SIGAR Closes After 17 Years, Leaving a $148.2 Billion Record of Afghanistan Reconstruction

A watchdog closes, but its findings remain

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction closed on January 31, 2026, ending 17 years of independent scrutiny of American spending in Afghanistan. Its final accounting covered $148.2 billion that Congress had approved for reconstruction through June 30, 2025, and identified between $26 billion and $29.2 billion in questionable spending, failed programs, wasted investments and corruption.

SIGAR ceased operating more than four years after the Afghan republic collapsed in August 2021. Its investigations traced how a vast effort to build security forces, public institutions and an economy capable of supporting them ended with the Taliban back in power and billions of dollars in equipment and infrastructure outside the control of the government they were intended to support.

In its announcement, SIGAR thanked the people who had followed and supported its work. The agency said:

SIGAR will officially close as an agency on January 31, 2026. We thank everyone who followed, used, and supported SIGAR's independent oversight over the past 17 years.

The Modern War Institute at West Point subsequently confirmed the closure. In a February 18, 2026, page by Charles Faint, the institute said SIGAR's website was no longer active and announced that it had preserved the final report and interviews from the agency's oral history project.

The closure ends a dedicated investigative office, while its records remain available for studying decisions made by American agencies, contractors and Afghan officials. Those records also describe the practical consequences for Afghanistan: security forces dependent on foreign support, projects that could not sustain themselves and aid programs exposed to interference after the Taliban takeover.

What Congress asked SIGAR to do

Congress established SIGAR in 2008 to independently examine how American reconstruction money was being used. Its mandate covered audits, inspections and investigations of programs, operations and contracts financed by United States appropriations, meaning money approved by Congress for particular purposes.

The Modern War Institute describes that authority in The SIGAR Project. SIGAR reported to Congress, issued quarterly assessments and recommended changes intended to improve results and prevent waste, fraud and abuse.

SIGAR was an oversight body rather than a donor. It did not run Afghanistan's reconstruction budget or distribute all the assistance it examined. Its task was to check whether money reached its intended purpose, whether projects worked and whether officials or contractors broke the law.

Afghan economic analyst Mirshakar Yaqubi said the agency's findings influenced donor decisions by documenting corruption and assessing whether projects delivered useful results. That influence explains why an office without its own aid program could still affect which activities received support.

The agency conducted hundreds of audits and investigations. Its investigations led to 171 criminal convictions, giving its work a legal consequence beyond the publication of critical reports.

How much money was involved?

Congress approved approximately $144.7 billion for Afghan reconstruction between 2002 and the middle of 2021, before the republic fell. By June 30, 2025, the cumulative amount approved had reached about $148.2 billion.

Those figures describe different periods. They also refer to money approved for reconstruction, a more precise measure than treating the entire amount as money already spent. The final accounting put the scale of the effort above the Marshall Plan, the American program to rebuild Europe after World War II, when adjusted for inflation.

SIGAR's sector figures included more than $77.9 billion for security, approximately $36.3 billion for governance and development, $4.7 billion for humanitarian assistance and $9.4 billion for efforts against narcotics. The security allocation alone represented more than half of the $148.2 billion total.

The watchdog also recorded $14.2 billion spent by American departments and agencies on evacuating and resettling Afghans in the United States after the republic collapsed. That spending served a different purpose from constructing institutions or infrastructure inside Afghanistan.

Where SIGAR found waste and failed programs

SIGAR's final review placed between $26 billion and $29.2 billion in categories that included questionable costs, unsuccessful programs, wasted assets and corruption. Compared with the $148.2 billion approved through June 2025, that range amounts to approximately 18% to 20%.

The categories cover different kinds of failure. A questionable cost is an expense auditors challenge because it lacks adequate support or conflicts with applicable requirements. A failed program can involve money spent on an approved activity that never achieves its intended result. Corruption involves the misuse of authority or resources for private benefit.

The final accounting included $7.3 billion spent on unsuccessful efforts against narcotics and $4.7 billion on stabilization programs that did not meet their goals. Stabilization programs sought to strengthen government authority and reduce support for insurgents in places affected by conflict.

SIGAR also identified more than $2.4 billion in wasted buildings, facilities and major equipment, alongside $232 million in improper or uncertain salary payments. These findings connected national spending decisions with practical failures: facilities without a sustainable purpose, equipment that could not be properly used and payroll records that could not reliably account for personnel.

The report described a wider mismatch between American ambitions and Afghan conditions. A mission that began with a limited counterterrorism purpose grew into an attempt to build institutions and capacities on a scale Afghanistan had not previously maintained.

Why the security forces proved so fragile

The United States devoted close to $90 billion over two decades to building and equipping Afghan security forces, according to SIGAR's broader security assessment. Yet those forces remained dependent on American support and collapsed as that support was withdrawn.

SIGAR's reviews identified weaknesses in both military capacity and the information used to measure it. Personnel records included so-called ghost soldiers and police: people listed on payrolls whose actual service could not be reliably verified.

On August 14, 2021, one day before Kabul fell, approximately 113,000 police were registered in the salary system, with 93.5% recorded as present. SIGAR considered that attendance figure highly unrealistic because the Taliban had already taken control of almost the entire country.

The watchdog's assessments also linked the collapse to political decisions. The Afghan government did not believe the United States would fully leave, was excluded from negotiations between Washington and the Taliban, and struggled with concentrated presidential power, corruption and weak public legitimacy.

SIGAR concluded that withdrawal decisions by two American presidents shaped the choices that followed in Washington, Kabul and the Taliban leadership. By August 2021, Afghanistan still lacked security forces capable of operating independently and sustaining themselves.

