Malaysia Breaks Up ISIS-Linked Network Among Bangladeshi Workers, Arresting 36

36 Arrests Across Selangor and Johor

Malaysian authorities have dismantled an ISIS-linked network operating among Bangladeshi migrant workers, arresting 36 men in three phases of operations between April and June 2025. As of July 4, five have been charged with terrorism offenses, 15 are slated for deportation and 16 remain in custody while police continue investigating.

The men, aged 25 to 35, were arrested in Selangor and Johor. Authorities estimate that between 100 and 150 people were involved in the wider network, identified as Gerakan Militan Radical Bangladesh (GMRB). Investigators expect further arrests.

Inspector-General of Police Mohd Khalid Ismail said the network recruited workers, circulated extremist ideology and collected money to support ISIS operations in Syria and Bangladesh. Police believe its purpose was to use Malaysia as a base for recruitment, fundraising and logistical support, rather than to carry out attacks in Malaysia.

The investigation brings together several parts of a transnational operation: recruitment among expatriate workers, propaganda distributed through social media, private communications through encrypted messaging services and money collected through digital payment channels. Authorities also believe the group sought to destabilize the Bangladeshi government by recruiting and indoctrinating workers living abroad.

Malaysia, a Muslim-majority country, continues to confront the threat of radicalization following an ISIS-linked attack in Kuala Lumpur in 2016. This case places attention on how an extremist organization can operate inside one country while directing its support toward activities elsewhere.

How Workers Were Drawn Into the Network

Police intelligence indicated that the group targeted Bangladeshi laborers employed in factories, construction and the service sector. Recruitment took place through social media and messaging applications, including WhatsApp and Telegram, alongside secret meetings.

Recruits were exposed to radical teachings and ISIS propaganda. Religious lessons and private gatherings provided further opportunities to spread the group's ideology and organize its activities. The network therefore combined contact through phones with meetings in person.

Recruitment reportedly included an oath-taking ritual known as bai'ah, an expression of allegiance to the group's cause. Members were also reportedly required to pay an annual fee of about RM500, roughly US$105, to support the network's activities.

The oath and membership payment gave the operation a structure beyond the circulation of extremist material. Police described a network that sought commitments from recruits and maintained a regular source of financial support.

Authorities estimate that Malaysia has more than 500,000 Bangladeshi workers, many of whom are undocumented and vulnerable to exploitation. Investigators believe the group used connections within that large migrant community to reach potential recruits.

Facebook Accounts Led Investigators to Malaysia

Investigators traced online activity to Facebook accounts linked to ISIS propaganda and then connected those accounts to internet protocol addresses in Malaysia. An IP address is an address associated with an internet connection, helping investigators trace where online activity originated.

WhatsApp and Telegram were used to coordinate recruitment, hold religious lessons and arrange clandestine meetings. The network's use of encrypted communications made tracking its exchanges more difficult for authorities.

Encryption protects the contents of messages from being easily read by others. In this investigation, police faced the task of following a group whose communications moved between public social media activity and more private channels.

The combination gave recruiters several ways to contact people. Facebook accounts distributed propaganda, messaging services supported continuing communication, and secret meetings brought participants together. Following those connections was central to identifying the network operating in Malaysia.

The case reflects the use of digital platforms by extremist groups for radicalization, recruitment and financing. Radicalization here describes the process of drawing people toward extremist beliefs, while recruitment turns that interest into participation in an organized group.

Membership Fees and Money Sent Abroad

Police said the network collected money through international bank transfers, e-wallets, mobile payment applications and international remittance services. Those channels allowed funds to move across borders in support of ISIS operations in Syria and Bangladesh.

An e-wallet stores money digitally for payments or transfers. A remittance service moves money between people, often in different countries. Investigators examined how the group used these services alongside its annual membership fees and digital donations.

The reported RM500 annual fee provided one recurring source of income. Donations offered another way to collect funds from supporters, while international transfers connected fundraising in Malaysia with the network's activities abroad.

Authorities have not disclosed how much money the network raised. The membership fees and digital donations nevertheless indicate an organized effort to gather financial support, rather than a recruitment operation alone.

Tracking the money is also part of understanding the group's reach. Recruitment took place among workers in Malaysia, while police identified intended support for operations in Syria and Bangladesh. Financial movements connected those different locations.

Charges, Deportations and Continuing Detention

Malaysian authorities have divided the 36 arrested men into three groups according to their alleged involvement. Five have been charged under the Penal Code with terrorism offenses, specifically membership in a terrorist organization. Fifteen described as having minimal involvement are slated for deportation to Bangladesh.

The remaining 16 are still in police custody pending further investigation. Together, those three groups account for all 36 arrests announced from the operations in Selangor and Johor.

Inspector-General Mohd Khalid Ismail explained that police were distinguishing between people with lesser involvement and those facing prosecution under Malaysian law:

We will deport those with minimal involvement back to their home country, while those with greater involvement will be charged under Malaysian laws.

