Taiwan Warns of Targeted Chinese Interference Before November 28 Local Elections

Cheap flights, campaign money and millions of online messages

Taiwan's National Security Bureau says China's efforts to influence the November 28, 2026, local elections are becoming more targeted, combining discounted flights for selected voters, suspected campaign funding, cyber intrusions and online messages tailored to particular audiences.

By September, Taiwan's Government Service Network was facing an average of about 2.58 million cyber intrusion attempts a day. Intelligence teams collected approximately 2.5 million pieces of disputed information between January and September, compared with about 1.69 million during the same period in 2025, an increase of roughly 48%.

NSB Director General Tsai Ming-yen told legislators and reporters on October 22 that Beijing was arranging cheaper airline tickets for selected Taiwanese citizens living in China to return and vote for candidates it supported. He also described investigations into suspected illicit funding, inexpensive sightseeing trips, illegal betting pools and hacking aimed at stealing election intelligence.

A criminal investigation has brought those concerns into two neighbourhood campaigns. Prosecutors allege that Taiwan People's Communist Party chairman Lin Te-wang and party official Chen Chen-chou received Chinese Communist Party instructions and funding to seek borough warden positions. Lin was detained, while Chen was released on NT$50,000 bail with restrictions on his residence.

Taiwan governs itself, while Beijing claims it as Chinese territory. Chinese authorities have previously denied interfering in Taiwanese elections or spreading disinformation. The current warnings concern alleged attempts to shape who wins local office and how voters judge their government, military and political choices.

The November vote will select officials across nine categories of local government. Its consequences extend beyond neighbourhood services: successful local politicians can build the organisations, public recognition and electoral records that carry them toward national office.

Why local contests attract national attention

China's approach combines institutions responsible for Taiwan policy, political outreach and intelligence. The Taiwan Affairs Office communicates Beijing's policies, while the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department cultivates relationships with groups and individuals outside the party. Taiwan's security warnings describe efforts to turn some of those relationships into political influence.

The party's February 2026 Taiwan Work Conference reportedly discussed a task force focused on the November elections and treated united front activity online as a policy priority. Economic incentives, including agricultural purchases, tourism and changes to import restrictions, were also identified as possible tools for reaching particular communities.

For a farming district, a promise of additional purchases can touch household incomes directly. For a tourism business, access to visitors from China can affect bookings and jobs. When such benefits are tied to political preferences, local economic concerns become a route for pressure over wider relations with Beijing.

The Democratic Progressive Party's China affairs department described four connected channels on November 8: people, money, organisations and information. It argued that hosted exchanges establish relationships, financial benefits support political allies, local associations provide mobilisation networks and online messaging carries political narratives into daily life.

The DPP is a participant in the election, and its statement was a political warning. Its department urged voters to examine candidates' political contacts and financial interests involving Beijing. Prosecutors and the NSB, meanwhile, are pursuing specific allegations through intelligence gathering and criminal investigations.

Two borough campaigns under investigation

The Tainan and Hsinchu district prosecutors' offices formed a joint task force after receiving intelligence about suspected foreign election interference. Investigators questioned 13 defendants in Tainan, along with one defendant and nine witnesses in Hsinchu.

Prosecutors allege that Lin received instructions and funding from the Chinese Communist Party to run for Tainan Borough warden, while Chen sought the Wuling Borough position in Hsinchu. Lin also allegedly arranged repeated trips to China for eligible voters, who received free services in exchange for their votes.

Both offices sought detention because they suspected criminal involvement and considered the men at risk of fleeing or coordinating with others to destroy evidence. The courts ordered Lin held without outside communication and granted Chen bail. The remaining defendants and witnesses were released after questioning.

The allegations remain before the justice system. China's Taiwan Affairs Office had not commented on the case. The prosecution account places an alleged exchange of benefits for votes at the smallest level of elected government, where personal relationships can carry considerable weight.

Online operations follow voters across platforms

The NSB's January 2026 report, Analysis of China's Cognitive Warfare Tactics Against Taiwan in 2025, described a campaign aimed at changing public attitudes through information. Cognitive warfare means trying to influence how people understand events, whom they trust and whether they believe resistance or political participation is worthwhile.

The bureau identified four goals in that report:

exacerbate internal divisions within Taiwan," "weaken Taiwanese people's will to resist the enemy," "influence allies' willingness to support Taiwan," and "win support for China's stance.

The NSB recorded a 60% increase in inauthentic social media accounts between 2024 and 2025. It tracked more than 2 million instances of disinformation in 2025, up 74% from 2023. Those earlier figures show that the election warnings follow several years of expanding activity.

During January to September 2026, Facebook's share of the disputed information collected by intelligence teams rose to 68.9%, from 43.6% a year earlier. The share on Threads doubled, from 4.5% to 9%. Together, the two platforms accounted for 77.9% of the collected material, compared with 48.1% previously.

The bureau described a process in which Chinese officials or state media establish a narrative, followed by proxy accounts, marketing companies and coordinated commenters spreading it. Content farms, imitation websites and videos generated with artificial intelligence can give a message many apparently independent voices.

Doublethink Lab, a Taiwanese organisation that studies information manipulation, has also described a shift toward decentralised campaigns that exploit existing arguments. One example was the false rumour that the DPP planned to sell Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company to the United States. Accounts linked to China circulated the claim, connecting anxiety about Taiwan's semiconductor industry with distrust of political leaders.

Stolen accounts and personal data sharpen the targeting

Taiwan's Government Service Network recorded approximately 173.28 million intrusion attempts during the first quarter of 2026. By July, the monthly total exceeded 100 million. The NSB said the increase could include preparations to gather intelligence and interfere in the election.

