Chinese Public Split Between Shared Global Leadership and Dominance, Survey Finds

Confidence in China meets caution about conflict

Forty eight percent of Chinese respondents preferred their country to share global leadership with other powers, while 41 percent wanted it to take a dominant role, according to a survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and The Carter Center in spring 2025. The split sits alongside striking confidence in China's strength: 97 percent described the country as at least somewhat strong globally, and 90 percent supported an active role in world affairs.

The nationwide poll offers a rare look at how people inside China weigh international power, economic opportunity and the danger of war. Just 17 percent described the United States as a friend of China, the lowest friendship rating among the countries included. Yet 61 percent favored a balanced approach to Washington, cooperating where interests align and seeking to limit American power where they do not.

Taiwan and economic rivalry were major sources of concern. Fifty seven percent considered a possible conflict with the United States over Taiwan a major threat, while 55 percent gave that assessment to economic competition with Washington. Those concerns existed alongside broad support for international trade and confidence that China's influence would grow.

The findings describe a public that wants China to remain deeply involved in the world without agreeing on how much authority it should seek. They also show that distrust of Washington can coexist with support for cooperation. For people whose livelihoods depend on trade, education or international business, relations between the two countries involve practical opportunities as well as questions of national power.

What respondents want China to do with its strength

Military strength, technological innovation and economic power were widely identified as foundations of China's influence. Two thirds of respondents also pointed to culture as a source of soft power, meaning the ability to attract people through ideas, traditions and cultural appeal rather than through military or economic pressure.

Large shares expected China's influence to become stronger over the next five years. Roughly seven in ten agreed that China has a unique character that makes it the greatest country in the world. That belief in national exceptionalism, the idea that a country has qualities setting it above others, helps explain the strength of confidence at home.

The 48 percent preference for shared leadership exceeded support for dominance by seven percentage points. Shared leadership means other major powers also have a voice in international decisions. In the vision described in the article, those powers include the United States, the European Union, India and others alongside China.

Supporters of a dominant role favored a more assertive direction connected to China's military power, industrial capability and technological strength. Support for shared leadership fits more closely with working through international institutions and building partnerships. The Chicago Council on Global Affairs published the findings in its survey findings and summary.

China's leaders have championed the United Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO), while promoting the Belt and Road initiative. Beijing says the initiative has cooperation agreements with about 150 countries. Its infrastructure, logistics and connectivity projects extend across Asia, Africa, the Middle East and parts of Europe and Latin America.

Partnerships can spread costs and risks, provide markets for Chinese manufacturing and technology, and build coalitions that counter pressure from the United States. Public support for multilateral diplomacy, in which several countries work together, gives Beijing support for its appeals to international law and global institutions.

Why distrust of Washington leaves room for cooperation

The United States was rarely viewed as a friend, but the most popular policy choice was a mixture of cooperation and competition. The 61 percent backing that approach supported friendly engagement where interests overlap while leaving room to restrict American power when interests clash.

Respondents who believed the United States was economically stronger were more likely to favor friendly cooperation. Those who thought China was stronger were more inclined to support efforts to limit US power. Perceptions of the relative strength of the two economies therefore tracked different preferences for dealing with Washington.

Trade and investment ties, global supply chains, and joint work on climate change and global health remain part of the relationship despite tariffs and technology controls. Supply chains are the networks of businesses and transport systems that move materials and products between countries. Disruption can affect producers, workers and customers on both sides.

A balanced policy leaves space for basic diplomatic engagement, steady crisis management and rules intended to reduce the danger of military incidents. Economic and technological competition can continue within that approach. The preference reflects awareness of the countries' deep economic connections and the costs of unchecked confrontation.

A 2024 survey by The Carter Center and Emory University found that most respondents believed friendly and peaceful relations with the United States were necessary for China's prosperity. The same study found caution about using force over Taiwan, alongside a sizeable minority open to coercive measures under certain conditions. Supportive views of Russia's war in Ukraine were also common, showing that restraint was not a uniform position across conflicts.

