China Expands Missile Factories and Bases as Satellite Images Reveal Scale of Buildup

Construction spreads across China's missile network

China has added more than 21 million square feet of floor space across a network of missile factories, research centers, test grounds and military facilities during five years of expansion. A review of satellite images, maps and government notices found growth at more than 60 percent of 136 known or suspected missile related sites and Rocket Force locations in a comparison spanning early 2020 to late 2025.

The construction amounts to the footprint of a major industrial district. Among 99 sites linked to missile manufacturing, 65 expanded. Of 37 bases belonging to the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force, 22 grew. The Rocket Force operates China's nuclear and conventional ballistic missiles.

Together, those figures show construction at 87 of the 136 locations examined, or about 64 percent. Manufacturing facilities and operational bases are both growing, extending the buildup from the places where missiles are developed and assembled to the installations that support their deployment.

A recent United States Defense Department estimate said the Rocket Force increased its missile inventory by about 50 percent between 2020 and 2024. The factory expansion strengthens Beijing's ability to threaten or deter military forces in the Western Pacific, complicate intervention around Taiwan and increase the cost of operating close to China's coastline.

Xi Jinping set the direction in 2012 with a drive to turn China's armed forces into a world class military. Defense spending has risen steadily, with missiles occupying a central place in that modernization effort.

William Alberque, a former NATO arms control director now at the Pacific Forum, described the expansion as part of a wider military competition.

We are in the initial phases of a new arms race.

What the satellite images reveal

Satellite imagery shows new factory towers, long assembly halls, deep earthen barriers and bunkers associated with handling energetic materials, substances used in propellants and explosives. Missile sections, support vehicles and equipment connected to launches are visible on open tarmacs at several locations.

Thick blast walls and mounds of earth surround many buildings. Those structures help contain the effects of an explosion and reflect the safety requirements of working with explosive materials.

China's expanding facilities occupy very different settings. Some stand inside major cities. Others sit in valleys where limited road access and surrounding terrain provide natural cover. Rural land has been cleared and villages relocated for industrial plants, test stands and depots connected to railways.

Many locations are connected to China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation and China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation. These two state owned industrial groups supply rockets and missiles across the People's Liberation Army. Ownership records, supplier announcements and tender notices help connect factories that might otherwise look ordinary to sensitive weapons programs.

How hidden facilities are identified

Analysts identify suspected missile facilities by looking for combinations of features rather than relying on a building's appearance alone. Double perimeter fences, frequent security checkpoints, covered testing bays and blast barriers are among the physical clues.

Other signs include mock objects used in tracking tests, short railway spurs and unusual heat plumes. A concentration of these features near a known defense campus increases the likelihood that a location is involved in missile work.

Government notices and industrial records add another layer to the satellite comparisons. Images show where buildings and roads have appeared; documents help identify the organizations using them and the kinds of work associated with the sites. The final production capacity of the expanded facilities has not been specified.

Why missiles matter around Taiwan

Beijing's missile strategy combines speed, reach and large numbers. Ballistic and cruise missiles can threaten airfields, ports and logistics centers across the first island chain, the chain of islands bordering China's nearby seas.

The approach is often called anti access area denial, or A2AD. In plain language, it means making it difficult for an opponent to enter an area and dangerous to operate there. Around Taiwan and the East China Sea, the aim is to push aircraft carriers and bombers farther away while threatening the bases and supply routes they depend on.

Recent wars have reinforced the value of combining different weapons in large attacks. Russia has used inexpensive drones and massed rockets to force defenders to spend costly interceptors before following with heavier missile salvos. Chinese military journals have argued for a similar combination of volume and precision.

Under that approach, waves of cheaper systems would seek to blind radars and exhaust air defenses. More advanced ballistic missiles could then strike through the openings created in those defenses.

Decker Eveleth, a researcher at CNA who tracks missile deployments, described how attacks on Taiwan's infrastructure could obstruct outside assistance.

China plans to target Taiwan's ports, helipads, and supply bases to block the US or its allies from sending any aid.

The United States and its partners would consequently face two connected tasks: protecting forward bases from repeated attacks and keeping long supply lines operating. Factory output becomes part of that military calculation. A country able to produce more missiles, more quickly and at lower cost, gains an advantage during an extended conflict.

A nuclear arsenal growing from a smaller base

Specialists estimate that China holds roughly 600 nuclear warheads in 2025. Its arsenal remains much smaller than those of the United States and Russia, but it is growing faster than that of any other nuclear state.

Since 2023, China's stockpile has increased by about 100 warheads a year. The Pentagon has projected that the total could exceed 1,000 by 2030. Reaching that figure would mean adding more than 400 warheads to the approximate 2025 total.

The eventual number depends on several practical decisions: how many new missile silos receive weapons, how many warheads are assigned to each missile and how much fissile material China produces. Fissile material is the material inside a nuclear weapon that sustains the reaction responsible for its explosive power.

China says it follows a policy of no first use, meaning it would not be the first country to use nuclear weapons in a conflict. It also typically stores warheads separately from launchers.

Military training now places greater weight on faster readiness to launch, better early warning and forces that can survive an attack. Those preparations cover missiles carried by road and rail, as well as missiles housed in fixed silos.

What Yumen and Hami show

Large missile fields at Yumen in Gansu province and near Hami in Xinjiang were first spotted in 2021. They suggest construction of hundreds of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles using solid fuel. Such missiles are designed to travel between continents.

Public research groups have assessed that the fields may contain more than 300 silos when complete. The Federation of American Scientists has published technical analysis and detailed satellite comparisons of both locations, including its second silo field briefing.

