Pentagon Nominee Urges Wider South Korean Role Against China as Alliance Debates Its Future

Noh puts South Korea's regional capabilities in focus

South Korea's advanced missiles, air defenses, satellites and electronic warfare systems can help deter China while Seoul continues to lead conventional deterrence against North Korea, Pentagon nominee John Noh has told the US Senate Armed Services Committee. His written answers bring a central question in alliance planning into sharper focus: how to prepare for threats from Beijing and Pyongyang at the same time.

Noh, the deputy assistant secretary of war for East Asia and nominee for assistant secretary of defense for Indo Pacific security affairs, urged allies to increase defense spending, strengthen critical capabilities and take greater responsibility for regional security. He identified China as the leading military challenge facing US defense planning in the region.

Noh described that assessment in his written answers to the committee:

China is the most serious military threat.

His comments come as Washington and Seoul discuss alliance modernization, the future of United States Forces Korea (USFK), and the division of responsibilities between American and South Korean forces. Washington's approach prioritizes forces stationed forward in the Pacific that can fight effectively, supported by modern bases, advanced strike weapons and missile defenses.

South Korea's potential contribution extends beyond weapons. Its ports, airfields, repair facilities and technology industries could help sustain allied operations during a regional emergency. Its exposure to disruption around Taiwan also gives Seoul a direct economic interest in keeping nearby shipping routes open.

Noh also raised concerns about Chinese naval activity in the Yellow Sea, including steel structures installed in a Provisional Maritime Zone claimed by both countries. He described those moves as an attempt to intimidate South Korea and pledged to work with American and South Korean counterparts on a measured response.

How one alliance could deter two threats

Washington's approach draws on integrated deterrence, a concept that combines US military strength with the capabilities of allies and partners across land, sea, air, cyber operations and space. In simple terms, the aim is to make an opponent face a coordinated network of defenses and possible responses instead of a single country's forces.

Lloyd Austin, speaking as US defense secretary while previewing the national defense strategy several years earlier, described the concept's place in American planning:

As we work on the national defense strategy, this concept of integrated deterrence will be a cornerstone of that approach.

Noh's argument also rests on a strategy of denial. That means convincing an adversary that an attack would fail to achieve its military objectives. Missiles that threaten an attacking force, defenses that intercept incoming weapons and bases that can keep operating after an opening strike all contribute to that calculation.

South Korea would continue to lead conventional deterrence against North Korea, using forces and weapons other than nuclear arms. Its growing capabilities could also support security across the wider region. The central planning challenge is to make those responsibilities reinforce each other while preserving a credible defense of the peninsula.

Missiles and layered defenses give Seoul greater reach

South Korea already fields advanced missiles, ships, aircraft, sensors and electronic warfare units developed primarily to counter North Korea. Many also have regional uses. Hyunmoo missiles, for example, give Seoul options to threaten military targets that could support coercive operations around Taiwan or in the East China Sea if deterrence fails.

The removal of missile range limits in 2021 opened the way for South Korea to develop systems with still greater reach. Modern multiple launch rocket systems, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles can complicate an opponent's planning at a distance. Destroyers and submarines extend those options at sea with weapons for attacking ships and targets on land.

South Korea's Korean Air and Missile Defense network combines Patriot interceptors with Korean systems designed for medium and long ranges. Aegis destroyers add tracking and engagement options offshore. Together with American assets on and around the peninsula, these systems make surprise attacks harder to execute and sustained attacks more difficult to maintain.

Seoul is accelerating work on interceptors for the upper layer of its missile defenses, complementing existing Patriot and Korean systems for medium ranges. A layered defense gives defenders more opportunities to detect and intercept incoming weapons as they move toward their targets.

Integration with American sensors and interceptors, including those operated by USFK and US Forces Japan, can improve tracking and the quality of engagements. Better coordination reduces the chance that a large volley of missiles could overwhelm defenses.

Practical investments matter alongside major weapons purchases. Faster procurement of precision guided munitions, more mobile launchers, better protected shelters and operations spread across multiple locations can shorten response times and help forces survive. A force that remains able to fight after an initial attack gives an aggressor less reason to expect a quick victory.

Space and electronic warfare support the same mission

South Korea's military reconnaissance satellites and ANASIS II communications satellite support targeting and secure command and control. Reconnaissance satellites help forces observe activity, while military communications allow commanders and units to exchange information during a crisis.

Electronic warfare adds another way to disrupt an opponent's operations. Units that jam or spoof navigation and communications signals can interfere with precision weapons and complicate a blockade or another coercive campaign. Jamming disrupts a signal; spoofing supplies a misleading one.

Satellites and networks would themselves be likely targets early in a conflict. Protecting space systems, maintaining communications when individual systems are disrupted and defending networks against cyber attacks are therefore part of the same effort to keep forces operating.

