Births fall below 100,000 as population growth slows
Azerbaijan recorded 95,875 births in 2025, down from 166,210 in 2015, according to the State Statistics Committee. That is a loss of 70,335 births a year, or about 42%, in a decade. Figures for 2026 point to another decline, bringing pressure on the government to address the costs of raising children and prepare schools and public finances for smaller generations.
Contents
- Births fall below 100,000 as population growth slows
- Two measures explain the decline
- A smaller generation is reaching family age
- Fewer registered marriages, with little change in marriage age
- Housing, migration and changing expectations
- Childcare access and small monthly payments
- What support should the state provide?
- Smaller classes could put teaching jobs under pressure
- A regional decline, from different starting points
- Key Points
Births in the first half of 2026 fell 10.6% from the same period in 2025. Between January and August, 56,404 children were born, while the birth rate fell from 9.3 to 8.2 births per 1,000 people. If that pace continued through December, the annual total would be around 85,000.
The 2025 total was the lowest since 1950, when the committee recorded 90,280 births. An annual total near 85,000 would fall below that earlier benchmark. The projection depends on births during the remaining months of 2026.
Azerbaijan's population still reached 10,273,000 on July 1, 2026. Births exceeded deaths by 16,213 between January and August, so the country continued to record natural population growth. The immediate change is slower growth, alongside a shrinking number of young children.
Bahar Muradova, chair of the State Committee for Family, Women and Children Affairs, considers the situation not yet critical. Economist Natig Jafarli warns that Azerbaijan is heading towards a demographic catastrophe. Their differing assessments frame a practical debate: how much of the decline reflects changing family preferences, and how much reflects obstacles that public policy could reduce?
Two measures explain the decline
The State Statistics Committee's demographic statistics collection brings together births, fertility, population reproduction, marriages, migration and population by age and region. Its publication Demographic Indicators of Azerbaijan 2026 covers these connected changes, allowing the fall in births to be considered alongside the changing size of the population starting families.
The birth rate and fertility rate describe different things. The birth rate counts babies born in a year for every 1,000 residents. The total fertility rate estimates how many children a woman would have over her lifetime if the pattern of births at each age stayed the same.
Azerbaijan's fertility rate fell from 2.1 children per woman in 2015 to 1.4 in 2025. It has been below the replacement level since 2016. Replacement level, usually around 2.1, is the average needed for one generation to replace itself over time, allowing for children who do not survive to adulthood.
The committee calculated that the female population's replacement rate in 2025 was about 61% of the level needed to replace generations. This measure focuses on the replacement of mothers by a future generation of mothers. A population can continue growing for a time below replacement fertility because its existing age structure still produces more births than deaths.
Place also matters. Women in urban areas have an average of 1.2 children, compared with 1.6 in rural areas. Both figures are below replacement level. During the first half of 2026, the national birth rate was 8.0 per 1,000 residents, compared with 10.1 in the Mountainous Shirvan economic region and 9.9 in Lankaran-Astara.
A smaller generation is reaching family age
Azerbaijan's decline has two connected causes: fewer people are reaching the ages when families commonly form, and those who do are having fewer children. Births fell sharply during the war and economic crisis of the 1990s, from 190,353 in 1991 to 110,356 in 2001. Those smaller generations are now adults.
The population aged 20 to 29 has declined by around 27% over the past decade. Even if every family had maintained the same number of children, a smaller population of potential parents would have reduced the number of births.
Larger groups are approaching adulthood. Azerbaijan has 817,000 teenagers aged 15 to 19, compared with 672,000 people aged 20 to 24. The younger group is 145,000 larger, or roughly 22%. That could ease the pressure caused by the smaller generations born earlier, although future birth totals will also depend on how many children these young people have.
The main milestones show how changes across several decades are now meeting:
- 1991 to 2001: annual births fell from 190,353 to 110,356.
- 2015: Azerbaijan recorded 166,210 births and fertility of 2.1 children per woman.
- 2016 onward: fertility remained below replacement level.
- 2025: births fell to 95,875 and fertility reached 1.4.
- January to August 2026: 56,404 births put the country on a pace of about 85,000 for the year.
Fewer registered marriages, with little change in marriage age
Registered marriages fell from 86,852 in 2013 to 48,546 in 2025, a reduction of about 44%. They declined a further 22.5% in the first half of 2026 compared with the same period a year earlier.
Women's average age at first marriage changed much less, rising from 23.6 to 24.1 over the decade. Among women entering a registered first marriage, the average shift was about six months. The larger numerical change was in how many marriages were registered.
Family formation also takes place outside registered marriage. Figures attributed to the State Statistics Committee put births to women without a registered marriage at 11,626 in 2025, down from 13,228 in 2024, 15,622 in 2023 and 18,814 in 2022. The decline between 2022 and 2025 was about 38%, extending the fall in births beyond registered marriages.
Of the 2025 total, 8,499 births were to women aged 15 to 29, while 1,258 were recorded in Baku. The published urban and rural figures, 4,999 and 7,027 respectively, add up to 12,026, which is 400 above the stated national total. No explanation was given for that discrepancy. These categories concern the mother's marriage registration, while the children themselves are counted in birth statistics.
