North Korea and Vietnam Sign Five Cooperation Pacts as Hanoi Balances Historic Ties and UN Sanctions

Five agreements bring Hanoi and Pyongyang closer

North Korea and Vietnam signed five cooperation documents at Mansudae Assembly Hall in Pyongyang on October 10, 2025, opening new channels in diplomacy, defense, health, media and commerce. The ceremony brought together senior officials, including both countries' foreign and defense ministers, during Vietnamese Communist Party chief To Lam's rare visit to North Korea.

The trip, the first by a Vietnamese leader in nearly two decades, coincided with celebrations for the 80th anniversary of the Workers Party of Korea. It also came during the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Vietnam and North Korea, which have designated 2025 as a Friendship Year.

The agreements give practical shape to a relationship built on decades of political solidarity. For Pyongyang, the visit offered a public display of international engagement during deep isolation. For Hanoi, it reopened channels with a historic partner while preserving its practice of balancing relationships with major powers and regional neighbours.

United Nations sanctions set firm limits on what the two governments can do, especially in defense and commerce. The central challenge is turning political goodwill into activities that comply with those restrictions. Health cooperation, information exchanges and official dialogue offer possible routes, while weapons transfers and assistance that advances North Korea's military capabilities are prohibited.

The timing placed Vietnam's diplomatic outreach alongside a much broader display of North Korean military power. To Lam joined Chinese Premier Li Qiang and Russian Security Council deputy chair Dmitry Medvedev on the reviewing stand with Kim Jong Un at a large military parade in Pyongyang.

What the five documents cover

The package combines agreements between government ministries with arrangements linking national news agencies and business organisations. Its five components are:

• A cooperation agreement between the two foreign ministries.
• A letter of intent on defense cooperation between the defense ministries.
• A memorandum on health and medical science cooperation between Vietnam's Ministry of Health and North Korea's Ministry of Public Health.
• A cooperation agreement between the Vietnam News Agency and the Korean Central News Agency, known as KCNA.
• A memorandum between the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and North Korea's Chamber of Commerce.

A letter of intent is an early framework rather than a binding treaty. Governments often use one to outline possible activities and begin organising further discussions or working groups. The defense document therefore provides a starting point for contacts, with the practical scope still to be worked out.

Details of the defense arrangement have not been made public. Possible activities under such frameworks include defense consultations, courtesy visits, military medicine and disaster response. The presence of both defense ministers suggests an effort to formalise contacts that have taken place intermittently over the years, then assess what international rules permit.

The health memorandum points toward medical science, training and public health programmes. Cooperation between news agencies typically involves exchanging content, arranging staff visits and sharing technical experience. The chambers of commerce memorandum creates a channel for exploring lawful business, while trade restrictions continue to apply.

A military parade frames the diplomacy

North Korea used the anniversary parade to display what it calls the Hwasong 20 intercontinental ballistic missile, along with hypersonic and cruise missiles. The procession also included a new type of multiple rocket launcher and a launcher linked to weapons described as suicide drones.

Kim Jong Un praised the military in his remarks and, according to the state account, referred to troops engaged in overseas operations. KCNA presented the parade as a demonstration of national strength and readiness. Kim said:

The army should continue to grow into an invincible entity that destroys all threats.

Medvedev's presence highlighted the strengthening relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang. The Russian Security Council deputy chair also met Kim and, in the North Korean account of their talks, credited North Korean personnel with supporting Russia's war effort in Ukraine.

Medvedev described that support as evidence of the relationship between the two countries:

The sacrifice of North Korean soldiers fighting for Russia in its military campaign in Ukraine proved the trust in relations between the two countries.

The claim could not be independently verified in Pyongyang and remained contested outside official narratives. For Vietnam, the setting placed its new agreements alongside North Korea's military messaging and its increasingly close relationship with Russia, adding sensitivity to the defense portion of the package.

