China Sentences Five Bai Syndicate Leaders to Death in Crackdown on Myanmar Scam Networks

Five death sentences for a network of 41 compounds

Five leaders of the Bai family crime network have been sentenced to death in China after a court found that their operations in Myanmar combined online fraud, gambling and violent abuse. The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court convicted 21 defendants in a case involving 41 compounds in the Kokang region and criminal activity valued by investigators at more than 29 billion yuan, or about $4.1 billion.

Bai Suocheng, the family patriarch, and his son Bai Yingcang were sentenced to death alongside Yang Liqiang, Hu Xiaojiang and Chen Guangyi. Authorities linked the network to the deaths of six Chinese citizens, as well as one suicide and multiple injuries. Its businesses had helped turn Laukkaing, a city near the Chinese border, into a center of casinos and large scale cyber fraud.

The convictions covered fraud, intentional homicide, intentional injury, organizing prostitution and organizing illegal border crossings. Other defendants received suspended death sentences, life imprisonment or prison terms of between three and twenty years. The penalties make the Bai case one of Beijing's strongest actions against the scam industry operating across Southeast Asia.

The judgment follows death sentences against members and associates of the Ming family, another powerful Kokang clan accused of running extensive gambling and fraud operations. Both cases show how criminal businesses grew inside Myanmar's conflict zones, using armed protection while exploiting people forced to work in scam centers and victims whose money was stolen abroad.

Chinese arrest warrants, diplomatic pressure and fighting along the border preceded the transfer of Bai Suocheng, Bai Yingcang and other suspects to China in early 2024. As of November 4, 2025, the campaign had removed leading figures and disrupted many compounds, while criminal operators continued shifting their businesses elsewhere in Myanmar.

How the Bai family built its power

Kokang is a Chinese speaking enclave in Myanmar's Shan State, situated along an active trade route. For two decades, the Bai family occupied a central position in its gray economy, where political influence, armed protection and businesses such as gambling were closely connected.

Local clans cultivated relationships with military figures as Myanmar's politics changed in the 2000s. Those figures included Min Aung Hlaing, now the head of Myanmar's junta. The Bais used such relationships and their own militia to dominate local politics and business. Laukkaing developed from a remote town into a busy strip of casinos, guesthouses and nightlife.

China's tighter controls on gambling and travel across the border put pressure on that business model. Conflict and the pandemic also disrupted earlier sources of revenue. The family moved into online scams, building compounds with office floors, dormitories and rooms used to hold people captive.

Recruiters drew workers from across the region with false promises of legitimate employment. Many were then forced to carry out fraud against people in China and elsewhere. The same armed influence that supported the family's local power helped protect these operations.

Bai Yingcang, the patriarch's son and one of the defendants sentenced to death, described the family's former standing in a state media documentary released in July:

At that time, our Bai family was the most powerful in both the political and the military circles.

Witness accounts described security teams guarding compound gates and moving workers under armed escort. Those teams also coordinated with local leaders who benefited from the money flowing through Kokang. The family's political connections, militia and income from criminal businesses reinforced one another, giving managers the means to keep workers inside and resist outside interference.

What happened inside the scam compounds

Myanmar's cyber scam centers operated like tightly controlled factories. Workers were divided into teams and instructed to pose as romantic partners, investment advisers or people offering lottery tips. Their task was to build trust through messaging apps, then persuade victims to send money to fake trading platforms or illicit cryptocurrency wallets.

A cryptocurrency wallet is a tool for receiving and transferring digital money. In these schemes, victims were directed to payments or platforms controlled by criminals, who took the funds. Workers followed scripts and daily targets, with fines, beatings or confinement used against those who failed to meet quotas.

The Bai network's 41 compounds combined accommodation with floors used for fraud operations. New arrivals surrendered their phones and passports. Managers monitored conversations, while guards patrolled corridors and stairwells. Losing access to identity documents and private communications made it harder for workers to leave or seek help.

Detainees were also traded between compounds, turning people into assets that managers could buy and sell. The Shenzhen court said violence was routine and that attempted escape or disobedience brought the harshest punishments.

A former worker who appeared in the July state media documentary described torture inside one of the centers:

Besides being beaten, they yanked out my fingernails with pliers and cut off two of my fingers with a kitchen knife.

Human rights investigators and international agencies say trafficking and coercion have drawn tens of thousands of people into the industry. The United Nations has estimated that about 120,000 people may have worked in scam centers in Myanmar, with another 100,000 trapped in Cambodia. Independent research groups put annual losses from scams across Southeast Asia in the tens of billions of dollars.

