Indus Treaty Dispute Exposes Gaps in Climate Planning and Water Cooperation

A water crisis extends beyond the treaty suspension

The Indus Waters Treaty requires India and Pakistan to exchange daily river measurements, reservoir releases and canal withdrawals. It also says the agreement can be modified or terminated only through another treaty ratified by both governments. Those provisions now sit at the centre of a dispute that has interrupted cooperation over a river basin supporting nearly 300 million people.

India placed the 1960 agreement in abeyance on 23 April 2025, a day after an attack in Pahalgam, in Indian administered Kashmir, killed 26 people. New Delhi blamed militants linked to Pakistan. Islamabad denied involvement. India says cooperation will remain suspended until Pakistan ends its support for terrorism, while Pakistan argues that the treaty provides no mechanism for unilateral suspension.

The immediate danger is not necessarily that India can stop the rivers flowing. Hydrologists say that would be technically difficult with existing infrastructure. The loss of information about flows and dam operations can nevertheless leave Pakistan less able to prepare for floods, droughts and irrigation shortages.

Climate change makes that information more valuable. Himalayan glaciers are shrinking, snow remains on the ground for less time, and seasonal flows could arrive earlier than farmers need them. Researchers disagree about whether the answer is to strengthen the existing agreement or replace it, but their proposals converge on a practical requirement: water management must respond to changing conditions rather than depend on assumptions made in 1960.

The dispute therefore has three distinct parts: whether treaty obligations continue, how upstream infrastructure affects downstream supplies, and whether the agreement can accommodate a changing river system. Resolving one will not automatically resolve the others.

What the agreement actually permits

Signed in Karachi on 19 September 1960 after negotiations mediated by the World Bank, the Indus Waters Treaty allocates the eastern Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers primarily to India and the western Indus, Jhelum and Chenab primarily to Pakistan. Its detailed exceptions matter as much as that broad division.

Article III obliges India to let western river waters flow, subject to specified domestic, agricultural, power generation and nonconsumptive uses. Nonconsumptive use means using water without substantially depleting it, as with navigation. Agriculture is a separate permitted category because irrigation does consume water. Storage is restricted under the treaty's hydropower and reservoir annexes.

The agricultural provisions specify additional irrigated cropped areas of 70,000 acres in the Indus drainage basin and 400,000 acres in the Jhelum drainage basin. For the Chenab, they allow 225,000 acres within its drainage basin, including a 100,000 acre limit in Jammu District, and 6,000 acres outside the basin. These ceilings come with further conditions governing development and storage releases.

Hydropower permissions are similarly conditional. For plants covered by Annexure D, the general operating rule requires water received upstream over seven consecutive days to be delivered downstream within that same period. Daily deliveries generally must remain between 30% and 130% of incoming volumes, with different rules for specified Chenab locations.

These provisions show why descriptions of either unrestricted Indian control or a complete ban on Indian use of the western rivers are misleading. The treaty permits development, but regulates its design, storage and operation.

From the April attack to a legal deadlock

The water dispute continued after four days of military clashes ended with a ceasefire on 10 May 2025. India's Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said treaty cooperation would remain on hold until Pakistan stopped supporting terrorism, using the condition that it do so "credibly and irrevocably".

The main developments span several years:

• 2022: The World Bank appointed a neutral expert and a Court of Arbitration chair for disputes involving Indian hydropower projects, while acknowledging practical and legal difficulties with concurrent proceedings.
• 22 April 2025: The Pahalgam attack killed 26 people.
• 23 April 2025: India announced that it was placing the treaty in abeyance.
• 10 May 2025: A ceasefire ended four days of fighting between India and Pakistan.
• 31 August 2025: Reports described an arbitration award affirming that the treaty remained in force despite India's suspension announcement. India rejected the court's authority.

The treaty text provides a firm reference point: Article XII requires a duly ratified agreement between both governments for modification or termination. Pakistan relies on that language in challenging India's action. India disputes the arbitration process and maintains its security condition for restoring cooperation.

Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif subsequently pressed the issue through his treaty appeal at Tianjin, urging respect for bilateral commitments at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. That diplomatic effort did not settle the disagreement over either the suspension or the tribunal.

The first loss is information

Article VI requires regular exchanges of river gauge and discharge measurements, reservoir extractions and releases, and several categories of canal data. Records are to be transmitted monthly, no later than three months after the month concerned. Information needed for operational purposes can be requested daily or at other intervals.

This is more than administrative paperwork. River discharge measures how much water passes a point over time. Combined with reservoir and canal information, it helps managers distinguish changes caused by weather from changes caused by storage or withdrawals upstream.

India reportedly halted routine hydrological exchanges and Permanent Indus Commission meetings within weeks of its announcement. Srinivas Chokkakula of the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi warned that withholding data could create uncertainty about downstream water availability. Reports also described possible sediment flushing from Chenab hydropower reservoirs without advance warnings to Pakistan. Those accounts do not establish how often such operations have occurred or their measured effects.