Where UN sanctions draw the line

United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted since 2006 prohibit the export and import of arms and related material to and from North Korea. They also ban technical training, services or assistance that could advance the country's military capabilities, as well as many forms of financial support connected to weapons programmes.

Vietnam, like every UN member state, is bound by those measures. A bilateral agreement cannot remove these obligations. The nature of each proposed activity, including the equipment, knowledge or financial support involved, will determine whether it fits within the rules.

Defense diplomacy can still take place within those limits. Policy consultations, attendance at conferences, coordination on disaster relief and military medicine training with a humanitarian focus are possible areas of contact, provided the activity complies with the restrictions.

Training on combat systems, supplying military equipment or sharing technologies that have both civilian and military uses would risk violating sanctions. Such technologies are often described as dual use because the same equipment or knowledge can serve ordinary civilian work and military purposes.

Vietnam has generally applied UN measures in its dealings with North Korea. Its defense engagement is therefore expected to be carefully calibrated. Even cooperation described as humanitarian needs attention to its actual content, particularly when military institutions are involved.

Health and humanitarian work has remained one of the few channels through which international groups continue to engage with North Korean institutions. Sanctions contain provisions for humanitarian activity involving medicine and food, although the practical arrangements still need to respect the restrictions that apply.

How the visit fits Vietnam's defense policy

Hanoi's approach rests on independent relations with many partners, often described as bamboo diplomacy. The idea is to maintain a firm position on national interests while allowing flexibility in relations with countries that may disagree with one another.

Vietnam's 2019 defense white paper set out four nos: no military alliances, no siding with one country to oppose another, no foreign bases in Vietnam, and no use or threat of force. The same document left room for deeper defense relations when national interests require them and encouraged broad cooperation supporting peace and stability.

Russia has been Vietnam's principal supplier of major arms for decades. Sanctions imposed on Moscow after its full scale invasion of Ukraine, together with pressure on Russian industry's supply chains, have complicated that relationship.

Hanoi has also been diversifying its partnerships. It upgraded relations with the United States to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2023 and has been building security cooperation with India, Japan, South Korea and European partners.

North Korea therefore sits within a much wider network of Vietnamese relationships. Engagement with Pyongyang is likely to remain limited and carefully framed, both to comply with international rules and to avoid friction with other important partners. The five new documents expand channels for contact without changing Vietnam's stated defense doctrine.

A relationship stretching back to 1950

Vietnam and North Korea established diplomatic relations in 1950. Their governments have long stressed solidarity between their ruling parties and a relationship shaped by wartime camaraderie. Earlier agreements covered culture, health, civil aviation, judicial assistance, investment promotion and protection, and the avoidance of double taxation.

Vietnam's late party leader Nong Duc Manh visited Pyongyang in 2007. Kim Jong Un's journey to Hanoi for the 2019 summit with the United States renewed contact after a long lull and included meetings with Vietnamese leaders.

The main milestones leading to the latest agreements are:

• 1950: Vietnam and North Korea established diplomatic relations.
• 2007: Nong Duc Manh visited Pyongyang.
• 2019: Kim visited Hanoi for the summit with the United States and met Vietnamese leaders.
• 2025: The two countries marked 75 years of diplomatic relations and designated a Friendship Year.
• October 10, 2025: Five cooperation documents were signed in Pyongyang during To Lam's visit and the Workers Party of Korea anniversary celebrations.

Both capitals already have mechanisms that could help carry the new agreements into practice. These include consultations at deputy foreign minister level and an intergovernmental committee on economic, trade, scientific and technical cooperation.

Those channels have helped maintain relations despite sanctions restricting commerce and technology exchanges. The October package gives the existing machinery new subjects to address, rather than requiring the two sides to build every working relationship from the beginning.

Ukraine brings extra scrutiny to defense contacts

Allegations that North Korea has supplied Russia with munitions and missiles for use in Ukraine have drawn sharp criticism from the United States, South Korea and their partners. Ukrainian authorities have reported missile debris containing components linked to North Korean designs.