The industry therefore harms two groups at once: people who lose their savings to fraudulent messages and people forced to send those messages under threats of violence.

What the Shenzhen sentences mean

The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court imposed five death sentences without a reprieve, two death sentences with a reprieve of two years, five life sentences and nine prison terms ranging from three to twenty years. Together, those groups account for all 21 defendants convicted in the Bai network case.

A death sentence with a reprieve of two years is a suspended death sentence. Chinese courts can later commute it to life imprisonment if the defendant meets conditions that include good behavior. This gives those two defendants a different sentencing status from the five leaders condemned to death without that reprieve.

Judges cited telecommunications fraud, intentional homicide and injury, organizing and coercing prostitution, and organizing illegal border crossings. Telecommunications fraud means deception carried out through communications systems, including phone calls and online messages, to obtain money from victims.

Bai Yingcang was also convicted in separate proceedings of conspiring to traffic and manufacture about 11 tons of methamphetamine. The court ordered asset confiscation and fines. Some foreign defendants face deportation after completing their prison terms.

No execution date was given. The judgments set out the penalties imposed on the defendants, while the campaign's wider message was expressed in the July documentary by a senior Chinese investigator:

No matter who you are, where you are, as long as you commit such heinous crimes against the Chinese people, you will pay the price.

The investigator's statement addressed anger in China over financial losses and the violent abuse of Chinese citizens. It also conveyed Beijing's expectation that foreign partners cooperate in arrests and the transfer of wanted suspects.

The Ming case and the sequence of the crackdown

A court in Zhejiang province sentenced members and associates of the Ming family to death in a related case involving a gambling and scam enterprise worth billions of dollars. Like the Bais, the Mings operated from Kokang, where powerful families combined local influence with criminal income.

Court findings in the Ming case described gunmen opening fire at a compound in October 2023, killing four people who were being moved under guard. Prosecutors said the group also killed people who resisted orders or tried to escape.

Ming Xuechang, the family patriarch, died in custody in Myanmar before he could be handed over to China. His son and other relatives were tried in China. The Bai and Ming prosecutions followed pressure that intensified in late 2023, when Chinese police offered rewards for wanted suspects and authorities publicized large numbers of repatriations.

The main developments unfolded across several periods:

• During the 2000s, Kokang clans developed ties with Myanmar military figures and expanded their political and commercial influence.
• In October 2023, an alliance of ethnic armies launched Operation 1027 in northeastern Myanmar. That month also saw the deadly shooting described in the Ming case.
• In late 2023, Chinese police issued warrants and offered rewards for leading suspects as pressure on the border networks increased.
• In early 2024, Myanmar's military transferred several suspects, including Bai Suocheng and Bai Yingcang, to Chinese custody.
• In July 2025, a state media documentary included accounts from Bai Yingcang, a former compound worker and a senior Chinese investigator.
• By November 4, 2025, the Bai case had produced convictions against 21 defendants, including five death sentences.

Authorities say more than 53,000 Chinese suspects and victims connected to northern Myanmar's compounds have been returned to China since the crackdown began. That total includes people with different roles in the industry, making the task of identifying victims and suspected offenders a major part of the response.

Border warfare changed the balance of power

Operation 1027 targeted military positions and crime hubs near the Chinese border. The offensive by an alliance of ethnic armies changed control across parts of northeastern Myanmar, disrupting the environment in which Kokang's criminal businesses had operated.

China did not stand in the way of the offensive, according to the analysis described at the time. The fighting weakened Myanmar's junta and disrupted scam centers that had harmed Chinese nationals. Beijing's campaign against fraud therefore unfolded alongside a substantial shift in the military balance near its frontier.

Chinese officials later brokered a ceasefire and pressed both the junta and armed groups to shut down criminal operations and keep border trade moving. Those priorities linked security concerns with the need to maintain commerce through a region affected by fighting.

Beijing has kept the junta at arm's length since Myanmar's 2021 coup. Its approach favors border stability and influence through relationships with provincial authorities and armed actors rather than a political embrace of the regime.

The arrangements remain temporary and uneven. China pursues the handover of suspects, tighter policing in neighboring Chinese provinces and pressure on local militias, while avoiding direct responsibility for Myanmar's internal conflict. Cooperation with one actor in a particular area does not give Beijing control over the many other armed groups and territories where criminal businesses can operate.

Rescues extend to the Thai Myanmar border

China, Thailand and Myanmar have also carried out joint actions that led to the release of thousands of detainees along the border. Thai officials organized airlifts for Chinese nationals rescued from scam centers, including an operation that moved about 200 people in a single day and plans to return up to 1,000 over several days.

