North Korea's Missile Advances Put US and Allied Defenses Under Growing Pressure

More missiles, more warheads and harder targets to intercept

North Korea could possess 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2035, compared with 10 or fewer assessed in 2025, according to a US Defense Intelligence Agency projection cited in an October 13, 2026, congressional report. Alongside that possible expansion, Pyongyang is developing maneuvering glide vehicles and missiles carrying several warheads, technologies that could make defending South Korea, Japan and the United States more difficult.

The Congressional Research Service report, Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs, brings together evidence of missile testing, expanding nuclear material production and closer military cooperation with Russia. Updated by Daniel M. Gettinger and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, the document identifies advances across several programs, alongside technologies still undergoing development.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy describes North Korea's nuclear forces as growing in size and sophistication and presenting a clear and present danger of nuclear attack on the American homeland. An April 2026 US defense official's testimony also assessed that North Korean missiles can strike South Korea and Japan with nuclear or conventional warheads.

For people living near North Korean missile targets, the concern involves several developments happening together: a potentially larger arsenal, more ways to launch weapons and flight paths that are harder to predict. The report's figures also describe different things. Its projection of 50 ICBMs concerns missiles, while estimates of approximately 50 assembled nuclear warheads concern the explosive weapons that various delivery systems could carry.

Why the latest hypersonic tests matter

CRS cites assessments that North Korea tested a Hwasong-11E-1 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle in September 2026, followed by an intermediate range ballistic missile carrying such a vehicle in October. North Korea described its October 3 launch as a hypersonic intermediate range missile test; the weapon reportedly traveled 350 kilometers.

Hypersonic means traveling at least five times the speed of sound, or Mach 5. A hypersonic glide vehicle is carried upward by a rocket before gliding through the atmosphere, with the ability to change course. Its maneuvering makes it harder for defenders to predict where to send an interceptor, a weapon intended to destroy an incoming missile.

CRS says analysts regard North Korea's glide vehicle development as being at an early stage. The defensive challenge nevertheless extends beyond speed: a weapon that changes direction gives tracking systems and commanders a more complicated task than one following a more predictable path.

Chris Green, senior Korean Peninsula adviser at the International Crisis Group, placed the tests within the longer competition between the two Koreas:

There has been an arms race on the Korean Peninsula for many years — and hypersonic weapons are just the latest manifestation of that.

South Korea has also flight tested its first domestically developed hypersonic weapon, with President Lee Jae-myung observing the launch. Lee described the test as a step toward stronger conventional defense capabilities. Green said continued North Korean deployment of offensive systems in large numbers could bring discussions about expanded missile defense in both South Korea and Japan.

A growing fleet of missiles using solid fuel

North Korea's missile expansion increasingly centers on solid propellant. Unlike a missile requiring liquid fuel preparations, a missile with solid propellant stores its fuel in the motor. CRS identifies advantages in maintenance and mobility, both important for weapons that can move between launch locations.

Pyongyang tested the Hwasong-18 ICBM in 2023 and the Hwasong-19 in 2024. It unveiled another missile using solid fuel, the Hwasong-20, in October 2025. According to the October 2026 CRS update, the Hwasong-20 does not appear to have undergone a flight test.

The 2026 US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessment says North Korea has tested ICBMs capable of reaching the entire US homeland. Congressional testimony cited by CRS recorded more than a dozen North Korean ICBM flight tests between 2022 and 2024.

The DIA projection of 50 ICBMs by 2035 would represent a force at least five times the size of the upper end of its 2025 estimate of 10 or fewer. The projection is a possible future inventory, with the pace of production and deployment determining how closely North Korea approaches it.

Multiple warheads add another defensive challenge

North Korea is pursuing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, known as MIRVs. This technology allows one missile to release several warheads onto separate paths toward different targets. Defenders could then face several incoming objects from a single launch.

