Myanmar Shares Worst Internet Freedom Ranking With China and Iran as Digital Crackdown Deepens

Nine points out of 100, with lives caught in the blackout

Myanmar scored 9 out of 100 for internet freedom in 2026, sharing the lowest position with China and Iran for the third consecutive year. Behind that score are blocked news services, arrests over social media posts and communication shutdowns that leave people in conflict areas struggling to receive warnings about airstrikes or contact relatives.

Freedom House's 2026 country report says the military retained direct and indirect control over all major telecommunications providers, enabling mass censorship and surveillance. Telecommunications infrastructure also continued to suffer damage during the nationwide conflict that followed the military's 2021 overthrow of the elected government.

The assessment covers June 2025 to May 2026, including elections held in December and January. Freedom House describes those elections as sham elections and says the period brought increased blocking of news sites, social media and tools used to bypass censorship, alongside imprisonment for online expression under a new election law.

Thit Nyan, a digital rights analyst with the Myanmar Internet Project, described the danger for civilians who depend on communication networks for essential information:

This is a very concerning situation. This is a life-and-death matter for the public.

People affected by conflict rely on mobile and internet connections for warnings about airstrikes, access to health care and education, and money transfers, he said. When those connections disappear, families lose several essential services at once, often while fighting is already forcing them from their homes.

What the ranking measures

Human Rights Myanmar, which works with Freedom House on the annual review, confirms the shared bottom ranking in its 2026 assessment summary. Myanmar has held that position since 2024. Its score fell from 36 in 2019 to 17 in 2021, the year of the coup, and then to 9 in 2024.

That is a decline of 27 points since 2019. Myanmar remains classified as "Not Free" on a scale where zero represents the least freedom and 100 the most. An unchanged score at this level means that severe restrictions have persisted through another assessment period.

The study uses 21 indicators covering obstacles to access, limits on content and violations of user rights. Those categories examine whether people can connect, what they can read or publish, and whether their online activity exposes them to surveillance, punishment or violence.

Freedom House's Myanmar country profile presents those three categories within a scoring framework that allocates up to 25 points for access, 35 for content and 40 for user rights. The 2026 country report is an abridged edition, offering a shorter account of developments than earlier full reports.

Election restrictions reached beyond polling stations

The Myanmar Internet Project documented the election period in its Digital Coup Quarterly, published in English by EngageMedia. It recorded at least 49 arrests for online expression between November 2025 and January 2026: nine in November, 27 in December and 13 in January.

December's total was three times November's. The project also recorded action under the law protecting elections against disruption, obstruction or destruction involving four people in November, 21 in December and four in January. These monthly figures show how election legislation became a tool for policing speech.

One case involved U Lwin Myint, a parliamentary candidate in Thingangyun Township. He received a sentence of one year of imprisonment with hard labour after using the term "2021 Spring Revolution" in a TikTok campaign activity, according to the quarterly report.

The military also increased phone inspections, checkpoint checks and digital monitoring during the election period. Those practices brought scrutiny into streets and homes as well as online discussions, making a person's stored messages or identity records another possible point of exposure.

A timeline of shrinking access

The deterioration stretches across several years, but the election months and the March 2026 monitoring findings provide a closer view of how restrictions operated.

• 2019: Myanmar's internet freedom score stood at 36 out of 100.
• 2021: The military overthrew the elected government, and the country's score fell to 17.
• 2024: Myanmar's score reached 9, beginning three consecutive years at that level.
• November 2025: Widespread internet disruption began on November 1, with authorities citing a submarine fibre optic cable malfunction. The Myanmar Internet Project recorded nine arrests for online expression during the month.
• December 2025: Elections began, and the project recorded 27 arrests for online expression.
• January 2026: Further election phases took place. By January 13, phone lines in Katha town were completely cut off, according to the project.
• March 2026: Athan recorded telephone and internet cutoffs affecting 133 townships by the end of the month.

The quarterly report says users continued to experience slow connections after services affected by the November disruption were restored. Many commonly used virtual private networks also became inaccessible. In December, the transport and communications ministry said full restoration would take until the end of that month.

Conflict created further interruptions. In Katha, Sagaing Region, the January loss of phone service made it difficult even to contact people displaced by fighting. Elsewhere, the project documented outages during military operations, electricity cuts that disrupted internet service, and interference from signal jammers used during military events.

Blackouts cut into daily survival

Athan's March monitoring report recorded 133 townships with telephone and internet lines cut off by the end of March 2026. A separate Athan monitoring tally identified communication shutdowns in 140 of 358 monitored townships, roughly 39 percent; the date attached to that tally was not specified.

Many affected townships were experiencing fighting between the military and forces opposing it. Athan documented communication cutoffs in villages in Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, during March, alongside continuing airstrikes.

For residents, a blackout can mean being unable to ask whether a road is safe, receive news of an attack or check whether a displaced relative has reached shelter. It can also interrupt transfers of money needed for food, transport or medical treatment.

Military restrictions and physical damage place overlapping pressures on the same networks. Freedom House identifies both deliberate controls and damage to telecommunications infrastructure during the conflict. Restoring a damaged connection therefore addresses only part of the access problem when authorities can also order services blocked or shut down.

