China's Beijing Parade Puts New Missiles, Drones and Nuclear Forces Alongside a Show of Political Unity

New weapons and powerful guests in Beijing

China displayed a new DF-61 intercontinental ballistic missile, an underwater drone more than 18 meters long and all three parts of its nuclear force in one of its largest military parades in years. In central Beijing, President Xi Jinping stood alongside Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un before tens of thousands of people, combining a military showcase with a display of political solidarity.

More than two dozen foreign leaders attended, while the United States and key allies stayed away. Missiles, drones, lasers and armored vehicles passed through Tiananmen Square, with fighter aircraft overhead. New air defense and systems associated with space defense appeared for the first time. The display showed the breadth of China's weapons development and its ability to manufacture complex equipment at scale.

Xi, China's commander in chief and head of the Central Military Commission, used his address to rally national pride and warn foreign rivals. He presented the occasion as evidence of China's resilience and determination.

The Chinese nation is the great nation that is never intimidated by any bullies.

The military message reached beyond Beijing. Many of the weapons are intended to threaten ships, aircraft and bases that support U.S. operations in East Asia, including around Taiwan. The political message came from the reviewing stand, where Xi, Putin and Kim appeared together in public for the first time.

China also used the event as a showroom for its arms industry. Leaders from the Global South were among the guests, giving Beijing an opportunity to court prospective buyers and strengthen partnerships that complicate Washington's defense planning. The spectacle joined three goals: reassuring citizens, warning rivals and attracting customers.

Missiles aimed at ships and distant bases

China's emphasis on long range strike ran through the parade. Alongside the DF-61, it showed a modernized DF-5C intercontinental missile and a missile labeled DF-31BJ. Chinese media said the DF-5C could carry multiple independently targetable warheads. In simple terms, one missile can release several warheads aimed at different targets.

The DF-31BJ suggested further expansion of China's land based nuclear forces and possible deployment in silos, the fixed structures used to house and launch missiles. The DF-26D, an anti-ship variant often dubbed the Guam killer, highlighted the ability China seeks to threaten U.S. bases and aircraft carrier groups across the Western Pacific.

New YJ series weapons, including the YJ-17, YJ-19 and YJ-20, were presented as high speed or hypersonic missiles intended to overwhelm naval defenses. They are designed to approach from different directions and at different altitudes, making interception more difficult. A strategic strike grouping of CJ-20A cruise missiles also appeared, pointing to continued investment in precise attacks using conventional weapons.

Hypersonic flight means traveling at least five times the speed of sound. When a missile also maneuvers unpredictably, defenders have less time to detect it, decide how to respond and attempt an interception. Ships and forward bases face greater risks from that combination, even while some new weapons are still moving toward full service.

China's broader aim is to create overlapping threats. A carrier group could face missiles from several directions while the airfields, ports and radar sites supporting it face separate attacks. The challenge for an opposing military would be protecting both its forces at sea and the facilities that keep them supplied.

A nuclear force with three ways to launch

China presented all three legs of its nuclear triad together at a parade for the first time. The formation included missiles launched from land, missiles associated with submarines and a system presented as capable of launching a nuclear weapon from the air.

The DF-5C, a large missile using liquid fuel, appeared on a transporter with multiple axles. Chinese media described its range as more than 20,000 kilometers. The DF-61 appeared alongside it, as did the DF-31BJ, which analysts believe may be a version of the DF-31 suitable for silos. The existing DF-31 is carried on road vehicles.

The JL-3, associated with China's ballistic missile submarines, represented the sea component. The JL-1 was presented as a nuclear capable system launched from the air. Together, the displays conveyed confidence in the reach and resilience of China's nuclear forces.

A nuclear triad spreads weapons across different platforms so that a country has a better chance of retaining a response after an attack. Land based missiles can be protected in silos or moved on trucks. Submarines can hide at sea. Aircraft provide flexibility because they can be redirected or recalled.

The Federation of American Scientists assesses China's stockpile at roughly 600 nuclear warheads, with growth under way. That remains far below the totals held by the United States and Russia. Analysts have also tracked construction of three large missile silo fields containing about 320 silos in total.

The DF-31BJ's appearance reinforced U.S. assessments that some of those silos could be loaded if China chooses. Beijing has said little publicly about the fields and does not disclose its warhead total. The roughly 600 warheads are an outside estimate, while the approximately 320 silos describe launch infrastructure.

Drones move above and below the sea

The AJX002, an extra large uncrewed underwater vehicle shaped like a torpedo and measuring more than 18 meters long, was among the most striking unmanned systems. Its appearance suggested plans to expand surveillance and potentially contest the waters beneath the surface.

The HSU100 underwater drone, an unnamed surface drone intended for mine warfare and other undersea devices whose roles were less apparent pointed to a maritime robotics program with several layers. Craft such as the AJX002 could scan for enemy submarines or lay mobile mines, adding new tasks to China's underwater forces.