CRS records an unsuccessful North Korean test involving a missile intended to carry MIRVs in June 2024. It also says improved solid rocket motor tests in 2025 and 2026 could support development of missiles carrying multiple warheads, potentially including the Hwasong-20.

The Hwasong-19's first flight on October 31, 2024, offers a detailed example of the work behind that ambition. North Korea reported a flight lasting 85.93 minutes, reaching an altitude of 7,687.5 kilometers and covering 1,001.2 kilometers. Japan's Defense Ministry recorded approximately 86 minutes, around 1,000 kilometers of distance and an altitude above 7,000 kilometers.

The missile used a launcher with 11 axles, compared with nine for the Hwasong-18. Technical assessments connected its larger size and greater lifting capacity with the possible carriage of a heavier payload, including multiple warheads. Photographs also showed a possible platform used to maneuver and release separate reentry vehicles.

Those assessments described successful MIRV deployment as requiring several successful payload tests over a period of years. CRS continues to describe the technology as a development priority, with the June 2024 failure part of that testing history.

Nuclear material production could expand the arsenal

North Korea is also increasing its ability to produce fissile material, the substances that sustain the nuclear reaction inside a warhead. Its programs use plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The amount produced helps determine how many nuclear weapons the country can build.

CRS cites a March 2026 International Atomic Energy Agency assessment describing continued operation of uranium enrichment facilities at Kangson and Yongbyon. The agency also identified a new building at Yongbyon resembling the Kangson facility.

In April 2026 testimony to the House Armed Services Committee, the DIA director assessed that Pyongyang was building a probable additional uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon to increase stockpile production. Enrichment raises the concentration of the form of uranium needed for a nuclear explosive.

Nongovernmental specialists cited by CRS estimate that North Korea has produced enough fissile material for up to 90 warheads and may have assembled approximately 50. The first estimate concerns material that could be turned into weapons; the second concerns weapons believed to have been built.

Pyongyang's plans create competing demands for that material. Its leadership wants weapons for different missiles and other delivery systems, as well as several warheads on a single missile. Expanding production would give it more scope to pursue those goals together.

Russia ties connect two theaters of conflict

North Korea has reportedly supplied Russia with Hwasong-11A, also designated KN-23, and Hwasong-11B, or KN-24, missiles for use against Ukraine. Both are missiles using solid fuel with the potential to strike locations throughout the Korean Peninsula.

CRS cites an April 2025 assessment by the US Forces Korea commander that Russia was expanding its sharing of technology, expertise and materials relevant to space, nuclear and missile programs in return for North Korean assistance in the war.

The relationship gives the weapons buildup a dimension beyond Northeast Asia. Missiles developed with targets on the Korean Peninsula in mind have entered a European war, while US officials assess that assistance is moving back toward North Korea in fields relevant to its military ambitions.

The technical assessment of the October 2024 Hwasong-19 test explained its increased performance through the missile's larger size and additional propellant. That provides a specific engineering explanation for the test results, alongside the broader US assessment of growing Russian technology sharing.

Submarine launches widen the development effort

North Korea has announced tests of two types of strategic cruise missiles launched from a submarine off its east coast. South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff said it tracked the weapons from before launch through their flight and final approach, assessing that one type came from a vertical launch system and the other from a torpedo tube.

South Korean analysts identified the likely launch platform as the Kim Kun Ok Hero, a modified submarine powered by diesel engines that North Korea unveiled in September 2023. A vertical launch system can allow missiles to be fired in quicker succession than torpedo tubes, potentially giving defenders less time to respond.

Cruise missiles use powered flight through the atmosphere. Ballistic missiles follow a different flight pattern, with rocket propulsion followed by a trajectory toward their target. North Korea is pursuing both types from naval platforms as part of Kim Jong-un's effort to develop a nuclear force that can operate at sea.

Shin Jong-woo, secretary-general of the Korea Defense and Security Forum, assessed that combat system tests for operational deployment were underway and predicted that a submarine launched ballistic missile test could follow.

