South Korea's Marriages and Births Shrink as Foreign Spouses Take a Larger Share

A small rebound after three decades of decline

South Korea recorded 222,400 marriages and about 238,000 births in 2024, a recovery that sits within a much larger decline in family formation. Marriages have fallen by nearly half since the mid 1990s, while annual births have dropped to roughly one third of the 715,000 recorded in 1995. Couples are marrying later, parents are older, and international marriages now account for about one in eleven unions.

Statistics Korea's figures show that the total fertility rate rose from a record low of 0.72 in 2023 to 0.75 in 2024. The rate describes the average number of children a woman would be expected to have under current birth patterns. It stood at 1.63 in 1995. South Korea's latest figure remains the lowest among advanced economies and about half the average across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

Officials attribute the recent improvement partly to weddings and births postponed during the pandemic and partly to a temporarily larger population of women in their early 30s. Marriages increased for a second consecutive year in 2024, and early figures for 2025 showed births continuing to rise.

South Korea has nevertheless entered what demographers describe as a super aged era. Deaths outnumber births, and the median age is rising rapidly. Fewer children and more older residents change the number of people available to work, the money needed for pensions and care, and the prospects of schools in communities losing young families.

The immediate challenge for policymakers is twofold: make marriage and parenthood less costly and less damaging to careers, while preparing public services and employers for an older population. The recovery in annual registrations offers some relief, but the forces behind the long decline remain deeply rooted in housing, education, working life and expectations about who provides care.

How far have marriages and births fallen?

Statistics Korea's historical series records a fall in the crude marriage rate from 8.7 marriages per 1,000 people in 1995 to 4.4 in 2024. This measure puts weddings in relation to the size of the population, making the change easier to compare across years. The agency publishes its annual releases through Statistics Korea.

Annual marriages peaked at 434,900 in 1996 before falling to 191,700 in 2022. Registrations then rose to 193,700 in 2023 and 222,400 in 2024. Despite that stronger second increase, the latest total remained about 44 percent below the level of the mid 1990s.

Births fell more sharply. The decline from 715,000 in 1995 to about 238,000 in 2024 amounts to roughly two thirds of the earlier total. The recent improvement therefore starts from a much smaller base of births and marriages than South Korea had three decades ago.

The main dates show both the long contraction and the recent change in direction:

• 1995: South Korea recorded 715,000 births, a fertility rate of 1.63 and 8.7 marriages per 1,000 people.
• 1996: Annual marriages reached their peak of 434,900.
• 2005: International marriages peaked before a subsequent decline.
• 2022: Annual marriages fell to 191,700, while international marriages began increasing again.
• 2023: Marriages rose to 193,700, but fertility reached a record low of 0.72.
• 2024: Marriages rose to 222,400, births increased to about 238,000 and fertility edged up to 0.75.
• April 2025: Births reached 20,717, up 8.7 percent from a year earlier, while marriage registrations recorded their 13th consecutive month of growth.

Couples are marrying and becoming parents later

Men marrying for the first time were, on average, 28.4 years old in 1995 and 33.9 in 2024. The average for women rose from 25.3 to 31.6. First weddings are now concentrated in people's 30s, rather than at the younger ages common three decades earlier.

Parents' ages have also increased. The average age of mothers at childbirth rose from 27.9 to 33.7, while fathers' average age increased from 31.1 to 36.1. Births to mothers aged 35 or older accounted for 35.9 percent of the total in 2024, compared with 4.8 percent in 1995.

Couples are also waiting longer between marriage and their first child. The average interval stretched from 1.5 years to 2.5 years. Later weddings and a longer wait afterward move the beginning of parenthood further into adulthood.

Multiple births, including twins, increased from 1.3 percent of births to 5.7 percent over the same period. That change is often linked to older maternal age and wider use of fertility treatment.

Smaller families and a close link to marriage

Firstborn children fell in number from 345,800 in 1995 to 146,100 in 2024. Their share of all births nevertheless increased from 48 percent to 61 percent because second and third births declined even more sharply. Second births dropped by about three quarters, with third births falling by a similar share.

South Korea is therefore seeing two changes together: fewer people beginning parenthood and fewer families going on to have additional children. A larger share of firstborns means that births are increasingly concentrated at the start of family life.

Births outside marriage rose from 1.2 percent of the total in 1995 to 5.8 percent in 2024. They remain uncommon by international standards. Around 95 percent of births occur within marriage, leaving the birth trend closely connected to the number of couples registering weddings.

Officials point to that connection when explaining why rising marriages may precede rising births. The average wait of 2.5 years between marriage and a first child also helps explain why changes in wedding registrations and birth registrations unfold on different schedules.