Cyber intrusion attempts are efforts to probe or enter computer systems. The bureau described possible objectives including surveillance, data theft and expanded intelligence collection. It also identified account hijacking, which allows an operator to publish through a real person's account and reach people who already recognise it.

The targeting concerns connect with the GoLaxy document findings, which described about 23 million Taiwan household registration records, more than 6.2 million news and social media entries, and roughly 5,000 target accounts in leaked company documents examined by Doublethink Lab.

Those documents also listed political profiles, companies, religious groups and civic associations. Linking such information can help operators identify relationships between a person, an organisation and a political issue, then choose messages suited to that audience. The origin and accuracy of the household records, and the measurable electoral effects of the alleged operations, remain unclear.

Political targeting has reached contests inside parties as well. During the October 2025 Kuomintang leadership race, commentator Jaw Shaw-kong alleged that newly created accounts and content generated with AI attacked Hau Lung-bin and promoted Cheng Li-wun, who won. The NSB identified more than 1,200 videos about the contest on TikTok and YouTube made by overseas accounts.

Intimidation moves from screens to personal safety

Comedian Huang Yi-hao, known for jokes about Chinese President Xi Jinping, was injured in an allegedly staged traffic accident. New Taipei prosecutors said China instigated the incident to stop him performing. Several people, including a Chinese national identified as K who allegedly planned the collision, were indicted on October 21.

Tsai addressed the case the following day, describing an escalation in repression that reaches across borders. He said tactics were moving beyond surveillance and violent intimidation toward harassment designed to evade Taiwan's laws, including alleged staged road accidents. His stated priorities were protecting Huang and ensuring those responsible faced punishment.

The NSB's wider assessment described surveillance, photographing targeted people, collecting private information for threats, impersonating critics in threatening emails and arranging physical confrontations. Such actions can make a political disagreement a question of personal safety for performers, activists and other public figures.

Military messaging has also entered local campaigning. Following the Kevin Tsai threats, Taiwan warned that a propaganda account linked to the People's Liberation Army had pressured the television host over his October 4 appearance at the campaign headquarters of DPP Taipei mayoral candidate Puma Shen.

Kevin Tsai later said he had attended events to conduct interviews and gather material, and he also attended incumbent Kuomintang Mayor Chiang Wan-an's campaign launch. The episode showed how public participation in an ordinary campaign event could draw pressure affecting a person's work and commercial relationships in China.

Military pressure and espionage add another layer

The NSB recorded more than 1,450 Chinese military aircraft sorties around Taiwan between January and September 2026, alongside 28 joint combat readiness patrols involving naval vessels. During the same period in 2025, it recorded more than 3,000 sorties and 31 patrols.

The bureau therefore described a decline in those particular measures of military activity, while warning that Beijing continued testing Taiwan's responses through other exercises. From June, Chinese coast guard and maritime patrol operations extended into waters east of Taiwan and the western Pacific.

During the first quarter, the NSB recorded more than 420 aircraft sorties and 10 joint patrols. It also counted 12 Chinese coast guard patrols in restricted or prohibited waters around Kinmen by the end of March, compared with 44 throughout 2025. Some vessels deliberately switched off automatic identification signals, the bureau said.

Espionage prosecutions have risen sharply. According to the NSB, the number of people indicted in Chinese espionage cases increased from six in 2020 to 73 in 2026, excluding cases brought under the Anti-Infiltration Act. Among 179 people whose cases had reached court decisions, 163 were convicted, a rate of about 91%.

The average sentence rose from one year in 2020 to six years and six months in 2026. The bureau described recruitment through intelligence contacts and online approaches aimed at military units and government agencies. Access to sensitive information gives such recruitment a security consequence beyond the election campaign itself.

What authorities are doing before polling day

Tsai said the NSB was using artificial intelligence to trace the origins of disputed online content and gathering evidence for judicial authorities. On October 22, he said the agency hoped to submit suspected interference cases for investigation before the November 28 vote.

The bureau's warnings developed through the year, moving from broad assessments of digital activity to accounts of specific electoral tactics and alleged intimidation:

• January 2026: The NSB published its assessment of China's information operations during 2025.
• April 6: A legislative report disclosed approximately 173.28 million government network intrusion attempts during the first quarter.
• October 20: A further report detailed roughly 2.5 million pieces of disputed information collected between January and September.
• October 21: Prosecutors indicted suspects in the alleged staged collision targeting Huang Yi-hao.
• October 22: Tsai described discounted flights, suspected funding and other targeted election tactics.
• November 8: The DPP's China affairs department warned about connected networks of people, money, organisations and information.
• November 28: Taiwan holds its local elections.

The investigations connect several activities that voters may encounter separately: a subsidised trip, a familiar social media account, a campaign donation or an online claim about a candidate. Authorities are examining whether particular benefits and messages are connected to foreign direction, illegal financing or exchanges for votes.

For local communities, the immediate stakes are concrete. Borough wardens and other local officials serve residents directly, while their political networks can support larger campaigns. Alleged interference at that level can therefore affect both everyday representation and the route through which future national leaders gain influence.

Key Points

• Taiwan holds its nine categories of local elections on November 28, 2026.
• The NSB alleges targeted Chinese tactics involving discounted flights, suspected campaign funding, cheap trips, hacking and online manipulation.
• Intelligence teams collected about 2.5 million pieces of disputed information from January to September, roughly 48% more than a year earlier.
• Prosecutors allege Chinese direction and funding in two borough warden campaigns; Lin Te-wang was detained and Chen Chen-chou received bail.
• Several people were indicted over an allegedly staged traffic accident targeting comedian Huang Yi-hao.
• The NSB is tracing online operations and aims to send evidence of suspected election interference to judicial authorities before polling day.