Western governments have also sanctioned companies and networks accused of moving artillery shells and rockets from North Korea to Russia. Against that backdrop, any government expanding defense contacts with Pyongyang faces closer attention from those countries.

Claims that North Korean troops have deployed to Ukraine have appeared in statements by Russian officials and in North Korean messaging, but lacked independent confirmation in the account surrounding the visit. Vietnam has not commented on those claims.

Hanoi's decisions would need to account for reputational costs alongside legal risks. Cooperation involving operational training or weapons technology would collide with UN restrictions and with Vietnam's effort to balance its international relationships.

The practical content of the defense letter will consequently matter more than the ceremony itself. Consultations and carefully defined humanitarian work would follow a different course from assistance involving military equipment, tactics or restricted technology.

Health offers a practical starting point

Public health is the least controversial area in the package. The memorandum could support cooperation on disease surveillance, maternal and child health, tuberculosis control and training for medical staff. These are possible fields of work, with the announced agreement providing the broader framework.

Disease surveillance means tracking illnesses so that health services can recognise outbreaks and respond. Cooperation in this area could involve sharing experience and improving communication between institutions. Both countries also have incentives to exchange knowledge about medical care that can be delivered at low cost and through local primary care services.

A steady channel between health institutions could support disaster response planning and communication. Medical cooperation also offers a way to maintain practical engagement with North Korea while concentrating on civilian needs.

Information exchanges provide another route. The Vietnam News Agency and KCNA agreement will likely involve content sharing and professional visits, while joint productions or staff exchanges would make implementation visible.

The chambers of commerce memorandum is exploratory. It can help business organisations identify permitted goods and services and establish contacts between companies. Its practical value depends on finding transactions that comply with sanctions, rather than reopening prohibited trade.

Civil aviation already features among the countries' earlier agreements. The warmer political relationship could revive technical conversations about air links if conditions allow, although the October package included no new aviation pact.

What implementation would look like

The next stage would be concrete activity under the five documents. On defense, possible signs of progress include a working group, a schedule for policy dialogues or visits by military medical teams. Those steps would show how the broad letter of intent is being translated into a programme.

Health delegations and training seminars would indicate movement on the medical memorandum. Media cooperation could become visible through joint productions and staff visits, while the chambers of commerce may meet to identify permitted trade, likely concentrating on humanitarian goods and services outside the sanctions bans.

International reaction will depend on the substance of those activities. Defense contacts confined to diplomacy and permitted work outside combat would carry a lower risk of sanctions problems. Activities moving into restricted areas could draw objections from Vietnam's partners.

Hanoi's usual preference for predictability and legal compliance points toward measured growth in the relationship. Public health, information sharing and structured dialogue offer more room for practical progress than military hardware or tactics.

The October 10 ceremony brought several strands of the relationship together at once: historic party ties, anniversary diplomacy and proposed institutional cooperation. Whether the agreements produce regular exchanges or more limited contact will depend on the programmes the two governments develop within the existing legal limits.

Highlights

• Vietnam and North Korea signed five cooperation documents in Pyongyang on October 10, 2025, covering diplomacy, defense, health, media and commerce.
• To Lam's visit was the first by a Vietnamese leader in nearly two decades and coincided with the Workers Party of Korea's 80th anniversary.
• The defense ministries signed a letter of intent, an initial framework whose detailed activities have not been disclosed.
• UN sanctions prohibit arms transfers and assistance that advances North Korea's military capabilities, limiting the scope for defense cooperation.
• Health cooperation offers possible work on medical training, disease surveillance, tuberculosis control, and maternal and child health.
• News agency and business contacts create channels for exchanges, while commercial activity remains subject to sanctions.
• Kim Jong Un's military parade and Medvedev's statements about North Korean support for Russia placed the visit in a sensitive international setting.
• Vietnam's four nos defense policy and its wider network of partnerships favour carefully measured engagement with Pyongyang.