Cabinet Backs New Powers to Prevent Robberies and Scams
Japan's Cabinet approved a bill on October 16, 2026, that would let police access smartphones remotely, with a judge's warrant, to identify people facing imminent robberies or scams. The proposal would allow officers to copy information from devices linked to organized crime and use it to warn potential victims or send patrols to their homes.
Contents
- Cabinet Backs New Powers to Prevent Robberies and Scams
- Why Police Want Access to the Devices
- When Would Remote Analysis Be Allowed?
- What Information Would Officers Seek?
- Who Could Examine the Data?
- Notification and Review Would Follow Access
- Privacy Is Central to the Debate
- Fraud Losses Add Pressure for Action
- From Expert Meetings to Parliamentary Debate
- Key Points
The proposed revision to the Police Duties Execution Act targets serious crimes involving several people acting together, particularly Japan's anonymous, loosely organized criminal groups known as tokuryu. Police would need an urgent reason to act and face strict conditions on which devices they could access and what information they could keep.
Cabinet approval puts the measure before parliament, the Diet. The government aims to secure passage during the current extraordinary session. If enacted, the law would take effect within six months of promulgation, the formal publication of a law after its passage. No exact starting date has been announced.
Yasuhiro Hanashi, chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, said at a press conference that the government wanted the new power introduced quickly:
We need to introduce remote analysis as soon as possible to ensure public safety and security,
The proposal would move police access to phone information into a preventive role: officers could seek information about the next intended victim before a planned attack takes place. Its conditions would require a specific crime to have already occurred and a danger of further serious harm.
Why Police Want Access to the Devices
Tokuryu groups use communication apps, including Signal and Telegram, to recruit participants and pass instructions for robberies and fraud. Their membership can shift between crimes, making it difficult for police to work from an arrested participant toward the people issuing orders.
Encrypted communications and messages that disappear automatically can leave investigators with little time to identify the next target. Encryption scrambles message content so that it can be read only with the right digital keys. Accessing a phone would seek information where messages are available to the person using the device.
The National Police Agency's case for the measure rests on difficulties with existing methods. Cooperation from telecommunications providers, interception of communications and examination of seized phones have left investigators struggling to identify organizers and future targets quickly enough.
One possible use would begin with the phone of an arrested participant. Investigators could use information from that device to identify a suspected organizer's phone, seek judicial permission to access it remotely, and search for details of an approaching crime. Officers on the ground could then act to protect the intended victim.
When Would Remote Analysis Be Allowed?
The bill would place remote analysis within the Police Duties Execution Act, which sets out powers officers may use to protect life, physical safety and property and to prevent crime. The proposed authority is framed around stopping harm from further offenses.
A specific crime, such as a fraudulent phone call, would first need to have occurred. Police would then need grounds to fear an expansion of harm or further crimes of the same kind. The measure targets serious, repeated organized crimes committed by several people acting in conspiracy.
Urgency is another condition. Police could use remote analysis when obtaining information quickly through other methods would be extremely difficult and the information was needed to prevent harm. The proposal therefore ties access to both the seriousness of the threat and the difficulty of gathering protective information in time.
The device itself would also have to meet a test. There must be reasonable grounds to believe it was used for communication among perpetrators or for contact with a person facing imminent harm. Police would have to connect the particular device to the criminal activity before seeking access.
What Information Would Officers Seek?
Potential victims' names and addresses are central to the proposal. Police would also seek details such as the planned time of an offense and the number of people expected to carry it out. Those details could turn a warning about a criminal group into a specific protective response.
A name and address could allow officers to contact a household directly. A planned time could help police decide when to position patrols nearby. Information about the number of participants could help determine the response needed to protect people at the location.
The process would involve accessing a device over the internet and copying information within the court's authorization. Specialist officers would examine the data, while investigators in the field would receive the information needed to prevent harm.
The National Police Agency has not publicly explained the technical method it would use. Investigative software capable of entering a device has been discussed as a possible approach, with operational details withheld because criminal groups could use them to develop countermeasures. The panel's proposed framework also excluded continuous police monitoring.
Who Could Examine the Data?
Only specialist officers designated by the National Police Agency commissioner general would be permitted to conduct the analysis. The bill provides for officers appointed specifically to investigate electronic devices for the prevention of harm.
Those officers would operate under a warrant issued by a judge. Information obtained outside the warrant's scope would have to be deleted. The proposal also separates the specialists examining device information from police carrying out protective measures on the ground.
