China offers bounties for 18 alleged Taiwan psychological operations officers after Lai defense pledge

Xiamen publishes names and offers rewards

Police in the Chinese mainland city of Xiamen have offered rewards of up to 10,000 yuan, about US$1,400, for information leading to the arrest of 18 people they accuse of serving in Taiwan's military psychological operations. The notice published photographs, full names and Taiwan identity numbers, bringing personal exposure into an increasingly public confrontation between Beijing and Taipei.

The announcement came one day after Taiwan President Lai Ching te used his National Day address to pledge stronger defenses and call for peaceful dialogue. Beijing accused him of encouraging separatism, while Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense rejected the bounty notice as an attempt to intimidate military personnel and undermine public confidence.

Xiamen, a mainland city closest to Taiwan across the strait, accused the named individuals of spreading separatist messages and inciting secession. Its police described them as core members of a military unit responsible for disinformation, intelligence collection, psychological operations and propaganda broadcasts.

Beijing regards Taiwan as part of its territory. The government in Taipei rejects that claim and operates its own elections, armed forces and foreign policy. Mainland law has no force in Taiwan, limiting the practical reach of the reward notice even as the publication of personal details creates pressure on those named.

The confrontation combines three forms of pressure: criminal accusations, public messaging and military signaling. For Taiwan's personnel and their families, the immediate consequences concern exposure and intimidation. For the wider public, the dispute centers on trust in the armed forces at a time when the government is seeking support for stronger defenses.

What the police notice alleges

Xiamen's public security bureau framed its announcement as a request for help tracking separatist plots. Police presented the case as a criminal pursuit under mainland law, using national security language that treats alleged promoters of Taiwan independence as fugitives.

The bureau said the named individuals had worked to encourage separatist activities and offered payment for information it considered useful.

"For a long time they plotted to incite separatist activities. Informants who provide valid clues will receive rewards of up to 10,000 yuan," Xiamen police said in the notice.

China's accompanying state media campaign accused the group of creating websites for smear campaigns, making games that celebrated secession, producing deceptive videos and operating illegal radio channels for infiltration. The allegations also included using support from external forces to shape public opinion.

Beijing's narrative presents those activities as an effort to weaken the national identity of people across the Chinese speaking world and make Taiwan independence seem normal. Taipei rejects the accusations and describes the publicity surrounding them as part of the mainland's own information campaign.

The notice's publication of identity numbers, names and photographs gives the campaign a personal dimension. Publicly releasing sensitive information, often called doxxing, can expose people to online harassment and place pressure on relatives and colleagues even when no arrest follows. Taiwan has long identified doxxing and public shaming as features of hostile information activity directed at the island.

Taiwan says the target is public confidence

Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense described the bounty announcement as an authoritarian stunt. It accused the mainland of exploiting Taiwan's free flow of information to divide society and weaken trust in the government, and urged the public to support the armed forces.

The ministry presented military service as a responsibility to protect the population, rejecting Beijing's attempt to portray the personnel's work as criminal activity.

"Defending national security and protecting the safety and wellbeing of the people is the unshirkable duty of every military officer and soldier," the ministry said.

Taipei said similar notices had appeared before and often depended on patchwork information gathered from publicly accessible sources. Its concern is that an open society's own information can be assembled and republished to generate outrage, suspicion and fear.

The difference between the two governments' descriptions is central to the dispute. Beijing presents a police investigation into separatism. Taipei sees an influence operation designed to turn the public against military institutions and make service members feel personally vulnerable.

Why enforcement has limits

Mainland authorities cannot enforce their law inside Taiwan, and the two sides have no extradition arrangement. The named individuals do not travel openly to the mainland. Information submitted in response to the reward notice would therefore not allow mainland police to make arrests in Taiwan under a mainland warrant.

Taiwan officials also point to the absence of mutual legal assistance channels of the kind that operate between many other jurisdictions. Such channels normally allow authorities to request evidence or other help across borders. Their absence further limits the notice's practical enforcement.

Travel beyond Taiwan can still bring complications. People transiting third countries may face scrutiny, while public exposure can affect overseas travel or employment. Relatives with business or study connections on the mainland may also face pressure, a recurring lever in disputes across the strait.