Where the demographic decline is deepest

South Gyeongsang Province recorded the steepest decline in births over the 30 years, at about 80 percent. Busan and North Jeolla each recorded declines of about 75 percent. Those losses are greater than the roughly two thirds reduction in births nationwide.

The Seoul capital area accounted for more than half of South Korea's births in 2024. Gyeonggi Province represented 28 percent, Seoul 19 percent and Incheon 6 percent. Together, those three shares add up to 53 percent.

Schools in some regions have already merged or closed as the number of children has fallen. For communities losing young residents, a smaller intake of pupils changes where families can send children to school and how local services are organised. The concentration of births around the capital also places family formation close to the housing pressures that many young adults identify as a reason to delay marriage and children.

Why work and household costs discourage parenthood

Housing is expensive, especially around Seoul, and private education is widely regarded as essential. Families describe the combined cost of a home and tutoring as a heavy burden that makes larger families harder to contemplate. Long working hours leave less time for care, while career breaks can carry substantial penalties.

South Korea's working hours remain long by OECD standards, and its gender pay gap is among the widest in the developed world. Women also perform far more unpaid care. For many young adults, marriage and parenthood appear to demand a choice between maintaining a career and taking on family responsibilities.

Yejin, a television producer aged 30 in Seoul, described those pressures in interviews with the BBC. She said workplace hours and expectations left no room for a child and that household responsibilities would probably fall on her if she became a mother.

Working in Korea is hard, you're stuck in a perpetual cycle of work.

Parental leave figures show how unevenly care is shared. Both parents are entitled to leave during a child's early years, yet in 2022 only about 7 percent of new fathers took any leave, compared with about 70 percent of mothers. Many women fear that stepping away from work will damage their careers. OECD research connects those pressures with low fertility and women's withdrawal from the labour force.

Sociologists and advocates also point to restrictions on family choices. Same sex marriage is not recognised, and unmarried women have limited access to donor insemination. A small but vocal 4B movement encourages some women to forgo dating, sex, marriage and childbirth in protest against rigid gender roles. Analysis from Think Global Health and other researchers argues that cash incentives alone have not changed these choices.

What is behind the improvement in 2024 and 2025?

Births rose in 2024 from the record low recorded the previous year, while fertility increased from 0.72 to 0.75. Officials identify postponed family plans as one reason: weddings and births delayed during the pandemic are now being registered.

The population of women aged 30 to 34 is also temporarily larger, reflecting an echo of the baby boom in the early 1990s. More women at ages when childbirth is now common can lift the birth count, even while the longer trend points toward fewer women of childbearing age.

April 2025 recorded 20,717 births, an increase of 8.7 percent from a year earlier and the fastest monthly gain in 34 years. Marriage registrations increased for a 13th consecutive month. Births in the first quarter of 2025 rose 7.3 percent compared with the same period in 2024.

The duration of the recovery is still uncertain. Deaths continue to exceed births, fertility remains far below replacement level, and the number of women of childbearing age continues to shrink. Replacement level describes the rate needed for one generation to replace itself over time. A temporary increase in births offers relief, while the longer decline still requires changes in the conditions surrounding family life.

Cash, childcare and leave are expanding

Successive governments have spent hundreds of trillions of won on family support. Measures include child allowances, housing benefits, coverage for in vitro fertilisation (IVF) for married couples, expanded daycare and longer paid parental leave. IVF is a fertility treatment in which eggs are fertilised outside the body before an embryo is transferred to the uterus.

Initiatives added in 2024 and 2025 extend paternity leave, introduce flexible schedules and direct loans and housing support toward newlyweds. Local governments and companies are also experimenting with dating events and other efforts to encourage people to meet and form relationships.

Yoon Suk Yeol, as president, called the demographic situation a national emergency and said earlier spending to encourage births had not worked. He described South Korea as excessively and unnecessarily competitive and ordered policies addressing low births as a structural problem rather than a temporary departure from normal conditions.

Researchers argue that subsidies improve household income but need to be accompanied by changes in working culture, a more equal division of care and less intense competition over education. The OECD makes similar points in its low fertility analysis.

Hong Sok chul, an economist at Seoul National University, said that reducing costs alone would be insufficient. In comments to local media, he called for broader changes:

There needs to be effort to solve structural social problems,

Economists, demographers and international outlets have urged caution about treating the recent increase as a lasting recovery. Their concern centres on the same pressures: fewer potential parents, expensive family life and employment arrangements that make care difficult to share.

Foreign spouses are a larger part of family life

International marriages increased from 13,500 in 1995 to about 20,800 in 2024. Their share rose from 3.4 percent to 9.3 percent of all marriages, moving from about one in thirty unions to about one in eleven. Cross national unions now represent a larger share than at any point in three decades.