The GJ-11, a stealthy drone with a flying wing design, represented the airborne side of that effort. A loyal wingman drone also appeared, designed to operate alongside aircraft with human pilots. Such drones can scout, interfere with enemy communications or sensors, and even absorb incoming missiles to help a piloted fighter survive.

Remote controlled armored buggies were shown for clearing mines and evacuating casualties. Four legged machines, often called robot wolves in Chinese media, can scout in urban areas, carry sensors or cross minefields. The variety showed how robotics is spreading across China's military rather than remaining confined to aerial reconnaissance.

Recent wars have demonstrated how inexpensive drones can find weak points in costly armor and air defenses. China's investment reflects those lessons, while extending unmanned systems into the air, onto the ground and across the sea.

Building a barrier to outside navies

The missiles and maritime drones fit a strategy often called anti access and area denial. The idea is to make it difficult and dangerous for an outside force to enter an area or operate freely once there. China can combine missiles, submarines, mines, drones and air defenses to raise the cost of intervention in the Western Pacific.

The YJ-17, YJ-19 and YJ-20 would complement ballistic systems such as the DF-26D, creating overlapping threats to aircraft carrier groups and logistics ships. Land attack weapons, including the YJ-18C, add pressure on ports, airfields and radar sites. Those facilities are essential for moving supplies, launching aircraft and detecting threats.

James Char, a scholar of China's armed forces at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, described how sea drones and missiles could work together to restrict a foreign navy's response during a crisis.

The combination of the sea drones they have and also the missiles, it will create an area that external navies couldn't even enter to intervene.

China also displayed equipment intended to protect its own surface fleets. The HHQ-9C long range air defense system, together with the shorter range HQ-16C and HQ-10, suggests a more complete shield against threats arriving at different distances.

The LY-1 directed energy weapon appeared on land and has also been tested at sea. Directed energy weapons use concentrated energy, such as a laser beam, against a target. Chinese engineers are experimenting with lasers to defeat drones and small boats, adding another possible layer of protection.

New tanks, fighters and assault aircraft

The Type 100 main battle tank appeared with features described in Chinese state media as highly intelligent. Its reported equipment includes an unmanned turret, advanced sensors, protection systems that counter incoming missiles and augmented reality tools for its crew.

An unmanned turret allows the crew to operate the weapon from elsewhere inside the vehicle. Active protection is intended to respond to an incoming threat before it strikes. Augmented reality tools place useful digital information into the crew's view. Together, these features seek to improve awareness and survival on the battlefield.

The aerial display included fifth generation fighters such as the J-20 and the J-35, which is capable of operating from an aircraft carrier. The KJ-600 early warning aircraft and Z-20T assault helicopters also featured. Early warning aircraft help detect threats and support the coordination of other aircraft.

The Z-20T and J-35 point toward a navy preparing for amphibious and expeditionary operations as well as coastal defense. Amphibious operations move forces from sea to land, while expeditionary operations take military activity farther from home bases.

The HQ-29 appeared among the air defense systems, with Chinese outlets portraying it as part of a new defense layer associated with space. Across the display, the intended direction was an integrated network that tracks targets and supports attacks across land, sea, air and other operating areas.

Automation depends on connected forces

The People's Liberation Army is investing in automation and artificial intelligence alongside new weapons. Drones can remain over an area, watch for activity and pass coordinates to artillery or missile units within seconds. Groups of drones can also draw the first rounds of defensive fire, consuming ammunition that might otherwise be used against larger targets.

A cyberspace unit and a separate information support force created in 2024 marched in the parade. Their work includes protecting networks, combining data from different sources and enabling faster targeting. A sensor finding a ship is useful only if that information reaches the commanders and weapons able to act on it.

China's military command culture is more centralized than the U.S. system. Chinese planners appear willing to push artificial intelligence tools closer to the battlefield because they see speed as an advantage, while retaining the ability for commanders to override those tools. How much independent decision making machines and units receive will shape how that approach works.

Drones also create demands for maintenance, software updates and coordination. They can be disrupted by jamming, which interferes with communications or navigation signals. Analysts observing the parade noted that the number of robotic programs suggested substantial investment, but also potentially substantial repair and cost burdens.

The information and cyberspace formations therefore matter alongside the missiles and drones. Their task is to help turn separate sensors, weapons and decision tools into a force that can keep operating under pressure.

Deployment, testing and the limits of a display

China's defense industry showed a breadth and pace of development that challenges longstanding dismissals of its equipment as copies of Western designs. The parade covered missiles, unmanned systems, naval air defense and armored vehicles, suggesting an industry able to produce new designs quickly and in considerable numbers.

The deployment status and production readiness of several new systems remain uncertain. Some weapons may be prototypes or available only in limited numbers, and some missiles and drones were displayed without being shown operating. Earlier Chinese parades included equipment that needed years to mature, a pattern also familiar in military showcases elsewhere.

Chieh Chung, a researcher at the Association of Strategic Foresight in Taipei, explained that equipment can reach units while development work continues.