That division matters because the information needed to protect a household may be much narrower than the contents of a phone. A field officer might need a person's address and the expected time of an attack, while other private messages would fall outside the authorized purpose.
The National Public Safety Commission would set detailed rules for handling information. Those rules would shape the practical work of examining copied data, passing necessary details to other officers and deleting information that police were not authorized to retain.
Notification and Review Would Follow Access
People whose devices were subjected to remote analysis would be notified afterward. The bill specifies that notices would include the suspected imminent crime, the date the court issued its warrant and the date police carried out the analysis.
Public safety commissions would review every use of the power to check whether procedures were followed. Judicial permission would therefore come before access, while commission review and notification would provide scrutiny after the operation.
The National Public Safety Commission would also determine the detailed notification procedures. At the earlier panel stage, the proposed approach was to inform affected people afterward to the maximum extent possible.
These safeguards address different stages of the same operation. A warrant controls the initial authorization; restrictions on specialist officers control who handles the information; deletion requirements govern what remains in police hands; and later notices provide affected users with a record of the action.
Privacy Is Central to the Debate
Japan's Constitution protects the secrecy of communications, and the expert panel acknowledged that remote access would touch both that protection and personal privacy. It called for proper procedures alongside its recommendation that the method be introduced promptly.
A smartphone can contain private conversations alongside information about a crime. The requirement to delete material outside the warrant's scope would become especially important when those types of information appear together during an examination.
The proposal's practical effect would depend on how officers apply its limits: which devices qualify, how closely collected information follows the warrant, and how much detail reaches police working in the field. The promised commission reviews would examine whether procedures were followed in each case.
Toshihiro Kawaide, a University of Tokyo professor who chaired the expert panel, linked successful crime prevention to public confidence when the panel completed its proposal on September 24:
We want police to achieve steady results in preventing damage while gaining public trust,
His statement captures the two demands facing the proposed system. Police want information early enough to protect someone, while people whose communications are accessed would depend on enforceable limits and later scrutiny to protect their privacy.
Fraud Losses Add Pressure for Action
Japan recorded about 325.7 billion yen in losses in 2025 across special fraud and social media investment and romance scams, a record total. These crimes can involve callers posing as trusted people or institutions, false investment opportunities, or relationships used to persuade victims to transfer money.
Special fraud losses through August 2026 were more than 30% above the same period a year earlier. That comparison covers special fraud, while the 2025 total of 325.7 billion yen also includes social media investment and romance scams.
Robberies linked to these loosely organized groups have also included killings. Police are seeking a way to identify the people at risk before another group member arrives at a home or another fraudulent payment is made.
The proposed power focuses on the information gap between an offense already detected and a further offense being prepared. For a potential victim, the intended benefit would be concrete: a warning from police, patrols near the home or another protective action before harm occurs.
From Expert Meetings to Parliamentary Debate
The National Police Agency's expert panel began meeting on August 10 and held five meetings before completing its recommendations on September 24. Its work focused on the difficulty of examining confidential communications through existing investigative methods and the need for legal safeguards.
The main steps are:
- August 10, 2026: The expert panel began discussions on remote analysis.
- September 24, 2026: The panel completed its recommendation for introducing the method with judicial approval and privacy protections.
- October 16, 2026: The Cabinet approved the bill to revise the Police Duties Execution Act.
- Current extraordinary Diet session: The government aims to secure parliamentary passage.
- Within six months of promulgation: The law would take effect if enacted.
Parliament will now consider a proposal that combines an urgent protective purpose with access to highly private information. The legal thresholds, deletion duties and review procedures would determine how the power is used in individual operations.
For police, the central aim is to turn information inside a criminal group's device into an opportunity to stop the next offense. For affected users, the warrant, limits on data handling and subsequent notice would define the protections attached to that access.
Key Points
- Japan's Cabinet approved the remote access bill on October 16, 2026; parliamentary passage is still required.
- Police would need a judge's warrant, an urgent threat of serious harm and major difficulty obtaining protective information by other means.
- Eligible devices would need a reasonable connection to communications among perpetrators or with people facing imminent harm.
- Designated specialists would examine the data, and information outside the warrant's scope would have to be deleted.
- Affected users would receive notice afterward, and public safety commissions would review every case.
- If enacted, the law would take effect within six months of promulgation.






