Thailand Expands Chinese Arms Purchases While Keeping Its US Alliance

Twenty More Armored Vehicles Deepen Beijing Ties

Thailand's latest purchase of 20 Chinese VN-1 armored vehicles, worth 1 billion baht, or about $32 million, adds to a growing Chinese presence in its armed forces while Bangkok maintains a security alliance with Washington dating to 1954. The deal brings the Royal Thai Army's VN-1 fleet to more than 120 vehicles and strengthens a military relationship that now includes submarine construction and exercises on land, at sea and in the air.

The contract was signed on January 12, 2025, at the Beijing headquarters of China North Industries Group Corporation, known as Norinco. Lieutenant General Natthaporn Khwan-yam, chief of the Thai army's ordnance department, attended alongside senior Chinese officials. The purchase was arranged through a government-to-government framework, making it part of the formal defense relationship between the two countries.

The VN-1 is a derivative of China's ZBL-09 infantry fighting vehicle. Such vehicles help infantry, the soldiers who fight on the ground, move and operate with armored protection. Thailand allocated the purchase to its 2025 defense budget to strengthen infantry capabilities near the front line, a priority made more urgent by continuing tensions along its border with Cambodia.

Beijing's expanding role is visible in the figures for earlier deliveries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, or SIPRI, Thailand received military equipment valued at $394 million from China between 2016 and 2022, compared with $207 million from the United States. China's figure was about 1.9 times the American figure, a gap of $187 million.

China became Thailand's leading arms supplier during that period. The shift has prompted defense analysts to question the strategic consequences of a major non-NATO ally of the United States bringing more Chinese equipment into its forces. Bangkok's purchasing decisions, however, sit alongside substantial American sales, training and military exercises.

A Submarine Deal Moves Toward 2028

The S26T diesel-electric submarine remains the largest single defense item Thailand has ordered from Beijing. The initial vessel costs approximately $412 million, or 13.5 billion baht, making it a much larger financial commitment than the latest armored vehicle order.

Royal Thai Navy Admiral Nares Wongtrakul visited China in December 2025 to inspect progress on the submarine. Construction has faced repeated delays since the hull was laid down in Wuhan in 2019. Laying down the hull marks a major stage in building a ship, but completing its machinery and other systems still requires substantial work.

The central obstacle was the engine. Germany blocked the export of MTU396 diesel engines to China, citing European Union arms embargoes imposed after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. That decision disrupted the machinery arrangement for the Thai submarine and left Bangkok deciding whether to accept a Chinese replacement.

Thailand initially resisted the substitute and demanded rigorous testing to establish its reliability. Chinese authorities eventually provided certification following more than 6,000 hours of engine testing, allowing a modified agreement to proceed.

The revised contract extends construction by 40 months and moves delivery to late 2028. It also includes technology transfer and crew training. Those provisions matter because buying a submarine involves preparing people to operate and maintain it, as well as completing the vessel itself.

How the Procurement Story Developed

Thailand's current position took shape through several stages, from the foundation of its American alliance to the growth of Chinese procurement and the resolution of the submarine engine dispute. The purchases are part of a relationship built over years, rather than a single decision to change partners.

• 1954: Thailand joined the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, or SEATO, and signed the Manila Pact, establishing formal security ties with the United States.
• 2003: Washington designated Thailand a major non-NATO ally.
• 2006 and 2014: Military coups strained relations with Washington.
• 2015: Thailand and China began the Falcon Strike air exercise series.
• 2016 to 2022: Chinese military equipment deliveries to Thailand totaled $394 million, compared with $207 million from the United States.
• 2019: The S26T submarine hull was laid down in Wuhan.
• 2024: Falcon Strike included more comprehensive combat elements than in previous years.
• January 12, 2025: Thailand signed the contract for 20 additional VN-1 vehicles.
• December 2025: Admiral Nares Wongtrakul inspected submarine progress in China.
• Late 2028: Delivery is scheduled under the revised submarine agreement.

The submarine's extended schedule shows how a purchase from one country can depend on export decisions made by another. Thailand's chosen Chinese vessel originally required German engines, bringing European restrictions into a transaction between Bangkok and Beijing.

