Taiwan Warns of AI Election Interference as GoLaxy Files Detail 23 Million Household Records

A vast database behind an election warning

About 23 million Taiwan household registration records, more than 6.2 million news and social media entries, and roughly 5,000 target accounts appear in leaked Chinese company documents examined by Taiwan's Doublethink Lab. The findings provide a detailed picture of the data and technology behind a new warning from Taiwanese national security officials ahead of local elections on November 28, 2026.

Officials speaking anonymously at a recent internal briefing said China was using artificial intelligence to build convincing false identities, divide audiences into political categories and deliver messages designed to deepen divisions or discourage voting. They described an operation that can begin with ordinary lifestyle posts before switching to political attacks.

Doublethink Lab's GoLaxy document analysis, written by its digital intelligence team and researcher Athena Tong, describes a system connecting political monitoring, personal profiles, automated writing and coordinated publishing. GoLaxy, also known as Zhongke Tianji, is a company that grew out of the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Computing Technology.

The practical concern for voters is that a familiar account discussing health, schools or daily life could be an invented person operated from abroad. Its political messages could then be adjusted to the interests and frustrations of the people following it.

Taiwan's nine categories of local elections put candidates across local government before voters. National security officials also alleged that China conducted systematic attacks against 1,850 candidates during the summer of 2025. More recently, they said, operators have used selected discussion topics, press conferences and third parties to spread related narratives.

What the 23 million records contain

Doublethink Lab describes the largest sensitive dataset as approximately 23 million household registration records obtained from sources that were not public. The documents also list 170 detailed political profiles, 75 political parties, 1,478 companies, more than 13,000 religious groups and nearly 24,000 civic associations.

The origin, age, accuracy and number of unique people represented in the household records remain unclear, as do the measurable effects of the alleged campaign on voting. The figure describes database entries, while the wider collection combines personal information, institutional records and public online content.

GoLaxy's collection draws on at least 10,000 sources concerning Taiwan worldwide. Its roughly 5,000 key social media targets are described as suitable for connecting an online identity to a real person. Such a connection would let an operator move from studying what an account posts to examining the person's political, professional or social relationships.

Political profiles cover figures from several camps, including President Lai Ching-te, former President Tsai Ing-wen, former Premier Su Tseng-chang, former Taiwan People's Party chairman Ko Wen-je and Kuomintang politician Hou Yu-ih. Fields include party membership, public office, birthplace, residence, education, religion and social ties.

A related knowledge graph connects parties, leaders, institutions and locations. A knowledge graph is a searchable map of relationships: instead of holding isolated names, it can show who leads an organisation, where it operates and how it connects to other people. GoLaxy's version includes a field recording an organisation's attitude toward China.

How audiences become separate targets

National security officials described four audience categories: hardliners, friendly people, people who might change their views, and people classified as objective. These are operators' labels for deciding which message to send to whom.

Doublethink Lab found a more specific project requirement in the leaked documents. It called for collecting at least 50,000 Taiwan related news items and classifying people mentioned in them into those four groups and their opposing counterparts, with at least 1,000 key people in each category.

The 170 detailed political profiles and the requirement for at least 1,000 people per category concern different parts of the files: an existing collection described in a summary and a broader project target. Together, they show both the information being organised and the scale of further classification sought.

Audience segmentation means separating a large public into smaller groups with shared characteristics. In advertising, it might determine who sees a promotion. Here, officials say, it is being used to select political narratives according to people's attitudes and vulnerabilities.

A message aimed at a committed supporter might encourage anger at others in the same camp. A message aimed at someone less certain might suggest that every candidate is unsuitable or that political effort is pointless. The intended result can be withdrawal from politics rather than support for a particular opponent.

From health advice to political attacks

Officials identified four recurring methods: tailoring narratives to different audiences, entering communities through convincing false accounts, reducing political participation and spreading false claims about everyday concerns.