Thailand cut electricity and other supplies to crime hubs and increased patrols. These measures targeted the resources compounds need to keep operating, while rescue and repatriation efforts focused on getting people out and arranging their return home.

Militia groups allied with Myanmar's military, including the Border Guard Force and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, control compounds and profit from protection rackets. Under such arrangements, armed groups receive money in exchange for guarding businesses or allowing them to operate in territory under their influence.

Officials said more than 7,000 stranded people in one border town still needed processing and safe passage home. Getting someone out of a compound is only one stage of a rescue: authorities must establish identity, assess their circumstances and organize travel.

Rangsiman Rome, chair of the Thai House Committee on National Security, called for cooperation beyond Thailand:

Thailand cannot do it alone. Only through coordinated international efforts can these networks be fully dismantled and prevented from returning.

Screening rescued people is difficult because many arrived after accepting offers of legitimate work and were trafficked across borders. Others were pressured into fraud after reaching the compounds. Authorities are trying to separate victims from suspected facilitators while identifying the financiers and fixers who keep the industry running.

Scam operators are moving deeper into Myanmar

Civil society groups and local reporting inside Myanmar describe criminal operators shifting away from the main crossings near China into eastern and southern Shan State. The locations identified include Kunhing, Mongpan, Mong Hsu, Mongyai, Laihka, Tangyan, Namhsan, Mongnawng and Mongping.

Recruiters and managers have also moved to Yangon, renting properties and quietly rebuilding their networks. The movement spreads parts of the business beyond the border compounds that became the main targets of Chinese pressure.

Some remote compounds use satellite internet and solar power. Satellite connections allow access to the internet without relying on a nearby fixed connection, while solar power supplies electricity. Together, those resources help operators work from valleys far from the main crossings and conventional supply networks.

Criminal networks also divide their activities between locations. Some sites focus on money laundering and training, while others carry out romance or investment scams. Money laundering means moving criminal proceeds through transactions or businesses to disguise where the money came from.

Investigators have documented kidnappings for ransom. Families are told to pay for a relative's release, sometimes through cryptocurrency transfers that are difficult to trace. The business therefore extends beyond stealing money through online deception to demanding payment from the relatives of captive workers.

Myanmar's economic distress helps sustain recruitment. The country lost an estimated 1.6 million jobs in 2021 after the coup, with young people and women hit hardest. A shortage of work pushes people toward risky job offers, while payments from syndicates tempt local officials and armed groups.

Villages near new hubs have seen steady arrivals of young people from cities and Chinese nationals. Some households earn money by renting rooms or selling food to compound workers. These local income streams help explain why shutting down one criminal center can leave a network of people and businesses ready to support another.

What the judgments change for victims and governments

Victims and their families continue to face trauma and debt even after arrests and convictions. Survivors describe beatings, forced isolation and threats against relatives. Many return home with police records or fines, and some remain under pressure to repay recruiters after being rescued.

Myanmar's fractured politics also limits the reach of enforcement. Syndicates operate in places where state authority is weak and soldiers, militias and business elites make deals for protection. Closing the business requires coordination across several territories and countries, rather than action at a single border crossing.

China's sentencing of the Bai leaders seeks to deter other criminal groups and reassure a public affected by fraud and abuse. It also reflects a strategy combining pressure on the junta, engagement with ethnic armed groups and intensive policing on the Chinese side of the frontier.

The campaign has removed prominent figures, secured the return of tens of thousands of people and disrupted many compounds. Continued relocation shows why arrests must be accompanied by tracing criminal money, cooperation among countries and support for lawful livelihoods in places where scam businesses have become sources of income.

The Bottom Line

• The Shenzhen Intermediate People's Court convicted 21 defendants linked to the Bai network and sentenced five leaders to death.
• Authorities said the network controlled 41 compounds, with criminal activity valued at more than 29 billion yuan, or about $4.1 billion.
• The case involved the deaths of six Chinese citizens, one suicide and multiple injuries.
• Two defendants received death sentences with a reprieve of two years, five received life sentences and nine received terms of three to twenty years.
• Bai Yingcang was also convicted in separate proceedings involving about 11 tons of methamphetamine.
• The Bai judgments followed death sentences in the Ming family case and the transfer of leading suspects from Myanmar to China in early 2024.
• Authorities said more than 53,000 Chinese suspects and victims connected to northern Myanmar's compounds had been returned to China.
• Rescues continued along the Thai Myanmar border, while more than 7,000 people in one border town still needed processing and safe passage home.
• Scam operators were relocating within Myanmar, using remote sites and dividing activities among fraud, training, money laundering and ransom schemes.