Housing, migration and changing expectations
Muradova attributes falling births mainly to changing attitudes and compares Azerbaijan's experience with that of developed countries. Eurostat recorded an average fertility rate of 1.34 children per woman across the European Union in 2024, close to Azerbaijan's 1.4 in 2025.
Household incomes in Azerbaijan are substantially lower, however, giving the comparison an economic dimension. Families may reach similar decisions about having children while facing different levels of pay, housing access and public support.
Jafarli points to expensive property, limited access to housing and emigration among young people of reproductive age. For a couple considering a child, securing somewhere to live and meeting regular household bills can influence whether to start a family or have another baby.
Official migration figures recorded 2,000 departures for permanent residence abroad in 2025 and 3,400 arrivals, a net gain of 1,400. These statistics measure registered permanent relocations. People living or working abroad without registering a permanent move can fall outside that count, leaving the wider scale of migration among young adults uncertain.
Childcare access and small monthly payments
A Cabinet of Ministers report puts access to preschool education at 38.7% among children aged one to five. The government's target for 2026 is 50%, a gap of 11.3 percentage points. Reaching it would mean extending access from fewer than four children in ten to one in two.
Childcare affects the time as well as the money available to a family. When a nursery or kindergarten place is unavailable, a parent may need to reduce paid work, leave a job or rely on relatives. Expanding access would address a recurring difficulty throughout a child's early years.
Mothers who are not employed receive a payment of 600 manats after a birth. Working parents on parental leave receive 44 manats a month until the child reaches 18 months, followed by 28 manats a month until the child turns three.
Women raising five or more children receive 140 manats per child, with 2,939 women receiving that benefit. Azerbaijan has no universal monthly child benefit, meaning there is no regular payment available for every child regardless of the family's eligibility for other programmes.
What support should the state provide?
Sociologist Uzeyir Shafiyev says universal child payments were abolished in 2006 after targeted social assistance was introduced. Targeted assistance directs support towards households meeting specified conditions, rather than paying a benefit for every child.
Shafiyev proposes restoring child benefits and lowering the threshold for large family status from five children to three. Akif Nasirli, head of the Centre for Liberal Economists, also regards child benefits as an investment in improving the demographic situation over time.
MP Gunay Agamali takes a different position, arguing that families should not expect the state to provide something in return for having children. Expert Ilgar Huseynli rejects the argument that benefits would encourage laziness.
MP Razi Nurullayev argues for a broader programme rather than a debate limited to cash payments. His proposals include preferential mortgages and better access to kindergartens. Those measures address different costs: buying a home, paying everyday bills and arranging care while parents work. The government has not announced plans to restore universal child benefits.
Smaller classes could put teaching jobs under pressure
The number of children under five fell from 851,000 in 2015 to 539,000 at the beginning of 2026. That is 312,000 fewer young children, a reduction of nearly 37%. These smaller groups will move through nurseries and schools in the coming years.
First Deputy Speaker Ali Ahmadov said schools had 1.5 million to 1.6 million pupils in 2015, but enrolment could fall to one million within a few years if the trend continued. He warned that around 50,000 teaching jobs could be at risk.
Azerbaijan had 146,381 teachers at the beginning of the 2024–2025 school year. The 50,000 jobs cited in Ahmadov's warning amount to roughly one third of that workforce. His figures describe a conditional outlook, with the scale of staffing changes depending on future enrolment and education decisions.
The timing stretches beyond schools. Smaller generations eventually enter employment, while older generations draw pensions. Jafarli warns that pension funding could become one of the state budget's main spending items. The connection is straightforward: fewer people entering work can mean fewer contributors supporting a growing retired population.
A regional decline, from different starting points
Azerbaijan is part of a wider fall in births across several Turkic states, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. The figures for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan show that the direction can be similar even when fertility levels remain different.
Kazakhstan recorded 48,541 births in the first two months of 2026, compared with 51,439 during the same period of 2025, a decline of 5.6%. Uzbekistan recorded 123,966, down from 135,912, a fall of 8.8%.
Projections accompanying those figures suggested that, if the trends continued, fertility could fall from 2.57 to 2.50 children per woman in Kazakhstan and from 3.21 to 3.00 in Uzbekistan. Those projected levels would still be above the replacement benchmark of about 2.1, while Azerbaijan's 2025 rate of 1.4 was below it.
Azerbaijan therefore faces several pressures at once: a smaller generation of potential parents, fewer registered marriages, lower fertility and limited childcare access. Larger teenage generations may bring more potential parents in the coming years. Whether births recover will also depend on the family sizes they choose and the housing, income and care arrangements available to them.
Key Points
- Azerbaijan recorded 95,875 births in 2025, about 42% fewer than in 2015.
- The January to August 2026 pace would produce roughly 85,000 births over a full year, below the 1950 total of 90,280.
- Fertility fell to 1.4 children per woman in 2025, below the replacement level of about 2.1.
- Smaller generations reaching adulthood and fewer children per woman are both reducing births.
- Preschool access stands at 38.7% for children aged one to five, against a government target of 50% in 2026.
- Proposals include child benefits, preferential mortgages and more kindergarten places. No plan to restore universal child benefits has been announced.
- Smaller generations are already approaching school age, with longer term pressure expected on employment and pension funding.