Mainland legal language frequently refers to the Anti Secession Law and national security statutes. Those frameworks give officials broad room to label conduct as secession, separatism or subversion. Taipei regards those labels as political tools rather than neutral legal categories.

The bounty's reach is consequently wider as a public threat than as an immediate arrest mechanism. It signals Beijing's intention to identify and shame people it associates with independence, while creating possible personal costs outside the courtroom.

What Taiwan's psychological operations involve

Taiwan organizes political warfare and psychological operations within its armed forces. Their responsibilities span troop education, responses to disinformation, public outreach and support for commanders during conflict. They serve both peacetime communication and wartime morale.

Most militaries have personnel who study adversaries, prepare messages for different audiences and counter enemy propaganda. Psychological operations focus on perceptions and behavior: what people believe, whom they trust and how they respond under pressure.

Xiamen police described the Taiwan unit as having divisions for information work, intelligence gathering, tactical psychological operations, propaganda, morale building and wartime mobilization. That description fits the broad development of Taiwan's political warfare system since the late 1940s, when the government relocated to the island.

The system developed within a military culture combining security, ideology and communications. As Taiwan became more democratic and its media more diverse, reforms reduced content devoted purely to ideology and placed greater weight on democratic messaging, resilience and transparency.

Cyber operations have a different immediate focus: computer networks, intrusions and technical disruption. Psychological operations and cyber units can cooperate and share tools or timing during a crisis, but one primarily targets technical systems while the other targets people's judgments and behavior.

An influence campaign might circulate rumors on social platforms, promote divisive claims or plant fabricated documents to weaken confidence in leaders. In Taiwan, many such methods have been traced to external actors and proxy media operating in the information gray zone, where hostile activity takes place without an open military confrontation.

Lai pairs a call for dialogue with stronger defenses

President Lai's National Day address combined an appeal to Beijing with plans to strengthen Taiwan's protection against attack. He urged the mainland to choose dialogue and announced steps to improve air defenses.

Lai repeated Taipei's request for Beijing to abandon the threat of force and engage peacefully.

"We call on Beijing to renounce the use of force and pursue peaceful dialogue," Lai said.

His defense agenda included an air defense concept with several layers, sometimes called T Dome, upgrades to early warning sensors and closer integration across military services. The approach seeks to connect detection and defensive responses rather than rely on a single protective system.

The agenda also points toward higher defense spending over the next several years. Its priorities include air and missile defense, capabilities to strike back after an attack, and civil resilience, meaning the ability of communities and public services to withstand disruption.

Beijing's Taiwan Affairs Office and Foreign Ministry portrayed Lai as a provocateur pursuing separatism with outside help. Mainland agencies said his address damaged peace and stability in the strait, while a spokesman said Taiwan's leaders were creating danger and that the mainland would take necessary measures.

State aligned commentary dismissed Taipei's defense plans as costly and unrealistic. The bounty notice then added a new personal threat to the political response, showing how quickly a major speech can become the focus of legal accusations, media campaigns and online activity.

Earlier lists widened the pressure

Mainland authorities had already publicized rewards for other alleged Taiwan personnel before the Xiamen announcement. In June, security services listed 20 people accused of military related hacking. Taipei dismissed that move as intimidation.

Mainland agencies later named several alleged intelligence officers and linked them to a private group described as a mock navy promoting independence. The sequence shows the public naming campaign extending across alleged hacking, intelligence and psychological operations roles.

Taiwan's Military Intelligence Bureau said the mainland uses its domestic laws to project an image of power beyond its borders and discredit Taiwan's armed forces. The bureau said the campaigns seek to discourage recruitment, damage public confidence and complicate debates over military budgets.

Former officials have also argued that these tactics signal effective Taiwanese counterintelligence work, giving mainland authorities a motive to respond publicly. Liu Te liang, a former director general of Taiwan's intelligence service, described the lists as a psychological tactic intended to influence both personnel and the wider public.

"The tactic tries to suggest deep infiltration, intimidate military personnel, and stir public criticism that could weaken intelligence work," Liu said.

The latest list names 18 alleged psychological operations personnel, compared with the 20 people accused of hacking in June. The earlier list concerned a different alleged activity, while both announcements used public exposure to put pressure on Taiwan's military institutions.