What the Submarine Signals

Greg Raymond, a senior lecturer at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs' Strategic and Defence Studies Center, described Thailand's submarine purchase in a 2024 analysis as an effort at geopolitical signaling. In that interpretation, the vessel carries meaning beyond the tasks it might perform at sea.

Raymond's analysis places the purchase within a strategy that prioritizes autonomy and ambiguity through dominance denial. Put simply, Bangkok seeks room to make its own decisions and resists allowing either Washington or Beijing to dominate its choices. Maintaining relationships with both powers also leaves some uncertainty about how Thailand would respond to competing demands.

The submarine and armored vehicle purchases support a lasting connection with China through equipment, training and technical cooperation. Thailand's continuing American alliance provides another set of relationships and capabilities. Together, they show why a change in the leading arms supplier does not capture the full shape of Bangkok's security policy.

Why the American Alliance Became Strained

Thailand's alliance with the United States grew out of shared Cold War concerns about communist expansion. During the Vietnam War, Bangkok contributed more than 37,000 troops to support American operations and opened U-Tapao Air Base for combat missions across Indochina.

Washington's designation of Thailand as a major non-NATO ally in 2003 reinforced that longstanding partnership. The designation recognizes a close defense relationship with a country outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The military coups of 2006 and 2014, which overthrew democratically elected governments, severely strained the relationship. After the 2014 coup, Washington suspended $3.5 million in military aid and reduced joint exercises. Beijing expanded its support during the resulting gap in cooperation.

The United States gradually restored some cooperation, but the interruptions left a lasting impression on Thai military leaders. They came to see China as a more dependable source of support without political conditions tied to human rights or democratic governance.

Different views of security also complicate the alliance. Washington sees China as a revisionist power challenging the rules-based international order. Bangkok sees no existential threat from Beijing. Thai military leaders focus more closely on internal stability and border security, priorities that do not always match American strategic objectives in the Indo-Pacific.

Price, Conditions and Diplomatic Flexibility

Thai defense officials explain their Chinese purchases primarily in practical terms. Cost is a major attraction as Thailand works within budget constraints while replacing aging military equipment. Chinese hardware typically costs less than American or European alternatives, and the VN-1 provides infantry support capabilities at a fraction of the price of comparable Western systems.

Chinese arms agreements also come without the human rights conditions or requirements to monitor how equipment is used that often accompany American Foreign Military Sales. Thai military leaders value transactions without congressional oversight or pressure over democratic governance.

The contrast became especially appealing after Washington suspended assistance following the 2014 coup while lifting similar restrictions on Egypt. That difference contributed to Thai perceptions that American policy was inconsistent.

Bangkok's approach also reflects its tradition of bamboo diplomacy. The expression describes a policy that combines firm foundations with flexibility, like bamboo bending in the wind. Thailand seeks to adapt to competition among powerful countries while protecting its freedom to choose.

Buying from several suppliers helps Thailand avoid excessive dependence on a single power. That preference for flexibility has served the kingdom through earlier centuries of great power competition in Southeast Asia. In today's defense policy, it allows Bangkok to pursue Chinese equipment while retaining important American connections.

Military Exercises Expand, With Boundaries

Thailand and China have expanded their cooperation beyond equipment sales. Their Falcon Strike air exercises began in 2015 with basic aerial combat maneuvers and developed into more complex operations involving early warning aircraft, bombers and air defense units.

The 2024 exercise included more comprehensive combat elements than previous editions, showing a commitment to greater operational familiarity. Practicing together helps military personnel understand how their counterparts communicate, organize and carry out missions.

The two countries now hold annual exercises across land, maritime and air operations. Their drills remain less sophisticated than Thailand's exercises with the United States, but they have grown beyond symbolic displays of friendship. Recent naval cooperation has covered counterterrorism tactics and warfare against submarines, while land exercises concentrate on counterterrorism operations relevant to Thailand's internal security challenges.