Aircraft orders showed what oversight could change

A SIGAR review of plans for Afghanistan's air force offers a concrete example of how an audit could alter spending before a project was completed. In January 2019, the agency examined a plan to acquire 159 UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.

The estimated cost of purchasing and maintaining the helicopters, and training pilots and technical personnel, ranged from $5.8 billion to approximately $7 billion. SIGAR warned that the Afghan air force would be unable to operate all 159 aircraft and recommended that the Defense Department reconsider the requirement.

In September 2019, the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee proposed cutting acquisition funding and asked the defense secretary to halt purchases in fiscal year 2020. The Defense Department subsequently reduced the order from 159 helicopters to 53, a reduction of 106 aircraft, or about two thirds.

The example captures a recurring issue in reconstruction: buying equipment was only the beginning. Aircraft also required trained crews, maintenance personnel, spare parts and continuing financial support.

Defense Department figures cited by SIGAR showed that Afghanistan possessed 162 American supplied aircraft on July 31, 2021, of which 131 were usable. Within weeks, the government those aircraft served had fallen. Approximately $7.1 billion in military equipment and weapons remained in Afghanistan after the withdrawal, while an estimated $24 billion in civilian and military infrastructure investment was lost following the government's collapse.

Aid continued after the Taliban takeover

The fall of the republic changed the purpose and delivery of American assistance. SIGAR recorded more than $3.83 billion in United States humanitarian and development assistance after 2021, with roughly $120 million disbursed through the United Nations and World Bank during the first three months of 2025.

Another figure in the final review concerned physical cash shipments. Between late 2021 and the middle of 2025, the United Nations transported approximately $3.8 billion in cash to Afghanistan to support donor projects, pay staff and help keep financial activity functioning.

The American assistance figure tracks a donor's support, while the United Nations figure tracks cash transported into the country. The two measures overlap in purpose and should be understood as different ways of describing aid operations.

SIGAR found that at least $10.9 million from American assistance administered after the Taliban takeover was used to pay taxes to authorities under Taliban control. It also identified $57.6 million in earlier American assistance that remained in bank accounts after August 2021 and might have become accessible to the Taliban.

The agency's July 2025 work described evidence that Taliban authorities steered funding toward nongovernmental organizations they preferred. Its 2023 High-Risk List had recorded 494 reported instances of Taliban interference with United Nations aid activities during a period of three months.

For aid organizations, those findings concerned everyday operating decisions: who could deliver assistance, which organizations could work and what information authorities demanded about local employees. SIGAR also concluded that aid helped stabilize the economy, which brought an indirect benefit to the authorities governing it.

Accountability extended beyond spending totals

SIGAR's record included investigations into the departure of former President Ashraf Ghani, sanctions connected to procurement and allegations of abuse involving security officials supported by foreign governments.

In its August 2022 investigation of allegations that Ghani left Afghanistan with large amounts of cash, SIGAR said he answered six of its 56 questions through his lawyer. Witnesses interviewed by the agency said he took little luggage onto the helicopter when he departed on August 15, 2021.

The investigation also identified approximately $5 million in cash left at the presidential palace. SIGAR assessed that some or all of it may have belonged to Ghani or the United Arab Emirates government and appeared to have been divided among presidential protection personnel after the helicopters left. Ghani denied allegations that he stole money.

On December 11, 2023, the United States Treasury sanctioned former parliamentary speaker Mir Rahman Rahmani, his son Ajmal Rahmani and 44 associated companies over alleged transnational corruption. SIGAR said information it collected contributed to the action. The Rahmanis denied the corruption allegations.

The final review also described American reliance on powerful local figures accused of serious abuses. It discussed allegations involving former Kandahar governor Gul Agha Sherzai and police commander Abdul Raziq, as well as cases of sexual abuse of children within Afghan security forces. SIGAR's analysis connected tolerance of abusive partners with resentment that helped the insurgency attract support.

What closure means for Afghanistan's record

Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid rejected SIGAR's value, saying it had been created to monitor American spending and that closing it would have no effect on Afghanistan. He also accused the agency of exaggeration and relying on information gathered from a distance.

Economist Sayed Masoud argued that the end of American reconstruction assistance had removed the main reason for maintaining the office. Yaqubi's assessment placed greater weight on its influence over donors and its record of corruption and project performance.

SIGAR's institutional closure is now complete. Its final report and oral history interviews are preserved by the Modern War Institute, while an archived version of its website is held in the University of North Texas Cyber Cemetery.

The main dates show how long the oversight mission continued after the government it examined had disappeared:

• 2008: Congress established SIGAR to oversee American reconstruction spending.
• August 15, 2021: The Taliban took Kabul and the Afghan republic collapsed.
• June 30, 2025: Cumulative congressional reconstruction appropriations reached approximately $148.2 billion.
• December 8, 2025: SIGAR issued its final report before closure.
• January 31, 2026: SIGAR ceased operations.
• February 18, 2026: The Modern War Institute published its preservation page.

The surviving record gives legislators, researchers and the public access to findings about how money was authorized, where programs failed and how officials responded. The evidence spans both the republic's collapse and the aid arrangements that followed it, preserving an account of decisions whose effects continue to shape Afghanistan.

Key Points

• SIGAR closed on January 31, 2026, after 17 years of independent oversight.
• Congress approved approximately $148.2 billion for Afghan reconstruction through June 30, 2025.
• SIGAR identified between $26 billion and $29.2 billion in questionable spending, failed programs, wasted investments and corruption.
• Its investigations produced 171 criminal convictions and helped change major procurement plans.
• The watchdog documented security forces dependent on foreign support and Taliban interference with aid after 2021.
• The Modern War Institute preserved the final report and oral history interviews; the University of North Texas holds the archived website.