Taiwan Targets 1,400 Anti-Ship Missiles as Coastal Defense Expansion Nears Key Milestones

A Dense Missile Shield Takes Shape

Taiwan expects to complete production of 1,000 Hsiung Feng II and III anti-ship missiles by December 2026, a milestone that defense officials say will help create the world's densest network of coastal maritime strike weapons. Combined with 400 Harpoon missiles purchased from the United States, the buildup is intended to make approaching Taiwan by sea far more dangerous for an attacking force.

The production drive is part of the Sea Air Combat Power Improvement Plan, a special budget initiative intended to accelerate asymmetric warfare capabilities. In simple terms, that means using weapons that can threaten a much larger opponent without trying to match its fleet or aircraft one for one. Defense officials familiar with production schedules expect the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology to finish the domestic missile program ahead of schedule.

The December target comes with a delivery complication. The buildup is described as producing an inventory of more than 1,400 missiles by the end of 2026, but the American purchase covers 400 Harpoons whose deliveries are scheduled to continue through 2028. The two stated purchase and production figures total 1,400; the number of Harpoons expected to be operational by December 2026 has not been specified.

Taiwan's geography explains the density claim. The island is roughly 245 miles long and 90 miles wide at its widest point. Defense officials describe the concentration of dedicated anti-ship weapons per square mile as unmatched anywhere else, with overlapping coverage reaching into the Taiwan Strait and the Philippine Sea.

The plan combines missile manufacturing, mobile launchers, improved guidance electronics and a new command structure. Its central purpose is to threaten the ships needed to carry and sustain an invasion force, making the sea crossing itself a major obstacle.

Domestic Production Drives the Expansion

The National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology is the backbone of Taiwan's domestic missile effort, drawing on two decades of development. Under current schedules, it manufactures approximately 131 Hsiung Feng II missiles and extended range versions annually, alongside roughly 70 Hsiung Feng III missiles and their extended range versions.

Those annual rates amount to about 201 missiles across the two families. The production lines have operated under the special budget framework since 2020, supporting the push toward the stated total of 1,000 domestically manufactured weapons.

The Hsiung Feng II is a subsonic cruise missile, meaning it travels below the speed of sound. Designed for coastal defense, it flies at low altitude to reduce the chance of radar detection while carrying a substantial warhead. Flying close to the surface gives a defending ship less opportunity to detect and respond to an approaching missile.

The Hsiung Feng III takes a different approach. Taiwan's principal supersonic anti-ship weapon can exceed Mach 2, or twice the speed of sound. Its speed shortens the time available for a ship to detect the missile, track its movement and attempt an interception.

Extended range versions of both weapons move the engagement area farther from Taiwan's coast. Chinese naval commanders would have to account for missile threats when positioning amphibious forces beyond the immediate shoreline and well beyond visual range. The objective is to make it harder to find a safe place to assemble ships before an assault.

Harpoon Deliveries Add Another Layer

Taiwan has begun receiving equipment from an American Harpoon Coastal Defense Systems package finalized in 2020 and valued at approximately $2.37 billion. The contract includes 100 launcher systems and 400 RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II missiles, together with mobile launch vehicles and radar trucks.

The first batch of 100 missiles, accompanied by launch vehicles and radar trucks, arrived in late 2024. That batch represents one quarter of the 400 missiles purchased. Full delivery is scheduled for 2028.

The Harpoon Block II supplies a proven subsonic capability that complements the faster Hsiung Feng III. It approaches close to the sea surface, hugging the wave tops to reduce radar exposure, and can approach targets from different angles.

Military planners call the combination a "high-low mix." Slower missiles approaching at very low altitude and faster supersonic weapons present different problems for a defending warship. Ships must divide attention, sensors and defensive missiles among threats with different flight profiles, including threats at higher altitude and those close to the water.

Coordinating those approaches can compress the time available for a naval defense system to deal with each incoming weapon in sequence. Taiwan's aim is to make a single defensive method less effective against the entire attack, while forcing crews to make several urgent decisions at once.

Mobile launch vehicles and radar trucks also allow batteries to disperse across Taiwan's rugged terrain. Units can move among firing positions surveyed in advance, scatter before a conflict and relocate after launching. That mobility is intended to make them harder to locate and destroy in an opening strike or a retaliatory attack.

Making an Invasion Costly at Sea

Taiwan's buildup is a central part of the "porcupine" approach to defense: making an attack too costly for a stronger opponent. The concept accepts that Taiwan cannot build a fleet large enough to challenge the People's Liberation Army Navy in open combat or maintain air superiority against mainland China's numerical advantages.

