More Bases, New Weapons and Closer Partnerships
The United States is expanding its military presence across the Indo-Pacific as China builds a larger navy, develops advanced weapons and strengthens security relationships across the region. By June 16, 2025, Washington's response includes broader access to bases, more joint exercises, infrastructure improvements and closer coordination with allies from Japan to Australia.
Contents
- More Bases, New Weapons and Closer Partnerships
- Why These Waters Matter
- China Builds Power Across Several Fronts
- A US Force Spread Across More Locations
- Alliances Become More Closely Connected
- Beijing Responds as Neighbors Weigh Their Choices
- Drones and Autonomous Systems Change Military Planning
- Access, Supplies and Political Trust Remain Difficult
- Deterrence Carries a Risk of Escalation
- Key Points
China's official defense spending increased by 7.2% in 2024, marking a third consecutive year of robust growth. Its People's Liberation Army Navy is now the world's largest navy, while its missile forces, nuclear stockpile and capabilities involving hypersonic weapons continue to expand.
Washington is responding by changing where its forces operate and how they would fight. Additional naval vessels and advanced aircraft are being deployed to strategic locations such as Guam, Japan and Australia. Forces are also practicing how to spread across more locations, making them harder to target and giving commanders more options during a crisis.
The competition reaches beyond ships, aircraft and missiles. Ports, infrastructure projects, intelligence sharing, access agreements and diplomatic relationships all affect which countries can operate where. Governments across the region must weigh their security interests alongside their economic relationships with China.
The immediate challenge is to strengthen deterrence, meaning the ability to discourage an attack by making its likely costs too high. Both Washington and Beijing are building forces intended to deter conflict and prevail if fighting begins. Their growing military activity also increases the danger that a confrontation around Taiwan or in the South China Sea could escalate.
Why These Waters Matter
The Indo-Pacific stretches from the eastern coast of Africa to the western shores of the Americas. It contains more than half the world's population, some of its most dynamic economies and several of its busiest shipping routes.
The South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca carry important flows of energy supplies and commercial goods. These waterways connect producers, factories and consumers across borders. Influence over them provides economic advantages as well as places from which military forces can operate.
The Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea are also security flashpoints. Disputes in these areas involve regional governments directly, while drawing in the wider competition between the United States and China. A crisis could affect neighboring countries, international commerce and the wider balance of power.
Washington's military expansion therefore serves several connected purposes: supporting allies, keeping access to important waters and maintaining the ability to respond across a vast region. Beijing's growing reach challenges the military balance that has traditionally favored the United States.
China Builds Power Across Several Fronts
President Xi Jinping has overseen sweeping reforms of the People's Liberation Army, or PLA. Modernization extends across land forces, naval forces, aviation, cyber operations and space capabilities. China's growing arsenal of ballistic and cruise missiles adds to the pressure on US and allied forces operating nearby.
Ballistic missiles follow an arcing flight path, while cruise missiles fly under power through the atmosphere. Hypersonic weapons travel at extremely high speeds. Together with a growing nuclear stockpile, these capabilities widen the range of threats that US planners must consider.
China's advances include the deployment of surveillance drones such as the WZ-9, described as capable of operating at high altitudes, construction of the Type 004 supercarrier powered by nuclear reactors, and the unveiling of technologies that allow drones to operate in swarms. Such systems are intended to extend China's reach, monitor US and allied activity and challenge the regional balance of power.
Beijing's economic and diplomatic activity supports its strategic ambitions. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has invested heavily in infrastructure, ports and resource extraction across Pacific Island countries and Southeast Asia. Economic dependence created through those relationships can translate into political and strategic influence.
China has also pursued security agreements and partnerships aimed at reducing US influence and making allied military planning more difficult. A government deciding whether to grant military access must consider its own security needs, domestic politics and relationships with other powers.
A US Force Spread Across More Locations
The United States is reinforcing, reforming and redistributing its forces. Beyond deploying ships and aircraft, it is reclaiming airfields, positioning equipment in advance and developing missile defense and surveillance systems. These investments are intended to make military operations possible from a wider network of locations.
Expanded access arrangements in the Philippines and Papua New Guinea are part of that effort. Washington is also deepening defense cooperation with India, the United Kingdom and other partners, while conducting large joint exercises with Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines.
The US Air Force approach known as Agile Combat Employment, or ACE, involves dispersing forces across multiple locations. The practical aim is straightforward: aircraft and the people supporting them should be able to operate from different places, increasing their chances of survival and complicating an adversary's targeting decisions.
The Marine Corps has redesigned regiments into mobile Marine Littoral Regiments, or MLRs. Equipped with new missile systems, these formations are intended to operate from locations with limited facilities. Their mobility fits the wider effort to avoid concentrating military strength in a small number of established bases.
Unmanned aircraft and autonomous underwater vehicles are also being integrated into US operations. They form part of the response to China's anti-access and area denial strategy, often shortened to A2/AD. In simple terms, that strategy seeks to prevent opposing forces from entering an area or make it difficult for them to operate there.
Alliances Become More Closely Connected
Japan, South Korea and Australia remain central to Washington's regional strategy. The United States is seeking partnerships that can coordinate more closely through shared intelligence, compatible equipment and joint command arrangements. Interoperability means that different countries' forces can communicate and operate effectively together.
The United States and Japan have agreed to reconstitute US Forces Japan as a joint force headquarters. The intended result is better operational coordination and readiness, strengthening the arrangements through which the two countries prepare for and respond to security challenges.