One example involved an account or page that initially discussed health and wellness. After attracting an audience, it could turn to accusations that the Ministry of Health and Welfare had neglected those readers. Familiar subject matter supplies the bridge between ordinary conversation and political pressure.

Other examples described fabricated claims that a candidate would permit large quantities of controversial medicines or relax restrictions on nightlife businesses after taking office. Officials presented these as false narratives designed to provoke anxiety among parents and the wider public.

Operators can also pretend to share a community's political loyalties, then post extreme comments during a sensitive event. Someone who appears to be an ally can encourage infighting from inside a group, making a dispute look like a spontaneous disagreement among genuine supporters.

National security officials said checks on some Threads accounts that appeared Taiwanese found registration telephone numbers from other countries. Investigators are examining those details alongside posting patterns, invented identities and coordination across platforms as part of their continuing monitoring.

The machinery that keeps false identities alive

GoLaxy's documents describe a central system for cultivating accounts across Facebook, X, Instagram, Line, Telegram, TikTok, YouTube and other services. Each account farming system could manage more than 50 mobile devices. One dashboard screenshot contained 3,692 virtual identities.

Account farming means building and maintaining accounts over time so they acquire the appearance of ordinary users. An invented person needs a consistent name, photograph, language, contact information and posting history. Routine activity helps that identity become familiar before it delivers a political message.

The documents describe assigning a device to a particular invented person, who may then have accounts on several platforms. They also set out procedures for different account conditions, including newly created accounts and accounts recently restored after suspension.

GoLaxy's system offered international telephone numbers, email addresses and network connections supporting those identities. Its internal discussion treated platform detection and account removals as a major operational bottleneck. Operators therefore spent resources on keeping accounts active as well as producing content.

Doublethink Lab identified seven accounts it believed GoLaxy operated. Its researchers connected some accounts to engineers whose names and photographs appeared elsewhere in the leaked files. The investigation also found suspected associated accounts using stolen or AI generated profile images and presenting themselves as Taiwanese citizens.

Researchers observed three suspected accounts sharing similar AI generated pet pictures on December 14, 2025. Some accounts also posted about Taiwanese politics. Several identifiable accounts had little engagement and carried fairly basic content, while the documents described much more ambitious capabilities.

AI connects monitoring, writing and distribution

GoLaxy's proposed GoPro propaganda system brings four stages together: monitoring political developments, identifying targets, generating content and publishing through accounts on overseas platforms. The documents describe a dedicated team of 50 people working on the system.

Natural language processing, software that examines human language, helps sort posts and news by subject, sentiment and political position. Operators can then select people or groups, generate material suited to them and distribute different versions through centrally controlled accounts.

The content tools include completing passages, recommending supporting material and rewriting the same message in different wording. This gives operators a way to circulate a shared narrative without every account repeating exactly the same sentence.

A parallel identity project sought scripts and interactions in Taiwanese Mandarin, Taiwanese Hokkien and English. Its specifications included at least 100 virtual identities across 10 virtual scenarios, with conversations and content spanning text, images, audio and video.

The combination matters because monitoring and messaging can feed each other. An operator can study reactions to a topic, adjust the language and try again through another account or platform. National security officials described support personnel continuing to monitor, assess and revise these operations.

Tong, a researcher affiliated with the University of Tokyo and the China Strategic Risks Institute, said AI greatly expands the volume of data operators can examine and the number of message variations they can produce. Doublethink Lab's investigation places that capacity alongside the continuing difficulty of running convincing accounts that attract real interaction.

The documents trace years of election work

The leaked collection runs to 399 pages and includes presentations, sales material and internal meeting records. Researchers Brett J. Goldstein and Brett V. Benson discovered the files, which are held for academic research at Vanderbilt University's Institute of National Security.