How the announcements unfolded

The recent confrontation sits within a sequence of earlier accusations and responses. The order matters because the latest bounty followed a major presidential speech about defense, placing the police notice inside a broader political exchange.

• In June, mainland security services listed 20 people accused of hacking tied to Taiwan's military. Taipei called the move intimidation.
• After that, mainland agencies named several alleged intelligence officers and linked them to a private group described as a mock navy for independence propaganda.
• In his National Day address, Lai called for peaceful dialogue and set out plans for stronger air protection and a tighter defense posture.
• One day after the address, Xiamen police announced rewards of up to 10,000 yuan for information about 18 alleged psychological operations personnel.
• Taiwan's defense ministry rejected the accusations and described the notice as cognitive warfare aimed at dividing society and weakening confidence in the armed forces.

By October 12, 2025, the exchange had brought together defense planning, criminal allegations and competing explanations of military information work. No date was given for a further step in the Xiamen case.

How cognitive warfare reaches ordinary people

Cognitive warfare is an effort to shape how people think and make choices. Rather than concentrating only on the information someone sees, it seeks to weaken trust, deepen division and create fatigue, making people less willing or able to judge competing claims.

Political messaging, selective leaks, forged documents, staged images and emotional triggers can all play a part. Social media makes distribution faster and cheaper, while recommendation algorithms help campaigns reach groups that may be more receptive to a particular message.

The methods described in Taiwan's information struggle include several ways of spreading pressure beyond officials and military personnel:

• Circulating rumors through anonymous accounts and chat groups.
• Distributing fabricated or edited videos made to look authentic.
• Publishing personal information to shame or pressure targets.
• Promoting divisive narratives through automated accounts and paid amplifiers.
• Creating fake civic groups, shell media brands or front organizations.
• Timing information activity with military flights or naval patrols to increase stress.

Taiwan has responded with rapid fact checks, exchanges of threat indicators with online platforms and cooperation with civil society groups monitoring manipulation. Schools, veterans groups and local leaders are often trained to recognize rumors and report coordinated activity.

Private businesses and diaspora communities also have a role because influence campaigns move across borders and languages. Hotlines and fact checking portals experience surges in activity during major holidays and elections, reflecting the attention Taiwan gives to information security during sensitive periods.

Military pressure and messaging move together

Military flights and maritime patrols near Taiwan already form a regular part of friction across the strait. Information operations run alongside them, preparing audiences for particular narratives and complicating decisions for political and military leaders.

The Xiamen notice illustrates how those pressures can reinforce one another. A defense announcement becomes the subject of hostile commentary, while criminal accusations seek to make the people carrying out military work appear exposed and vulnerable.

The United States remains Taiwan's principal security partner, approving arms packages and providing training support. Japan and other regional partners closely monitor the strait. Those relationships influence the strategic calculations in Beijing and Taipei, while the legal limits on a mainland reward notice remain unchanged.

Any attempt to criminalize a wider group of Taiwanese personnel would further inflame tensions and bring stronger responses from Taipei. Both sides are seeking to show resolve while avoiding a crisis that escapes their control.

The contest is likely to continue combining legal notices, media narratives and military signals because each supports the others. For Taiwan, the immediate challenge is to protect personnel and public confidence while pursuing the defense changes Lai has announced. Beijing is using the bounty campaign to reinforce its claim that activities it associates with independence fall within its criminal authority.

At a Glance

• Xiamen police offered up to 10,000 yuan, about US$1,400, for information leading to arrests of 18 alleged Taiwan military psychological operations personnel.
• The notice published photographs, names and Taiwan identity numbers, and alleged separatist messaging and incitement to secession.
• Associated accusations included smear websites, games celebrating secession, deceptive videos, illegal radio channels and support from external forces.
• Taiwan's defense ministry rejected the allegations and called the announcement cognitive warfare intended to divide society and weaken trust in the armed forces.
• Mainland law has no force in Taiwan, and the two sides have no extradition arrangement. Public exposure can still complicate travel and put pressure on relatives.
• The notice followed Lai's National Day call for peaceful dialogue and stronger defenses, including the T Dome air defense concept.
• Earlier mainland announcements targeted 20 alleged military hackers in June and, later, several alleged intelligence officers.
• Taiwan is responding to information pressure through fact checking, platform cooperation, civil society monitoring and training to recognize manipulation.