The legal response involves Chapter VIA of Malaysia's Penal Code, which covers terrorism activities, and the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act, known as SOSMA. The five membership charges form part of that response, while investigations into the other detainees continue.

The estimate of 100 to 150 people involved in the wider network extends beyond the 36 men arrested so far. Police expect more arrests as they follow the group's recruitment, communications and financial connections.

How the Operation Unfolded

Police conducted the operation over several months in 2025. The announced sequence runs from arrests beginning in April through the legal and immigration decisions described by July 4:

• April 2025: Arrests began in an operation targeting the network among Bangladeshi migrant workers.
• April to June 2025: Police carried out three phases of operations in Selangor and Johor, arresting 36 Bangladeshi men aged 25 to 35.
• By July 4, 2025: Five had been charged, 15 were slated for deportation and 16 remained in custody pending further investigation.

The operation's scope included both the people allegedly organizing support and the channels used to sustain it. Police intelligence connected propaganda accounts, communications, meetings and fundraising activity across the investigation.

Malaysia's Special Branch played a role through its intelligence work. Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail praised that work and the Royal Malaysian Police's handling of the operation.

Why Malaysia Became a Base

Malaysia's position as a regional economic hub, together with its reliance on foreign labor, provides a setting in which extremist networks can seek recruits within migrant communities. The country's large Bangladeshi workforce includes people facing economic hardship, social isolation and limited oversight.

Those conditions can leave workers vulnerable to exploitation and extremist messaging. The network allegedly targeted people in ordinary workplaces, including factories, building sites and service businesses, while using private communications and meetings to build support.

Authorities stress that Malaysia was not the group's direct target for attacks. Its intended role was as a base where members could recruit, collect funds and provide logistical support for ISIS activities abroad.

The group's reported ambition to destabilize the Bangladeshi government gave its recruitment among expatriate workers another purpose. Police believe indoctrination in Malaysia was linked to political and militant objectives beyond the country where those workers earned their living.

The case also reflects a broader pattern in which transnational extremist organizations use Southeast Asian countries as logistical hubs. For Malaysia, preventing that activity means addressing networks that may be supporting violence elsewhere even when they are not planning a local attack.

The Government's Response

Home Minister Datuk Seri Saifuddin Nasution Ismail said the government was committed to preventing Malaysia from becoming a haven or transit point for foreign extremist movements. He credited the police and Special Branch with protecting the country's security.

Saifuddin described the operation as evidence of the security forces' professionalism:

The success of this operation demonstrates the efficiency and professionalism of Malaysia's security forces, particularly the police, in safeguarding the nation's sovereignty, harmony, and public peace.

The immediate response combines criminal charges, immigration action and continuing investigation. Authorities are pursuing people they consider more deeply involved through Malaysian law while preparing to return those described as having minimal involvement to Bangladesh.

The investigation also highlights the importance of cooperation between Malaysia and Bangladesh. Recruitment among Bangladeshi nationals in Malaysia, fundraising across borders and the group's ambitions concerning Bangladesh connect the responsibilities of both countries.

International intelligence sharing is another part of the response described in the case, particularly in preventing Southeast Asia from becoming a transit hub for foreign fighters. Tracking financial flows and identifying people moving between countries require cooperation beyond a single police force.

Protecting Workers From Further Recruitment

The dismantling of the network addresses the immediate operation, while the conditions that can make migrant workers vulnerable remain. Economic hardship, isolation and a lack of community support can create openings for recruiters offering belonging alongside extremist teachings.

Prevention measures identified in the case include closer engagement with migrant communities, outreach programs, language and integration support, and education that counters radical ideology. Building trust between workers and law enforcement can encourage people to report suspicious recruitment or fundraising.

Digital monitoring and stronger scrutiny of financial flows also remain central concerns. Police followed propaganda accounts and communications in this investigation, while the use of encrypted services and digital finance complicated efforts to track the network.

The case has prompted calls for stronger background screening and monitoring of foreign workers, particularly in industries employing large migrant workforces. Community engagement addresses another part of the same problem by helping workers find support outside the networks that recruiters seek to build.

For Malaysia, the announced arrests bring together a domestic policing operation and a wider effort against support for terrorism abroad. The continuing investigation now concerns the remaining detainees, other suspected participants and the financial connections behind the network.

Key Points

• Malaysia arrested 36 Bangladeshi men aged 25 to 35 in Selangor and Johor during three phases of operations between April and June 2025.
• Authorities estimate that 100 to 150 people were involved in the wider ISIS-linked network.
• Police said the group used social media, encrypted messaging, secret meetings and digital payments to recruit and raise funds.
• Members reportedly paid about RM500, roughly US$105, each year and took an oath of allegiance.
• Five men have been charged, 15 are slated for deportation and 16 remain in custody pending further investigation.
• Authorities believe Malaysia served as a recruitment and fundraising base for activities abroad, rather than a direct target for attacks.
• Police expect further arrests. The total amount of money raised has not been disclosed.