Myanmar Migrants Keep Money Outside Military Banking Channels as Remittance Controls Tighten

A financial lifeline built on trust

A 2024 International Organization for Migration survey found that 93 percent of Myanmar migrants sending money home from Thailand used informal channels, including 60 percent who relied on the hundi broker network. Those figures show the scale of the challenge facing Myanmar's military authorities as they demand that overseas workers transfer at least a quarter of their earnings through official channels.

For families receiving the money, the choice is about exchange rates, access and trust. For migrants who fled the February 2021 coup, it can also be a refusal to put foreign currency into a banking system controlled by a government they oppose.

Aung, 31, previously worked at a state bank in Myanmar's Bago region. He now sends his mother and sister between 3,000 and 5,000 baht, approximately US$90 to US$150, each month through an agent in his home village. Explaining his choice, he said:

I only use the agent in my home village. The exchange rate is better and the military does not get the money.

He described the relationship in personal terms:

My agent is like my brother, I trust him 100 per cent.

His experience captures why cheaper digital transfers alone may not draw migrants into banks. Formal services have become more competitive, yet identity requirements, fears of conscription and distrust of Myanmar's authorities continue to shape how people send money. The distinction is between helping relatives receive income and helping the state obtain foreign currency. Hundi allows those objectives to remain separate, although it leaves customers dependent on brokers whose reliability can vary.

How hundi moves value without moving cash

Hundi is a system of transfers arranged through agents who settle obligations with one another. In the Thailand to Myanmar corridor, it can connect migrant wages directly with payments for traded goods, without the same cash physically crossing the border.

Agents collect baht from migrants in places such as Mae Sot and Mae Sai. Those funds pay Thai exporters for goods purchased by Myanmar importers. The importers then provide the corresponding amount in kyat to agents inside Myanmar, who pay the migrants' families.

The recipient receives local currency, the exporter receives baht and the agents balance their accounts. Myanmar's banks and central bank reserves need not receive the foreign currency involved. This explains why a transfer can support a household and finance imports while bypassing the state's preferred banking channels.

Fees typically range from 2 to 2.5 percent. The network also serves migrants in Malaysia through shops in Kuala Lumpur's Pudu district and other parts of the Klang Valley. A migrant named Ju said transfers usually arrived within a day. That speed is one attraction, though it is an individual account rather than a guarantee for every transaction.

The exchange rate can outweigh the fee

The amount a family receives depends on both the transfer charge and the rate used to convert foreign currency into kyat. Reports describe hundi rates as potentially twice as favourable as Myanmar's official rate of about 2,100 kyat per US dollar.

A worker in Thailand gave a more specific comparison: a market rate of 130 kyat per baht against 63 kyat through a government channel. At those rates, a 5,000 baht transfer would produce 650,000 kyat at the market rate but only 315,000 kyat at the lower rate. The difference is 335,000 kyat before fees, slightly more than half the market value.

Other reported rates show that the formal market is not uniform. Authorized banks were said to have offered 3,600 kyat per dollar from December, compared with a market rate around 4,300 and the central bank's official rate of 2,100. At 3,600 rather than 4,300, the recipient would get about 16 percent less kyat before charges. Those dollar rates and the worker's baht comparison should not be treated as observations from the same date.

Digital wallet fees have fallen close to hundi's roughly 2.5 percent, while bank charges previously reached about 10 percent. Some bank and financial technology exchange rates also approach market rates. Thai banks have partnered with Myanmar platforms including KBZPay and AYA Pay. Even so, a competitive advertised price is of little use to someone who cannot open an account or whose relatives cannot easily withdraw the money.

Official access depends on migration status

The International Organization for Migration's Thailand Labour Migration Profile estimates that 4.2 million Myanmar migrants were living in Thailand in regular and irregular situations combined. That includes 1.8 million without regular status, approximately 43 percent of the total.

A separate, later reported IOM count puts the number of Myanmar nationals in Thailand at as many as 4.6 million as of September. The figures refer to different reference periods and should not be treated as interchangeable. The broader estimate of 5.2 million migrants of all non Thai nationalities is another population again.