Thailand nevertheless maintains boundaries around these activities. Its American-built F-16 and F-5 fighter jets are excluded from exercises with China under agreements prohibiting their use in those drills. Washington imposed the restriction because of concerns about exposing American technology.

The aircraft rules show how Thailand's two defense relationships affect each other in daily military practice. Bangkok can train with China while keeping certain American systems outside that cooperation, preserving a boundary between the equipment and knowledge shared with each partner.

Cambodia Brings the Balancing Act Closer to Home

Thailand's immediate security concerns include disputes with Cambodia around contested temple sites and frontier areas. Those tensions have helped drive the recent armored vehicle purchases. Bangkok and Phnom Penh have each accused the other of unprovoked aggression.

Thailand has rejected offers of mediation from the United States, China and Malaysia in favor of bilateral negotiations. Its preference is to address the border dispute directly with Cambodia while retaining control over the diplomatic process.

China is Thailand's largest trading partner, giving Bangkok a strong economic reason to maintain close ties with Beijing. At the same time, Thailand hosts Cobra Gold, Southeast Asia's largest multinational military exercise, which it jointly sponsors with the United States. The combination allows Thailand to benefit from both relationships without formally aligning against either country.

That approach also brings difficult choices. Washington has been reluctant to sell Thailand its most advanced systems, including the F-35 fighter, citing security concerns about potential technology transfer to China. Closer Chinese defense ties can therefore affect access to American equipment.

Beijing's growing influence in Cambodia creates unease in Bangkok as well. Rumored Chinese naval access at Ream has raised concerns about China's ability to project military power near Thai borders. Thailand has also rejected Chinese proposals for Mekong River law enforcement patrols to enter Thai territory, showing limits to its accommodation of Beijing.

Washington Still Has a Substantial Role

The United States remains deeply involved in Thailand's defense sector despite China's rise as an arms supplier. State Department figures put Thailand's active Foreign Military Sales cases at more than $3 billion. These are government arrangements for acquiring American defense equipment and related support.

The cases include Stryker infantry carriers, Black Hawk and Lakota helicopters, F-16 upgrade packages and Harpoon missiles. Washington also authorized more than $605 million in direct commercial defense exports to Thailand from fiscal years 2019 through 2021. Those authorizations concern commercial exports, while the active Foreign Military Sales cases describe a different channel of defense business.

American engagement extends to professional military education. In 2022 alone, Thailand sent personnel to 244 courses sponsored by the United States, including attendance at American military service academies. These educational relationships connect future Royal Thai Armed Forces leaders with American counterparts and help the two militaries work together.

The United States also funds maritime security initiatives and capabilities for humanitarian assistance. Those areas give the partnership purposes beyond buying weapons or preparing for combat.

Senior American visits reinforced the relationship in 2022. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken both traveled to Bangkok and pledged help with military modernization and technological cooperation.

The Biden administration then authorized the largest American contingent in a decade for the 2023 Cobra Gold exercise. That decision signaled renewed commitment despite continuing American concerns about Thailand's democratic backsliding.

Thailand's defense policy therefore combines a growing Chinese equipment inventory with extensive American sales, education and exercises. The scheduled submarine delivery in late 2028 will add another major Chinese system, while Bangkok continues to seek autonomy in its dealings with both powers and manage the more immediate pressures along the Cambodian border.

Key Points

• Thailand signed a contract on January 12, 2025, for 20 additional Chinese VN-1 armored vehicles, costing 1 billion baht, or about $32 million, and bringing its fleet to more than 120.
• The S26T submarine costs approximately 13.5 billion baht, or $412 million. A revised agreement following the German engine export blockage schedules delivery for late 2028.
• SIPRI figures put Chinese military equipment deliveries to Thailand at $394 million between 2016 and 2022, compared with $207 million from the United States.
• China and Thailand have expanded military exercises, while American-built F-16 and F-5 fighters remain excluded from drills with China.
• American ties continue through more than $3 billion in active Foreign Military Sales cases, military education, security assistance and Cobra Gold.
• Bangkok seeks flexibility between Washington and Beijing while addressing border tensions with Cambodia and setting limits on Chinese security activity near its territory.