Australia is investing in submarines powered by nuclear reactors and missiles with longer ranges. It also hosts US forces on rotational deployments and participates in joint exercises. These activities connect Australia's own military development with the broader US presence.
The Quad brings together the United States, Japan, Australia and India. AUKUS connects Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Both illustrate the growing use of smaller groups of countries alongside wider partnerships to organize cooperation and respond more flexibly to regional threats.
These arrangements place greater responsibility on regional powers. Japan, Australia and India are investing in their own capabilities and deepening partnerships, contributing to a shift from a system dominated by one power toward one in which several influential countries help shape security decisions.
Beijing Responds as Neighbors Weigh Their Choices
China has conducted naval exercises involving live ammunition near Australia and Vietnam, increased air and maritime operations around Taiwan, and expanded its South China Sea presence through artificial islands and military installations. These activities serve military purposes while also signaling Beijing's reach and resolve.
Beijing combines economic incentives with coercive tactics. Its approach presents alignment with China as a source of opportunity while using threats against countries that oppose its interests. Trade, investment and security pressure therefore operate together in the regional competition.
Security agreements involving China and Pacific Island countries, including the Cook Islands and Solomon Islands, have alarmed Australia and New Zealand. Both see China's moves as attempts to establish a strategic foothold close to their own territories, an area where they have traditionally held strong influence.
Vietnam and the Philippines are seeking closer security ties with the United States while maintaining economic relations with China. Their choices reflect the practical difficulty of separating defense concerns from trade and investment relationships.
India and South Korea also seek to balance their relationships and avoid being forced into a choice between Washington and Beijing. This approach, often called hedging, means keeping several options open. Different regional priorities make it harder for the United States to build a unified response to Chinese coercion.
Drones and Autonomous Systems Change Military Planning
The United States and China are competing over unmanned and autonomous systems, including drones and vehicles that operate underwater. An unmanned vehicle carries no crew, while an autonomous system can perform certain tasks without continuous human direction.
The US military is integrating these systems, along with platforms using artificial intelligence, into its operational planning. The Replicator initiative aims to deploy thousands of relatively inexpensive autonomous systems that could overwhelm an adversary's defenses and support partners such as Taiwan in a potential conflict.
The concept depends partly on numbers. A force using many less expensive systems can present an opponent with numerous targets and tasks at once. This changes the planning problem for a defender accustomed to tracking a smaller number of larger military platforms.
China is developing its own combination of surveillance drones, artificial intelligence and electromagnetic warfare capabilities. Electromagnetic warfare involves using or disrupting signals on which military communications and sensors depend.
Combined with new naval assets such as the Type 004 supercarrier, these technologies could support a connected combat system. Ships, aircraft, drones and other platforms would work together, extending China's ability to challenge US forces at sea and in the air.
Access, Supplies and Political Trust Remain Difficult
US military plans depend on decisions made by allied and partner governments. Permission to use territory and bases during a crisis remains uncertain, and those choices could affect Washington's ability to move and sustain forces. Political access is therefore part of operational readiness.
Alliance management presents another challenge. US demands for allies to carry a larger share of defense costs, together with diplomacy focused on exchanges of benefits and commitments, can strain relationships when partners believe mutual trust is being weakened.
The US defense industrial base also faces constraints in producing munitions and maintaining reliable supply chains. A prolonged conflict would require a continuing flow of ammunition, replacement equipment and other supplies. Disrupted supply routes would make that task harder.
War games and assessments suggest that the United States could struggle to sustain intense operations, especially if supply chains are interrupted or allies hesitate to provide support. The ability to arrive in a region and the ability to keep fighting there require different kinds of preparation.
A proposed response is a more integrated and permanent joint deterrence force involving the United States, Australia and Japan. Such a coalition could establish lasting command structures, improve the ability of forces to work together and distribute responsibilities more evenly. Political, operational and strategic barriers would have to be overcome to achieve that level of cooperation.
Deterrence Carries a Risk of Escalation
The Taiwan Strait and South China Sea bring military operations and political signaling into close contact. As the United States, China and regional forces conduct more activity, an incident or miscalculation could grow into a wider crisis.
Washington's approach seeks to make its presence more credible through dispersed forces, closer alliances and new technology. Beijing's military expansion and willingness to apply coercion increase concern about its longer term intentions and the stability of the regional order.
Countries across the Indo-Pacific are making their own choices within that competition. Their decisions about defense investment, access to territory and diplomatic partnerships will help determine how effectively any coalition can act.
The consequences extend to trade, international rules and the global balance of power. Maintaining credible deterrence while preserving ways to manage crises is central to avoiding a conflict that neither military preparation nor economic relationships would make easy to contain.
Key Points
- The United States is expanding military access, deployments, exercises and infrastructure across the Indo-Pacific.
- China's official defense spending rose 7.2% in 2024, alongside modernization across its armed forces.
- US plans include dispersing aircraft, mobile Marine Littoral Regiments and greater use of autonomous systems.
- Japan, Australia, South Korea and other partners are central to US strategy, while the Quad and AUKUS provide additional avenues for cooperation.
- China is combining military activity, infrastructure investment and security agreements to extend its regional influence.
- Access to bases, munitions production, supply chains and political trust could shape the ability to sustain military operations.
- Taiwan and the South China Sea remain major flashpoints where deterrence and crisis management must operate together.






