China Expels He Weidong, Miao Hua and Seven Other Senior Officers Before Key Party Meeting

Nine expulsions reshape China's military leadership

China has expelled nine senior military officers, including Central Military Commission vice chair He Weidong and former military political chief Admiral Miao Hua, in a corruption purge that reaches across the armed forces' command structure just days before a major Communist Party meeting in Beijing.

The Ministry of National Defense said all nine had been removed from the Communist Party and their military posts. Their cases have been transferred to military prosecutors for possible criminal charges. Authorities described the offenses as grave, involving extremely large sums of money and causing highly harmful consequences, without giving a monetary total.

He, China's second highest ranking general, also held a seat on the 24 member Politburo, one of the party's most powerful leadership bodies. His removal is the first takedown of a sitting Central Military Commission vice chair since the Cultural Revolution, making it one of the most consequential leadership changes during Xi Jinping's rule.

As of October 18, 2025, the immediate political focus is the approaching Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee. The meeting provides an opportunity to fill vacancies in the Central Military Commission, the party body that commands China's armed forces and is chaired by Xi.

The nine officers held posts covering joint operations, political oversight, the army, navy, missile forces and armed police. Eight were also Central Committee members. Their expulsions therefore affect both military leadership and the party body gathering for the plenum. Beijing presents the action as a major achievement in its campaign against corruption, while the scale of the removals creates another round of turnover for a military undergoing extensive modernization.

Who has been removed?

The officers' last known positions show how widely the purge reaches. Some commanded forces, while others managed political loyalty, personnel or the coordination of military operations.

• He Weidong: Central Military Commission vice chair, Politburo member and former commander of the Eastern Theater Command.
• Miao Hua: admiral and director of the Central Military Commission Political Work Department.
• He Hongjun: executive deputy director of the Central Military Commission Political Work Department.
• Wang Xiubin: executive deputy director of the Central Military Commission Joint Operations Command Center.
• Lin Xiangyang: former commander of the Eastern Theater Command.
• Qin Shutong: political commissar of the People's Liberation Army Army.
• Yuan Huazhi: political commissar of the People's Liberation Army Navy.
• Wang Houbin: commander of the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force.
• Wang Chunning: former commander of the People's Armed Police.

Political commissars and political work officials are responsible for the party's authority within the military. Their positions sit alongside the operational command structure, making the removal of Miao, He Hongjun, Qin and Yuan consequential for the management of personnel and loyalty as well as military administration.

Several of the nine had been absent from public events for months. He Weidong had not been seen publicly since March. Such disappearances have repeatedly preceded formal punishment in China's opaque political system, where investigations into senior figures can remain unannounced for long periods.

What the accusations mean in practice

The Defense Ministry described the cases as extremely serious and said the punishments were a major success for the party's campaign against corruption. It referred the files to military procuratorates, the prosecutors responsible for handling crimes within the armed forces.

Party discipline and criminal proceedings are separate stages in this process. Expulsion removes an officer from the party, while referral to prosecutors moves the case toward possible formal indictment. In China, disciplinary investigations into party members often come before criminal charges.

Defense Ministry spokesperson Zhang Xiaogang said the punishments expressed the party's determination to remove corruption from the military. He presented the action as a way to strengthen discipline and cohesion:

The punishments underscore the clear stance that there is absolutely no place for corrupt elements to hide within the military.

Beijing's message combines punishment with a claim about military effectiveness: officials argue that removing corrupt officers will make the force more united and improve its ability to carry out orders. The cases now move into the military justice system, alongside the political work of replacing the dismissed leaders.

Why Beijing is also talking about loyalty

The PLA Daily, the military's flagship newspaper, used unusually sharp language in an editorial about the nine officers. It framed their conduct as a breach of party loyalty and moral standards, and as a challenge to the party's control over the armed forces:

They were disloyal and lost their chastity, a total collapse of their beliefs as party members.

The editorial's focus on loyalty explains why this is more than a series of financial investigations. The legal process concerns alleged wrongdoing and possible prosecution. The political response concerns who controls the military and whether officers follow the party leadership.

Xi's vision for the People's Liberation Army, or PLA, puts absolute party leadership at its center. He wants a force that is disciplined, loyal and ready to fight. Removing senior officials responsible for political work brings that demand into the departments that oversee beliefs, appointments and loyalty across military units.