Marriages between Korean men and foreign women reached about 15,600 in 2024, while marriages between Korean women and foreign men numbered roughly 5,000. International marriages peaked in 2005, subsequently declined and began increasing again in 2022.

The pattern reflects personal choices and economic circumstances, including longstanding imbalances in rural marriage markets. As international marriages become more common within a smaller national total of weddings, support for multicultural households becomes a more visible part of family policy.

Researchers and organisations including Think Global Health and the OECD argue that more foreign workers and families could help sustain the labour force and support an ageing population. Even with higher fertility, the number of women in their 20s and 30s will be smaller in coming decades. Managed immigration can ease that transition alongside better support for multicultural families already living in South Korea.

Language programmes, school support and protection against discrimination can help children in these households thrive. Investment in inclusion by employers and local governments can also widen the pool of future workers and community leaders, particularly if international marriage continues growing and immigration fills more employment gaps.

A smaller population changes pensions, care and jobs

The OECD estimates that South Korea's population could halve over the next six decades if fertility stays low and immigration remains modest. The share of seniors could climb toward 60 percent by the 2080s.

The old age dependency ratio is expected to rise. This ratio compares the number of older people with the population of working age. When it increases, pensions and care must be supported by a relatively smaller pool of potential workers and taxpayers. South Korea faces growing pressure on pension systems and long term care, alongside a narrowing tax base.

Health and welfare budgets are already growing faster than revenues. Employers face worker shortages in care, construction and advanced manufacturing, even as young people experience unemployment or underemployment and lengthy screening for elite jobs. A shortage in one occupation can coexist with intense competition for another.

Joan C. Williams, an American legal scholar, reacted bluntly to South Korea's fertility figures in a 2023 documentary on the country's public educational broadcaster. Her response captured the alarm that had moved beyond specialist demographic discussions:

South Korea is so screwed.

Policymakers, employers, schools and families now face the practical task of reducing the costs and risks of having children while respecting personal choice. They must also organise services for a population whose needs are changing as it grows older.

Which changes address the reasons people hesitate?

Researchers identify a package of measures rather than a single payment or programme. Shorter working hours, predictable schedules and meaningful flexibility would help parents continue their careers. Paternity leave that is well paid and widely used would make it easier to share care at home.

Reliable daycare with long opening hours would reduce reliance on grandparents or private tutors. Housing policies that lower the initial costs faced by young couples, especially near jobs, would address another source of anxiety.

Education reform could include expanded after school programmes, stronger schools outside the most sought after districts and efforts to discourage excessive private tutoring. If parents feel less pressure to buy expensive cram school hours, the perceived cost of a second child falls.

Gender equality is central to these proposals. Stronger enforcement against discrimination during and after parental leave, fairer pay and promotion arrangements that do not punish time away would make parenthood less threatening to women's careers. Some analysts recommend reserving part of parental leave for fathers, with unused leave lost rather than transferred, as in France and the Nordic countries. Such arrangements have been shown to increase men's use of leave.

Financial assistance remains part of the response. The new administration has floated large loans at low interest rates for newlyweds, with debt forgiveness linked to children, expanded allowances up to age 18 and tax changes reducing the burden on larger families. Pairing these benefits with reforms to work and schooling would address more of the reasons young adults hesitate.

Immigration can complement those changes through predictable routes for skilled and essential workers and support for their families. Updating rules that restrict family formation, including barriers to assisted reproduction for unmarried women, would also bring policy closer to the choices people seek to make.

Key Points

• Marriages rose to 222,400 in 2024 but remained about 44 percent below the level of the mid 1990s.
• Births fell from 715,000 in 1995 to about 238,000 in 2024. Fertility recovered slightly to 0.75 from 0.72 in 2023.
• People marry later, and 35.9 percent of births are now to mothers aged 35 or older.
• Firstborns account for 61 percent of births, while second and third births have fallen by about three quarters since 1995.
• International marriages reached about 20,800 in 2024, representing 9.3 percent of all marriages.
• Gyeonggi, Seoul and Incheon accounted for 53 percent of births, while South Gyeongsang, Busan and North Jeolla experienced especially steep declines.
• Births increased in early 2025, helped by postponed family plans and a temporarily larger population of women in their early 30s.
• Housing and education costs, long working hours and unequal care responsibilities remain central pressures on family formation.
• Expanded financial support, leave and childcare sit alongside proposals for workplace reform, education changes and immigration.
• Deaths still exceed births, leaving South Korea to support family choices while preparing for a smaller, older population.