Sediment flushing removes accumulated material from a reservoir by releasing water carrying sand, silt and other particles. The timing matters downstream because a release can change both flow and water quality. Without notice, managers have less opportunity to adjust operations.

The commission is also the treaty's first channel for examining questions about interpretation, application or possible breaches. Article VIII requires at least one meeting annually and a general river inspection every five years. Its interruption weakens routine communication, even though the agreement separately provides neutral expert and arbitration procedures.

Glacier loss is changing the seasonal calendar

A Science academic article by Sushmita Pathak, published on 11 June 2025, describes climate pressures that the treaty's negotiators did not anticipate. It puts the basin's population at nearly 300 million and reports changing snow, glacier and river conditions.

Arun Shrestha, a climate scientist at the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, says the Hindu Kush Himalayas could warm by up to 2.2 degrees Celsius by the end of the century at current emissions rates. A 2023 ICIMOD study found that glaciers disappeared 65% faster in the 2010s than in the preceding decade and could lose up to two thirds of their volume by 2100.

Shakil Ahmad Romshoo, vice chancellor of the Islamic University of Science and Technology in Srinagar and a specialist in hydrology and glaciology, reported below normal snow persistence in the Indus Basin for the preceding three years. Snow persistence is the length of time snow stays on the ground. Shorter persistence changes when stored winter precipitation enters rivers.

Upper Indus rivers currently reach their maximum flows between June and August, coinciding with irrigation demand. Rising temperatures and changes from snowfall to rainfall could shift that peak earlier. Basin flows are forecast to reach a peak around the middle of the century as glacier melting accelerates, then decline as ice and snow reserves diminish.

That sequence explains why more meltwater now does not guarantee greater water security later. It also means that annual totals alone cannot show whether water will arrive when crops, reservoirs and cities need it.

Only a small fraction of glaciers are monitored

The climate forecasts carry substantial uncertainty. Romshoo says researchers monitor only 16 of roughly 33,000 glaciers in the Indian Himalayas. That is about 0.05%, or approximately one monitored glacier for every 2,000. These figures describe the Indian Himalayas, not an inventory limited to the Indus Basin.

Monitoring stations also tend to sit at lower elevations. Shrestha says this limits understanding of snowfall at higher altitudes, including snow delivered by storms known as western disturbances. Debris and black carbon deposited on snow and ice introduce further uncertainty about melting.

Fazlul Haq, a geographer at Ohio State University, argues that treaty management should respond to observed flows rather than remain fixed around historic assumptions. He described the need for a different approach:

We need to rethink the IWT not as a static political agreement, but as a living, evolving environmental treaty.

His proposal would use satellite observations and other measurements to guide conservation measures and reservoir release schedules. Sparse snow cover could trigger preparations for shortages. Forecasts of excessive flows could inform storage or diversion decisions.

This would change management, not simply redraw river allocations. It would require monitoring funds, agreed methods and a willingness to share information. Better satellite coverage cannot by itself replace cooperation over how dams and canals are operated.

Hydropower development raises separate technical disputes

Pakistan's objections include the 330 megawatt Kishenganga and 850 megawatt Ratle projects. A central issue is pondage, the amount of water temporarily held to support power generation, and whether project designs comply with treaty limits.

The distinction matters because generating electricity does not necessarily consume the water passing through a turbine. Storage and release schedules can still affect downstream timing. The treaty therefore regulates both plant design and operation rather than treating every hydropower project as either harmless or prohibited.

Annexure D generally requires India to provide specified design information at least six months before construction of river works begins. Pakistan then has three months to raise objections on treaty compliance grounds. Technical questions within defined categories can go to a neutral expert, while disputes can proceed through other mechanisms, including arbitration.

India objects to concurrent proceedings on related issues and does not recognise the Court of Arbitration's authority in the current dispute. Pakistan participates in both arbitration and neutral expert proceedings. Reports differ in their descriptions of the August award, with some stressing treaty continuity and another also describing restrictions on hydropower work. Those descriptions do not establish the full scope of project restrictions.

Meanwhile, Jammu and Kashmir's installed hydropower capacity is projected to rise from 3,540 megawatts to more than 5,164 megawatts by December 2026, with Pakal Dul and Kiru nearing completion. The projected increase exceeds 1,624 megawatts, or about 46%. Installed generating capacity, however, is not a measure of how much river water India can withhold.

Reform need not start from an empty page

Romshoo considers a new agreement involving all basin countries, including China and Afghanistan, unlikely amid political tensions. He favours strengthening the existing treaty to address climate change, groundwater, pollution and water variability.

The treaty already contains provisions relevant to part of that agenda. Article IV addresses undue pollution and reasonable measures to treat sewage or industrial waste where necessary. It would therefore be inaccurate to say that the agreement ignores pollution entirely.