Taiwan brings together fear of war and support for pressure

Taiwan was central to respondents' security concerns. Fifty seven percent in the spring 2025 survey regarded a possible conflict with Washington over the island as a major threat. Beijing claims Taiwan as its territory, and the People's Liberation Army has increased pressure around it through patrols, exercises and gray zone tactics, actions that apply pressure without becoming open warfare.

Views of Taiwan's people were much warmer than views of its government. Nine in ten respondents said the Taiwanese population was friendly toward China, while fewer than half described the government in Taipei as friendly. That gap leaves room for ties between people even while official relations remain tense.

The 2024 Carter Center and Emory University study found that 55 percent agreed force should never be used to resolve the Taiwan issue. Roughly one quarter disagreed. When respondents were asked about a hypothetical timetable for coercive steps aimed at unification, the most frequent answer was within five years.

That answer concerned a hypothetical timetable; the study gave no scheduled date for such steps. The findings combined opposition to outright war with acceptance of pressure tactics and a desire for progress on an issue viewed as fundamental to sovereignty, meaning a country's authority over territory it considers its own.

Public preferences can affect the room leaders have to ease or intensify a crisis. Anxiety about a Taiwan conflict, together with support for active international engagement, makes crisis hotlines, transparency about military activities and credible rules for avoiding miscalculation especially relevant. Warm views of Taiwan's people also provide a basis for personal connections across the divide.

Russia and North Korea lead the friendship ratings

Russia was described as a friend of China by 83 percent of respondents, while North Korea received that assessment from 76 percent. Those strong ratings contrasted with the colder views of several US allies and other countries in China's neighborhood.

Australia, the European Union and Vietnam occupied the middle of the friendship rankings, with about half of respondents calling them friends. Majorities described India, the Philippines and South Korea as not friends. Japan and the United States received the most negative assessments.

The pattern suggests a public view of a difficult neighborhood in East Asia, where security relationships and economic interests help shape trust. Many respondents appeared to see a world divided into camps, with those interests carrying more weight than shared values.

A 2025 survey from the China Institute at the University of Alberta added another dimension. Respondents identified the United States as the most likely adversary in a future military conflict, with Japan second. Yet the United States again ranked as the leading destination for overseas study and was also a leading choice for work opportunities.

Canada remained a top choice for emigration. Those preferences show how distrust of foreign governments can exist alongside interest in the education, careers and living opportunities available in their countries. A person can worry about a country's strategic intentions while still wanting to study or work there.

How China's confidence compares with views abroad

Pew Research Center's global polling in early 2025 found a median favorable rating of 49 percent for the United States across 24 surveyed nations, compared with 37 percent for China. The difference was 12 percentage points. A median is the middle result when the countries' figures are arranged in order, rather than a single percentage combining all respondents.

The gap was narrowing as views of the United States worsened in several countries and opinions of China improved in some places. Pew's July 15, 2025, global survey summary includes detailed country tables on attitudes toward both countries and their leaders.

China still faced largely negative views in many advanced economies. Parts of Africa and Southeast Asia were more favorable. An Afrobarometer survey across 29 African countries found that six in ten respondents viewed China's influence on their country positively, ahead of the positive assessments of US and European Union influence.

Asia Society's Global Public Opinion on China initiative has tracked changes in attitudes since 2000. It recorded a steep decline during the first year of the pandemic in parts of the Global South, followed by a more varied pattern. Africa and the Middle East held steady, while parts of Southeast Asia improved.

The distance between regional assessments has widened or narrowed depending on the period and major events. Pew's 2022 research found sharp increases in unfavorable views of China in advanced economies during the Xi era, associated with the South China Sea, narratives surrounding the pandemic and human rights.

Confidence in President Xi and President Trump was low in many countries, though the pattern varied by region. In Europe and parts of Asia, publics expressed concern about China's expanding power and military buildup. Human rights and interference in domestic politics were also concerns. These attitudes form the international setting in which Beijing pursues a larger leadership role.

Trade remains popular despite economic rivalry

Seventy three percent of Chinese respondents said international trade benefited China's economy and living standards. Sixty percent supported a policy of global free trade. Those findings place support for economic openness alongside concern about competition with the United States.

Free trade means low or zero tariffs and few other barriers to goods and services moving across borders. Tariffs are taxes on imports. Protectionist policies use tariffs or other controls to shield domestic industries from foreign competition.