Opening a Thai bank account requires a passport and other documents issued or notarised by Myanmar's embassy. Formal transfer services can also require work permits and visas. These requirements exclude many people who entered Thailand unofficially, including those fleeing conflict or military conscription.

IOM describes three official routes: recruitment under bilateral labour agreements, seasonal work using border passes, and registration windows for migrants already in Thailand. The latter can provide a Thai Pink Card and work permit, but Myanmar workers also need a Certificate of Identity. The seasonal route restricts where workers can travel.

Documentation capacity remains a constraint. Reports say up to 2 million workers need Myanmar Embassy approval and that only five Certificate of Identity centres were operating in Thailand in early 2026. Official recruitment has been reported to take 60 to 120 working days. IOM separately found an average of six months for Myanmar recruits in 2022. Both accounts point to a lengthy process rather than an immediate route into formal banking.

Low wages and debt reduce what families receive

IOM's profile reports that 33 percent of surveyed Myanmar migrant workers earned below Thailand's legal minimum wage. It also found that 34 percent were in debt, with an average debt of US$800. These pressures affect how much workers can send home and how much they can afford to lose in fees or currency conversion.

Recruitment and registration costs add another burden. Myanmar workers reported median costs of US$890 for registration inside Thailand in 2023, against an official registration cost of about US$75. The reported amount was almost 12 times the official figure. Costs for recruitment from Myanmar were US$1,150 in 2023, while irregular migration from Myanmar cost US$604 in a 2021 assessment. These are different processes and years, not directly comparable prices for the same service.

Seventy percent of migrant workers surveyed by IOM borrowed to pay recruitment fees and related costs. Thailand's Royal Ordinance concerning the Management of Migrant Workers (2017) prohibits Thai recruitment agencies from charging workers service fees, although costs incurred in the country of origin can still fall on workers. Thailand reduced migrant visa fees to 500 baht, approximately US$15, in November 2023.

IOM says 42 percent of migrant workers send remittances. That measures participation among workers, whereas the 93 percent informal transfer figure measures the channel used by Myanmar remitters surveyed in Thailand. The two percentages answer different questions and do not contradict one another.

Remittance controls reach passports and travel

Myanmar's authorities require overseas workers to send at least 25 percent of their earnings home through designated official channels. Reports differ on the rule's starting date: one account places its introduction in September 2023, while another describes rules introduced in 2024. IOM confirms the requirement but does not resolve that date difference.

The controls extend beyond the transfer itself. IOM says workers who fail to comply risk losing regular status in Thailand or being barred from future regular labour migration. Other reported penalties include passport confiscation, travel restrictions and refusal to renew passports or Overseas Worker Identification Cards.

Workers returning to Myanmar on leave are reportedly required to show evidence of official remittances and payment of income tax before being allowed to depart again. A separate 2 percent tax on overseas income began on October 1, 2023, with tax receipts required for passport renewal or new identity certificates.

The reported sequence shows how payment requirements have become connected to documentation and movement:

• February 2021: The military takeover accelerated displacement and departures from Myanmar.
• September 2023: One account dates the mandatory 25 percent official remittance rule to this month.
• October 1, 2023: A 2 percent income tax on overseas workers began.
• 2024: Another account dates remittance rules to this year; IOM documents the requirement and possible migration penalties.
• February 2024: Military conscription became another driver of departures.
• Early 2026: Only five Certificate of Identity issuing centres were reported to be operating in Thailand.

Further enforcement reportedly included instructions to Yangon employment agencies in August to use the Family Remittance Management System. More than 100 licensed agencies were said to have been fined and suspended for failing to provide records. No firm date for a new enforcement deadline or review has been announced in these accounts.

The state wants a larger share of foreign currency

Labour Minister Maung Myint, reassigned to the ministry on October 3, made the government's financial objective explicit. Reports place his subsequent comments on October 4 or two days after his appointment, so the precise statement date differs between accounts.