Taiwan instead invests in relatively inexpensive weapons capable of inflicting severe damage. Like the animal whose defensive quills give the strategy its name, the objective is to make an attacker face unacceptable costs. Officials have described the planned missile concentration as a "deadly red line" for approaching Chinese naval task forces.

Amphibious transport ships, escorts and support craft are central targets. Moving hundreds of thousands of troops across the Taiwan Strait would require a large and vulnerable maritime logistics chain. China would need secure sea approaches to transport the ground forces required to occupy Taiwan and keep those forces supplied.

Taiwan's planners intend to use saturation attacks, launching several missiles from different directions at approximately the same time. A warship carries a limited number of defensive missiles and can deal with only so many threats at once. Repeated attacks from dispersed batteries could consume those defensive stocks, leaving later missiles a better chance of reaching their targets.

The intended advantage therefore comes from the relationship between numbers, mobility and timing. Missiles spread across the island must be able to survive, locate approaching ships and coordinate their attacks for the inventory to deliver its planned effect.

A New Command Is Planned for July

Taiwan plans to establish a littoral combatant command in July 2026. Littoral operations take place in coastal waters and the nearby land areas from which forces can influence events at sea. The new organization will bring existing Hai Feng brigades and new units equipped with Harpoons into a single operational system.

The reorganization is intended to place all coastal defense anti-ship missile units under unified command for the first time. It addresses coordination problems that have complicated planning for attacks involving multiple launch sites and missile types.

A common command system would manage domestic and American supplied weapons together, coordinating launches against approaching flotillas. The aim is to organize attacks from several directions and in several layers, rather than have individual batteries fight as isolated units.

Taiwan's planning also reflects an operational problem visible in allied exercises: communications may be disrupted during combat. American Marine Corps and Army units have practiced dispersed operations with limited direction from higher headquarters. Taiwan's planned arrangement similarly prepares for individual batteries to act autonomously while contributing to a wider defensive plan.

That requires both common coordination and the ability to continue operating when orders or targeting information become harder to exchange. The July command change is intended to connect the growing arsenal to that operational requirement.

American Exercises Test Mobile Missile Operations

American forces are practicing comparable methods across the First Island Chain, where Taiwan's buildup forms part of a wider regional move toward dispersed coastal defense. In February 2026, the U.S. 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment conducted combat readiness evaluations in Hawaii that included moving mobile anti-ship launchers through island environments.

Lieutenant Colonel Joshua Anderson, a future operations planning officer with the regiment and the evaluation exercise director, described how the 3rd Littoral Combat Team moved, received supplies and conducted firing missions:

By far the most impressive aspect of 3rd LCT's performance was their insertion of a naval surface fires task element through contested battlespace into the Pacific Missile Range Facility on Kauai, receiving a near-simultaneous resupply of NSM via littoral surface connector, executing multiple fire missions against threat groups, and then basically disappearing into the operating environment.

The drills involved the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System, known as NMESIS. It uses unmanned launchers to fire Naval Strike Missiles with a reach of 115 nautical miles. The exercises tested getting missile units into contested areas, supplying them and keeping them operating, the same broad challenges Taiwan's coastal forces would face during conflict.

The U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii also demonstrated deploying High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS, from maritime vessels. The activity tested the ability to bring precision firepower into position from the sea.

Taiwan has already acquired HIMARS, which adds another layer of weapons capable of striking from a distance against approaching naval forces. The U.S. Army has also fielded Typhon missile systems capable of launching anti-ship weapons over long distances and has tested them in exercises with Australian forces.

Japan and the Philippines Extend Regional Coverage

Japan deployed upgraded Type-12 surface-to-ship missiles to Camp Kengun on Kyushu in March 2026. Their range is roughly 620 miles, compared with about 62 miles for the earlier version, a tenfold increase using those figures.

The longer reach covers portions of China's coastline and approaches to Taiwan from the north. The deployment fits a wider regional pattern in which mobile missiles based on islands can threaten ships across surrounding waters.

Luke Collin, a former U.S. Navy officer and a principal at the Asia Group advisory firm in Washington, D.C., described the deployment as stabilizing and consistent with Japan's constitutional framework:

Japan has interpreted its constitution as permitting the maintenance of Self-Defense Forces for national defense, and this capability is part and parcel of that.

Mark Davidson, a former director of the U.S. Global Counterterrorism Communications Center and a professor at Temple University's Japan Campus, called Japan's deployment a "symbolically important step" in increasing defense capabilities alongside Washington and Manila.

The Philippine Marine Corps has also introduced BrahMos missile systems, adding coastal missile coverage along the southern approaches. Security analysts describe these deployments as a synchronized series of capability upgrades intended to support joint defense of the First Island Chain.