The emphasis on unity also helps explain the official argument for the purge. Beijing says corruption weakens cohesion, and that punishment can restore a reliable chain of command. The practical challenge is to carry out those investigations while keeping leadership and operational decisions functioning.

Xi's command structure faces another reset

The Central Military Commission is the nerve center of China's armed forces. Xi chairs it, and He Weidong was one of its two vice chairs. In the leadership hierarchy, He stood directly behind Xi and veteran general Zhang Youxia.

Miao had already been removed from the commission earlier in 2025. The commission has operated with fewer members than usual since early this year, and He's departure adds to the need to redistribute responsibilities and fill senior posts.

Zhang Youxia, military discipline chief Zhang Shengmin and Joint Staff Department chief Liu Zhenli remain central to the force's daily management. The forthcoming appointments will affect how responsibilities are shared among the officials overseeing operations, political work and military administration.

He Weidong's promotion in 2022 was unusually rapid. He moved directly into the commission's vice chair position and the Politburo without first serving a full term on the Central Committee. His rise reflected Xi's emphasis on Taiwan and on joint operations, meaning different military services working together in a coordinated campaign.

Wen Ti Sung, a researcher of Chinese politics, said the formal removals give Xi an opportunity to appoint new military leaders at the party meeting:

Xi is cleaning house for sure. The formal removal of He and Miao means he will get to appoint new members of the Central Military Commission at the plenum.

The vacancies give Xi another opportunity to promote officers he trusts into roles covering operations, procurement and political work. Procurement is the process through which the military buys equipment and services. Decisions about those purchases, alongside promotions and training priorities, will help determine the force's development in the coming years.

How the latest purge fits earlier removals

Xi's military reforms and disciplinary campaigns have run alongside each other for several years. The reforms have reorganized theater commands, reduced oversized headquarters units and sought to prepare the PLA for modern warfare involving several services at once.

Recent investigations have concentrated on equipment development and the Rocket Force, which operates both conventional and nuclear missiles. Former defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe were expelled over corruption connected in part to procurement. Investigations have also reached aerospace and defense industry executives.

The sequence of earlier changes helps explain why Wang Houbin's removal stands out:

• In 2022, He Weidong advanced directly into the Central Military Commission vice chair role and the Politburo.
• In 2023, the Rocket Force's leadership was replaced. Wang Houbin, an admiral, was one of the replacements and is now among the nine expelled officers.
• Also in 2023, former foreign minister Qin Gang disappeared from public view before his removal, showing that similar patterns of absence extended beyond the military.
• Since early 2025, the Central Military Commission has operated with fewer members than usual. Miao was removed from the commission earlier in the year.
• He Weidong has not been seen publicly since March. By October 18, his expulsion and those of eight other officers had been announced ahead of the Fourth Plenum.

During Xi's current term, more than a dozen senior officers he promoted have been investigated or disappeared from public view, a pattern without precedent in the reform era. Announcements have often followed the same sequence: a prolonged absence, limited official references, then an abrupt expulsion notice and referral to prosecutors.

Can a cleaner military also become more cautious?

The latest sweep reaches several sensitive parts of the force at once: political work, joint operations, the Rocket Force and the armed police. Supporters argue that breaking corrupt networks can improve discipline and efficiency. Critics warn that repeated leadership changes and procurement investigations can slow decisions and make commanders more hesitant.

Corruption in military purchasing can affect more than the price of equipment. Defense scholars warn that it can encourage people to hide defects, exaggerate performance or divert money away from maintenance and training. A weapon that looks satisfactory in paperwork may then fail to deliver the capability commanders expect.

Neil Thomas, a specialist in Chinese politics, described the tension between stronger control and greater caution:

The system gets cleaner and more obedient, but also more cautious and at times more brittle.

Frequent changes at the top can slow the development of military doctrine, the principles guiding how forces fight, and delay major exercises. Officers further down the chain may also become reluctant to take initiative, even though fast moving military situations can require quick judgments.

Beijing argues that discipline builds cohesion and that removing corruption will improve combat effectiveness over time. Its leadership is pursuing those goals while the PLA introduces new technology across several fields. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency's 2025 threat assessment describes Chinese modernization in cyber, space and missile capabilities. Reliable equipment purchasing, steady leadership and training that connects those capabilities are central to putting them into practice.

