Taiwan Sends Transnational Repression Bill to Cabinet, Targeting Overseas Instigators and Local Accomplices

10 Min Read
Taiwan Sends Transnational Repression Bill to Cabinet, Targeting Overseas Instigators and Local Accomplices

A new offense aimed at intimidation across borders

Taiwan's Ministry of Justice has sent the Cabinet a draft amendment to the Anti-Infiltration Act that would create a specific offense of transnational repression and increase penalties for people helping hostile foreign forces silence others. Justice Minister Cheng Ming-chien announced the step at a legislative committee hearing on November 18, 2026.

Contents
  1. A new offense aimed at intimidation across borders
  2. How the draft would define repression
  3. Where existing laws fall short
  4. Nine methods, from violence to family pressure
  5. Attacks bring the legal debate into focus
  6. Following the money and reaching the organizers
  7. Victim support is being developed separately
  8. A reform effort stretching across several hearings
  9. International cooperation and the next legislative steps
  10. Key Points

The proposal follows a government tally of 131 Taiwanese targeted in 149 incidents since 2005. Mainland Affairs Council Deputy Minister Liang Wen-chieh presented those figures during an earlier legislative hearing, describing tactics ranging from physical attacks and surveillance to threats against relatives and restrictions on business activity.

Cheng said the draft would address accomplices in Taiwan, including people who help gather information or follow targets. Other proposed measures include confiscating assets connected to offenses and rules intended to limit the spread of repression through the internet.

The central concern is that an attack can frighten more people than its immediate victim. A comedian attacked after mocking China's leadership, for example, may prompt other performers to avoid the same subject. Officials describe that pressure to remain silent as a chilling effect.

The draft remains under Cabinet review. Cheng said the ministry would accelerate its submission to the Legislative Yuan, but gave no date for that step. The proposed prison terms, detailed internet provisions and timetable for a vote have not been announced.

How the draft would define repression

Cheng outlined a preliminary definition focused on hostile foreign forces crossing borders to attack individuals, groups or Taiwanese public officials in order to interfere with Taiwan's social order and democratic system. The intended result would be to make people censor their own speech or conduct.

Advertisement

The definition would connect the immediate act, such as intimidation or assault, to the foreign source and its purpose. Cheng said defining both hostile foreign forces and crossborder repression was a central part of the amendment.

The proposed offense would require a connection to an infiltration source, assessed through the facts and evidence of each case. The National Security Bureau has described the planned coverage as conduct carried out under the instruction, at the request or with the funding of hostile foreign forces.

Democratic Progressive Party legislator Fan Yun pressed Cheng for a precise definition during the November 18 hearing. She also asked whether the law would increase responsibility for private investigation businesses and intermediaries that follow people or collect intelligence in Taiwan.

Cheng said the draft already addressed local accomplices. The practical aim is to reach the chain behind an operation, from the person carrying out an attack to intermediaries and whoever directs or finances it overseas.

Where existing laws fall short

Taiwan currently handles suspected repression cases through several laws, depending on what happened. Cheng cited the Personal Data Protection Act and Criminal Code offenses including bodily injury, attempted murder, insult and intimidation. The National Security Bureau also identified the Organized Crime Prevention Act as an existing prosecution tool.

The Ministry of Justice gave specific examples of current maximum sentences:

  • Ordinary bodily injury: five years in prison.
  • Property damage: two years.
  • Criminal threats: two years.
  • Unlawful surveillance or recording covered by secrecy provisions: three years.
  • Offenses under Article 41 of the Personal Data Protection Act: five years.

The ministry argues that those provisions focus on harm to an individual while giving insufficient weight to an operation intended to intimidate a wider community or disrupt democratic institutions.

Cheng also identified conduct that existing laws struggle to cover. Taiwan has no specific provision penalizing people for reporting Taiwanese to China's online portal for alleged Taiwan independence activities. Politically motivated following also falls outside the Stalking and Harassment Prevention Act when it lacks the connection to sex or gender required by that law.

Advertisement

Nine methods, from violence to family pressure

Liang described nine forms of Chinese transnational repression: physical attacks, criminal prosecution, psychological coercion, digital oppression, border controls, collective punishment, economic sanctions, interference with democratic institutions and abuse of institutional mechanisms.

Physical attacks include assaults, paint attacks and staged traffic accidents. Psychological pressure includes surveillance and publicly labeling people as committed supporters of Taiwan independence. Digital tactics can include circulating satellite images of homes and spreading false information.

Relatives, friends and business partners can also become targets. Liang described threats against those around a victim, restrictions on business dealings, frozen bank accounts and limits on entering or leaving a territory.

The council's list of targets includes politicians, military and defense personnel, judicial officials, academics and people active in civil society. Its figures of 131 people and 149 incidents show that the number of recorded incidents exceeds the number of people targeted; Liang did not provide a breakdown of repeat targeting.

Liang said Beijing's use of prosecutions and wanted notices against alleged Taiwan independence supporters was also an attempt to assert jurisdiction over Taiwan. That concern places the proposed criminal offense within a broader dispute over China's efforts to impose its authority beyond the territory it controls.

Comedian Huang Yi-hao's case has become a prominent example in the legislative discussion. Prosecutors indicted five men in October over an alleged car attack carried out on instructions from a Chinese individual. Prosecutors said the aim was to prevent Huang from performing because his material satirized the Chinese Communist Party.

Huang attended the earlier legislative hearing and urged the main political parties to cooperate on reform. Cheng later cited his case when explaining the proposed offense to Fan.