Hong Min, a senior researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, assessed the submarine's operational capability as limited. He identified submerged launches, long patrols and ballistic missile operations as capabilities still awaiting demonstration. CRS similarly notes doubts about whether submarine development has kept pace with the missiles intended for those vessels.

A sequence of tests, displays and nuclear preparations

North Korea's activity follows goals announced years earlier. Its January 2021 defense plan called for tactical nuclear weapons, new submarines, multiple warheads and an ICBM with a range of 15,000 kilometers. The recent milestones show how those ambitions have moved into testing and public display.

• September 3, 2017: North Korea conducted its sixth and most recent nuclear explosive test at Punggye-ri.
• June 2024: A reported test involving a missile intended to carry multiple warheads was unsuccessful.
• October 31, 2024: North Korea conducted the first flight test of the Hwasong-19 ICBM.
• October 2025: Pyongyang unveiled the Hwasong-20 ICBM.
• September 2026: Analysts assessed that North Korea tested a Hwasong-11E-1 carrying a hypersonic glide vehicle.
• October 3, 2026: North Korea announced a hypersonic intermediate range missile test.
• October 11, 2026: North Korea opened its National Defense Revolution Museum.
• October 13, 2026: CRS updated its assessment of the nuclear and missile programs.

The museum displayed a diagram of the Hwasong-20 carrying multiple warheads, with a board describing a range extending to the Middle East, Australia and South America. Other exhibits included the Hwasong-17, hypersonic missiles, a new submarine launched ballistic missile and rocket launchers of 600 millimeters.

South Korea's unification ministry described the museum as North Korea's first dedicated to displaying strategic weapons. Its opening around the Workers' Party's 81st founding anniversary placed the weapons program at the center of a major political celebration.

North Korea's nuclear test infrastructure is another concern. A 2025 DIA assessment said the Punggye-ri site had been restored and the country was positioned to conduct a seventh nuclear test at a time of its choosing. No date for such a test was given.

Defense planning and diplomacy face the same expansion

South Korea and Japan face missiles with conventional or nuclear payloads, while US planners also face a growing potential threat to the American mainland and forces stationed in the region. CRS says North Korean intermediate range missiles may be able to target Guam, extending the planning problem beyond the peninsula.

Recent launches have kept those concerns immediate. South Korea's military detected multiple ballistic missiles fired from near Pyongyang toward eastern waters in October. Japan detected at least two and assessed that they landed outside its exclusive economic zone.

Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean army general and senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, described how uncertainty about claimed capabilities affects military planning:

It's anybody's guess whether they're telling the truth on this, but any prudent military planner should always assume the worst.

North Korea's political position adds another difficulty. Kim has repeatedly rejected denuclearization negotiations since his talks with US President Donald Trump broke down in 2019. The 2025 US intelligence community assessment said Kim views nuclear weapons as protection for his government's survival and has no intention of renouncing them.

The United States, South Korea and Japan continue to state their commitment to North Korea's complete denuclearization. Multiple UN Security Council resolutions call for the elimination of its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.

CRS identifies sanctions enforcement, diplomatic efforts and adjustments to US and allied military deployments and readiness as matters Congress could examine. The practical challenge is responding to an arsenal expanding in several directions at once: more launchers, more potential warheads, maneuvering payloads and weapons intended for use at sea.

Key Points

• CRS updated its assessment of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs on October 13, 2026.
• DIA assessed 10 or fewer North Korean ICBMs in 2025 and projected a possible inventory of 50 by 2035.
• Recent hypersonic glide vehicle tests and work on multiple warheads could make missile interception more difficult.
• Specialists cited by CRS estimate material for up to 90 warheads, with approximately 50 potentially assembled.
• US officials assess that Russia is expanding military technology sharing in return for North Korean assistance against Ukraine.
• The Hwasong-20, submarine operations and multiple warhead systems remain at different stages of development.
• Washington, Seoul and Tokyo retain their stated goal of complete North Korean denuclearization.