The United States has applied sweeping tariffs to a range of imports. China has combined industrial policy, government action to support selected industries, with selective opening of its own economy, while presenting itself abroad as a defender of multilateral trading rules.

Support for trade matters in concrete terms because international sales and purchases connect Chinese production to overseas markets and goods. The survey's finding that trade benefits living standards shows that respondents associated international commerce with everyday economic welfare, even while many regarded US economic competition as threatening.

China's leaders are also placing greater weight on self reliance in advanced technology. That effort extends from semiconductors, the chips used in electronic devices, to clean energy supply chains. It runs alongside the effort to increase Chinese influence within international institutions.

Support for global institutions comes with tensions

Respondents supported working through institutions such as the United Nations even when doing so required compromise on some policies. That preference fits with the substantial support for shared leadership and with Beijing's public defense of international rules.

Governments around the world, however, have scrutinized China's state subsidies, restrictions on market access and technology transfer practices. Subsidies are public support for businesses or industries. Market access concerns involve how easily foreign companies can sell or operate in a country, while technology transfer concerns involve the sharing of technical knowledge and capabilities.

Beijing's rhetoric and implementation do not always match. Its leaders combine advocacy for global rules with policies intended to protect domestic capabilities and reduce reliance on foreign technology. Public support for international trade therefore exists within a policy setting that mixes openness with selective controls.

The leadership split gives that combination added meaning. Many respondents want China to work with other powers, while a large minority favors dominance. Both groups see a strong country, but their preferred use of that strength differs. The survey captures that disagreement rather than a single public demand for one international strategy.

What the surveys reveal, and where caution is needed

Polling inside China's tightly managed information environment carries practical difficulties. Sampling, access to respondents and social desirability bias can influence results. Social desirability bias occurs when people give the answer they believe is acceptable rather than the answer that best reflects their own view.

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs and The Carter Center have made a sustained effort to capture a range of opinions. Their methodology and questionnaires are published for scrutiny, allowing readers to examine how respondents were selected and how questions were asked.

Academic research summarized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies describes a more diverse public than a single national position suggests. Wealthier and more educated respondents often hold more liberal views, favor markets more strongly and express less nationalism. Many Chinese citizens prefer diplomatic and economic tools to military solutions.

Students from China who study in the United States often report more liberal attitudes than peers who remain at home. The University of Alberta's 2025 survey also found that social media now dominates as a source of international news, especially among younger respondents. That can speed the circulation of narratives during a crisis.

The studies discussed here cover several periods, making their timing useful for understanding the picture as of September 6, 2025:

• Since 2000, Asia Society's initiative has tracked changing global attitudes toward China.
• In 2022, Pew documented rising unfavorable views in advanced economies during the Xi era.
• In 2024, The Carter Center and Emory University examined views on peaceful US relations and the use of force over Taiwan.
• In spring 2025, the Chicago Council and Carter Center surveyed Chinese attitudes toward global leadership, trade and international threats.
• On July 15, 2025, Pew published its comparison of changing views of the United States and China.

For foreign policymakers and businesses, the recurring themes are concrete: support for engagement and trade exists alongside firm positions on sovereignty and security. That combination affects how Chinese audiences may receive foreign governments and companies, and the room Beijing's leaders have to ease tensions or increase pressure.

What to Know

• Forty eight percent favored shared global leadership for China, while 41 percent preferred a dominant role.
• Ninety percent supported active engagement in world affairs, and 97 percent saw China as at least somewhat strong globally.
• Only 17 percent called the United States a friend, but 61 percent supported a balanced approach combining cooperation and competition.
• A possible US conflict over Taiwan was a major threat for 57 percent; US economic competition was a major threat for 55 percent.
• Russia and North Korea received friendship ratings of 83 percent and 76 percent, respectively.
• Seventy three percent said trade benefited China's economy and living standards, and 60 percent favored global free trade.
• The 2024 Carter Center and Emory University survey found 55 percent opposed using force to resolve the Taiwan issue, alongside support among some respondents for coercive steps.
• Pew's 2025 survey recorded median favorable views of 49 percent for the United States and 37 percent for China across 24 nations, with substantial regional differences.