The sites have a grid layout resembling older training areas, with evenly spaced launch positions and extensive support roads. Solid fuel missiles can remain in their launch tubes for long periods and be fired on short notice.

Placing even a fraction of the silos on alert would increase the number of firing positions an opponent would have to account for. A larger network makes an attempt to destroy China's missile force in a single strike more complicated and increases the chances that some weapons would survive.

The main dates in the expansion show how industrial construction and nuclear developments have progressed together:

• 2012: Xi Jinping set a course toward building a world class military.
• Early 2020 to late 2025: The satellite comparison identified expansion across more than 60 percent of the 136 locations examined.
• 2020 to 2024: The United States Defense Department estimated that the Rocket Force's missile inventory grew by about 50 percent.
• 2021: Large silo fields at Yumen and near Hami were first identified.
• Since 2023: China's nuclear stockpile has grown by about 100 warheads annually.
• 2030: The Pentagon projects that China's nuclear arsenal could exceed 1,000 warheads.

The DF 26 and weapons harder to intercept

Factory expansion around Beijing and in other provinces includes facilities producing the DF 26, a ballistic missile carried on a road vehicle and described as having medium range. It can carry a conventional or nuclear payload and reach Guam, the United States territory that gives the weapon its Guam killer label.

China advertises the DF 26 for attacks against ships and targets on land. Its flight profiles suggest that it can maneuver during its final approach. That movement makes interception more difficult for defensive systems expecting a missile to follow a stable path.

A new variant, the DF 26D, has been showcased with a hypersonic glide vehicle. Such a vehicle is first boosted to high altitude, then separates and travels at very high speed through the atmosphere along a changing route.

A traditional ballistic missile largely follows an arcing flight after its powered stage. A glide vehicle's shifting path can make its later movements harder to predict, complicating both tracking and interception. Together with the new silo fields and solid fuel intercontinental missiles, these programs show how greater production could affect military planning during a crisis.

Budgets and the pressure to replace interceptors

Beijing raised its announced defense budget by 7.2 percent in early 2025 to about $245 billion. It was the fourth consecutive year of increases at that pace. Independent analysts believe actual military spending is higher when spending outside the announced budget is included.

The priority given to missiles is visible in the scale of factory construction and the pace of equipment trials at test ranges. Buildings, assembly lines, testing facilities and deployment bases all support the ability to turn spending into usable weapons.

The United States faces pressure on the other side of the production equation. Stocks of some advanced interceptors have tightened after large deployments to partners. Operational demands have already consumed part of the inventory of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, interceptors, which defend against ballistic threats at high altitude.

Washington has contracted with industry to increase production, including a multibillion dollar award to expand manufacturing lines. Each interceptor nevertheless costs many millions of dollars and takes months to build. Repeated attacks can therefore place demands on both the weapons immediately available and the factories expected to replace them.

Anticorruption investigations disrupt the Rocket Force

The Rocket Force's expansion has taken place alongside a sweeping anticorruption campaign. Several senior officers and procurement chiefs have been removed, and investigations have reached units responsible for testing new missiles and accepting them into service.

Those investigations have raised concerns about quality control, storage practices and the accuracy of reports on weapons performance. Testing and acceptance procedures matter because they determine whether equipment meets military requirements before units rely on it.

Political campaigns can uncover wrongdoing and discourage graft. They can also interrupt schedules, slow decisions and delay deliveries as managers are replaced and contracts reviewed.

The scale of construction suggests that the broader industrial program is continuing. Local delays remain likely as personnel changes and contract checks work through individual facilities and organizations.

How India and the region are responding

India is watching China's missile expansion with growing concern. Chinese units already deploy missiles of short and medium range on the Tibetan Plateau and in Xinjiang. More factory capacity could support more frequent rotations of those forces and new variants with greater accuracy.

New Delhi is modernizing its own weapons, including Agni and Pralay missiles and Akash NG air defense, while deepening cooperation with partners. China's production growth therefore matters beyond a possible confrontation over Taiwan.

Japan, Australia and Southeast Asian states are investing in dispersed bases, sensors with longer reach and supply lines that can withstand disruption. Spreading military assets across more locations reduces dependence on any single installation, while stronger logistics help keep forces supplied during repeated attacks.

Taiwan faces the immediate problem described in the targeting strategy: surviving the opening missile salvos while keeping ports and airfields operating long enough for assistance to arrive. Across the region, the expanding Chinese industrial network is making the ability to sustain operations under attack a central planning concern.

The Bottom Line

• More than 60 percent of 136 known or suspected missile related and Rocket Force sites expanded in the comparison spanning early 2020 to late 2025.
• Added floor space exceeded 21 million square feet, with growth at 65 of 99 manufacturing sites and 22 of 37 Rocket Force bases.
• The United States Defense Department estimated that the Rocket Force's missile inventory increased by about 50 percent from 2020 to 2024.
• Beijing's missile strategy seeks to keep outside forces farther from Taiwan and threaten the bases and supply routes supporting them.
• China has roughly 600 nuclear warheads in 2025. The Pentagon projects that the total could exceed 1,000 by 2030.
• The Yumen and Hami fields may contain more than 300 silos when complete, while DF 26 production and the showcased DF 26D point to further changes in missile capabilities.
• China's announced 2025 defense budget rose 7.2 percent to about $245 billion, while the United States is working to replenish advanced interceptors.
• Anticorruption investigations could delay some deliveries even as construction continues. India and other regional states are strengthening weapons, defenses, bases and supply networks.