South Korea, Japan and the United States already share warning data about North Korean missiles in real time. Closer sharing could also improve awareness around other regional flashpoints. For planners, faster and more reliable information supports both missile defense and decisions about how to respond.

USFK's mission faces a broader regional test

USFK's core mission has long been to deter and, if necessary, defeat a North Korean attack. Debate now centers on how those forces could contribute to a wider regional emergency without creating an opening for Pyongyang.

The Seventh Air Force brings F 16 squadrons and supporting aircraft to that mission. Those aircraft provide valuable capability, although their range and ability to survive against advanced air defenses impose limits. Moving American aircraft or other assets away from Korea during a Taiwan crisis could increase risks on the peninsula.

Proposals for adapting USFK therefore focus on giving forces greater regional reach while keeping them in South Korea. The intended result is dual deterrence: an alliance able to deter and defeat nuclear and conventional threats from both North Korea and China.

One proposal would permanently station F 35 fighters in South Korea, a transition already discussed for the future. Replacing older F 16s with those aircraft would add stealth, electronic attack capabilities and sensor fusion, which combines information from different sensors to give pilots a clearer picture of a battle.

Another proposal would prioritize South Korea for collaborative combat aircraft. These are unmanned aircraft controlled by crewed fighters that can extend operational reach and give an adversary more targets and threats to manage. Such changes could increase capability while reducing the personnel needed to operate the force.

New missile units and resilient bases are proposed

Advocates of a broader USFK role also propose an Army Multi Domain Task Force in Korea. Such a formation would combine capabilities across different areas of warfare, including missiles able to reach targets far beyond the immediate battlefield.

The proposed equipment includes Mid Range Capability launchers that fire Tomahawk and Standard Missile 6 weapons, alongside the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon, often called Dark Eagle. Together with the 210th Field Artillery Brigade and future Precision Strike Missiles, those systems would threaten important targets on the peninsula and farther away.

A combined American and South Korean task force could divide responsibilities, expand capability and reduce the American footprint. These remain proposals in the debate over USFK's future. No date was given for permanently basing the aircraft or deploying the proposed missile formations in South Korea.

Camp Humphreys, the largest US base outside the continental United States, already provides infrastructure to sustain air and land operations across the western Pacific. Osan and Kunsan air bases, together with South Korea's Busan Naval Base, could support staging, maintenance and repair during a prolonged regional emergency.

Those facilities are close enough to support operations without sitting on the immediate front line. Attacking them would risk widening a conflict. At the same time, increasingly accurate Chinese and North Korean weapons make base protection more urgent.

Hardening facilities, improving defenses against missiles and drones, and preparing to disperse aircraft, equipment and personnel quickly would help preserve operations under attack. Logistics and secure command networks are as central to the proposed posture as the weapons themselves.

Yellow Sea structures bring pressure closer to home

China's installation of steel structures in the Yellow Sea's Provisional Maritime Zone has become a focus of concern in Seoul and Washington. South Korea and China coordinate activities in the area while working toward a maritime boundary agreement.

Noh described the Chinese activity as intimidation and said he would coordinate with American and South Korean counterparts to review it and develop a response. The structures appear intended to assert a Chinese presence and unsettle South Korea.

The episode illustrates gray zone pressure, meaning coercive actions that remain below the level of open warfare. Possible responses range from diplomatic protests and legal steps under maritime law to more coast guard patrols and, if necessary, removal of unlawful obstacles.

South Korea has dealt with similar challenges through coordination among its navy, coast guard and foreign ministry. Public messaging and targeted surveillance can help officials manage incidents and reduce the risk of miscalculation.

Regular allied operations in international waters and joint maritime exercises can also support navigation rights and resist attempts to treat nearby seas as areas of exclusive control. Choosing a measured response matters because an escalating confrontation could divert attention and resources from wider deterrence.

Troop numbers, political consent and burden sharing

A Senate draft of the next defense authorization bill would prevent a sudden reduction in US troops below the longstanding level of 28,500 unless the administration certifies that the change serves national security interests. The provision puts a familiar number at the center of a debate increasingly concerned with what the force can do.

Modern fighters, missiles launched from land, resilient logistics, protected command systems and stronger base defenses are among the capabilities being discussed. The argument for those changes is that personnel totals alone cannot describe whether USFK can meet simultaneous challenges from North Korea and China.

Washington and Seoul must also navigate operational control, meaning who commands forces, alongside strategic flexibility and the division of defense costs. Strategic flexibility concerns whether and how American forces based in Korea can respond to emergencies elsewhere.