In a statement on his TikTok account, Maung Myint described workers who did not remit through the required system as providing no return to the state:

To obtain hard currency for Myanmar, the state government has urged them to remit 25 percent of their salaries. However, while some remit, others do not. So for the state, we are just sending them off. In reality, there is no benefit. It is a loss of benefit.

Reported Finance Ministry figures put official remittances at US$5.6 billion in 2025, approximately 38 percent of foreign inflows. Another account describes that amount as nearly 7 percent of gross domestic product and twice the 2019 figure. The ministry data were not public, which limits independent examination of how the total was compiled.

For comparison, total remittances in 2015 were estimated at US$8 billion, equivalent to 13 percent of GDP, but only US$1 billion to US$2 billion was officially recorded. That means formal records captured roughly 12.5 to 25 percent of the estimated total that year. The US$8 billion historical estimate includes informal transfers and cannot be directly compared with the US$5.6 billion official figure as a measure of growth or decline.

Informal flows are estimated at three to five times official flows, but that ratio is not established as applying to the 2025 total. Multiplying it by US$5.6 billion would therefore create an unsupported estimate. The present value of all remittances, and their current share of GDP, remain uncertain.

The need for household support is substantial. World Bank figures put inflation near 25 percent in June, while reported estimates of the kyat's loss against the dollar since the coup range from about 75 to 80 percent. Foreign direct investment reportedly barely exceeded US$1 billion in the same recent annual period, far below the reported official remittance total.

Trust does not remove the risk of exploitation

Some hundi customers have been cheated. Users sometimes test an unfamiliar agent with a small payment before committing more money. That precaution reflects the limits of a system whose reliability rests heavily on personal relationships rather than ordinary banking safeguards.

Pana Janviroj, executive director of the Institute for Strategic Policy, warned of exploitation and said both governments had security interests in monitoring transfers. Describing those concerns, he said:

a lot of grey money goes into this system

Such concerns do not establish that ordinary family remittances are illicit. They do explain why authorities want greater visibility into networks that can mix household transfers with commercial settlement. Pana also suggested employer contributions to welfare funds for legal migrant employees to help meet Thailand's healthcare, education and other service costs.

For some exiles, greater visibility is itself a danger. Mark, a migrant using an anglicised nickname, said registration could expose him and his family to retaliation or conscription. Explaining why he rejected official channels, he said:

I don't want to give the government any money to buy more guns and bombs to use on us.

Proposals address documents as well as banking

Proposals for bringing more transfers into formal channels include paying officially recruited workers into bank accounts, speeding up identity documents for Pink Card holders and offering rates close to the market rate for mandatory remittances. Another proposal would reward compliance during document renewal rather than deny renewals.

A proposed pilot for direct settlement in baht and kyat would begin around Mae Sot and Myawaddy. Myanmar approved the baht for international payments in 2023. The proposal could connect formal payments more closely to border trade, but no launch date or confirmed implementation decision is given.

A five year labour agreement signed on August 6 and 7 allows undocumented workers to register and expiring permits to be renewed. Its practical reach depends on embassy approvals and identity document capacity. Lower fees may attract workers who already have documents, while those without them need a workable route to legal access. Migrants who fear the authorities face a separate problem that a better exchange rate cannot by itself solve.

Key Points

• A 2024 survey found 93 percent of Myanmar remitters in Thailand used informal channels; 60 percent used hundi.
• Hundi agents connect migrant payments with trade settlement, allowing families to receive kyat without foreign currency entering Myanmar's banks.
• Myanmar requires at least 25 percent of overseas earnings to be remitted through official channels and separately taxes foreign income at 2 percent.
• IOM estimates 1.8 million Myanmar migrants in Thailand lack regular status, restricting access to formal financial services.
• Reported official remittances reached US$5.6 billion in 2025, but the current total including informal transfers is uncertain.
• Competitive rates, faster documentation and safer access are central to proposals for formal transfers; no settlement pilot launch date is confirmed.