Article VII recognises a common interest in developing the rivers and allows mutually agreed cooperation on observation stations, meteorological data, drainage works and engineering projects. It also requires notice and available information about planned works that, in the planning country's opinion, would materially affect the other party.

These clauses provide possible foundations for better climate monitoring and operational coordination. They do not amount to a detailed climate adaptation system or guarantee agreement on new measures.

Dan Haines, an associate professor in University College London's department of risk and disaster reduction, considers renegotiation the likeliest resolution, while identifying conditional reinstatement and permanent termination as other possible outcomes. He says the UN Watercourses Convention, which entered into force in 2014, could be a starting point if both governments reconsidered the principles of sharing international rivers. He regards such a fundamental redesign as unlikely.

Daanish Mustafa, professor in critical geography at King's College London, argues for a new agreement incorporating Kashmiris and other stakeholders. He attributes ecological damage and lost fishing livelihoods to the existing model. His argument that exclusive eastern river rights conflict with international law is an academic position, not an established ruling presented here.

Pakistan's exposure combines dependence and management

Nine in ten Pakistanis live in the Indus Basin, and approximately 80% of the country's irrigated agriculture depends on the river system. Karachi and Lahore also rely on the Indus and its tributaries for drinking water.

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar has said the system sustains the lives and livelihoods of more than 250 million people in Pakistan. That national figure is different in scope from the nearly 300 million people cited for the entire basin. Earlier coverage used a Pakistani population estimate of roughly 240 million, so the figures should not be treated as a single consistent population series.

Other reported estimates put agriculture at almost 90% of Pakistan's water consumption and suggest the country stores less than 10% of water received from seasonal rains and melting snow. The 80% and 90% figures measure different things: dependence of irrigated agriculture on the Indus, and agriculture's share of water consumption.

Domestic irrigation practices and storage limitations can worsen vulnerability, but they do not settle whether treaty obligations have been met. Equally, maintaining treaty rights would not remove the need to manage water more efficiently within Pakistan.

Dar warned participants at an International Water Symposium organised by Pakistan's Embassy in Austria and the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna about attempts to reduce Pakistan's allocation:

Any attempt to deprive Pakistan of the waters rightfully allocated to it would have serious implications for regional peace and security.

President Asif Ali Zardari had also raised the issue during his water rights appeal in Doha. Reports of discussion at a UN Human Rights Council session in Geneva similarly linked water governance with food security and livelihoods, but do not establish a formal council decision on the dispute.

A regional test with deadlines approaching

Mehebub Sahana, a geography fellow at the University of Manchester, places the dispute within wider regional tensions in a University of Manchester analysis. South Asia contains nearly a quarter of the world's population and depends heavily on rivers fed by Himalayan snow and glaciers.

In August 2024, floods affected nearly 5.8 million people in Bangladesh. Some Bangladeshi officials alleged that India released upstream dam water without warning. India denied responsibility, citing extreme rainfall and standard operations. The disagreement illustrates why reliable information matters even when governments dispute what caused a disaster.

India also occupies a downstream position on the Brahmaputra, which flows from Tibet's Yarlung Tsangpo. China's approval of a major hydropower project there makes upstream transparency a concern for India as well as Pakistan. Sahana argues that weakening cooperation on the Indus could damage India's position in other river negotiations.

The Ganges Water Treaty, which guarantees Bangladesh a minimum flow, is due to expire in 2026. Reports also describe incomplete implementation of arrangements involving the Mahakali and Kosi rivers with Nepal and the Teesta with Bangladesh. These are distinct agreements, but they face related pressures from mistrust and changing water conditions.

Pakistan's Law, Justice and Human Rights Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar has raised the Indus suspension with British Minister Stephen Doughty. Tarar called for resolution through international law and the existing treaty framework. Doughty connected water and climate cooperation with agriculture, human security and disaster preparedness. Both sides agreed to continue engagement.

No agreed date for restoring Indus data exchanges or beginning treaty renegotiation has been identified. The concrete future markers are the Ganges treaty's 2026 expiry and the December 2026 hydropower projection. Romshoo's assessment that India could gain greater ability to regulate flows over a decade or more is a longer term scenario, not evidence that it can immediately stop Pakistan's supply.

Key Points

• India placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance on 23 April 2025 after the Pahalgam attack. Pakistan denies involvement and challenges the suspension.
• The treaty requires bilateral ratification for modification or termination and sets detailed limits on India's use of western rivers.
• Interrupted river data exchanges create immediate risks for forecasting and water management, even without a major reduction in flows.
• Glacier loss and shorter snow persistence could shift seasonal peaks earlier, followed by declining supplies after a projected peak around midcentury.
• Researchers propose better monitoring, flexible management and either treaty reform or replacement. No renegotiation timetable has been agreed.
• Hydropower disputes, regional diplomacy and Pakistan's domestic water management remain separate but connected parts of the crisis.