A monthly missile supply with consequences beyond Ukraine
Russia is receiving dozens of ballistic missiles from North Korea every month, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said on November 16, linking the growing supply to an attack on a major Ukrainian energy facility and warning that battlefield use is helping Pyongyang improve its weapons.
Contents
- A monthly missile supply with consequences beyond Ukraine
- What the November 7 attack revealed
- How investigators identify North Korean weapons
- Russia's own factories add to the pressure
- What Zelensky means by missile parity
- A military partnership extending beyond missiles
- Moscow signals further contact with Pyongyang
- Military aid discussions run alongside peace efforts
- What remains to be decided
- Key Points
Preliminary investigations indicated that Russia used a North Korean KN-23 missile against the facility on November 7, Zelensky said. During the wider Russian assault overnight on November 6 and 7, Ukraine recorded 36 ballistic missiles and shot down four, according to Ukrainian accounts.
Zelensky delivered his warning ahead of a November 17 meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, where allies were expected to discuss further military assistance and funding. He named Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy as countries with which Ukraine was discussing additional missile supplies.
His appeal connected three pressures: North Korean deliveries, Russian plans to expand domestic missile production and Ukraine's shortage of weapons to intercept attacks or strike the launchers responsible. He also urged civilians to respond to air raid alerts because intelligence indicated that Russia had prepared another attack.
Zelensky, Ukraine's president, described the wider regional danger in his evening address:
North Korea is honing its ballistic missiles by having them used in this war. This creates additional challenges for the entire region surrounding Korea. It is also a challenge for us in Europe.
For countries near the Korean Peninsula, including South Korea and Japan, his warning concerns what North Korea learns from weapons used thousands of kilometres away. For Ukraine, the immediate concern is the continuing arrival of missiles that can strike cities and essential infrastructure.
What the November 7 attack revealed
The attack on a major energy facility gave Zelensky's warning a specific example. He said preliminary findings pointed to a KN-23, a North Korean ballistic missile designed for relatively short distances compared with weapons built to cross continents.
A ballistic missile is powered upward before travelling much of its route along an arcing path. A cruise missile generally flies within the atmosphere under continuous engine power. Their different flight patterns require different defensive responses, and ballistic missiles can give defenders very little time to act.
Four interceptions out of 36 ballistic missiles amount to about 11%. That figure describes the reported outcome of that particular assault, while also showing the scale of the defensive task Ukraine faced that night.
Zelensky subsequently said Ukraine lacked enough Patriot interceptor missiles and that the United States could take the leading role in supplying them. Interceptors are the defensive missiles fired at incoming weapons. His request therefore covers both protecting targets in Ukraine and obtaining more ways to attack Russia's missile forces.
How investigators identify North Korean weapons
Experts at the Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise have described examining fragments of North Korean KN-23 missiles and related weapons used against Ukraine. Their work offers a physical basis for identifying weapons after explosions leave only scattered wreckage.
The institute's experts identified engine parts, fasteners, steering mechanism drives, bearings and fragments of microelectronics. They said unusual welding and the metal's chemical composition helped distinguish the wreckage from Russian missile designs.
The experts estimated the explosive warhead at about 500 kilograms and said several modifications probably exist. Such a large explosive charge can destroy much of the missile itself, leaving investigators to reconstruct its identity from surviving components.
Investigators also said a substantial share of the microelectronics they examined was made in China, Taiwan, the United States and other countries. They considered launches from North Korean equipment likely because adapting Russian launch systems would be more difficult.
Those examinations help explain how Ukraine traces missile origins alongside intelligence assessments. Zelensky's broader warning concerns the feedback North Korea can gain from repeated launches, including how weapons perform against real targets and air defences.
Russia's own factories add to the pressure
Ukraine's military intelligence agency, known as HUR, briefed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's Staff on Russian plans to expand production of ballistic and cruise missiles, Zelensky said. The Staff is the senior forum through which Ukraine's leadership reviews military operations and planning.
Zelensky described the planned production volumes in direct terms:
The scale of production they are planning is not intended for peace.
In an assessment covering October 2026, HUR estimated that Russia held up to 700 ballistic missiles and several thousand cruise missiles. It put Russia's combined production capacity at more than 200 ballistic and cruise missiles a month, including up to 110 ballistic missiles.
The agency estimated stocks of Iskander-M missiles at about 115, with production of around 65 a month. It also put Kalibr cruise missile stocks above 450 and monthly production at roughly 29, while the monthly production target for Kh-101 cruise missiles exceeded 80.
HUR also described manufacturing difficulties, including a temporary suspension of Kinzhal production because of accuracy problems and defects affecting some Kh-101 missiles. Its assessment nevertheless portrayed an industry continuing to replenish substantial stocks. North Korean deliveries add another supply stream alongside that domestic output.
What Zelensky means by missile parity
Zelensky asked allies for what he called clear parity: enough comparable capability for Ukraine to respond to Russia's missile threat on equal terms. His appeal went beyond requesting additional air defence ammunition.
