain apart

Former Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya visited Beijing in late September as head of the Japan Association for the Promotion of International Trade. He met China's top diplomat Wang Yi and Vice Premier He Lifeng, providing a channel for contact despite the political deadlock.

Bilateral trade continues, and exchanges between businesspeople have partly revived. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials nevertheless doubt that these contacts will quickly restore political dialogue while President Xi Jinping's government continues demanding a retraction.

Takaichi has repeatedly said she is open to dialogue with China. The main dates connecting the legal framework, the dispute and the next diplomatic opportunity are:

• July 1, 2014: Japan's National Security Council and Cabinet approve the decision setting out a limited collective self-defence interpretation.
• 2015 and 2016: Security legislation is enacted and then takes effect.
• November 7, 2025: Takaichi describes circumstances in which a Taiwan emergency could threaten Japan's survival.
• Late September 2026: Iwaya meets senior Chinese officials in Beijing.
• November 18 and 19, 2026: The APEC gathering in Shenzhen offers a possible opportunity for contact between Takaichi and Xi.

A meeting between the two leaders has not been confirmed. The immediate diplomatic issue is whether they can establish a channel for discussing their differences while Beijing maintains its demand and Tokyo keeps its position.

Economic pressure reaches factories and entertainment

China's response has included restrictions on exports of rare earths used in manufacturing advanced products. For Japanese companies, access to these materials affects production planning and the reliability of supply networks. Tourism and entertainment have also been affected by the deterioration in relations.

Nagy points to the Institute of Geoeconomics' Survey of 100 Japanese Companies on Economic Security as evidence of businesses reassessing their exposure. He says a large majority of major companies surveyed are prioritising changes to supply networks and diversifying operations into Southeast Asia, India and North America.

Diversification means arranging more than one source of supply or location for production. A company can continue serving Chinese customers while building alternatives elsewhere, giving it more options if exports are restricted or transport is disrupted.

Cultural businesses face pressure too. Sanrio apologised and withdrew from a promotional collaboration involving the Japanese television spy drama VIVANT after criticism in China over the programme's portrayal of Chinese espionage. The episode illustrates how a political dispute can affect a commercial partnership far removed from a parliamentary debate on defence law.

In Nagasaki, the flow of visitors from China has slowed. For businesses serving those visitors, the diplomatic dispute is therefore also a question of customers and income. The commercial exchanges that continue have practical value even while talks at the highest political level remain difficult.

Defence spending puts transparency under scrutiny

Japan's military expenditure in 2025 was estimated by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute at $62.2 billion, or 1.4% of gross domestic product, placing it 10th worldwide. The same estimates put China's spending at $336 billion and US spending at $954 billion. China's figure was about 5.4 times Japan's.

Another description of Japan's defence expansion puts spending at 2% of GDP, while the SIPRI estimate gives 1.4% for 2025; the timing and accounting basis of the 2% figure are unspecified. Japan has also acquired missiles capable of striking targets at long range, a change that makes explanations of their intended role especially relevant to neighbours and Japanese voters.

Tomoko Ako, a University of Tokyo professor, argues that Japan should explain how its defence policy reflects lessons from history and a commitment to preventing war. She said:

Japan needs to say that we are not neglecting history but are thinking of preventing war, focusing on defense rather than military activities,

Ako is concerned that leaders may appear to impose defence plans without enough public agreement or debate. Her argument places civilian control, meaning authority exercised by elected leaders rather than the military, alongside openness about the scale and purpose of military spending.

The 2014 decision provides concrete commitments for that discussion. It reaffirms an exclusively defensive policy, the three nonnuclear principles and peaceful dispute resolution through diplomacy and international law. It also calls for stronger cooperation with the United States and other partners. Explaining how current spending and deployments fit those commitments would address both domestic scrutiny and criticism abroad.

Nagasaki residents keep a local connection alive

About 150 residents, members of the Chinese community and Chinese consulate staff joined a cleanup at the international cemetery of Inasa Goshinji in Nagasaki. Participants spent about two hours cutting grass and collecting fallen leaves at a site that opened as a Chinese cemetery in 1602 and is the oldest international cemetery in Nagasaki Prefecture.

The Nagasaki Prefecture Japan-China Friendship Council began the activity in 1974, two years after Japan and China normalised diplomatic relations. Organisers described this year's gathering as the 53rd cleanup. The event was cancelled in 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Chinese Consul General Chen Yong was absent because of official duties. Vice Consul Liu Jiyu attended with other consulate personnel. Liu stressed Nagasaki's long history as a place of exchange with China and the value of carrying that friendship into the next generation.

Yuko Okubo, a director of the nonprofit Asia Exchange Friendship Association, said she participated with the hope that Japan and China would continue to have good relations. A participant originally from Fujian described working together as a basic way for individuals to maintain human contact when they could do little about political disagreements.

Nagasaki's gathering brings the choices facing Japan into a local setting. Alliance cooperation addresses security, public debate gives citizens a voice in defence policy, and continued personal exchange preserves relationships across the diplomatic divide. Each serves a different purpose during a dispute that has lasted nearly a year.

Key Points

• Takaichi's November 7, 2025, Taiwan remarks remain at the centre of a diplomatic dispute with China.
• Japan's legal framework permits limited force only under conditions tied to protecting Japan's survival and people.
• Yamamoto advocates stronger partnerships with the United States and other countries rather than retracting the remarks.
• Trade and business contacts continue, while rare earth restrictions and weaker tourism affect economic ties.
• A Takaichi-Xi meeting at the November 18 and 19 APEC gathering in Shenzhen remains unconfirmed.
• About 150 people joined a Nagasaki cemetery cleanup, maintaining a local tradition of exchange.