A chip boom alongside a four-year wage standstill
South Korea's semiconductor manufacturers increased productivity by an average of 8.5% a year from 2021 to 2025, while productivity across other industries fell 0.4% annually, according to a Korea Development Institute analysis released on November 16, 2026. The divide helps explain why strong gains in one industry have brought little improvement in purchasing power for workers across the economy.
Contents
- A chip boom alongside a four-year wage standstill
- Why a higher paycheck can still buy less
- How wage growth lost momentum after 2021
- What KDI measured inside businesses
- How much of the wage gap productivity explains
- Even leading firms outside chips barely advanced
- Financial strain nearly doubles outside semiconductors
- Petrochemicals, construction and video face different pressures
- Restructuring support must reach workers too
- Key Points
Average real wages, which measure pay after accounting for inflation, increased just 0.2% over those four years. In the first half of 2026, they rose 0.3% from a year earlier. Regular pay, excluding bonuses and other special payments, fell 0.3% after inflation.
KDI researchers Song Ho-gyu and Jeong Su-hwan, both in the institute's economic outlook division, examined the problem in a report whose title translates as Background and Policy Implications of Real Wage Stagnation Through Firm Productivity Analysis. Their findings connect weak wage growth with declining productivity, financial strain among businesses and pressures specific to industries such as petrochemicals and construction.
The consequences extend beyond a disappointing national average. Workers employed in industries where average real wages declined accounted for 53.2% of all workers in the first half of 2026. Among regular employees, the share was 44.4%. Song said the proportions were higher than in 2024 and 2025.
Why a higher paycheck can still buy less
Real wages describe what earnings can buy. A worker can receive a larger paycheck in won and still lose purchasing power if prices rise faster. KDI found that inflation and slower increases in regular pay had constrained wage growth at different stages since 2021.
Inflation was a major restraint in 2021 and 2022. From 2022 onward, slower growth in nominal regular pay, meaning pay before adjusting for prices, also limited improvement. The result was a prolonged squeeze rather than a single weak year.
Bonuses helped lift the average in the first half of 2026, while the purchasing power of more predictable earnings declined. Regular pay includes basic salary and allowances paid routinely, making it especially relevant to households planning recurring expenses.
Nominal wages rose 21.6% in electronic component manufacturing, which includes semiconductors, and 12.3% in services related to finance and insurance. Those large increases in a few sectors sat alongside falling real wages across industries employing more than half of workers. National averages also change when the mix of people employed changes, including their industries and pay levels.
How wage growth lost momentum after 2021
South Korea's earlier wage record was much stronger. Between 2011 and 2021, average real wages increased 24.0%, equivalent to average annual growth of 2.2%. From 2021 to 2025, the cumulative gain was only 0.2%, or about 0.05% a year.
Hourly earnings also slowed, showing that the weakness extended beyond changes in the number of hours people worked. Average annual growth in real hourly wages fell from 3.1% in 2011–2021 to 1.2% in 2021–2025. KDI noted that working hours had also declined at a similar pace during the earlier period.
The main stages of the slowdown were:
- 2011–2021: Average real wages rose 24.0%, with annual growth averaging 2.2%.
- 2021–2025: Average real wages rose only 0.2% in total.
- 2024: Average real wages increased 0.5%.
- 2025: Average real wages increased 0.9%.
- First half of 2026: Average real wages rose 0.3% from a year earlier, while regular real pay fell 0.3%.
- November 16, 2026: KDI released its analysis linking the prolonged weakness to productivity differences.
Regular employees experienced a sharp narrowing of the industries delivering stronger pay growth. Their real regular pay had risen by an average of 2.3% annually in 2011–2021. Among industries employing at least 100,000 regular workers, only electronic component manufacturing exceeded that benchmark during 2021–2025, recording 2.5% annual growth.
What KDI measured inside businesses
KDI estimated productivity using financial statements from companies subject to external audits. Its measure, revenue productivity, examines how much value a business generates from the labor and capital it uses. Capital includes resources such as machinery and equipment.
A company creates value by turning its inputs into goods or services worth more than the materials and services it purchases. Greater productivity can give a business more room to pay workers, invest and meet financing costs.
Revenue productivity reflects technology and efficiency, together with selling prices, demand and competition. A manufacturer may improve its equipment yet face weaker revenue productivity if oversupply drives down the price of its products. This helps explain why KDI's recommendations address both production methods and the markets companies serve.
Semiconductors pulled ahead over the longer period as well. From 2011 to 2025, their productivity grew by an average of 11.3% annually, compared with 1.0% across other industries. During 2021–2025, chip productivity still rose 8.5% a year despite the industry's downturn in 2023, while the rest of the economy's measured business sector moved backward.
How much of the wage gap productivity explains
KDI's analysis of 44 industries found that an industry with cumulative productivity growth 10 percentage points higher had, on average, cumulative growth in regular employees' real fixed pay about 0.9 percentage points higher during 2021–2025.
Applying that relationship, productivity differences accounted for roughly one-third of the approximately 9 percentage point gap in real regular pay growth between electronic component manufacturing and other industries. That is about 3 percentage points of the gap.
The institute also examined how companies responded when productivity increased unexpectedly. A 10% rise above expected productivity was associated with labor costs per worker being 1.1% higher after one year. The estimated effect declined to 0.3% after four years. Labor costs measure the company's spending on workers, while real regular pay measures a particular part of employees' earnings after inflation.