Several dates connect the latest warning to earlier planning and monitoring:

• December 2022: Meeting records discussed cooperation on information manipulation directed at Taiwan, including data collection, realistic digital identities and content distribution.
• November 25 to December 1, 2023: An election monitoring report tracked 634,448 content entries ahead of Taiwan's 2024 presidential election.
• Summer 2025: Taiwanese national security officials say China systematically targeted 1,850 candidates.
• August 5, 2025: The existence and significance of the GoLaxy files became public.
• December 14, 2025: Researchers observed coordinated sharing of similar AI generated pet images by suspected associated accounts.
• October 2026: Officials warned of increasingly automated interference ahead of the November 28 local elections.

The weekly report from late 2023 followed competing presidential tickets and changes in attention around figures including Hou Yu-ih, Jaw Shaw-kong and Ko Wen-je. It examined attacks, counterattacks and arguments over economic relations with China.

Its 634,448 entries over seven days amount to about 90,635 entries a day. That calculation illustrates the scale of the monitoring workload. The report examined content and interactions to assess political narratives and cohesion within the principal camps.

Who is connected to GoLaxy

Doublethink Lab says a project and client overview in the files lists China's Cyberspace Administration, the Central Military Commission's Science and Technology Commission, the Taiwan Affairs Office and Base 311. The latter, also known as PLA Unit 61716, is based in Fuzhou and is associated with psychological operations directed at Taiwan.

GoLaxy has denied having direct links to the Chinese Communist Party. Tong said some contracts signed through third parties had clear connections to the People's Liberation Army, the party or government bodies.

The files also identify a network of technology and media partners. Their roles range from data collection and language technology to digital media production and social media management. The December 2022 meeting discussed how several partners would contribute different parts of a Taiwan focused project.

Doublethink Lab's analysis therefore describes an arrangement involving commercial suppliers, research expertise and state clients. Companies supply the databases, software and account infrastructure that government or military organisations can use.

A wider operation with Taiwan at its centre

GoLaxy's documents describe similar monitoring of the United States, Hong Kong and countries along China's Belt and Road routes. For Hong Kong, a company presentation claimed that analysis of 180,000 Twitter users identified more than 3,000 key figures and over 100 online opinion leaders.

The United States material includes more than 2,000 additional political figures and opinion leaders, alongside journalists, researchers, businesses and institutions. An election dashboard design combines political calendars, candidate attention, campaign finance and state voting analysis.

Doublethink Lab also found unfinished elements. A demonstration of a proposed map of American candidate activity used a map of Hangzhou's West Lake. The example shows a presentation tool still using a domestic map while describing a proposed American election application.

Taiwan receives unusually detailed treatment across the files, combining household records, civic organisations, political relationships and language specific virtual identities. Instructions even called for accounts devoted to Taiwan's relationship with Lithuania, showing how a diplomatic issue could become a dedicated social media operation.

China's broader information strategy also reaches established media. A Reporters Without Borders investigation described investment in international broadcasting, stakes in foreign media and training programmes for journalists from developing countries. It documented embassy pressure directed at Danish and Philippine journalists after coverage concerning China and Taiwan or Chinese influence activities.

For Taiwan's November election, the immediate issue is more intimate: who is speaking inside ordinary online communities, how that identity was created and why a particular message reaches a particular voter. Officials say continued monitoring must follow activity across platforms as operators combine automated accounts with human direction and local political disputes.

Key Points

• Taiwanese national security officials warn of AI assisted interference ahead of local elections on November 28, 2026.
• Doublethink Lab says GoLaxy files list about 23 million household registration records and more than 6.2 million news and social media entries concerning Taiwan.
• The documents describe political profiling, audience classification, automated content production and centrally managed false accounts.
• Officials say operators seek to deepen divisions, provoke anxiety and discourage political participation.
• Researchers identified seven accounts they believed GoLaxy operated, with some showing limited engagement.
• GoLaxy denies direct links to the Chinese Communist Party; researchers identify government and military connections in the documents and contracts.