The alliance's current discussion follows several earlier developments:

• In 2006, Washington and Seoul reached an understanding that US forces in Korea would not be sent into regional conflicts against the will of the Korean people.
• In 2021, the removal of missile range limits opened the way for South Korea to develop missiles with greater reach.
• By October 10, 2025, alliance discussions covered modernization, USFK's future role, operational control, strategic flexibility and burden sharing.

North Korean and Chinese military threats have evolved since the 2006 understanding. Planners are considering how to preserve that principle while giving the alliance more options during a regional crisis. A more capable South Korean military, working more closely with American and Japanese operations, is central to that discussion.

Noh urged allies to invest more in capabilities that could block an adversary's objectives, particularly strike weapons with greater reach, integrated air and missile defense, space and electronic warfare. South Korea already devotes a large share of national output to defense, with rising budgets supporting new interceptors, advanced aircraft and naval modernization.

Aligning those investments with alliance requirements would distribute responsibility more widely and allow the United States to concentrate power where it is most needed. Noh described the intended relationship as a true burden sharing partnership.

A Taiwan crisis could put Korea under simultaneous pressure

A conflict around Taiwan would create an immediate problem for defense planning on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea could raise tensions or launch attacks while American and allied forces were occupied elsewhere. Moving USFK assets away at that moment could make the peninsula more vulnerable.

Keeping a credible allied force in Korea would reduce the attraction of such a move for Pyongyang. That concern helps explain proposals to give forces based in Korea weapons able to reach both North Korean targets and relevant targets farther south, without requiring USFK to relocate.

South Korea's contribution would depend on the scale and nature of the crisis. Possible roles include intelligence sharing, logistics, maintenance and evacuating civilians without combat. Fuel supplies, repairs, and staging through ports and airfields could sustain American operations.

Seoul could also supply precision munitions and other materials to ease pressure on American stocks. If Chinese forces attacked American or allied bases, or if vital shipping routes near Korea were threatened, South Korea might take more direct roles, including maritime defense in nearby waters, while keeping most forces focused on North Korea.

President Yoon Suk yeol has publicly described stability around Taiwan as a regional and global concern tied to security and prosperity:

The Taiwan issue is a global issue, and preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an essential element in security and prosperity in the Indo Pacific region.

Trilateral coordination among Seoul, Tokyo and Washington already includes real time North Korean missile warnings. Discussions about smoother command relationships between USFK and US Indo Pacific Command could reduce delays during a rapidly developing crisis. Much of that planning takes place quietly to avoid public friction while preparing responses that keep the peninsula defended.

Trade and technology raise the stakes for Seoul

More than nine tenths of South Korea's maritime trade passes through the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Studies suggest a severe conflict could reduce South Korean gross domestic product by nearly a quarter. GDP measures the value of goods and services produced in an economy, so a loss on that scale would affect production, employment and household incomes.

Those exposures make open shipping routes a concrete South Korean interest. Protecting trade flows and making supply chains more resistant to disruption also reduce the effectiveness of economic coercion. They help explain Seoul's increasingly vocal support for peace and stability in the strait.

South Korea's industrial role gives it another place in allied deterrence. Its semiconductor, battery and advanced materials industries support American and allied technological strength. The country is building what may become the world's largest chip manufacturing cluster, alongside American efforts through the CHIPS and Science Act and allied industrial policies to diversify supply chains away from China.

South Korea also produces critical materials, including electronics grade silicon and high purity tungsten. The Sangdong mine in Gangwon Province is expected to become a major source of tungsten outside China, with support from American financing and industry.

Noh's message connects those economic interests with military responsibilities. Seoul would continue to lead conventional deterrence against North Korea while developing capabilities that make aggression elsewhere in Northeast Asia harder to carry out successfully.

The priorities under discussion include stronger strike and missile defenses, more secure bases, closer connections among American, South Korean and Japanese sensors and command networks, and logistics able to withstand disruption. Proposals for permanent basing of advanced aircraft and missiles launched from land would give that posture greater reach while maintaining an American presence in Korea.

At a Glance

• Pentagon nominee John Noh called China the region's most serious military threat and urged allies to increase defense investment.
• He identified South Korean strike weapons, missile defenses, space systems and electronic warfare as contributions to wider deterrence.
• South Korea would continue to lead conventional deterrence against North Korea.
• USFK proposals include permanent F 35 basing, collaborative combat aircraft and an Army Multi Domain Task Force with advanced missiles.
• A Senate draft would restrict a sudden troop reduction below 28,500 without a national security certification.
• Noh pledged coordination over Chinese activity and steel structures in the Yellow Sea's Provisional Maritime Zone.
• A Taiwan crisis could create simultaneous pressure from North Korea, making continued defense of the peninsula central to alliance planning.
• More than nine tenths of South Korea's maritime trade passes through the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, tying regional stability directly to its economy.