Liang also pointed to suspected violence linked to the Chinese Communist Party involving Japanese political commentator Akio Yaita. In that case, a suspect surnamed Liao was intercepted and arrested at an airport before leaving Taiwan through a coordination mechanism involving several agencies.

Advertisement

A paint attack on a boxing gym operated by Hong Kong democracy supporter Tong Wai-hung illustrated another investigative problem. Liang said an ordinary response might treat it simply as property damage. The Mainland Affairs Council alerted police to the owner's political background and the possibility of repression, prompting further investigation.

The issue also reaches Taiwanese abroad. In early October, the FBI arrested a woman in California on suspicion of acting as a Chinese agent and spying on President Lai Ching-te's son, Lai Ting-yu, and his family. She pleaded not guilty to federal espionage charges later that month and was awaiting trial.

Following the money and reaching the organizers

The National Security Bureau says existing legal tools make it difficult to hold overseas directors and actors at state level accountable. Its proposed response combines criminal law changes with investigations into financial channels, Chinese instigators overseas and criminal networks operating inside Taiwan.

Intelligence agencies and prosecutors have established a mechanism to coordinate cases, exchange warnings and respond quickly to suspected illegal activity. The government has also brought prosecutors, immigration officials, investigators and police into a rapid contact platform.

The proposed confiscation mechanism would let authorities take assets connected to repression offenses. That would add a financial consequence alongside criminal punishment and make the funding behind an operation part of the enforcement response.

Internet provisions would address the spread of repression beyond the original act. Officials have described online dissemination as part of the problem, alongside direct surveillance and violence. Details of the powers and procedures remain part of the draft under review.

The local accomplice provisions are especially relevant to operations that use intermediaries. A person directing an attack from overseas may rely on someone in Taiwan to identify a target, gather personal details, arrange payment or recruit an attacker. Investigators would need evidence connecting those actions to the foreign source.

Victim support is being developed separately

Liang said the Cabinet established a platform in July to coordinate assistance across agencies. The Mainland Affairs Council also plans a dedicated reporting hotline so people can flag suspected repression.

Advertisement

Fan asked whether the amendment would include victim protection. Cheng replied that other ministries were considering separate legislation and that the Justice Ministry would help with the legal work.

The government is therefore pursuing two related tracks: stronger criminal provisions and arrangements for people facing threats. The National Security Bureau has included protecting potential victims, gathering intelligence and issuing early warnings among its priorities.

The boxing gym case shows why coordination matters for someone reporting an incident. Police may initially see damaged property, while another agency holds information about earlier political threats. Bringing those details together can help investigators decide what to examine and whom to protect.

Cheng also said police training would be strengthened to improve awareness of cases involving people active on issues such as relations with China and human rights.

A reform effort stretching across several hearings

The Anti-Infiltration Act took effect in 2020 and covers five categories of offenses. Officials now want to expand its reach beyond its existing focus on specified political and public order activities.

The legislative debate has developed through several stages:

  • January 12, 2026: The legislature's Internal Administration Committee examined amendments, including a proposal to extend restrictions on foreign directed election assistance to prospective candidates.
  • July 2026: According to Liang, the Cabinet established a platform to coordinate responses across agencies.
  • November 5, 2026: The Judiciary and Organic Laws and Statutes Committee heard government reports on crossborder repression and legal prevention measures.
  • November 18, 2026: Cheng said the Justice Ministry's draft creating a transnational repression offense had reached the Cabinet for review.

The January debate exposed a drafting challenge that remains relevant: defining prohibited conduct precisely enough for criminal prosecution. The Interior Ministry sought a clear definition of prospective candidates, while the Justice Ministry warned that an intention to run for office could change and lacked an objective test before formal registration.

During that hearing, lawmakers cited figures showing that more than 80 percent of Anti-Infiltration Act cases from 2023 through 2025 ended without indictment. Liang described difficulties proving instructions from China when intermediaries, companies or organizations had ambiguous connections to its party, government or military.

Advertisement

International cooperation and the next legislative steps

Fan linked the domestic proposal to international efforts against repression. She said Liberal International, which held its first general assembly in Taiwan that year, adopted three resolutions supporting Taiwan and condemning transnational repression.

According to Fan, the resolutions stated that China has no lawful jurisdiction or sovereignty over Taiwan and called on democracies to refuse cooperation with repression and strengthen international coordination.

The National Security Bureau identified the United States, United Kingdom, Canada and Germany as countries that have adopted or are pursuing legislation addressing foreign interference and transnational repression. It described approaches covering conduct such as online harassment, stalking, financial harm and threats of violence carried out under foreign government direction.

Taiwan's immediate next step is Cabinet review of the Justice Ministry draft, followed by its planned submission to the legislature. Liang also said a National Security Act amendment had already been submitted and was awaiting examination in the Internal Administration Committee.

The challenge for lawmakers is concrete: write provisions that cover the foreign organizers, funding and local assistance behind intimidation, while giving investigators and courts clear elements to prove. For people facing threats, the accompanying reporting and protection arrangements will shape how quickly authorities can respond.

Key Points

  • The Justice Ministry has sent the Cabinet a draft creating a transnational repression offense under the Anti-Infiltration Act.
  • The proposal addresses local accomplices, increased penalties, confiscation and internet dissemination.
  • The Mainland Affairs Council recorded 131 Taiwanese targeted in 149 incidents since 2005.
  • Officials identified gaps involving political surveillance, online reporting to Chinese authorities and accountability for overseas organizers.
  • A reporting hotline is planned, while other ministries are considering separate victim protection legislation.
  • Cabinet review is underway. No legislative vote date or proposed sentencing scale has been announced.
Share This Article

You May also Like