Why Taiwan and nearby waters matter

He Weidong's career was closely connected to China's military focus on Taiwan. Before becoming a commission vice chair, he commanded the Eastern Theater Command, which oversees forces facing the Taiwan Strait.

U.S. defense officials credited him with helping to plan and oversee the large live fire drills launched after then U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in 2022. Those exercises simulated blockades and strikes, showing the Eastern Theater Command's central role in any conflict scenario involving Taiwan.

His departure removes an officer who combined Xi's trust with operational experience on that front. Lin Xiangyang, another former Eastern Theater commander, is also among those expelled, extending the purge's reach into leadership associated with the same strategic area.

Miao Hua's political work responsibilities covered ideology, personnel loyalty and oversight across units, including the coast guard. His removal therefore also touches the political management of formations operating in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea.

In those contested waters, enforcement activity, messaging and gray zone tactics require close political direction. Gray zone tactics are actions that apply pressure while staying below the level of open warfare. Changes in the leadership overseeing such activity affect the people responsible for coordinating military actions with the party's objectives.

Military communication between China and the United States has been uneven in recent years. Fewer exchanges among senior officers increase the risk of miscalculation in busy air and sea lanes. Leadership changes can also complicate foreign militaries' efforts to identify counterparts as responsibilities and reporting lines shift.

U.S. officials continue to describe China as their top pacing challenge, meaning the military competitor around which they plan capabilities and preparations. Crisis management and deterrence consequently remain priorities even as Washington handles other global demands.

Military investment continues through the turmoil

China has continued building its fleet, fielding missiles and upgrading infrastructure despite the changes at the top. The party run legislature approved a 7.2 percent rise in the official defense budget for 2025, bringing it to roughly $246 billion.

Foreign assessments contend that actual military spending is higher when items outside the official budget are included. The published increase nevertheless shows that investment is continuing alongside disciplinary action.

Beijing is pursuing two connected tasks: acquiring more military capability and policing the organizations that deliver it. The corruption investigations put particular pressure on the second task, because equipment spending depends on trustworthy purchasing decisions, accurate reporting and sufficient maintenance.

Leadership turnover adds another challenge to that investment program. New officers must oversee equipment and training while taking over responsibilities from dismissed predecessors. The officials appointed to vacant posts will help set priorities for procurement, promotions and joint operations into the coming years.

What the Fourth Plenum could decide

The Central Committee is due to convene in Beijing early in the coming week. The Fourth Plenum typically handles personnel and policy, and personnel changes are on the agenda. Removing eight Central Committee members among the nine officers creates openings that can be filled at the meeting, alongside vacancies in the Central Military Commission.

Xi has not signaled a successor to He Weidong. Potential appointees are likely to come from theater commands, the Joint Staff Department and political work systems across the services. Xi tends to advance officers with loyalty credentials and experience in joint training.

The appointments will influence the PLA's pace of operations and the relationship between party leadership and military command into the late 2020s. Officers selected for political work, operational coordination and procurement will inherit responsibilities directly affected by the latest investigations.

Beijing's stated objective is to strengthen the military by cleaning up its leadership. Achieving that will involve moving cases through military courts, tightening audit trails for purchases and restoring more predictable command arrangements while maintaining modernization. The next leadership choices will show how Xi intends to manage those tasks after another sweeping purge.

Key Points

• China expelled nine senior officers, including Central Military Commission vice chair He Weidong and former political work chief Admiral Miao Hua.
• He also held a Politburo seat and is the first sitting commission vice chair taken down since the Cultural Revolution.
• The Defense Ministry described grave corruption involving extremely large sums and referred the cases to military prosecutors.
• Eight of the nine officers were Central Committee members, creating vacancies ahead of the Fourth Plenum in Beijing.
• The purge reaches political work, joint operations, the army, navy, Rocket Force and armed police.
• He and Lin Xiangyang previously commanded the Eastern Theater Command, which oversees forces facing Taiwan.
• Officials say stronger discipline will improve cohesion; concerns center on leadership turnover, procurement problems and greater caution among commanders.
• Military modernization continues, with the official 2025 defense budget rising 7.2 percent to roughly $246 billion.
• Xi has not signaled He's successor. The approaching party meeting provides an opportunity to refill senior military posts.