Pay structures help explain why the relationship varies by industry. In automobile and trailer manufacturing, a large share of the rewards accompanying stronger productivity came through bonuses, while growth in real regular pay was more limited.
The researchers also identified differences between the company accounts used to estimate productivity and wage statistics that include smaller workplaces. Changes in the workforce, including aging and increased employment of women, may also have contributed to the remaining gap. Jeong acknowledged that employment changes could raise both measured productivity and average wages when workers with lower productivity leave.
Even leading firms outside chips barely advanced
KDI found weakness across the productivity rankings of businesses outside semiconductor manufacturing. The productivity index for the top third rose only 0.8% cumulatively from 2021 to 2025. The middle third declined 2.5%, while the bottom third fell 9.7%.
The 0.8% gain for the leading group covered the entire four-year period. Semiconductor manufacturing's 8.5% increase was an annual average. The figures show how little progress even the stronger businesses outside chips achieved over the period.
KDI consequently argued that existing leading companies alone would struggle to deliver broad productivity gains. It called for established industries to develop more distinctive products that command greater value, alongside changes that allow productive new businesses to enter markets and expand.
Jeong Su-hwan, a KDI researcher, also pointed to the semiconductor industry's small share of total employment. Discussing whether chip wage gains would spread, he said in translation:
Whether semiconductor wage increases will directly connect to other industries is uncertain.
Chip wages could lift the national average in 2027, Jeong said. For workers elsewhere, the practical issue is whether their own employers and industries can generate enough additional value to support sustained increases.
Financial strain nearly doubles outside semiconductors
Businesses struggling to meet interest payments became more prominent outside the chip industry. KDI defines a marginal firm as a company whose operating profit has fallen short of its interest costs for three consecutive years.
These firms accounted for 6.2% of value added outside semiconductor manufacturing in 2025, up from 3.2% in 2021. That was an increase of 3 percentage points, bringing the share close to twice its earlier level. In semiconductor manufacturing, the corresponding share rose from 0.1% to 0.3%.
The percentages measure the share of value added associated with financially strained companies. They describe how much economic activity lies in that group, rather than the proportion of businesses counted individually.
Among the bottom third of industries ranked by productivity growth, the share associated with marginal firms increased by an average of 7.0 percentage points. KDI attributed 6.6 percentage points of that increase to productivity factors. Its analysis assigned a larger role to weak productivity than to higher interest rates.
For policy, the finding matters because extending a loan or subsidizing interest addresses financing pressure, while a company's difficulty generating enough operating profit can persist. KDI called for support that also changes how businesses operate and where workers and investment are deployed.
Petrochemicals, construction and video face different pressures
Petrochemicals illustrates the problems facing established industries. Song said domestic producers expanded capacity during stronger market conditions, after which greater Chinese self-sufficiency reduced export demand. The resulting excess capacity increased pressure on profitability.
Construction faced weaker demand linked to population changes alongside rising building costs. Broadcasting and video businesses faced the spread of streaming services, often called OTT services because they deliver content over internet connections rather than traditional broadcasting networks.
KDI identified all three as industries with weak productivity and wage performance. Their difficulties call for responses suited to their circumstances: reorganizing production where capacity exceeds demand, responding to shifts in construction needs and costs, or adapting to different ways audiences consume video.
Shipbuilding provided an example of improving an existing industry. Song pointed to producers differentiating their work through vessels such as carriers for liquefied natural gas, or LNG. Moving toward more valuable products and controlling costs helped position the industry to benefit when demand recovered.
Restructuring support must reach workers too
KDI recommended business restructuring, career transitions and retraining rather than relying on uniform loan extensions or interest subsidies. For companies, restructuring can mean concentrating resources on products or activities where they are more competitive and reducing costs through a better division of production.
Song Ho-gyu, a KDI researcher, described the approach in translation:
There is a way to secure competitiveness by concentrating on the areas each does well, achieving economies of scale and lowering production costs.
Economies of scale mean that producing more efficiently at greater volume can lower the cost of each unit. Song also acknowledged that reorganizing businesses can involve reducing staff, creating an immediate need to help workers move to new jobs.
Training, assistance with career changes and income support during transitions therefore form connected parts of the proposal. Workers need support through the period between a job disappearing and securing another position, as well as the skills required by employers that are expanding.
KDI's recommendations set a direction for policy. No implementation timetable or funding amount was announced with the analysis. Its central warning was that continued productivity weakness outside semiconductors could leave wage gains concentrated in a few industries and keep pay differences across industries in place.
Key Points
- Semiconductor productivity grew 8.5% annually in 2021–2025, while productivity outside chips fell 0.4% a year.
- Average real wages rose only 0.2% across 2021–2025, following a 24.0% increase in 2011–2021.
- In the first half of 2026, real wages rose 0.3%, but regular real pay declined 0.3%.
- Industries with falling real wages employed 53.2% of all workers.
- Productivity differences explained about one-third of the 9 percentage point gap in real regular pay growth between electronic components and other industries.
- Financially strained firms accounted for 6.2% of value added outside semiconductors in 2025, compared with 3.2% in 2021.
- KDI urged business restructuring, better products, support for growing firms, and retraining and income assistance for workers changing jobs.