The regional comparison is practical: Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines and American forces are all developing ways to distribute weapons rather than concentrate every maritime strike capability aboard large ships. Their forces are testing or deploying systems that can move, threaten naval traffic and complicate an opponent's planning.

Chinese Electronic Warfare Shapes Taiwan's Upgrades

China's electronic warfare capabilities present a direct challenge to Taiwan's missile plans. A missile must find and track a ship through an environment in which radar signals, guidance systems and communications may be disrupted deliberately.

In January 2026, Chinese state media broadcast footage of the Type 055 destroyer Yanan operating near Taiwan. The vessel, weighing 11,000 tons, reportedly fired electronic jamming missiles and activated powerful radars during an encounter with unidentified aircraft.

The footage showed the destroyer switching its radars to high power as the aircraft picture expanded, then firing weapons described as electronic jamming missiles. Such countermeasures seek to create electromagnetic confusion rather than destroy an approaching target directly.

Active and passive electronic countermeasures can confuse a missile's seeker, the equipment it uses to locate a target, or disrupt data links that carry guidance information. The Yanan encounter illustrated the kind of electronic environment Taiwan's missiles would have to operate through.

Taiwan's planners intend to shift toward upgrades to existing stocks after completing mass production this year. Officials estimate a requirement for 232 upgraded systems with improved chipsets and guidance electronics. The planned changes are intended to improve accuracy and resistance to electronic interference.

Maintaining a target lock while an opposing ship attempts to confuse the weapon is central to that effort. More missiles increase the number of potential attacks, while better guidance is intended to help those missiles remain effective under heavy jamming.

December Drills Tested Blockade and Disruption

China's "Justice Mission 2025" exercises, conducted around Taiwan in late December 2025, illustrated the broader setting for the missile expansion. The drills combined electronic warfare platforms with conventional strike assets to practice suppressing enemy air defenses and disrupting command networks.

The exercises involved record numbers of aircraft sorties, including J-20 stealth fighters and H-6K bombers carrying supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles. A sortie is a single operational flight by an aircraft.

Chinese state media broadcasts accompanying the exercises stressed comprehensive superiority and integrated blockade and control. The activities tested coordination among forces under conditions resembling the compressed timelines of a real crisis.

Coast guard vessels also participated, blurring the boundary between military aggression and civil maritime administration. For Taiwan, that adds complexity to a threat picture involving naval forces, aircraft, electronic disruption and vessels operating under a law enforcement identity.

Taiwan's response combines improved guidance, dispersed launchers and command changes. The same network intended to threaten an invasion fleet would have to function while China attempted to interfere with its sensors, communications and ability to organize attacks.

The Schedule From Purchase to Final Deliveries

Taiwan's coastal missile buildup spans several years of purchasing, production and organizational change. The main milestones show why the December 2026 manufacturing target and the American delivery schedule need to be considered together:

• 2020: The Harpoon package was finalized. Domestic Hsiung Feng production lines have operated under the special budget framework since this year.
• Late 2024: The first 100 Harpoon missiles arrived with associated launch vehicles and radar trucks.
• Late December 2025: China conducted the Justice Mission 2025 exercises around Taiwan.
• January 2026: Chinese state media broadcast the Yanan footage showing electronic countermeasures near Taiwan.
• February 2026: The U.S. 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment tested mobile missile operations during readiness evaluations in Hawaii.
• March 2026: Japan deployed upgraded Type-12 missiles to Camp Kengun on Kyushu.
• July 2026: Taiwan plans to establish its new littoral combatant command.
• December 2026: Taiwan expects completion of mass production of 1,000 Hsiung Feng II and III missiles.
• 2028: Delivery of all 400 American Harpoon missiles is scheduled to finish.

The next organizational milestone is July's command establishment, followed by the domestic production deadline in December. Together with mobile American launch systems and planned electronics upgrades, those steps are intended to turn a large missile inventory into a coordinated coastal defense network.

The Essentials

• Taiwan expects to complete production of 1,000 Hsiung Feng II and III missiles by December 2026.
• Defense officials describe the planned concentration of coastal anti-ship weapons as the world's densest.
• The approximately $2.37 billion Harpoon package includes 100 launcher systems and 400 missiles, with final deliveries scheduled for 2028.
• A new littoral combatant command is planned for July 2026 to unite existing Hai Feng and Harpoon units.
• Officials estimate a requirement for 232 upgraded systems with improved guidance electronics and resistance to jamming.
• American exercises and missile deployments by Japan and the Philippines reflect a wider regional shift toward dispersed coastal defense.