Phone registration adds another layer of surveillance

Athan reported increased control through the Central Equipment Identity Register, or CEIR, during March. The system uses a phone's International Mobile Equipment Identity number, usually called its IMEI, to identify the device when it connects to a mobile network.

An IMEI works like an identifying number for the handset. A CEIR database can check that number and allow or block the device's access. When linked with SIM card registration and other personal information, the system can connect a particular phone with its user.

Athan warned that linking those records could enable closer tracking of users, the phones they carry and their locations. It noted that similar systems operate in Thailand and Indonesia for purposes including controlling illicit phone markets, collecting taxes and tracking devices, while warning that Myanmar's use was likely to focus more heavily on surveillance.

The Myanmar Internet Project also documented wider use of the Person Scrutinization and Monitoring System, or PSMS, at checkpoints and during household registration checks. Its quarterly report described inspections in Yangon and elsewhere, alongside renewed searches of pedestrians' phones in Mandalay.

These measures connect digital records with encounters in daily life. A person may face scrutiny when using a network, passing a checkpoint or undergoing a household inspection, rather than only when publishing a post.

Online speech carries the risk of detention

Data for Myanmar counted 1,993 arrests for social media comments between February 2022 and October 2025, according to the Myanmar Internet Project's quarterly report. Facebook has been a major setting for cases involving criticism of the military or support for resistance movements.

Authorities have used Section 505A of the Penal Code, which prohibits incitement, along with counterterrorism and telecommunications laws against online critics. Artists and celebrities have been among those targeted. The election protection law added another route for punishing expression during the voting period.

Accessing blocked platforms presents a related problem. Users rely on virtual private networks, or VPNs, to reach services such as Facebook. A VPN routes an internet connection through another server and can help bypass some restrictions. The military has criminalized VPN use while also disrupting access to the tools themselves.

A Yangon resident who used his real name on social media described knowing people in major cities who had been arrested for expressing support for the resistance. He explained how that fear shaped his own behaviour:

I have to swallow my own feelings and control myself not to share them online.

His account shows how arrests affect more people than those taken into custody. The possibility of punishment can lead users to withhold opinions, avoid discussion and withdraw from public debate.

Satellite access faces controls from several sides

Starlink satellite terminals have provided an alternative where ordinary telephone and internet networks are unavailable. They connect through satellites rather than depending on the same local mobile infrastructure, making them valuable in areas affected by blackouts.

Athan reported that the Arakan Army required private Starlink users in Rakhine State to register and pay 300,000 kyat in advance. The charge combined a registration fee of 200,000 kyat for one year with a tax of 100,000 kyat for three months. The armed group's technical department warned that unregistered terminals, or terminals with unpaid taxes, could be confiscated.

The Myanmar Internet Project documented restrictions by other forces as well. It reported Starlink restrictions and equipment confiscation by the Ta'ang National Liberation Army in Namtu, and the seizure of 15 Starlink devices by local administration and defence forces in Nabar village, Indaw Township, in January.

The military also seized Starlink equipment in Putao during the election period. In Thayetchaung, the Karen National Union issued a March 6 statement describing communication restrictions as necessary for residents' safety amid military cutoffs and continuing airstrikes. Civilians seeking an alternative connection therefore faced decisions by several authorities controlling different territories.

Journalists and users face the same restricted networks

The Independent Press Council Myanmar reported that 27 journalists, including five women, remained detained, according to the quarterly report's January account. Journalists also faced restrictions while trying to cover the military's elections.

Limits on reporting compound limits on access. When journalists cannot work freely, fewer independent accounts reach the public. When news sites and social platforms are blocked, residents have fewer ways to find the reporting that is still produced.

Rights groups also pursued action against military information channels. The quarterly report documented the removal of military propaganda accounts from several platforms following complaints by Justice For Myanmar. That activity unfolded alongside the military's continuing restrictions on independent media and ordinary users.

The global assessment places Myanmar within a wider decline: internet freedom worsened for the 16th consecutive year, with deterioration in 16 of the 38 countries assessed and improvement in eight. The countries covered account for about 70.9 percent of the world's internet users.

Freedom House's recommendations include stronger tools to bypass censorship, digital security training and access to emergency satellite connectivity. It identifies the International Telecommunication Union's World Radiocommunication Conference in 2027 as a venue where governments should advocate for emergency satellite access. For Myanmar's residents, the immediate needs remain practical: a working connection, reliable information and the ability to communicate without fear of detention.

Key Points

• Myanmar scored 9 out of 100 in 2026, sharing the lowest internet freedom ranking with China and Iran.
• Freedom House says military control of major providers enabled censorship, surveillance and localized shutdowns.
• The Myanmar Internet Project recorded at least 49 arrests for online expression from November 2025 through January 2026.
• Athan recorded telephone and internet cutoffs affecting 133 townships by the end of March 2026.
• Phone registration, checkpoint inspections and restrictions on VPNs increased pressure on users.
• Military authorities and several armed groups restricted access to Starlink satellite connections.