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy possess missiles capable of effective strikes, he said, and Ukraine was discussing more suitable supplies with them. He also urged partners to revisit providing technology that could help destroy ballistic missile launchers inside Russian territory.
Zelensky explained that request in his address:
We also need to return to the discussion of destroying Russia's ballistic missile launchers. The Western world has the technology to do this, and to bring Russia to peace sooner and guarantee security more reliably, we must have these technologies here in Ukraine.
Air defences attempt to stop a missile after it has been launched. Striking a launcher aims to prevent future launches from that equipment. Ukraine is asking allies to support both approaches, combining protection for potential targets with pressure on the forces carrying out attacks.
Ukrainian forces had already struck an Iskander-M launcher in Russia's Kursk region on October 29 and overnight into October 30, according to Ukrainian accounts. Other targets included ammunition and logistics depots and military repair units. Zelensky's November appeal sought broader capabilities for that kind of response.
A military partnership extending beyond missiles
Russia and North Korea signed a strategic partnership treaty in 2024 containing a mutual defence clause. Their cooperation has since included ammunition and North Korean troops supporting Russia's war, alongside the missile deliveries described by Zelensky.
HUR estimates that North Korea supplies between 25% and 40% of Russia's artillery ammunition. Other estimates put total North Korean shell deliveries at 8 million to 11 million over two and a half years, moved through a maritime supply chain involving four Russian cargo ships and at least 112 voyages.
Those shipping estimates put deliveries as high as 350,000 shells a month and suggest North Korean ammunition accounted for as much as half of Russian artillery fire in some combat zones. The broader HUR estimate concerns Russia's ammunition supply, while the higher share refers to particular areas of fighting.
Zelensky also said in September that Pyongyang was preparing to deploy another 10,000 troops to Russia, on top of 8,000 already serving there. Taken together, the Ukrainian assessments describe a relationship supporting several parts of Russia's war effort rather than missiles alone.
Moscow signals further contact with Pyongyang
The Kremlin also signalled the possibility of another meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said a meeting could take place if Kim attended the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in China.
Putin had met a delegation from North Korea's ruling Workers' Party led by senior official Jo Yong Won. He asked the delegation to pass his best wishes to Kim and praised the countries' expanding relations.
These contacts form the diplomatic side of the partnership Zelensky is urging European countries to counter. His argument is that North Korean support gives Russia additional military capacity while providing Pyongyang with experience that can affect security in Asia.
Military aid discussions run alongside peace efforts
The November 17 gathering was scheduled as the 37th meeting of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, also known as the Ramstein format. The United Kingdom and Germany were due to convene it at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss defence and financial assistance.
Diplomatic efforts were proceeding at the same time. Russia, the United States and Ukraine held trilateral negotiations on November 10 and 11. On November 13, the European Council said European Union institutions and five countries would jointly represent Europe in future negotiations.
Those countries were France, Germany, Italy, Poland and the United Kingdom, known as the E5 within the Coalition of the Willing, a grouping working on security guarantees for Ukraine. Zelensky said European officials would meet in Berlin to develop joint steps for the negotiating process. He also called for continued strong sanctions pressure.
The sequence of military and diplomatic developments was:
- October 29 and overnight into October 30: Ukrainian forces struck an Iskander-M launcher and other military targets in Russia's Kursk region.
- November 6 and 7: Russia launched 36 ballistic missiles at Ukraine; preliminary findings linked a strike on an energy facility to a North Korean KN-23.
- November 10 and 11: Russia, the United States and Ukraine held trilateral peace negotiations.
- November 13: The European Council announced a joint European approach to future negotiations.
- November 16: Zelensky warned about North Korean missile deliveries and a possible Russian air attack.
- November 17: Allies were due to discuss further support at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting.
What remains to be decided
Zelensky gave no exact monthly missile total beyond dozens, and his address did not announce an agreed package of additional European weapons, delivery dates or new arrangements for attacking launchers inside Russia. The November 17 meeting was the next scheduled opportunity for allies to discuss assistance.
For Ukrainian civilians, his most immediate instruction was to heed air raid warnings. His public warning covered the evening of November 16, the night and the following day, reflecting intelligence that Russian forces had prepared another strike.
For allies, the decision concerned resources as well as strategy: supplying enough interceptors to protect Ukrainian targets while considering the missiles and technology Kyiv wants for striking launchers. For countries around the Korean Peninsula, Zelensky's warning placed North Korea's battlefield learning at the centre of the same discussion.
Key Points
- Zelensky said Russia receives dozens of North Korean ballistic missiles every month.
- Preliminary Ukrainian findings linked a November 7 strike on a major energy facility to a North Korean KN-23.
- Ukraine is seeking more interceptors, comparable strike weapons and technology to target launchers inside Russia.
- HUR estimates that Russian factories can produce more than 200 ballistic and cruise missiles a month.
- Zelensky warned that combat use helps North Korea improve weapons, creating risks for Europe and countries near Korea.
- Allies were due to discuss military and financial support on November 17, alongside continuing diplomatic efforts.