Some weapons may still be in limited deployment to units, undergoing field testing during deployment, and may not yet be fully standardised or ready for mass production.

Alexander Neill, a security analyst based in Singapore, said the breadth of the display still gave foreign defense planners substantial work to do.

China was sending a message of technological advance and military strength on all fronts, there is indeed a lot for rival defence planners to get their heads around.

Neill also saw a possible commercial purpose behind parts of the presentation.

I do wonder if there is an element here of China being eager to sell this technology to other militaries ... there was after all a little gimmickry here too.

Every military must turn new designs into trained units able to use them together. China's centralized approach can support rapid production and mobilization, while making improvisation harder during chaotic fighting. The U.S. system often gives officers at lower levels more discretion, which can help units adapt when circumstances change.

Xi, Putin and Kim present a united front

Xi's appearance with Putin and Kim carried a political message beyond the weapons passing below them. Russia has become more dependent on China since invading Ukraine. North Korea has supplied arms to Russia and seeks relief from international isolation.

The three leaders' first public appearance together suggested that Washington could face coordinated pressure across different regions if tensions rose. After the parade, Russian media reported that Putin met Kim for more than two hours and invited him to visit Russia.

Leaders from Iran and Myanmar and officials from Pakistan were also among the guests. The absence of Western leaders reinforced the picture of parallel blocs becoming more firmly established on opposite sides of the Pacific.

Donald Trump reacted on social media, portraying the gathering as a hostile alignment against the United States.

Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against The United States of America.

Xi hosted a banquet for the visiting leaders and used nationalist language in his remarks. He told the troops that China's rise was unstoppable. Chinese state media called the nuclear triad the country's strategic ace, combining a message of confidence for domestic audiences with a warning to foreign adversaries.

Taiwan and the challenge for U.S. forces

Taiwan and the forces that might support it sit at the center of the military problem illustrated by the parade. The DF-26D and YJ series anti-ship missiles are intended to threaten carriers at long distances. Cruise missiles and ballistic missiles aimed at land targets can attack the airfields, ports and radar sites needed for warning and resupply.

Underwater drones could scout or lay mines along likely transit routes. Those threats would add to the work facing a force trying to reach a crisis area, protect its ships and keep supplies moving. China's ability to deter intervention depends on fielding enough weapons and keeping them working through an attack.

The United States and its allies are investing in responses, including lasers aboard ships, improved missile defenses, electronic warfare and decoys. Dispersing aircraft and other assets among several bases can reduce concentration at a single target. Hardened shelters and rapid runway repairs can limit disruption after early strikes.

Submarines remain a critical U.S. advantage because they are difficult to locate and can attack from unexpected directions. The contest beneath the sea therefore remains important even as China expands its own underwater robotics.

U.S. units also practice mission command, which gives junior leaders room to adapt when communications fail. Chinese forces are improving their training and exercises, but their centralized structure may leave less room for spontaneous adjustments. China's strengths in numbers, industrial output and modern designs must be translated into effective operations by units facing uncertainty and damage.

Production, integration and exports come next

Three developments will shape how the parade's message translates into military capability: production, integration and exports. Wider deployment of missiles such as the YJ-19 and YJ-17 would change the risks facing ships and bases. The cyberspace and information support units must connect sensors, weapons and decision tools under pressure.

Arms sales could extend the reach of the display beyond China's own forces. Countries looking for less expensive alternatives to Western equipment may choose Chinese drones, air defense systems or armored vehicles, expanding Beijing's influence and creating new supply networks.

China's military changes also sit within a longer sequence of investment and organizational development.

• 1979: China last fought a war.
• Since the 1990s: China has increased its defense budget many times over.
• 2024: China created the separate information support force that appeared in the parade.

Frequent military drills near Taiwan provide another setting for China's preparations. The parade brought its priorities into public view: use missiles and unmanned systems to push opponents farther from China's shores and threaten critical facilities across the region. Production, training, repair capacity and coordination will determine how effectively those systems work together.

Key Points

• China displayed new missiles, drones, lasers, armored vehicles and aircraft in central Beijing.
• Xi Jinping appeared publicly with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un for the first time, before tens of thousands of people.
• More than two dozen foreign leaders attended; the United States and key allies stayed away.
• China showed all three legs of its nuclear triad, including the DF-61, DF-5C, DF-31BJ, JL-3 and JL-1.
• The Federation of American Scientists estimates roughly 600 Chinese nuclear warheads; analysts have tracked about 320 silos across three large fields.
• YJ series missiles, the DF-26D and maritime drones aim to increase the risks for foreign ships and supporting bases.
• The Type 100 tank, GJ-11 drone, J-35 fighter and LY-1 directed energy weapon illustrated development across several military roles.
• Some systems may still be undergoing field testing or operating in limited numbers, with production and integration remaining major tasks.
• The display combined military deterrence, domestic reassurance, political solidarity and a pitch to prospective arms buyers.